I2NSF L. Xia
Internet Draft Huawei
Intended status: Standard Track D. Zhang
Alibaba
E. Lopez
Fortinet
N. BOUTHORS
Qosmos
Expires: January 2016 July 20, 2015
Information Model of Interface to Network Security Functions
Capability Interface
draft-xia-i2nsf-capability-interface-im-03.txt
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Abstract
This draft is focused on the north-bound interface of NSFs (Network
Security Functions) and proposes an information model for
configuring various kinds NSF security functions, based on the
packet-based paradigm. The Yang structure and application examples
are also presented to clarify how to use the information model.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ................................................ 2
2. Conventions used in this document ........................... 3
2.1. Terminology ............................................ 3
3. Information Model for Capability Interface .................. 4
3.1. Overview ............................................... 4
3.2. Packet-Based Paradigm .................................. 7
3.3. Rule .................................................. 10
3.4. Match ................................................. 11
3.5. Action ................................................ 13
4. I2NSF Capability Interface Policy IM Grammar ............... 14
5. I2NSF Capability Interface IM Yang Structure ............... 18
6. Use Examples of I2NSF Capability Interface IM .............. 21
7. Security Considerations .................................... 21
8. IANA Considerations ........................................ 22
9. References ................................................. 22
9.1. Normative References .................................. 22
9.2. Informative References ................................ 22
10. Acknowledgments ........................................... 23
1. Introduction
Due to the rapid development and deployment of cloud computing
services, the demand of cloud-based security services is also
rapidly growing. The customers of them can be enterprises [I-
D.zarny-i2nsf-data-center-use-cases], User Equipment (UE) of mobile
network and Internet of Things (IoT) [I-D.qi-i2nsf-access-network-
usecase], residential access users [I-D.pastor-i2nsf-access-
usecases], and so on.
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Derived from [I-D.dunbar-i2nsf-problem-statement], there could be
two types of I2NSF interfaces:
o Interface between I2NSF user/client with network/security
controller: [I-D.xia-i2nsf-service-interface-DM] describes the
information model used by this type of interface. It's a service-
oriented interface, the main objective is to unify the
communication channel and the security service request
information model between various high-level application (e.g.,
openstack, various BSS/OSS, etc) with various network controllers.
The design goal of the service interface is to decouple security
service in application layer from various kinds of security
devices and their device-level security functions. The intent-
based information model approach derived from RBAC model can be a
feasible option for it;
o North-bound interface provided by NSFs (e.g., FW, AAA, IPS, Anti-
DDOS, Anti-Virus, etc), no matter whether the NSFs are performed
by Virtual Machines (VMs) or physical appliances. In this
document, this type of interface is also referred to as
"capability interface". Any network entities (e.g., I2NSF clients,
network/security controller, etc) can use this interface to
configure the required security functions of NSFs. Nowadays
different NSF vendors have different proprietary interfaces and
information models for configuring their security functions.
This draft is focused on the capability interfaces and proposes an
information model for configuring various kinds NSFs. It's used by
the NSFs to decouple from the various security services came from
the application layer and highlight the security capabilities they
can provide. Section 3 defines the information model for capability
interface. Section 4 gives its representation by Yang data model.
Section 5 includes some using examples to clarify how to use the
information model.
2. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].
2.1. Terminology
AAA -Access control, Authorization, Authentication
ACL - Access Control List
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AD - Active Directory
ANSI - American National Standards Institute
DDoS - Distributed Deny of Services
FW - Firewall
I2NSF - Interface to Network Security Functions
INCITS - International Committee for Information Technology
Standards
IoT - Internet of Things
IPS - Intrusion Prevention System
LDAP - Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
NAT - Network Address Translation
NBI - North-bound Interface
NIST - National Institute of Standard Technology
NSF - Network Security Function
RBAC - Role Based Access Control
UE - User Equipment
URL - Uniform/Universal Resource Locator
VM - Virtual Machine
3. Information Model for Capability Interface
3.1. Overview
The capability interface cares about the specific security
capabilities that NSF can provide rather than the type of device
that the NSF belongs. That is, it is assume that the user of the
capability interface does not care about whether the NSF that it is
communicating with is a firewall or an IPS. Instead, the user cares
about the capability that the NSF has, such as, packet filtering,
deep packet inspection, and etc. Based on this consideration, the
capability interface discussed in this memo is designed based on a
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generic IM that is abstracted from the various specific security
capabilities.
