Network Working Group                                              X. Xu
Internet-Draft                                                  S. Jiang
Intended status: Informational                                  D. Zhang
Expires: September 13, 2012                  Huawei Technologies Co.,Ltd
                                                              D.  Korzun
                                                                  Z. Cao
                                                          March 12, 2012

Extensions of Host Identity Protocol (HIP) with Hierarchical Information


   This document explores the benefits brought by extending the Host
   Identity Protocol (HIP) with hierarchical information.  In addition,
   three types of candidate solutions are introduced.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 13, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal

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   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   ( in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Benefits introduced by Hierarchical Information  . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Candidate Solutions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  Integrating Hierarchical Information into 128 Bits HITs  . . .  5
     4.1.  Compatible flat-structured HITs  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.2.  HITs on nodes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.3.  Generating a hierarchical HIT  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  Transporting Hierarchical information outside HITs . . . . . .  8
     5.1.  Hierarchical_HIT Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     5.2.  Hierarchical Information Registration  . . . . . . . . . . 10
     5.3.  Domain Name System (DNS) Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   6.  Extending the length of HITs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   7.  Analysis of the Three Solutions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   9.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

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1.  Introduction

   While having obtained a tremendous success, the current Internet
   architecture shows its limits in many aspects.  For example, the
   current Internet cannot well support the incorporation of mobile and
   multi-homed terminals, lacks essential security mechanisms, and
   suffers from the issues caused by the explosively increased lengths
   of routing tables.  In order to address these challenges, a
   comprehensive solution, the Host Identity Protocol (HIP), was
   proposed.  A simple principle behind HIP is to separate hosts'
   identities from their topological locations in the Internet.
   Currently, the basic architectures and protocols of HIP have been
   developed, which are security-inherited and provides essential
   supports for mobility and multi-homing features.

   There is no hierarchcial information in the current HITs; hosts in
   the current HIP architecture are organized as all "flat".  This is
   largely because a flat HIP namespace is simple and easy to implement.
   This document first discusses the issues with the flat HIP
   architecture and analyzes the benefits brought by integrating
   hierarchical information with HIP in terms of security, management,
   integration with hierarchical overlays and etc.  Then, this document
   introduces several potential solutions which can be used to
   facilitate the integration of hierarchical information.

2.  Benefits introduced by Hierarchical Information

   Hierarchy is a practical methodology in the design and organization
   of non-trivial distributed systems, and has been adopted in many
   large-scale networks and distributed systems (e.g., Internet).  It
   brought benefits in terms of simplifying system architectures,
   improving the capability of system management, facilitating audit and
   security, and etc.  To be consistent with the hierarchical features
   of the Internet, two critical namespaces of the Internet, IP and
   FQDN, are designed in hierarchical ways.  However, based on certain
   concerns (e.g., easy implementation), the current HIT namespace is
   flat; HIP itself does not provide any support for hierarchy either.

   This section attempts to demonstrate that current HIP, by using
   hierarchical information, can be more efficient and flexible in many
   typical scenarios.

   Firstly, hierarchical information is essential for the combination of
   HIP with hierarchical overlays (e.g., hierarchical resolution
   mechanisms).  Compared with flat overlays where resources are
   maintained at essentially random nodes, hierarchical overlays are
   able to support reasonable business and trust models where resources

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   are managed by Administrative Domains (ADs) with distinct boundaries.
   For example, it is normally not desired for a country to have its
   resolution infrastructure and the related data resources managed by
   other countries.  In order to correctly route across hierarchical
   overlays, hierarchical information (e.g., AD identifiers) is required
   to identify the destination AD where the desired resources are
   maintained, while the resource identifiers are used to locate the

   Secondly, the hierarchical information can be used to address the
   uniqueness verification issues with HITs in current HIP solutions.
   In current HIP solutions, the HIT of each host is required to be
   unique all over the world, which is very difficult to guarantee.
   However, if the Internet is divided into multiple administration
   domains, this problem is relatively easier to address.  As
   hierarchical information (i.e., AD identifier) can be used to
   identify the AD of a HIT, it only needs to be guaranteed that the HIT
   is unique within the AD.  The process of verifying the uniqueness of
   HITs can be performed when the host registers its HIT with the AD.

