Network Working Group S. Wilkinson
Internet-Draft YFS
Intended status: Informational B. Kaduk
Expires: March 9, 2015 MIT
September 5, 2014
Integrating rxgk with AFS
draft-wilkinson-afs3-rxgk-afs-07
Abstract
This document describes how the new GSSAPI-based rxgk security class
for RX is integrated with the AFS application protocol. It describes
a number of extensions to the basic rxgk protocol, clarifies a number
of implementation issues, and provides values for the application-
specific elements of rxgk.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 9, 2015.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document.
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. The AFS-3 Distributed File System . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. rxgk and AFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Providing Keys for the Callback Channel . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Security Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Authenticator Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Application-Specific Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Key Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Application-Specific GSSNegotiate Behavior for AFS-3 . . 6
5.2. Token Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Token Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Container . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.2. Token Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.3. Token Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Cache Manager Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. Keyed Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.2. Unkeyed Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Combining Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. The AFSCombineTokens Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. Server to Server Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.1. Token Printing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.2. Declaring rxgk Support for a Fileserver . . . . . . . . 13
10.2.1. File Servers With the Cell-Wide Key . . . . . . . . 13
10.2.2. File Servers With Per-Server Keys . . . . . . . . . 13
10.3. Registering Per Server Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11. Securing the Callback Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.1. Lifetime and scope of the callback channel . . . . . . . 17
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
13. AFS-3 Registry Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
14.1. Downgrade attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
14.2. Per Server Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
14.3. Combined Key Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
15.1. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
15.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix B. Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B.1. Since 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B.2. Since 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
B.3. Since 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
B.4. Since 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
B.5. Since 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
B.6. Since 05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
B.7. Since 06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction
rxgk [I-D.wilkinson-afs3-rxgk] is a new GSSAPI-based [RFC2743]
security layer for the RX [RX] remote procedure call system. The
rxgk specification details how it may be used with a generic RX
application, but leaves some aspects of the protocol as application-
specific. This document resolves the application-specific portions
of rxgk for use with the AFS-3 distributed file system, and provides
additional detail specific to integrating rxgk with AFS-3.
1.1. The AFS-3 Distributed File System
AFS-3 is a global distributed network file system. The system is
split into a number of cells, with a cell being the administrative
boundary. Typically an organisation will have one (or more) cells,
but a cell will not span organisations. Each cell contains a number
of fileservers which contain collections of files ("volumes") which
they make available to clients using the AFS-3 protocol. Clients
access these files using a service known as the cache manager.
In order to determine which server a particular file is located upon,
the cache manager looks up the location in the volume location
database (vldb) by contacting the vlserver. Each cell has one or
more vlservers, which are synchronised using an out-of-band
mechanism.
User and group information is stored in the protection database
(prdb), which is made available by the ptserver(s), colocated with
the vlservers. Fileservers check with the prdb before granting
access to files which are subject to access control.
1.2. rxgk and AFS
This document describes the special integration steps needed to use
rxgk with AFS-3 database servers (the PR and VL rx services) and file
servers (the RXAFS, RXAFSCB, and AFSVol rx services), as well as
specifying application-specific portions of the rxgk specification
for use by these services. Other AFS-3 services are not covered by
this document; the generic rxgk document applies to them.
AFS-3 differs from a standard rxgk deployment in that it does not
require GSSAPI negotiation with each server. Instead, a client
performs GSSAPI negotiation just once, with the vlserver, receiving a
token usable with any database server in the cell, as described in
Section 5. Traditional AFS rxkad authentication required that the
cell-wide key be distributed to all servers in the cell, both
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
database servers and file servers, making no distinction between
tokens used for database servers and file servers. rxgk can operate
in a similar fashion, with a cell-wide key shared amongst all
servers, but is not limited to doing so.
For more complex cell topologies, rxgk also supports configurations
where (some) file servers do not have the cell-wide key. Tokens
encrypted in these server-specific keys are returned by an extended
version of the CombineTokens RPC, AFSCombineTokens. AFSCombineTokens
also provides a mechanism for indicating whether a specific server is
rxgk capable, allowing cells to securely migrate to rxgk from other
security mechanisms.
1.3. Providing Keys for the Callback Channel
The AFS-3 protocol provides a mechanism by which a client can obtain
a promise from a fileserver to "call back" when a particular piece of
data is changed, so that the client does not need to check with the
fileserver for the current-ness of the data every time it is used.
