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Versions: 00                                                            
drip Working Group                                       A. Wiethuechter
Internet-Draft                                                   S. Card
Intended status: Standards Track                      AX Enterprize, LLC
Expires: 26 August 2021                                     R. Moskowitz
                                                          HTT Consulting
                                                        22 February 2021


                            DRIP Registries
                 draft-wiethuechter-drip-registries-00

Abstract

   TODO

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 August 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.






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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     2.1.  Required Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     2.2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Provisioning  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Overview of Transactions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  HHIT Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  Manufacturer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.4.  Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.5.  Operator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.6.  Aircraft  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.6.1.  Standard Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.6.2.  Operator Assisted Provisioning  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.6.3.  Initial Provisioning  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   TODO

2.  Terminology

2.1.  Required Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.2.  Definitions

   See [drip-requirements] for common DRIP terms.

   HDA:  Hierarchial HIT Domain Authority.  The 16 bit field identifying
      the HIT Domain Authority under a RAA.

   HID:  Hierarchy ID.  The 32 bit field providing the HIT Hierarchy ID.

   RAA:  Registered Assigning Authority.  The 16 bit field identifying
      the Hierarchical HIT Assigning Authority.




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3.  Provisioning

   Under DRIP UAS RID a special provisioning procedure is required to
   properly generate and distribute the certificates and attestations to
   all parties in the USS/UTM ecosystem using DRIP RID.

   Keypairs are expected to be generated on the device hardware it will
   be used on.  Due to hardware limitations (see Section 4) and
   connectivity it is acceptable under DRIP RID to generate keypairs for
   the Aircraft on Operator devices and later securely inject them into
   the Aircraft (as defined in Section 3.6.2).  The methods to securely
   inject and store keypair information in a "secure element" of the
   Aircraft is out of scope of this document.

3.1.  Overview of Transactions

   In DRIP, each Operator MUST generate a Host Identity of the Operator
   (HIo) and derived Hierarchical HIT of the Operator (HHITo).  These
   are registered with a Private Information Registry along with
   whatever Operator data (inc.  PII) is required by the cognizant CAA
   and the registry.  In response, the Operator will obtain a
   Certificate from the Registry, an Operator (Cro), signed with the
   Host Identity of the Registry private key (HIr(priv)) proving such
   registration.

   An Operator may now add a UA.

   *  An Operator MUST generate a Host Identity of the Aircraft (HIa)
      and derived Hierarchical HIT of the Aircraft (HHITa)

   *  Create a Certificate from the Operator on the Aircraft (Coa)
      signed with the Host Identity of the Operator private key
      (HIo(priv)) to associate the UA with its Operator

   *  Register them with a Private Information Registry along with
      whatever UAS data is required by the cognizant CAA and the
      registry

   *  Obtain a Certificate from the Registry on the Operator and
      Aircraft ("Croa") signed with the HIr(priv) proving such
      registration

   *  And obtain a Certificate from the Registry on the Aircraft (Cra)
      signed with HIr(priv) proving UA registration in that specific
      registry while preserving Operator privacy.

   The operator then MUST provision the UA with HIa, HIa(priv), HHITa
   and Cra.



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   *  UA engaging in Broadcast RID MUST use HIa(priv) to sign Auth
      Messages and MUST periodically broadcast Cra.

   *  UAS engaging in Network RID MUST use HIa(priv) to sign Auth
      Messages.

   *  Observers MUST use HIa from received Cra to verify received
      Broadcast RID Auth messages.

   *  Observers without Internet connectivity MAY use Cra to identify
      the trust class of the UAS based on known registry vetting.

   *  Observers with Internet connectivity MAY use HHITa to perform
      lookups in the Public Information Registry and MAY then query the
      Private Information Registry which MUST enforce AAA policy on
      Operator PII and other sensitive information

3.2.  HHIT Delegation

   Under the FAA [NPRM], it is expecting that IDs for UAS are assigned
   by the UTM and are generally one-time use.  The methods for this
   however are unspecified leaving two options.