   Moreover, hierarchical information has been widely employed in
   advanced authorization systems (e.g., attributes based or role-based
   authorization systems) to make the access control aggregates.  By
   using AD identifiers, it is possible for security managers to design
   the access control policies based on the AD of hosts so as to reduce
   the length of access control lists.  In contrast, there is nothing
   common between flat HITs that were assigned by the same authority or
   that their represented hosts have the same properties, and thus they
   are difficult to be categorized.

   Apart from the advantages mentioned above, hierarchical information
   may associate HIP with better HIT administrating and auditing
   capabilities.  The hierarchical information makes HITs more
   aggregative; they can be grouped according to its belonging authority
   or domain.  Each network operator just needs to manage and maintain
   HITs and their mapping information in a relatively small range.  Such
   advantages can make HIP easier to be accepted by the countries or
   organizations which have relatively strict management policies on
   their networks.

3.  Candidate Solutions

   There are various ways to integrate hierarchical information into the
   HIP architecture.  In the current version of document, we select
   three representative candidates, and more solution may be introduced
   in future versions.

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   The first type of solution is to embed hierarchical information into
   HITs directly.  For instance, divide a HIT into two parts; the first
   part indicates the hierarchical information of the host, and the
   second pare is the identifier of the host.  The principle behind this
   type of solution is similar with IP addresses.

   The second type of solution is to transport hierarchical information
   somewhere outside HITs, e.g., in a certificate or in a parameter.  In
   the preceding case, the certificate can be transported within the
   CERT parameter of the HIT header.

   The third type of solution is a hybrid of the above two types of
   solutions.  This type of solution extends the length of the 128 bits
   HITs.  The extended place is used to contain hierarchical

4.  Integrating Hierarchical Information into 128 Bits HITs

   In this section, we introduce an example hierarchically structured
   HIT namespace.  In this hierarchical HIT namespace, a 128-bit HIT
   consists of two parts: an n-bit HIP AD ID and a (128-n)-bit local
   host ID. (n is a subject to be decided in the future.)  It can
   represent maximum 2^n administrative domains and 2^(128-n) hosts
   within each administrative domain.  The Administrative Domain ID has
   embedded organizational affiliation and global uniqueness.  The local
   host ID is a hash over the AD ID and the public key of the ID owner.
   |           n bits              |            128-n bits           |
   |  HIP Administrative Domain ID |           local host ID         |

                     HIT with Hierarchical Information

   Since the local host ID is a hash result, the strength of the local
   host ID in tolerating brute-force attacks is affected by its length.
   If the hash algorithm cannot be inverted, the expected number of
   iterations required for a brute force attack is O(2^(128-n)) in order
   to find a local host ID that matches with a given local host ID.
   Therefore, for the secure consideration, we recommend to only assign
   necessary bits for HIP administrative domain ID and leave space for
   the local host ID as much as possible.  It should be noted that this
   draft does not take into account the ORCHID prefix defined in
   [RFC4843] for two reasons: firstly, ORCHID is only temporary assigned
   for experimental usage till 2014 only.  The proposal design in the
   document is targeting to be used continuously after 2014.  Secondly,
   the fixed 28-bit orchid prefix reduces the security properties
   massively and increase collusion possibility highly.

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   The HIP administrative domain, as its literal, is a logic region in
   which the HIs of all nodes are assigned by the same authority.
   Within a same HIP administrative domain, all the nodes should have
   the same HIP AD ID or the same leftmost certain bits.  Furthermore,
   the authority may be organized internally hierarchically.

   The HIP AD ID should be assigned by a global administrative
   organization with the principle that every HIP AD ID must be globally

   Consequentially, the HIP AD IDs may be organized hierarchically.  For
   example, a big organization may obtain a block of HIP AD IDs with an
   assigned 16-bit prefix.  It then can assign 24-bit HIP AD IDs to its
   sub-organizations.  All these sub-organizations have the same
   leftmost 16-bit.