At present, this takes the form of a single bit of information about
whether the callback is still valid, with no authentication of the
callback break. It is desired that future work expand the callback
channel to convey more than a single bit of information, and provide
an authenticated (and potentially confidential) channel for updating
callback promises.
This document provides a mechanism to establish a key and token that
can be used to provide a secure callback channel. Though the format
of that token is flexible and not specified in this document, this
document does need to specify a mechanism by which a callback key can
be established between the two parties. This is done by means of the
authenticator's appdata field, binding a callback key to an rx
connection, so that all callbacks generated by that connection will
use the indicated callback key.
1.4. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Security Index
When used within the AFS protocol, rxgk has an RX securityIndex value
of 4.
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
3. Authenticator Data
The appdata opaque within the RXGK_Authenticator structure used in
the rx challenge/response authentication exchange contains the
results of XDR encoding the RXGK_Authenticator_AFSAppData structure.
struct RXGK_Authenticator_AFSAppData {
afsUUID client_uuid;
RXGK_Data cb_tok;
RXGK_Data cb_key;
afs_int32 enctype;
afsUUID target_uuid;
};
client_uuid the UUID of the client.
cb_tok the rxgk token to be used for secure callbacks created by
RPCs over this connection. In some implementations this token
may be empty (zero-length).
cb_key the raw key material (k0) to which cb_tok corresponds, to be
used as the master key for the secure callback connections
created by RPCs over this connection.
enctype the RFC 3961 enctype of the cb_key key material.
target_uuid the UUID of the server being authenticated to (if
applicable). Database servers do not have UUIDs; when
authenticating to database servers, this field should be set to
all zero bits. File server UUIDs may be obtained from the VLDB
in the same call that returns their addresses.
4. Application-Specific Constant
The constant RXGK_MAXDATA takes the value 1048576 for use with AFS-3.
5. Key Negotiation
An AFS cell wishing to support rxgk MUST run an rxgk key negotiation
service, as specified in [I-D.wilkinson-afs3-rxgk], on each of its
vlservers. The service MUST listen on the same port as the vlserver.
The GSS identity afs-rxgk@_afs.<cellname> of nametype
GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE is the acceptor identity for this service.
Where multiple vlservers exist for a single cell, all of these
servers must have access to the key material for this identity, which
MUST be identical across the cell. Clients MAY use the presence of
this identity as an indicator of rxgk support for a particular cell.
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
Clients that wish to support cells using other rx security objects
MAY downgrade if this identity is not available.
5.1. Application-Specific GSSNegotiate Behavior for AFS-3
The input and output opaques of the GSSNegotiate RPC are left as
implementation-defined, as needed to retain information across
subsequent calls during a single GSS negotiation loop.
5.2. Token Applicability
Tokens returned from the GSSNegotiate and CombineTokens calls MUST
only be used with database servers. Tokens for fileservers MUST be
obtained by calling AFSCombineTokens (Section 9) before each server
is contacted.
rxgk tokens are in general only usable with the particular rx service
that produced them. For the AFS-3 protocol, the database server
services are grouped together to accept a common type of token, and
the file server services are grouped together to accept a different
common type of token, but it is important to emphasize that a token
for a database server will not in general be useful against a file
server, and vice versa. Tokens for database servers are obtained
from the standard rxgk negotiation services, but tokens for file
servers are obtained through a new procedure, the AFSCombineTokens
RPC.
6. Token Format
This section defines the format of rxgk tokens for use with the AFS-3
protocol. The same layout is used for database server tokens and
file server tokens, but file server tokens may be encrypted in a
different key than database server tokens.
6.1. Container
rxgk tokens for AFS take the form of some key management data,
followed by an encrypted data blob. The key management data (a
version number, followed by an RFC 3961 encryption type) allows the
server receiving a token to identify which key has been used to
encrypt the core token data.
struct RXGK_TokenContainer {
afs_int32 kvno;
afs_int32 enctype;
opaque encrypted_token<>;
};
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
The RXGK_TokenContainer structure is XDR encoded and transported
wherever a token is used, such as in the 'token' field of the
RXGK_ClientInfo structure specified in [I-D.wilkinson-afs3-rxgk].