The information model specified for I2NSF capability interface is
shown in Figure 1.
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+-----------+
|Packet |
+->header or |
| |payload |
+------+ | +-----------+
|Packet| | +---------+
+->based |-+-> Service |
| |match | | +---------+
| +------+ | +-----------+
| +->Application|
| +-----------+
|
| +----------+
| +-> User |
| | | group |
+----+ +-----+ | | +----------+
| | +->Match|-+ +----------+
+-->Rule| | +-----+ | +-> Session |
| | | | | | | state |
| +----+ | | +-------+ | +----------+
| | | |context| | +----------+
| * | +->based +-+-> Schedule |
| * | |match | | +----------+
| * | +-------+ | +---------+
| | | | Region |
| | +-> group |
+------+ +----+ | | |
| | | | | | +---------+
|Policy+--+-->Rule+--+
| | | | | | +-------+
+------+ | +----+ | +->Permit +
| | | +-------+
| * | +-------+ | +-------+
| * | +->Basic +-+-> Deny |
| * | | |action | | +-------+
| | | +-------+ | +-------+
| | | +-> Mirror|
| | | +-------+
| | |
| | | +----------+
| | | +->Antivirus:|
| +----+ | | | |profile |
| | | | +-------+ | | +----------+
+-->Rule| +->Action +-+ | +---------+
| | +-------+ | +-> IPS: |
+----+ | |signature|
| | +---------+
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| | +----------+
| | | URL |
| +->Filtering:|
| |data base |
| | +----------+
| +--------+ | +----------+
+->Advanced+-+ | File |
|action | +->Blocking: |
+--------+ | |profile |
| +----------+
| +----------+
| | Data |
+->Filtering:|
| |profile |
| +----------+
| +-----------+
| |Application|
+-> control |
| +-----------+
| *
+-> *
*
Figure 1. The Overall Information Model for I2NSF Capability
Interface
As illustrated in Figure 1, at the top level, policy is a container
including a set of security rules. Each rule represents some
specific security requirements or actions. Security policy combines
these rules together according to some logic, i.e., their similarity
or mutual relations, etc.
A Security policy is created and assigned to any NSFs depending on
specific requirements and scenarios. For example, a security policy
can be responsible for an enterprise branch, or can be used for the
access control to one set of services.
3.2. Packet-Based Paradigm
It is clarified in [I-D.lopez-i2nsf-packet] that abstractly all NSFs
are packet-processing engines that inspect packets traversing
networks, either directly or in context to sessions to which the
packet is associated. This draft uses this packet-based paradigm for
the design of NSF capability interface IM. This packet-based design
approach is very general and easily extensible, and so can avoid any
potential constraints which could limit NSFs' functional
capabilities.
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Considering from the perspective of packet-processing, NSFs differ
in the depths of packet headers and/or payloads they can inspect,
the various session/context states they can maintain, and the
actions or specific profiles they can apply. Therefore, the NSF
capabilities can be characterized by the level of packet-processing
and context that a NSF can support, and the actions and profiles
that the NSF can apply. In the other hand, NSF Vendors can register
their provided NSF capabilities by using the Subject-Object-Action-
Function categories described by [I-D.lopez-i2nsf-packet].