   One promising allocation solution of HIP AD ID is following current
   routable IP address allocation system [RFC2050].  At first IANA
   allocates some HIP AD ID prefixes to RIR (Region Internet Registry)
   or NIR (National Internet Registry),then RIR or NIR sub-allocates the
   HIP AD ID prefix to LIR or backbone ISP that subdivides the tag
   prefix to middle or small ISP.  Historical experience of routable IP
   address allocation indicates that the allocation system can ensure
   global uniqueness of HIP AD IDs.

   An advantage of this solution is that the HHIT architecture can build
   a distributed catalogue based on current IP address Internet
   Registry.  Each level Internet Registry only needs to maintain its
   HHIT information.  This catalogue is like current IP Whois Server
   operated by each IP address Internet Registry.  But it should include
   many more attributes about a HHIT, such as organizational
   affiliation, geographical information, privacy protection rule etc.
   The catalogue should be independent of current IP Whois system and IP
   address Internet Registry should provide some mechanism to translate
   HHIT to its useful attributes on demand of various applications.

   The local host IDs remains the original meaning of HIT - "a hashed
   encoding of the Host Identity".  For each HIP administrative domain,
   it is mandatory to maintain the uniqueness of all local host IDs.  It
   is guaranteed by the process of generating a HIT, see Section 5.

   For resolution purposes, HITs are aggregatable with AD IDs of
   arbitrary bit-length, similar to IPv4 addresses under Classless
   Inter-Domain Routing [RFC4632].

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4.1.  Compatible flat-structured HITs

   Obviously, not all hosts are willing to use hierarchical HITs in all
   scenarios for various reasons, such as privacy.  Therefore, it is
   useful that the hierarchical HIT architecture keep compatible with
   the flat HIT architecture.

   The flat HITs can be defined as a specific sub-set of the
   hierarchical HITs architecture.  With the same reserved Flat HIT Tag
   (3 or 4 bits) at the beginning, for example, the left-most 3 bits is
   000, the flat HITs can be used as defined in [RFC4423].
   |                           128 bits                              |
   |FHIT Tag|            Flat host identity tag                      |

4.2.  HITs on nodes

   HIP-enabled nodes may have considerable or little knowledge of the
   internal structure of hierarchical HITs, depending on the role the
   node plays (for instance, host versus mapping server).  At a minimum,
   a node may consider pre-generated HITs have no internal structure:
   |                           128 bits                              |
   |                       host identity tag                         |

   Only sophisticated hosts may additionally be aware of the type of
   their HITS and use the hierarchical structure of HITs to simplify the
   resolution procedure.

4.3.  Generating a hierarchical HIT

   The process of generating a new hierarchical HIT takes three input
   values: an n-bit HIP AD ID, a 2-bit collusion count, (an example, it
   is a subject to be changed in the future.) the host identity (the
   public key of an asymmetric key pair).  A hierarchical HIT should be
   generated as follows:

   1.  Set the 2-bit collision count to zero.

   2.  Concatenate from left to right the HIP AD ID, the collusion
       count, and the host identity.  Execute the SHA-1 algorithm on the
       concatenation.  Take the (128-2-n) leftmost bits of the SHA-1
       hash value.

   3.  Concatenate from left to right the n-bit HIP AD ID, the 2-bit
       collusion count and (128-2-n)-bit hash output to form a 128-bit

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   4.  Perform duplicate detection within the HIP administrative domain
       scope.  If a HIT collision is detected, increment the collision
       count by one and go back to step 2.  However, after four
       collisions, stop and report the error.  (Note: the duplicate
       detection mechanism is not discussed in this document.  It may be
       broadcast or central registration.)

   The design that includes the HIP AD ID in the hash input is mainly
   against the re-computation attack: create a database of HITs and
   matching public keys.  With the design, an attacker must create a
   separate database for each HIP administrative domain.

   The design reduces the number of bit of hash output 2 bits lower.  It
   does reduce the safety.  However, O(2^(128-2-n)) iterations is large
   enough to prevent brute-force attacks.

   For security reason, the abovementioned SHA-1 hash algorithm may be
   replaced by any safer algorithm.