6.2. Token Encryption
rxgk supports encrypting tokens both with a single cell-wide key and
with per-file-server keys. The cell-wide key must be installed on
all database servers in the cell, and may additionally be installed
on non-database file servers when per-file-server keys are not
desired. Cell-wide keys should be for a selected RFC 3961 encryption
mechanism that is supported by all servers within the cell that will
use that key. Per-server keys should be for an encryption mechanism
that is supported by both the destination server and the negotiation
service on the vlserver. The management of per-server keys is
discussed in more detail in Section 14.2.
Key rollover is permitted by means of a key version number. When a
key is changed, whether cell-wide or per-server, a different (larger)
key version number MUST be selected. Servers SHOULD accept tokens
using old keys until the lifetime of all existing non-printed (see
Section 10.1) tokens has elapsed. Services using printed tokens
should be prepared to regenerate those tokens in the case of key
rollover.
Encryption is performed over the XDR encoded RXGK_Token structure,
using the RFC 3961 encrypt operation, with a key usage value of
RXGK_SERVER_ENC_TOKEN (defined in [I-D.wilkinson-afs3-rxgk]). The
enrypted data is stored in the encrypted_token field of the
RXGK_TokenContainer structure described in Section 6.1.
6.3. Token Contents
The token itself contains the information expressed by the following
RPC-L:
struct RXGK_Token {
afs_int32 enctype;
opaque K0<>;
RXGK_Level level;
afs_uint32 lifetime;
afs_uint32 bytelife;
rxgkTime expirationtime;
struct PrAuthName identities<>;
};
enctype: The RFC3961 encryption type of the session key contained
within this ticket.
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
K0: The session key. (See [I-D.wilkinson-afs3-rxgk] for details of
how this key is negotiated between client and negotiation
service.)
level: The security level, as defined in [I-D.wilkinson-afs3-rxgk],
that MUST be used for this connection.
lifetime: The maximum number of seconds that a key derived from K0
may be used for, before the connection is rekeyed. If 0, keys
have no time-based limit.
bytelife: The maximum amount of data (expressed as the log base 2 of
the number of bytes) that may be transferred using a key
derived from K0 before the connection is rekeyed. If 0, there
is no data-based limit on key usage.
expirationtime: The time (expressed as an rxgkTime) beyond which
this token may no longer be used. Servers MUST reject attempts
to use connections secured with this token after this time. A
value of 0 indicates that this token never expires. It is
RECOMMENDED that an expirationtime of 0 is only used for
printed tokens.
identities: A list of identities represented by this token. struct
PrAuthName is the identity structure defined in
[I-D.brashear-afs3-pts-extended-names].
7. Cache Manager Tokens
Some deployment scenarios for AFS-3 involve multi-user machines with
a single Cache Manager that fetches data on the users' behalf. When
multiple users have access to the same content, data that is fetched
on the behalf of one user may be cached and re-displayed to a second
user, without re-fetching it from the fileserver hosting the data.
The initial data aquisition is authenticated by the first user's
credentials, and if only that user's credentials are used, it may be
possible for a malicious user or users to "poison" the cache for
other users, and introduce bogus data.
In order to protect users of a multi-user cache manager from each
other, it is possible to give the cache manager its own token, which
can be combined (Section 9) with the users' tokens so that the user
may be authenticated at the fileserver while still preserving the
integrity of the data obtained by the cache manager. In order to
obtain a token, the cache manager must have some means of acquiring/
using key material.
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
7.1. Keyed Clients
When a host already has key material for a GSSAPI mechanism supported
by the vlserver, that material MAY be used to key the cache manager.
The cache manager simply calls the rxgk negotiation service using the
relevant material, and obtains a token. The cache manager should
frequently regenerate this token, to avoid combined tokens having
unnecessarily close expiration times. The cache manager should not
regenerate this token so often so as to place excessive load on the
vlservers.
It is recommended that GSS identities created specifically for use by
a cache manager have the name afs3-callback@<hostname> of name type
GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE where <hostname> is the fully qualified
domain name of the cache manager.
7.2. Unkeyed Clients
When a client has no key material, it is possible that an anonymous
GSSAPI connection may succeed. Clients MAY attempt to negotiate such
a connection by calling GSS_Init_sec_context() with the anon_req_flag
[RFC2743] and the default credentials set.