Table 1-4 below lists some examples included in the categories for
constructing the NSF capability:
+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| Subject (packet) Capability Index |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Layer 2 | Layer 2 header fields: |
| Header | Source/Destination/s-VID/c-VID/EtherType/.|
| | |
|---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Layer 3 | Layer header fields: |
| | protocol |
| IPv4 objects | port |
| | src port |
| | dscp |
| | length |
| | flags |
| | ttl |
| | |
| IPv6 Object | |
| | addr |
| | protocol/nh |
| | src port |
| | length |
| | traffic class |
| | hop limit |
| | flow label |
| | |
| TCP | Port |
| SCTP | syn |
| DCCP | ack |
| | fin |
| | rst |
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| | psh |
| | urg |
| | window |
| | sockstress |
| UDP | |
| | flood abuse |
| | fragment abuse |
| | Port |
| HTTP layer | |
| | hash collision |
| | http - get flood |
| | http - post flood |
| | http - random/invalid url |
| | http - slowloris |
| | http - slow read |
| | http - r-u-dead-yet (rudy) |
| | http - malformed request |
| | http - xss |
| | https - ssl session exhaustion |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| IETF PCP | Configurable |
| | Ports |
| | |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| IETF TRAM | profile |
| | |
| | |
|---------------+-------------------------------------------+
Table 1. Subject (packet) Capability Index
+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| Object (context) Capability Index |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Session | Session state: new, established, related|
| | invalid, untracked |
| | |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Time | time span |
| | days, minutes, seconds, |
| | Events |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
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| Events | Event URL, variables |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
Table 2. Object (context) Capability Index
+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| Actions Capability Index |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Ingress port | SFC header termination , |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| | Pass |
| Egress port | Deny |
| | Mirror |
| | Functional call |
| | Encap various header |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
Table 3. Actions Capability Index
+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| Functional profile (advanced actions) Capability Index |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Profile types | Vendor specific |
| | Flexible Profile URL |
| | Accept external |
| | |
+---------------+-------------------------------------------+
Table 4. Functional profile (advanced actions) Capability Index
3.3. Rule
Each rule is defined in the classic "match & action" style that
already implemented in most NSFs today.
The NSF follows the rules one by one to process the passing traffic
as follows:
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1. The NSF analyzes traffics in a packet-based match fashion or a
context-based match fashion, or both. In the packet-based match
fashion, the NSF only inspects the packet header and/or payload
to retrieve the attributes at the network or the application
layers. Such attributes could include address, length of payload,
port, protocol, user, and etc. When performing a context-based
match, besides retrieving and analyzing the attributes from the
packet, the NSF also needs to check some of the attributes
against contextual attributes (e.g., session state, schedule and
region) in order to decide the ways of processing the packets;
2. The NSF compares the attributes with the match conditions defined
in the first rule. If all the conditions are met, the traffic
matches the rule. If one or more conditions are not met, the NSF
compares the attributes with the conditions of objects defined in
the next rule. If all rules are not met, the NSF denies the
traffic by default;
3. If the traffic matches a rule, the NSF performs the defined basic
actions over the traffic. If the basic action is deny, the NSF
blocks the traffic. If the basic action is permit/mirror, the NSF
resumes checking whether certain advanced actions are referenced
in the rule. If yes, go to step 4. If no, the traffic is
permitted;
4. If certain advanced actions (e.g., Antivirus, IPS, etc) are
referenced in the rule and the basic action defined in the rule
is permit/mirror, the NSF performs integrated checks on the
content carried over the traffic. The integrated check inspects
the content carried over the traffic based on the conditions
defined in the referenced profiles of advanced action and
implements appropriate actions based on the check result. If any
advanced action determines to block the traffic, the NSF blocks
the traffic. If all advanced actions determine to permit the
traffic, the NSF allows the traffic through.
One rule can be applied multiple times on different places, i.e.,
links, devices, networks, vpns, etc. It not only guarantees the
consistent policy enforcement in the whole network, but also
decreases the configuration workload.
3.4. Match
Match (aka, Objects) consists of two categories of match condition:
packet-based match and context-based match. Each category includes
various match conditions representing different kinds of objects.
Derived from the packet-based paradigm, the former match is based on
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the packet content directly; the latter match is based on the
context to sessions to which the packet is associated. In other
words, the context includes some environment relevant
characteristics that are not directly in the packet but need to be
derived from session analysis.
The logic relation among all the conditions is flexible, it can be
"AND", "OR". The former means the traffic must match all the
conditions, while the latter means the traffic only needs to match
one of the conditions.
The general objects for packet-based match are as follows:
o Packet header or payload: all meaningful and useful attributes in
packet header or payload, for example: src/dest address, src/dest
port, payload fragment, etc;
o Service: A service is an application identified by a protocol
type and port number. It can be a service or a group of services.