5.  Transporting Hierarchical information outside HITs

   As mentioned previously, there are at least two methods of
   transporting hierarchical information in HIP headers, i.e., using
   certificates and using parameters.  Compared with the certificate
   oriented method, it is relatively more efficient to use parameters to
   transport hierarchical information.  For instance, some parameters of
   a certificate (e.g., the name and the public key of the subject) are
   already contained in HIT headers.  When using a certificate to
   transport hierarchical information, these parameters may have to be
   transported again, causing redundancy.  In addition, certificates
   have to be signed by issuers.  The signature of a certificate can be
   used to verify the authenticity of the transported hierarchical
   information, which is very useful when the certificate is used to
   transport hierarchical information for the source HIT of a HIP
   packet.  However, when the certificate is used to transport
   hierarchical information for the destination HIT of a HIP packet, the
   signature is redundant because the receiver of the packet needs not
   to verify the authenticity of its hierarchical information.  Another
   concern is performance.  A HIT can be attached with multiple
   certificates which are issued by diverse third parties for the
   various purposes.  The system thus may have to go through all the
   certificates in order to find the proper certificate issued by the AD
   and use it to assess the validity of the HIT.

   In the remainder of this section, we mainly introduce an example

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   Hierarchical_HIT Parameter which is used to transport hierarchical
   information.  In addition, several associated extensions are

5.1.  Hierarchical_HIT Parameter

   This parameter contains the information about the AD and should be
   transported in R1 and I2 packets of basic.

   Type       61698
   Length     length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding
   ADI Type   type of the Administration Domain Identifier field
   ADI Length length of the FQDN or NAI in octets
   NB Length  length of the Not Before Time field in octets
   NA Length  length of the Not After Time field in octets
   AD         the identifier of the AD of the sender
   Not Before the beginning of the valid period of the HIT of the sender
   Not After  the end of the valid period of the HIT of the sender
   SIG alg    signature algorithm
   Signature  the signature is generated by the AD previously,
              calculated over the concatenation of Host Identity field
              of HOST_ID, and AD Identifier, Not Before Time, Not After
              Time fields of the Hierarchical_HIT parameter.

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   |              Type             |            Length             |
   |ADIType|    ADI Length         |           NB Length           |
   |      NA Length                |           Sig Length          |
   |    SIG alg    |              AD Identifier                    /
   /                               |          Not Before Time      /
   /                               |          Not After Time       /
   /                               |          Signature            /
   /                             |          Padding                |

   The following ADI Types have been defined:

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     | Type                                                 | Value |
     | none included                                        | 0     |
     | FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name, in binary format) | 1     |
     | NAI (Network Access Identifier)                      | 2     |

   The format for the FQDN is defined in[RFC1035] Section 3.1.  The
   format for NAI is defined in [RFC4282].  Not Before Time and Not
   After Time fields can either UTCTime or GeneralizedTime defined in
   [RFC2459].  SIG alg is set to 0 when there is no signature included.
   In this case, Sig Length is set 0 as well.

   Note that the parameter introduced in this section only consists of
   very essential information.  The parameter may need to be extended or
   modified before being applied in future.

5.2.  Hierarchical Information Registration

   If the authenticity of the hierarchical information of a HIT needs to
   be proved in practice, the HIT need to register with an AD and obtain
   the signature.  The registration process can be whether in-band or
   out-of-band.  In the following diagram, a protocol for hierarchical
   information registration is illustrated.
                +-----+                            +------+
                |     |            I1              |      |
                |     |--------------------------->|      |
                |     |<---------------------------|      |
                |  I  |         R1(REG_INFO)       | AD   |
                |     |         I2(REG_REQ)        |Server|
                |     |--------------------------->|      |
                |     |<---------------------------|      |
                |     |         R2(REG_RES)        |      |
                +-----+                            +------+

   This protocol is an extension of basic by using the HIP Registration
   Extension [RFC5203].  In R1, AD Server sends the service it provides
   to Initiator in the REG_INFO element.  Initiator then attaches the
   REG-REQ element and the HHIT parameter with the I2 message.  The
   Signature field in the parameter is left unfilled.  The AD server
   signs the HHIT and its parameters, and sends the signature back in

5.3.  Domain Name System (DNS) Extension

   This section introduces a DNS extension which further extends the HIP
   RR Storage Format proposed in [RFC5205].