   1  The entity generates its own HHIT, discovering and using thr RAA
      and HDA for the target Registry.  The method for discovering a
      Registry's RAA and HDA is out of scope here.  This allows for the
      device to generate an HHIT to send to the Registry to be accepted
      (thus generating the required Host Identity Claim) or denied.

   2  The entity sends to the Registry its HI for it to be hashed and
      result in the HHIT.  The Registry would then either accept
      (returning the HHIT to the device) or deny this pairing.

   In either case the Registry must decide on if the HI/HHIT pairing is
   valid.  This in its simplest form is checking the current Registry
   for a collision on the HHIT.

   Upon accepting a HI/HHIT pair the Registry MUST populate the required
   the DNS serving the HDA with the HIP RR and other relevant RR types
   (such as TXT and CERT).  The Registry MUST also generate the
   appropriate Host Identity Claim for the given operation.

   If the Registry denied the HI/HHIT pair, because there was a HHIT
   collision or any other reason, the Registry MUST signal back to the
   device being provisioned that a new HI needs to be generated.

3.3.  Manufacturer




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               +--------------+      Ca0a0 +-----------------+
               | Manufacturer | <--------> | Manufacturer CA |
               +--------------+ Ama0       +-----------------+
                  ^    |
                  |    |
                  |    |
          Ca0a0   |    |   Ama0
                  |    |
                  |    v
               +----------+
               | Aircraft |
               +----------+

   During the initial configuration and production at the factory the
   Aircraft MUST be configured to have a serial number.  ASTM defines
   this to be an ANSI/CTA-2063A.  Under DRIP a HHIT can be encoded as
   such to be able to convert back and forth between them.  This is out
   of scope for this document.

   Under DRIP the Manufacturer SHOULD be using HHITs and have their own
   keypair and Cxx (Certificate: Manufacturer on Manufacturer).  (Ed.
   Note: some words on aircraft keypair and certs here?).

   Certificate: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft 0 (Ca0a0) is extracted by the
   manufacturer and send to their Certificate Authority (CA) to be
   verified and added.  A resulting certificate (Attestation:
   Manufacturer on Aircraft 0) SHOULD be a DRIP Attestation in the Axy
   Form - however this could be a X.509 certificate binding the serial
   number to the manufacturer.

3.4.  Registry

   TODO

   DRIP UAS RID defines two levels of hierarchy maintained by the
   Registration Assigning Authority (RAA) and HHIT Domain Authority
   (HDA).  The authors anticipate that an RAA is owned and operated by a
   regional CAA (or a delegated party by an CAA in a specific airspace
   region) with HDAs being contracted out.  As such a chain of trust for
   registries is required to ensure trustworthiness is not compromised.
   More information on the registries can be found in [hhit-registries].

   Both the RAA and HDA generate their own keypairs and self-signed
   certificates (Certificate: RAA on RAA and Certificate: HDA on HDA
   respectively).  The HDA sends to the RAA its self-signed certificate
   to be added into the RAA DNS.





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   The RAA confirms the certificate received is valid and that no HHIT
   collisions occur before added a HIP RR to its DNS for the new HDA.
   An Attestation: RAA on HDA is sent as a confirmation that
   provisioning was successful.

   The HDA is now a valid "Registry" and uses its keypair and
   Certificate: HDA on HDA with all provisioning requests from
   downstream.

3.5.  Operator

               +----------+            +---------+
               | Registry | ---------> | HDA DNS |
               +----------+  [HIP RR]  +---------+
                  ^    |
                  |    |
                  |    |
            Coo   |    |   Aro
                  |    |
                  |    v
               +----------+
               | Operator |
               +----------+

   The Operator generates a keypair and HHIT as specified in DRIP UAS
   RID.  A self-signed certificate (Certificate: Operator on Operator)
   is generated and sent to the desired Registry (HDA).  Other relevant
   information and possibly personally identifiable information needed
   may also be required to be sent to the Registry (all over a secure
   channel - the method of which is out of scope for this document).