In some cases a cache manager may not have any dedicated credentials,
but have user credentials from multiple different users. These
tokens could be combined using the RXGK_CombineTokens operation and
the combined token used as a proxy cache manager token. However,
conspiring malicious users could still be able to manipulate the
cache, and the differing token expiration times for user tokens would
make cache management quite complicated with this approach. As such,
it is not recommended for general use.
8. Combining Tokens
This section describes the server-side behavior of the
RXGK_CombineTokens operation for the AFS-3 protocol.
There are no application-specific fields in RXGK_Token, so only the
behavior for combination of identity information remains to be
specified.
The identity lists in the 'identities' fields of the two tokens are
combined via order-preserving concatenation and placed in the
'identities' field of the output token.
Printed tokens (Section 10.1) cannot be combined with any other
token, and servers MUST reject attempts to do so, whether via
CombineTokens, AFSCombineTokens, or any other token-combining
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
procedure. AFSCombineTokens with a printed user_tok and an empty
cm_tok is not considered to be token combination for this purpose.
9. The AFSCombineTokens Operation
AFS extends the existing CombineTokens operation to provide a more
featured token manipulation and conversion service. This operation
takes a user token, an optional cache manager token, options for
enctype and security level negotiation with the server, and a
destination file server identifier. It returns a token specific to
the specified destination fileserver, and a structure containing some
information describing the returned token. AFSCombineTokens is the
only way to obtain a valid file server token (other than printing a
token, see Section 10.1).
AFSCombineTokens(IN RXGK_Data *user_tok,
IN RXGK_Data *cm_tok,
IN RXGK_CombineOptions *options,
IN afsUUID destination,
OUT RXGK_Data *new_token,
OUT RXGK_TokenInfo *token_info) = TBD;
user_tok: An rxgk token for the vlserver.
cm_tok: Either an rxgk token for the vlserver, or empty (zero-
length).
options: An RXGK_CombineOptions structure containing a list of
enctypes acceptable to the client and a list of security levels
acceptable to the client.
destination: The UUID of the server new_token is intended for. File
server UUIDs may be obtained from the VLDB in the same call
that returns their addresses.
new_token: The output rxgk token, or empty (zero-length).
token_info: Information describing the returned token.
The AFSCombineTokens call MUST only be performed over a secured rxgk
connection. AFSCombineTokens MUST NOT be offered over an
RXGK_LEVEL_CLEAR connection. Servers MUST reject all attempts to
perform this operation over channels that do not offer integrity
protection. This integrity guarantee protects the returned token
information (token_info) as well as the options and destination
arguments submitted to the server.
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
Clients which are caching the results of RPCs on behalf of multiple
users (such as a traditional AFS Cache Manager), SHOULD provide both
the user's token (as user_tok) and a token generated from an identity
that is private to the cache manager (as cm_tok). This prevents a
user from poisoning the cache for other users. Recommendations on
keying cache managers are contained in Section 7.1.
The output token from AFSCombineTokens is a token specific to the
fileserver indicated by the destination argument. As such, it is not
a valid input token for a successor AFSCombineTokens operation, as
the input tokens for AFSCombineTokens must be tokens for the
vlserver.
Clients using a printed token (see Section 10.1) MUST provide that
token as user_tok. cm_tok MUST be empty.
The server uses a zero-length new_token to indicate that the
generation of rxgk tokens for the specified fileserver cannot work at
the present time. Upon receipt of such a zero-length new_token, the
client MAY fall back to using a different authentication mechanism
for that server. An rxgk capable client operating within an rxgk
enabled cell MUST NOT downgrade its choice of security layer in any
other situation.
In other cases where the server is unable to perform the
AFSCombineTokens operation with the given arguments, a nonzero value
is returned. Clients MUST NOT use such an error as an indication to
fall back to to a different security class.
The 'identities' list from user_tok is copied to the 'identities'
field of the new_token. The 'identities' list from cm_tok is
discarded unused.