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   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   | HIT Length    |  PK algorithm |           PK Length           |
   |ADIType|     ADI Length        |           NB Length           |
   |         NA Length             |             HIT               /
   /                               |        Public Key             /
   /                               |     Rendezvous Server         /
   /                               |        AD Identifier          /
   /                               |       Not Before Time         /
   /                               |       Not After Time          /
   /       |

   Apart from the fields illustrated in [RFC5205], the extension
   includes following fields: ADI type, ADI Length, NB Length, NA
   Length, AD Identifier, Not Before Time, Not After Time.  Because the
   meanings of these fields is identical to their counterparts in the
   Hierarchical_HIT Parameter, they are not introduced here in detail.

6.  Extending the length of HITs

   In this section, we introduce a hybrid of the above two types of
   solutions.  In this solution, hierarchical information is integrated
   within HITs.  Unlike the solution proposed in section 3, the space of
   the flat hash part of a HIT does not have to be occupied.  Instead,
   the whole length of the HIT is extended, and the extended space is
   used to contain the hierarchical information.  An example of such
   hierarchical HITs is presented in the following figure.
   |                           128 bits                              |
   |                       hierarchical information part             |
   |                       flat hash part                            |

   The enlarged HIT presented in the figure can be broken into two
   parts: the hierarchical information part and the flat hash part.  In
   this example, the flat hash part is generated by hashing the

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   concatenation of hierarchical information part and the associated
   public key.  In order to keep enough capability in tolerating brute
   force attacks and be compatible with TCP, it is recommended the flat
   hash part is set 128 bits long.  When receiving such a HIT, a user
   only transfers the flat hash part to the TCP layer, and thus TCP will
   treat it as an ordinary IPv6 address.

7.  Analysis of the Three Solutions

   A criticism on the first type of solution is that the capability of
   an identifier in tolerating brute-force attacks is affected as a part
   of the space of the identifier that is occupied by the topological
   information.  This issue can be largely addressed by puzzles which
   have been employed in Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)
   [RFC3972].  Also, it is possible to extend the length of HITs to
   enhance their tolerant capability on brute force attacks.

   Another concern with hierarchical HITs is that they are not suitable
   for the scenario where hosts do not intend to disclose their
   hierarchical information.  In section 4, these problems and
   associated solutions are introduced.

   The second type of solution allows a user to flexibly present or hide
   the hierarchical information in various circumstances.  A
   disadvantage imposed by this type of solution is that more traffic
   needs to be transported as both certificates and parameters may
   contain redundant information.

   Compared with the first type of solution, the capability of the third
   type of solution in tolerating brute force attacks is not influenced.
   Additionally, compared with the second type of solution, the third
   type of solution avoids transporting the redundant information.
   However, a disadvantage of the third type of solution is that it
   modifies the architecture of HIP headers.

8.  IANA Considerations

   The namespace, HIP AD ID, defined in section 4 is an n-bit long
   value, which represents a globally unique HIP administrative domain.
   IANA may found an authority institute to manage the global assignment
   of HIP AD ID.

   Additionally, IANA is expected to allocate a type code for the
   Hierarchical_HIT Parameter illustrated in section 5.

   Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an

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9.  Security Considerations

   The hierarchical HIT routing infrastructure provides some mechanisms
   for defending attacks (e.g., proving HIT ownership, certificate
   binding hierarchical HITs to a trusted third party, or random AD
   IDs).  Below we list some possible attacks on hierarchical HITs.

   Forging hierarchical HITs.   An attacker generates a HIT with certain
      attack-suitable properties for using it for further attacks.
      Classes of such properties are listed below.  For checking the
      existence of a HIT, the name resolution system (DNS/DHT) can be

      Intrusion.  Generation of HITs belonging to some organization.  As
         a result the attacker can participate in communications between
         organization's hosts.  Organization's AD ID is known to the
         attacker, and 64-bit hash value is generated.  The attacker has
         to prove the ownership of that HIT since it does not have the
         private key.