NSF matches the service traffics based on the protocol types and
port numbers and applies the security actions to them;
o Application: An application is a computer program for a specific
task or purpose, and multiple applications constitute an
application group. It provides a finer granularity than service
in matching traffic. Even if different applications have the same
service, they still can be distinguished by analyzing the data
packets and comparing the signatures of each application. The
hierarchy category method is appropriate for identifying
applications. For example, the application of Gmail belongs to
the category of business systems, and the subcategory of Email.
Other key attributes that belongs to and can be used to identify
an application are data transmission model (e.g., client-server,
browser-based, networking, peer-to-peer, etc), risk level (e.g.,
Exploitable, Evasive, Data-loss, Bandwidth-consuming, etc).
The general objects for context-based match are as follows:
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o User group: A group of user information. The user is a person
application who is authorized to access network resources. A user
can be an internet access user who accesses Internet resources or
intranet resources from inside the intranet through a FW, or a
remote access user who connects to a FW in VPN, or PPPoE mode to
access intranet resources. The NSFs need to know the IP address
or other information (i.e., user's tenant or VN-ID) of the user
to identify the user's traffic and perform the pre-defined
actions. It can also define a group of users to match and perform
actions to them together;
o Session state: any one specific state related to the
user/operation sessions, such as authentication state, TCP/UDP
session state, bidirectional state, etc;
o Schedule: A schedule defines time ranges. A rule can reference a
schedule to filter traffic that passes through the NSF within the
schedule. A schedule can be a periodic schedule, or a one-time
schedule;
o Region group: A group of user's location information. The logical
definition of users' location can be pre-defined in the location
signature database by the geographical information, or be manual
defined by the user's IP information.
Objects are extensible, new match conditions can be defined and
added into them any time according to requirements.
3.5. Action
The action of a security rule is also divided into two categories
logically: basic actions and advanced actions. Basic actions are
either permit, deny or mirror. Deny simple means to block the
matching traffics. Permit and mirror have more meanings by
performing the referenced advanced actions. The all advanced actions
in one rule can inspect traffic content during one-pass, which
greatly improves system performance.
Every advanced action includes its own matching conditions to
identify specific traffic and perform required actions. The advanced
action is defined by specific requirements or for specific scenarios.
Some typical advanced actions are Antivirus, IPS, URL filtering,
File blocking, Data filtering, Application control, and so on.
To deal with the situation of emerging new threats, i.e., zero-day
exploits, unknown malwares, APTs, NSF's advanced actions (aka
functions) should have the capability of dynamic update. A NSF
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should be able to load the new advanced action and/or update the
signature used by existing functions when an unknown threat is
identified. The new advanced actions and signature can be provided
by different security vendors after their research on the new
threats and sent and stored in a centralized policy repository or
stored separately in their local policy repository. Anyway, a
standard interface is needed when the NSF negotiates with the policy
repository about the new functions/signatures needed. Additionally,
I2NSF capability interface should have the unified information model
to configure and apply all these functions/signatures. The details
will be added in future version.
By combining advanced actions and using them appropriately, NSFs can
defend against possible attacks and reduce the waste of system
resources.
4. I2NSF Capability Interface Policy IM Grammar
This section specifies the RIB information model in Routing Backus-
Naur Form [RFC5511]. This grammar is intended to help the reader
better understand the english text description in order to derive a
data model.
Firstly, several types of route are specified as follows:
o IPv4: Match on destination IP address in the IPv4 header
o IPv6: Match on destination IP address in the IPv6 header
o MPLS: Match on a MPLS label at the top of the MPLS label stack
o MAC: Match on MAC destination addresses in the ethernet header
o Interface: Match on incoming interface of the packet
Then, the I2NSF capability interface policy IM grammar is specified
as follows:
<Policy> ::= <policy-name> <policy-id> (<Rule> ...)
<Rule> ::= <rule-name> <rule-id> <Match> <Action>
<Match> ::= [<packet-based-match>] [<context-based-match>]
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<packet-based-match> ::= [<packet-header-payload> ...]
[<service> ...]
[<application> ...]