Other aspects of the operation of AFSCombineTokens, including the
combination of keys and tokens, are largely the same as the
CombineTokens RPC, documented in [I-D.wilkinson-afs3-rxgk] and
Section 8. The only differences pertain to the case where the
supplied cm_tok is empty. In this case, there is only one input
token master key, so the KRB-FX-CF2() algorithm is not applicable;
instead, the master key K0 from user_tok is reused unchanged for the
output token. The enctype of that K0 MUST be present in the
'enctypes' array of the 'options' parameter; if it is absent, the
server MUST fail the AFSCombineTokens RPC.
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
10. Server to Server Communication
A number of portions of the AFS protocol require that servers
communicate amongst themselves. To name a limited subset of
examples, file servers must register their location (IP addresses)
with the vldb, and must query the prdb when serving data; moving
volumes from one file server to another requires that the file
servers communicate with each other directly.
A server with the cell-wide shared key can forge a token for its use
in server-to-server communication, which we refer to as "token
printing". Printed tokens take on a special form (Section 10.1) and
are limited in that they cannot be combined with any other token.
However, file servers with a server-specific key (that is, without
the cell-wide shared key), can only print a token to themselves.
Such tokens are not usable to communicate with database servers or
other file servers. As such, file servers with a per-server key will
need GSS credentials in order to function. These credentials can be
used to acquire an rxgk token, allowing queries to the database
servers. They can also be used to register the file server in the
vldb, and to create and update the file server's server-specific key
in the vldb.
10.1. Token Printing
A server with access to the cell-wide pre-shared key may print its
own tokens for server-to-server access. To do so, it should
construct a database server token with suitable values. The list of
identities in such a token MUST be empty. It can then encrypt this
token using the pre-shared key, place it in an RXGK_TokenContainer
describing the key used to perform the encryption, and use it in the
same way as a normal rxgk token. The receiving server can identify
it is a printed token by the empty identity list.
The session key within a printed database server token MUST use the
same encryption type as the pre-shared key. When connecting to a
fileserver starting from a printed token, a client MUST use the
AFSCombineTokens service as discussed above to ensure that they are
using the correct key for the fileserver.
File servers with per-server keys may also print tokens, though these
tokens are in general of limited utility. (Being file server tokens,
they are not valid inputs to AFSCombineTokens, etc..)
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
10.2. Declaring rxgk Support for a Fileserver
The AFSCombineTokens call has specific behaviour when a destination
endpoint does not support rxgk. Implementing this behaviour requires
that the vldb have a record of whether a fileserver supports rxgk.
Fileservers currently register with the vlserver using the
VL_RegisterAddrs RPC. This document introduces an extended version,
VL_RegisterAddrsAndKey (Section 10.3), and either one may be used to
indicate that a fileserver supports rxgk. Fileservers which support
rxgk MUST call these RPCs over an rxgk protected connection. The
vlserver then infers rxgk support from the rx security layer used in
registration. To prevent downgrade attacks, once a fileserver has
registered as being rxgk capable, the vlserver MUST NOT remove that
registration without administrator intervention.
Once a fileserver has been marked as supporting rxgk,
VL_RegisterAddrs calls for that fileserver MUST only be accepted over
an rxgk protected connection. vlservers MUST only accept calls to
VL_RegisterAddrs and VL_RegisterAddrsAndKey from a printed token, an
administrator, or the identity registered for the fileserver using a
prior call to VL_RegisterAddrsandKey.
There are two tracks for registering a file server as being rxgk-
enabled; one for file servers with the cell-wide key, and another for
file servers with per-server keys.
10.2.1. File Servers With the Cell-Wide Key
When a file server which will use the cell-wide key is registered as
rxgk-capable, there is no need to register a new key for that server
(and in fact it would be actively harmful!), so there is no need to
use VL_RegisterAddrsAndKey. In this case, VL_RegisterAddrs is
sufficient, and using a printed token for the rxgk connection for
VL_RegisterAddrs indicates that the file server possesses the cell-
wide key. Since the file server has the cell-wide shared key, it
will need get its key updated when the cell-wide key is updated, and
does not need to update its own key separately. As such, it will
never need to call VL_RegisterAddrsAndKey.
10.2.2. File Servers With Per-Server Keys
This section describes the case when the automated keying mechanism
described in Section 10.3 is used. If the record of per-server keys
in the vldb is being manually maintained, cell administrators should
manually register the file servers in the vldb using VL_RegisterAddrs
instead.