   The Registry cross checks any personally identifiable information as
   required.  Certificate: Operator on Operator is verified (both using
   the expiration timestamp and signature).  The HHIT is searched in the
   Registries database to confirm that no collision occurs.  A new
   attestation is generated (Attestation: Registry on Operator) and sent
   securely back to the Operator.  Optionally the HHIT/HI pairing can be
   added to the Registries DNS in to form of a HIP Resource Record (RR).
   Other RRs, such as CERT and TXT, may also be used to hold public
   information.

   With the receipt of Attestation: Registry on Operator the
   provisioning of an Operator is complete.

3.6.  Aircraft






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3.6.1.  Standard Provisioning

   Under standard provisioning the Aircraft has its own connectivity to
   the Registry, the method which is out of scope for this document.

   +----------+
   | Registry |
   +----------+
       ^
       |
       |
       |  Cro, CoaN
       |
       |
   +----------+                        +----------+
   | Operator | <--------------------- | Aircraft |
   +----------+          Ca0aN         +----------+

                    Figure 1: Standard Provision: Step 1

   Through mechanisms not specified in this document the Aircraft should
   have methods to instruct the Aircrafts onboard systems to generate a
   keypair and certificate.  This certificate is chained to the factory
   provisioned certificate (Certificate: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft 0).
   This new attestation (Attestation: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft N) is
   securely extracted by the Operator.

   With Attestation: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft N the sub certificate
   (Certificate: Aircraft N on Aircraft N) is used by the Operator to
   generate Attestation: Operator on Aircraft N.  This along with
   Attestation: Registry on Operator is sent to the Registry.

   +----------+
   | Registry |
   +----------+
       |
       |
       |
       |  Token
       |
       v
   +----------+                        +----------+
   | Operator | ---------------------> | Aircraft |
   +----------+        Token           +----------+

                    Figure 2: Standard Provision: Step 2





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   On the Registry, Attestation: Registry on Operator is verified and
   used as confirmation that the Operator is already registered.
   Attestation: Operator on Aircraft N also undergoes a validation check
   and used to generate a token to return to the Operator to continue
   provisioning.

   Upon receipt of this token, the Operator injects it into the Aircraft
   and its used to form a secure connection to the Registry.  The
   Aircraft then sends Attestation: Manufacturer on Aircraft 0 and
   Attestation: Aircraft 0 to Aircraft N.

   +---------+
   | HDA DNS |
   +---------+
       ^
       |
       | HIP RR
       |
       |
       |
   +----------+ <----------------------------+
   | Registry |                              |
   +----------+ ------------------------+    |
       |                                |    |
       |                                |    |  Token,
       |  CroaN                   CraN  |    |  Cma0, Ca0aN
       |                                |    |
       |                                |    |
       v                                v    |
   +----------+                      +----------+
   | Operator |                      | Aircraft |
   +----------+                      +----------+

                    Figure 3: Standard Provision: Step 3

   The Registry uses Attestation: Manufacturer on Aircraft 0 (with an
   external database if supported) to confirm the validity of the
   Aircraft.  Attestation: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft N is correlated with
   Attestation: Operator on Aircraft N and Attestation: Manufacturer on
   Aircraft 0 to see the chain of ownership.  The new HHIT tied to
   Aircraft N is then checked for collisions in the HDA.  With the
   information the Registry generates two certificates: Attestation:
   Registry on Operator on Aircraft N and Attestation: Registry on
   Aircraft N (Offline Form).  A HIP RR (and other RR types as needed)
   are generated and inserted into the HDA.