      Substitution.  An attacker tries to use the HIT already existed in
         the organization.  As a result, the attacker substitutes good
         host.  Generation of HITs (64 bits of hash value) randomly or
         by enumeration.  For every HIT the attacker tries to join the

      Cutting.  AD ID can code a hierarchy with in a large organization.
         The hierarchy of AD ID is based on prefixes.  As a result, an
         attacker can generate a HIT that shares a prefix with the AD ID
         of the organization.  Hence the attacker cuts a part of HIT
         space.  Similarly to intrusion and substitution except that the
         generated HITs share some prefix with the given AD ID.

      Accumulation.  Valid HITs can be prepared in advance, i.e.,
         collected in a database.  Similarly to substitution attack, the
         attacker generates HITs and tries to join.  Is it possible to
         identify that the HIT is in use and what is the ratio of
         successful identifications (does HIT exist or not) .

      Sybils.  Introduction of many forged HITs.  They incrementally
         appear in the system.  The attacker has a host with a valid HIT
         joined to the system.  Can this host introduce new participants
         (with new HITs) easier than a newcomer without a protege.

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   Denial of Service.   The hierarchical HIT infrastructure consists of
      DNS and DHT servers.  In addition, there can be third-party
      servers, e.g., for license binding.  All such servers are a target
      to DoS attacks, including DDoS.

      1.  Generation of a high-rate request flow to a DNS server.

      2.  Generation of a high-rate request flow to a DHT server (or a
          set of severs of a given organization).

      3.  Generation of a high-rate request flow to a third-party
          server.  It controls its service rate limiting incoming

   Pollution.   Similarly to DoS attacks, DNS and DHT servers are target
      to incorrect data.1.  The attacker tries to store bogus AAAA
      records for hierarchical HIT in DNS. 2.  Similarly to the
      intrusion and substitution attacks, the attacker tries to insert
      bogus HITs into DHT system of a given organization.

10.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks Thomas.  R. Henderson for his kindly prove-reading and
   precious comments.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2050]  Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and
              BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2459]  Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, T., and D. Solo, "Internet
              X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL
              Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999.

   [RFC4282]  Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The
              Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005.

   [RFC4423]  Moskowitz, R. and P. Nikander, "Host Identity Protocol
              (HIP) Architecture", RFC 4423, May 2006.

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   [RFC5201]  Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson,
              "Host Identity Protocol", RFC 5201, April 2008.

   [RFC5203]  Laganier, J., Koponen, T., and L. Eggert, "Host Identity
              Protocol (HIP) Registration Extension", RFC 5203,
              April 2008.

   [RFC5205]  Nikander, P. and J. Laganier, "Host Identity Protocol
              (HIP) Domain Name System (DNS) Extensions", RFC 5205,
              April 2008.

11.2.  Informative References

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [RFC3972]  Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
              RFC 3972, March 2005.

   [RFC4632]  Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
              (CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
              Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, August 2006.

   [RFC4843]  Nikander, P., Laganier, J., and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix
              for Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers
              (ORCHID)", RFC 4843, April 2007.

Authors' Addresses

   Xiaohu Xu
   Huawei Technologies Co.,Ltd
   HuaWei Building, No.3 Xinxi Rd., Shang-Di Information Industry Base, Hai-Dian District
   Beijing,   100085
   P. R. China


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Internet-Draft              Hierarchical HIP                  March 2012

   Sheng Jiang
   Huawei Technologies Co.,Ltd
   HuaWei Building, No.3 Xinxi Rd., Shang-Di Information Industry Base, Hai-Dian District
   Beijing,   100085
   P. R. China


   Dacheng Zhang
   Huawei Technologies Co.,Ltd
   HuaWei Building, No.3 Xinxi Rd., Shang-Di Information Industry Base, Hai-Dian District
   Beijing,   100085
   P. R. China


   Dmitry Korzun


   Zhen Cao
   Xuanwumenxi Ave. No.32
   Beijing,   100053

   Phone: 86-10-52686688

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