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
Since the goal is to establish a per-server key,
VL_RegisterAddrsAndKey is necessary for the first call. However,
best practices require that the file server change its long-term key
periodically, so it must retain the ability to perform subsequent
VL_RegisterAddrsAndKey calls in the future, to register those new
keys in the vldb. For this reason, a printed token is not a useful
choice for performing the initial call to VL_RegisterAddrsAndKey,
since only a printed token would be able to perform a subsequent
call. The printed token would require the cell-wide shared key,
eliminating any benefit from having a server-specific key. As such,
a regular (non-printed) token is required for the initial call to
VL_RegisterAddrsAndKey. A cell administrator's token could be used,
but it is advantageous to allow file servers with per-server keys to
operate without intervention by the central cell administrators (so
that these file servers could be run solely by a local administrator
without need for central administrator intervention).
Thus, is is expected that a file server with a per-server key will
have a dedicated GSS identity and credentials that it will use for
registering with the vldb (VL_RegisterAddrsAndKey) and that will also
be used for securing the file server's regular connections to the
database servers during normal operation. The vlserver will store in
the vldb what GSS identity is used to perform VL_RegisterAddrsAndKey
for a given file server UUID, and allow that identity to perform
successor calls to VL_RegisterAddrsAndKey for that UUID.
Is is RECOMMENDED that GSS identities created solely for use on file
servers with per-server keys be of the form
afs3-fileserver@<hostname> of name type GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE.
10.3. Registering Per Server Keys
The provisioning of file servers with their own keys, rather than the
cell-wide master key, requires the ability to maintain a directory of
these keys in the vldb, so that the AFSCombineTokens RPC can encrypt
the outgoing token with the correct key. The manner in which this
directory is maintained is left to the implementor, who MAY decide to
use a manual, or out of band, key management system. Otherwise, the
automated keying mechanism described as follows will be used.
Implementations supporting automatic key management through the AFS-3
protocol MUST provide the VL_RegisterAddrsAndKey RPC (similar to the
VL_RegisterAddrs RPC). This RPC is called by a fileserver to
register itself with the VLDB; it MUST be called over a secure
connection that provides confidentiality protection.
For the purpose of this RPC, the fileserver acts as the client and
the vlserver as the server. Once the RPC completes, both peers of
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
the RPC call can generate a key to be used as the fileserver's long-
term server key.
vlservers MUST NOT permit calls to VL_RegisterAddrsAndKey for
fileserver UUIDs which already exist within the vldb, unless that
UUID already has a server-specific key registered.
The VL_RegisterAddrsAndKey RPC is described by the following RPC-L:
struct RXGK_ServerKeyDataRequest {
afs_int32 enctypes<>;
opaque nonce1[20];
};
struct RXGK_ServerKeyDataResponse {
afs_int32 enctype;
afs_int32 kvno;
opaque nonce2[20];
};
const RXGK_MAXKEYDATAREQUEST = 16384;
const RXGK_MAXKEYDATARESPONSE = 16384;
typedef opaque keyDataRequest<RXGK_MAXKEYDATAREQUEST>;
typedef opaque keyDataResponse<RXGK_MAXKEYDATARESPONSE>;
VL_RegisterAddrsAndKey(
IN afsUUID *uuidp,
IN afs_int32 spare1,
IN bulkaddrs *ipaddr,
IN afs_int32 secIndex,
IN keyDataRequest *request,
OUT keyDataResponse *response) = XXX;
uuidp: The fileserver's UUID.
spare1: Unused. (Clients SHOULD pass zero.)
ipaddr: The list of addresses to register as belonging to this
fileserver.
secIndex: The index of the security mechanism for which a key is
being set.
keyDataRequest: An opaque blob of data, specific to the security
mechanism defined by secIndex. For rxgk, it is the XDR-encoded
representation of an RXGK_ServerKeyDataRequest structure.
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
keyDataResponse: An opaque blob of data, specific to the security
mechanism defined by secIndex. For rxgk, it is the XDR-encoded
representation of an RXGK_ServerDataResponse structure.
The client provides, in the RXGK_ServerKeyDataRequest structure, a
list of the RFC3961 encryption types that it will accept as a server
key. It also provides a nonce containing 20 random data bytes.