<packet-header-payload> ::= [<address-scope>] [<layer-2-header>]
[<layer-3-header>] [<layer-4-header>]
[<payload>]
<address-scope> ::= <route-type> (<ipv4-route> | <ipv6-route> |
<mpls-route> | <mac-route> | <interface-route>)
<route-type> ::= <IPV4> | <IPV6> | <MPLS> | <IEEE_MAC> | <INTERFACE>
<ipv4-route> ::= <ip-route-type> (<destination-ipv4-address> |
<source-ipv4-address> | (<destination-ipv4-address>
<source-ipv4-address>))
<destination-ipv4-address> ::= <ipv4-prefix>
<source-ipv4-address> ::= <ipv4-prefix>
<ipv4-prefix> ::= <IPV4_ADDRESS> <IPV4_PREFIX_LENGTH>
<ipv6-route> ::= <ip-route-type> (<destination-ipv6-address> |
<source-ipv6-address> | (<destination-ipv6-address>
<source-ipv6-address>))
<destination-ipv6-address> ::= <ipv6-prefix>
<source-ipv6-address> ::= <ipv6-prefix>
<ipv6-prefix> ::= <IPV6_ADDRESS> <IPV6_PREFIX_LENGTH>
<ip-route-type> ::= <SRC> | <DEST> | <DEST_SRC>
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<layer-3-header> ::= <ipv4-header> | <ipv6-header>
<ipv4-header> ::= <SOURCE_IPv4_ADDRESS> <DESTINATION_IPv4_ADDRESS>
<PROTOCOL> [<TTL>] [<DSCP>]
<ipv6-header> ::= <SOURCE_IPV6_ADDRESS> <DESTINATION_IPV6_ADDRESS>
<NEXT_HEADER> [<TRAFFIC_CLASS>]
[<FLOW_LABEL>] [<HOP_LIMIT>]
<service> ::= <name> <id> <protocol> [<protocol-num>] [<src-port>]
[<dest-port>]
<protocol> ::= <TCP> | <UDP> | <ICMP> | <ICMPv6> | <IP>
<application> ::= <name> <id> <category> <subcategory>
<data-transmission-model> <risk-level>
<signature>
<category> ::= <business-system> | <Entertainment> | <internet>
<network> | <general>
<subcategory> ::= <Finance> | <Email> | <Game> | <media-sharing> |
<social-network> | <web-posting> | <proxy> | ...
<data-transmission-model> ::= <client-server> | <browser-based> |
<networking> | <peer-to-peer> |
<unassigned>
<risk-level> ::= <Exploitable> | <Productivity-loss> | <Evasive> |
<Data-loss> | <Malware-vehicle> |
<Bandwidth-consuming> | <Tunneling>
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<signature> ::= <server-address> <protocol> <dest-port-num>
<flow-direction> <object> <keyword>
<flow-direction> ::= <request> | <response> | <bidirection>
<object> ::= <packet> | <flow>
<context based match> ::= [<user-group> ...] [<session-state>]
[<schedule>] [<region-group>]
<user-group> ::= <user>...
<user> ::= (<login-name> <group-name> <parent-group> <password>
<expired-date> <allow-multi-account-login>
<address-binding>) | <tenant> | <VN-id>
<session-state> ::= <new> | <established> | <related> | <invalid> |
<untracked>
<schedule> ::= <name> <type> <start-time> <end-time>
<weekly-validity-time>
<type> ::= <once> | <periodic>
<action> ::= <basic-action> [<advanced-action>]
<basic-action> ::= <pass> | <deny> | <mirror> | <call-function> |
<encapsulation>
<advanced-action> ::= [<profile-antivirus>] [<profile-IPS>]
[<profile-url-filtering>]
[<profile-file-blocking>]
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[<profile-data-filtering>]
[<profile-application-control>]
5. I2NSF Capability Interface IM Yang Structure
This section specifies the I2NSF capability interface information
model in Yang structure [RFC6020].
module: Security Policies
+--security-policies
+--rw policy-set* [policy-name]
+--rw policy-name string
+--rw policy-id uint16
+--rw security-rules
+--rw rule-set* [rule-name]
+--rw rule-name string
+--rw rule-id uint16
+--rw Match
| +--rw packet-based-match
| | +--rw user* [login-name]
| | | +--rw login-name string
| | | +--rw group-name string
| | | +--rw parent-group string
| | | +--rw password string
| | | +--rw expired-date data-and-time
| | | +--rw allow-multi-account-login boolean
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| | | +--rw address-binding Boolean
| | | +--rw tenant? uint32
| | | +--rw VN-id? uint32
| | +--rw address*
| | | +--rw route-type route-type-def
| | | +--rw value
| | | +--rw (route-type)?