   Attestation: Registry on Operator on Aircraft N is sent via a secure
   channel back to the Operator to be stored.  Attestation: Registry on



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   Aircraft N (Offline Form) is sent to the Aircraft to be used in
   Broadcast RID.

3.6.2.  Operator Assisted Provisioning

   This provisioning scheme is for when the Aircraft is unable to
   connect to the Registry itself or does not have the hardware required
   to generate keypairs and certificates.

   +----------+
   | Registry |
   +----------+






   +----------+                        +----------+
   | Operator | ---------------------> | Aircraft |
   +----------+       aN, CaNaN        +----------+

               Figure 4: Operator Assisted Provision: Step 1

   To start the Operator generates on behalf of the Aircraft a new
   keypair and Certificate: Aircraft N on Aircraft N.  This keypair and
   certificate are injected into the Aircraft for it to generate
   Attestation: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft N.  After injecting the keypair
   and certificate, the Operator MUST destroy all copies of the keypair.

   +----------+
   | Registry |
   +----------+
       ^
       |
       |
       |  Cro, Cma0, Ca0aN, CoaN
       |
       |
   +----------+                        +----------+
   | Operator | <--------------------- | Aircraft |
   +----------+        Cma0, Ca0aN     +----------+

               Figure 5: Operator Assisted Provision: Step 2

   Attestation: Manufacturer on Aircraft 0 and Attestation: Aircraft 0
   on Aircraft N is extracted by the Operator and the following data
   items are sent to the Registry; Attestation: Registry on Operator,



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   Attestation: Manufacturer on Aircraft 0, Attestation: Aircraft 0 on
   Aircraft N, Attestation: Operator on Aircraft N.

   +----------+            +---------+
   | Registry | ---------> | HDA DNS |
   +----------+   HIP RR   +---------+
       |
       |
       |
       |  CroaN, CraN
       |
       v
   +----------+                        +----------+
   | Operator | ---------------------> | Aircraft |
   +----------+          CraN          +----------+

               Figure 6: Operator Assisted Provision: Step 3

   On the Registry validation checks are done on all attestations as per
   the previous sections.  Once complete then the Registry checks for a
   HHIT collision, adding to the HDA if clear and generates Attestation:
   Registry on Operator on Aircraft N and Attestation: Registry on
   Aircraft N (Offline Form).  Both are sent back to the Operator.

   The Operator securely inject Attestation: Registry on Aircraft N
   (Offline Form) and securely stores Attestation: Registry on Operator
   on Aircraft N.

3.6.3.  Initial Provisioning

   A special form of provisioning is used when the Aircraft is first
   sold to an Operator.  Instead of generating a new keypair, the built
   in keypair and certificate done by the Manufacturer is used to
   provision and register the aircraft to the owner.

   For this either Standard or Operator Assisted methods can be used.

4.  Security Considerations

   TODO

5.  References

5.1.  Normative References

   [F3411-19] "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking",
              February 2020.




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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

5.2.  Informative References

   [drip-requirements]
              Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A. Gurtov,
              "Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP)
              Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-drip-reqs-06, 1 November 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/
              internet-drafts/draft-ietf-drip-reqs-06.txt>.

   [drip-rid] Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,
              "UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-drip-uas-rid-01, 9 September 2020,
              <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-drip-uas-
              rid-01.txt>.

   [hhit-registries]
              Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter,
              "Hierarchical HIT Registries", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hhit-registries-02, 9 March
              2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-
              moskowitz-hip-hhit-registries-02.txt>.

   [NPRM]     "Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification
              of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", December 2019.

Authors' Addresses

   Adam Wiethuechter
   AX Enterprize, LLC
   4947 Commercial Drive
   Yorkville, NY 13495
   United States of America

   Email: adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com


   Stuart Card
   AX Enterprize, LLC
   4947 Commercial Drive



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   Yorkville, NY 13495
   United States of America

   Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com


   Robert Moskowitz
   HTT Consulting
   Oak Park, MI 48237
   United States of America

   Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com







































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