The server selects an encryption type shared by it and the client,
and returns that, along with 20 bytes of random data that it has
generated, in RXGK_ServerKeyDataResponse. If there is no common
encryption type, then the server MUST fail the request.
The vlserver MUST store the identity list from the token used to make
this connection. The vlserver MUST only permit subsequent calls to
VL_RegisterAddrsAndKey for this UUID when they come over a connection
authenticated with that same identity list, an administrator's token,
or a printed token. Such subsequent calls using an administrator's
token or a printed token do not update the identity list associated
with this UUID's key. New fileserver UUIDs register themselves with
the vldb in a "leap of faith", binding a GSSAPI identity to the
fileserver UUID for future authenticated operations. Fileservers
SHOULD use VL_RegisterAddrsAndKey to rekey themselves periodically,
in accordance with key lifetime best practices.
For rxgk, the file server key can then be derived by both client and
server using
random-to-key(PRF+(K0, K, nonce1 || nonce2));
random-to-key is the function specified by the RFC3961 profile of the
encryption type chosen by the server and returned in enctype.
PRF+ is the function of that name specified by [RFC4402].
[[The PRF+ function defined in RFC 4402 specifies that the values of
the counter 'n' should begin at 1, for T1, T2, ... Tn. However,
implementations of that PRF+ function for the gss_pseudo_random()
implementation for the krb5 mechanism have disregarded that
specification and started the counter 'n' from 0. Since there is no
interoperability concern between krb5 gss_pseudo_random() and rxgk
key derivation, implementations of the RFC 4402 PRF+ function for
rxgk key derivation should use the RFC 4402 version as specified,
that is, with the counter 'n' beginning at 1.]]
K0 is the master key of the current rxgk session, e.g., as originally
determined by the GSSNegotiate call.
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
K is the key generation seed length as specified in enctype's RFC3961
profile.
|| is the concatenation operation.
11. Securing the Callback Channel
AFS has traditionally had an unprotected callback channel. However,
extended callbacks [I-D.benjamin-extendedcallbackinfo] require a
mechanism for ensuring that callback breaks and, critically, data
updates, are protected. This requires that there is a strong
connection between the key material used initially to perform the
RPC, and that which is used to protect any resulting callback. We
achieve this by binding the key used to secure the callback
connection into the authenticator used to create the original rxgk
connection. Callbacks created as a result of RPCs performed on that
rxgk connection will use the callback key given in the authenticator.
11.1. Lifetime and scope of the callback channel
The RXGK_Authenticator_AFSAppData structure contains a key and
enctype, but no key version number field. This restricts the
connection to only ever having one key to secure callbacks created as
a result of calls on that connection, even if there are multiple Rx
challenge/response exchanges where a new authenticator could be
constructed. This is acceptable, because if the client needs to
rotate the key used for secure callbacks to it, the client can
initiate a new connection to the server, with a new callback key.
It may be reasonable for a cache manager to only ever use one key for
secure callbacks (until the cache manager is restarted), such as in a
cell where all fileservers have the cell-wide shared key or where all
fileservers are equally trusted. Alternately, a cache manager may
use just one callback key per fileserver. In either case, which key
to use for incoming callback connections is known just from the
context of the connection, so there is no need to provide a callback
token in the authenticator.
In all cases, both cache manager and file server must retain the
callback key until all callbacks using that key are expired. The key
should be cached in the server's per-connection private data, to
ensure that the callback key is only used for callbacks created as a
result of calls on the connection to which the key is bound.
Only RPCs issued over an rxgk protected connection should receive
rxgk protected callbacks.
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
12. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA.
13. AFS-3 Registry Considerations
This document requrests that the AFS-3 registry allocate code points
for the new RPCs AFSCombineTokens (for the RXGK service) and
RegisterAddrsAndKey (for the VL service).
14. Security Considerations
14.1. Downgrade attacks
Using the presence of a GSSAPI key to determine a cell's ability to
perform rxgk is vulnerable to a downgrade attack, as an attacker may
forge error responses. Cells which no longer support rxkad should
remove their afs@REALM and afs/cell@REALM Kerberos keys.