| | | +--:(ipv4)
| | | | ...
| | | +--:(ipv6)
| | | | ...
| | | +--:(mpls-route)
| | | | ...
| | | +--:(mac-route)
| | | | ...
| | | +--:(interface-route)
| | | | ...
| | +--rw layer-header-payload*
| | | ...
| | +--rw service* [name]
| | | +--rw name string
| | | +--rw id uint16
| | | +--rw protocol enumeration
| | | +--rw protocol-num uint8
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| | | +--rw src-port-num uint16
| | | +--rw dest-port-num uint16
| | +--rw application* [name]
| | | +--rw name string
| | | +--rw id uint16
| | | +--rw category enumeration
| | | +--rw subcategory enumeration
| | | +--rw data-transmission-model enumeration
| | | +--rw risk-level enumeration
| | | +--rw signature
| | | | +--rw server-address inet:ip-address
| | | | +--rw protocol enumeration
| | | | +--rw dest-port-num uint16
| | | | +--rw flow-direction enumeration
| | | | +--rw object enumeration
| | | | +--rw keyword string
| +--rw context-based-match
| +--rw session-state*
| | ...
| +--rw schedule* [name]
| | +--rw name string
| | +--rw type enumeration
| | +--rw start-time data-and-time
| | +--rw end-time data-and-time
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| | +--rw weekly-validity-time? data-and-time
| +--rw region*
| ...
+--rw actions
+--rw basic-actions enumeration
+--rw advanced-actions* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw profile-antivirus?
| ...
+--rw profile-IPS?
| ...
+--rw profile-url-filtering?
| ...
+--rw profile-file-blocking?
| ...
+--rw profile-data-filtering?
| ...
+--rw profile-application-control?
| ...
6. Use Examples of I2NSF Capability Interface IM
TBD
7. Security Considerations
TBD
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8. IANA Considerations
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2234] Crocker, D. and Overell, P.(Editors), "Augmented BNF for
Syntax Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, Internet Mail
Consortium and Demon Internet Ltd., November 1997.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the
Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
October 2010.
[RFC5511] Farrel, A., "Routing Backus-Naur Form (RBNF): A Syntax
Used to Form Encoding Rules in Various Routing Protocol
Specifications", RFC 5511, April 2009.
9.2. Informative References
[INCITS359 RBAC] NIST/INCITS, "American National Standard for
Information Technology - Role Based Access Control",
INCITS 359, April, 2003
[I-D.zarny-i2nsf-data-center-use-cases] Zarny, M., et.al., "I2NSF
Data Center Use Cases", Work in Progress, October 2014.
[I-D.qi-i2nsf-access-network-usecase] Qi, M., et.al., "Integrated
Security with Access Network Use Case", Work in Progress,
October, 2014.
[I-D.pastor-i2nsf-access-usecases] Pastor, A., et.al., "Access Use
Cases for an Open OAM Interface to Virtualized Security
Services", Work in Progress, October, 2014.
[I-D.dunbar-i2nsf-problem-statement] Dunbar, L., et.al., "Interface
to Network Security Functions Problem Statement", Work in
Progress, September, 2014.
[I-D.xia-i2nsf-service-interface-DM] Xia, L., et.al., "Data Model of
Interface to Network Security Functions Service Interface",
February, 2015.
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[I-D.lopez-i2nsf-packet] Lopez, E., "Packet-Based Paradigm For
Interfaces To NSFs", March, 2015.
10. Acknowledgments
This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.
Authors' Addresses
Liang Xia (Frank)
Huawei
101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012
China
Email: Frank.xialiang@huawei.com
DaCheng Zhang
Alibaba
Email: Dacheng.zdc@alibaba-inc.com
Edward Lopez
Fortinet
899 Kifer Road
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
Phone: +1 703 220 0988
EMail: elopez@fortinet.com
Nicolas BOUTHORS
Qosmos
Email: Nicolas.BOUTHORS@qosmos.com
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