14.2. Per Server Keys
The mechanism for automatically registering per-server keys is
potentially vulnerable, as it trades a short-lived key (the rxgk
session key, which protects the key exchange) for a long-lived one
(the server key). There is precedent for this sort of key exchange,
such as when using kadmin to extract a new kerberos keytab.
14.3. Combined Key Materials
As described in Section 7, combined tokens are used to prevent cache
poisoning attacks on multi-user systems. In order for this
protection to be effective, cache managers MUST NOT provide user
access to keys produced through the combine tokens operation, unless
those keys will not be used by the cache manger itself.
15. References
15.1. Informational References
[RX] Zeldovich, N., "RX protocol specification", October 2002.
[I-D.benjamin-extendedcallbackinfo]
Benjamin, M., "AFS Callback Extensions (Draft 14)", draft-
benjamin-extendedcallbackinfo-02 (work in progress),
December 2011.
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
15.2. Normative References
[I-D.brashear-afs3-pts-extended-names]
Brashear, D., "Authentication Name Mapping extension for
AFS-3 Protection Service", draft-brashear-afs3-pts-
extended-names-09 (work in progress), March 2011.
[I-D.wilkinson-afs3-rxgk]
Wilkinson, S., "rxgk: GSSAPI based security class for RX",
draft-wilkinson-afs3-rxgk-00 (work in progress), January
2010.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
[RFC3961] Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005.
[RFC4402] Williams, N., "A Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) for the
Kerberos V Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism", RFC 4402, February 2006.
[RFC4506] Eisler, M., "XDR: External Data Representation Standard",
STD 67, RFC 4506, May 2006.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
rxgk has been the work of many contributors over the years. A
partial list is contained in the [I-D.wilkinson-afs3-rxgk]. All
errors and omissions are, however, mine.
Appendix B. Changes
B.1. Since 00
Add references to RX and XDR specifications.
Add introductory material on AFS.
Change expirationTime to be expressed using the rxgkTime type.
Document how encryption types are chosen for printed tokens, and how
they are used against fileservers.
Expand security considerations section to cover combined tokens.
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
Rename AFS_SetCallbackKey as RXAFS_SetCallbackKey.
B.2. Since 01
Rename RXAFS_SetCallbackKey to RXAFS_SetCallBackKey.
Add an AFS-3 Registry Considerations section.
Clarify the vlserver/dbserver/fileserver relationship.
AFSCombineTokens prototype changes.
Clarify the scope of the document.
Use a leap of faith for RegisterAddrsAndKey.
Specify the nametype of the acceptor identity.
B.3. Since 02
Deal with fallout of errorcode's removal from RXGK_TokenInfo.
Rework "securing the callback channel".
B.4. Since 03
Clarify the distinction between dbserver and fileserver tokens.
AFSCombineTokens is the only way to get file server tokens.
Add new kind of PrAuthName, PRAUTHTYPE_EMPTY.
Specify how cache manager token identities are stored in file server
tokens.
Place bounds on some XDR opaque arrays.
Expound more about printed tokens, for dbservers and fileservers.
B.5. Since 04
Rearrange content within the document in attempt to give a more
coherent structure and improve readability.
Add specifications for the remaining pieces of rxgk behavior which
the core document left as application-specific.
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft Integrating rxgk with AFS September 2014
Change the token format. Instead of having the last entry in the
identities list be the CM identity, use an explicit separate field
for the identity to be used for callbacks.
As a result, PRAUTHTYPE_EMPTY is no longer necessary.
General edits for grammar and readability.
Add security considerations for the DoS attach that is possible by
setting fake callback keys.
Add a clarifying note for the RFC 4402 PRF+ implementation.
B.6. Since 05
Remove start_time from the token format.
Remove the SetCallBackKey RPC, in favor of putting a callback key in
the authenticator appdata. This provides a simpler solution to the
problem of establishing a secure callback channel.
While here, add the server UUID into the appdata as well as the
client UUID, to prevent some possible routes to data corruption.
B.7. Since 06
General edits for clarity.
Use afs_uint32 for token lifetimes, to match the core spec.
Authors' Addresses
Simon Wilkinson
Your File System Inc
Email: simon@sxw.org.uk
Benjamin Kaduk
MIT Kerberos Consortium
Email: kaduk@mit.edu
Wilkinson & Kaduk Expires March 9, 2015 [Page 21]