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Versions: 00                                                            
anima                                                              Y. Li
Internet-Draft                                                   L. Shen
Intended status: Standards Track                     Huawei Technologies
Expires: December 30, 2021                                 June 28, 2021


         Autonomic IP Address To Access Control Groups Mapping
           draft-yizhou-anima-ip-to-access-control-groups-00

Abstract

   This document defines the autonomic technical objectives for IP
   address/prefix to access control groups mapping.  The objectives
   defined can be used in Generic Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)
   to make the policy enforcement point receive IP address and its tied
   access control groups information directly from the access
   authentication points and then execute the group based policies.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 30, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of




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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Problems  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Autonomic IP Address to Access Control Groups Mapping
       Procedures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Behaviours of IP Address to Access Control Groups Mapping
           Requesting Nodes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Behaviours of IP Address to Access Control Groups Mapping
           Providing Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Autonomic IP Address to Access Control Groups Objectives  . .   8
     5.1.  IPAddressToAccessControlGroups Objective Option . . . . .   8
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix A.  Objective Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   Ubiquitous group based policy management makes sure that the users
   can obtain the same network access permission and QoS assurance
   wherever they access the campus network.  That is, the permission and
   QoS assurance are tied to user role, rather than access points and/or
   IP address assigned.

   Group means a number of endpoints connecting to the network that
   share common network policies.  It facilitates the easy design and
   provision of policy.  A user's role is usually a group indicated by a
   group ID.  Group based policy management has been replacing the
   traditional IP address and/or port number based policy widely.

   The policy enforcement point (PEP) requires the IP address/prefix and
   access control group mapping information of user in order to execute
   the group based policy.  This mapping information is usually first
   available at the access authentication point (AAP) during the
   procedures of user access and authentication/authorization.  However
   PEP may not be the access authentication point.  Therefore IP and
   group mappings has to be passed to PEP.





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   This document defines the autonomic technical objectives for IP
   address/prefix and access control group mapping.  In this document,
   group is also used for short to refer to the access control group.
   The Generic Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP) [RFC8990] can make
   use of these technical objectives as the basic building blocks of a
   ubiquitous group based policy management solution, especially for a
   campus network.

   Autonomic Networking Infrastructure (ANI) is designed to provide the
   elementary functions and services to be further integrated and used
   by Autonomic Service Agents (ASA) on nodes.  The campus policy
   management ASA can integrate the function introduced in this document
   when necessary.

2.  Terminologies

   This document uses terminology defined in [RFC7575].

   PEP:  Policy Enforcement Point.  A logical entity that enforces
      policy decisions [RFC3198].  The policy decisions are group based
      policies in this document.

   AAP:  Access Authentication Point.  A logical entity that obtains the
      information of the attaching clients' assigned IP address/prefix
      and their access control groups.  AAP may get the information from
      one or different resources, for example, DHCP [RFC2131] [RFC8415]
      server and/or RADIUS [RFC3198] server.

3.  Problems

   The traditional policy in a campus network is normally presented as
   IP prefix/address based, for example, "Deny the traffic from IP
   prefix X to IP prefix Y".  Each of the access port of the switches is
   assigned a subnet prefix and each subnet implies a group.  It works
   well when the end hosts are static.  With the increasing deployment
   of wireless accessed users and more complicated and dynamic
   requirements of campus network policy, such an assumption no longer
   hold.  For instance, a user from the engineering department may bring
   the laptop to access the campus network via a WiFi access point.
   Then it will be assigned an IP address from a different subnet prefix
   from the other fixed end hosts in the same engineering department.
   It is hard and tedious to provision the consistent policy with the
   other hosts in the same group for this specific IP address.  Another
   example is a user can belong to more than one group, say group of
   department A and also VIP group.  Group assignment is much more
   flexible than subnet defined IP address assignment.





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   Therefore group based policy is used in such cases.  No matter what
   IP address is assigned to the user, its belonging access control
   groups have no change and the group based policies has no change too.
   For example, the policy can be "Allow the traffic from group
   engineering to group testing, and assign the traffic destined to VIP
   group the highest priority".  In order to make group based policy
   work, the IP address and its group mapping information has to be
   stored on PEP so that IP addresses carried in data packet can be
   mapped to the group ID first and then the policy can be enforced.

   IP and group mapping information is usually first available at the
   access authentication point (AAP).  Figure 1 show a typical campus
   network.  The policy enforcement point (PEP) can be core switches,
   while the access authentication point (AAP) is the access switch in
   the figure.  AAP serves as the DHCP relay which remembers the IP
   address assigned to the client and/or at the same time it talks to
   AAA server to get the client's group information based on client's
   identity.

       +-------+     +-------+
       | core1 | --- | core2 |               core switches (PEP)
       +-------+    /+-------+
        |  \       /  |     \
        |   \     /   |      \
        |    \   /    |       \
        |     \ /     |        \
        |      \      |         \
    +-------+ / \ +-------+   +-------+
    | acc1  |/   \| acc2  |   | acc3  |        access switches
    +-------+     +-------+   +-------+            (AAP)
                                   |
                                   |
                                   |
                                   |
                               +-------+
                               | WiFi  |
                               | AP1   |       wifi access point
                               +-------+



                   Figure 1: Hierarchical Campus Network

   A more complex campus network is shown in Figure 2.  There are 4 PEPs
   are deployed at the key positions for different types of traffic.
   The AAPs obtaining a user's IP and group ID mapping information are
   access switches (not fully shown in the figure) which are the access
   nodes for the attaching clients.



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   The problem to be solved by Autonomic Networking here is how to make
   IP address/prefix and access control group mapping information
   available at PEP from AAP.

                            via SSL VPN tunnel     -----
                           +--------+            /       \
                           | user2  |-----------+Internet |
                           |(group1)|           |         |
                           +--------+            \-------/
                                                     |
                                                     |
                                                     |
                               +---------------------|--------+
           -----               |                     |        |
         /       \             |  +--------+     +--------+   |
        |   WAN   | --------------|  WAN   |     |SSL VPN |   |
        |         |            |  | border |     |Internet|   |
         \-------/             |  |firewall|     |gateway |   |
             |                 |  +--------+     +--------+   |
             |                 |      |PEP3         | PEP2    |
             |                 |      |        +----+         |
      +------|---------+       |      |        |              |
      |      |         |       |  +--------+   | +--------+   |
      |  +--------+    |       |  | core   |---+ |        |   |
      |  |  core  |    |       |  | switch |-----|firewall|   |
      |  | switch |    |       |  +--------+     +--------+   |
      |  +--------+    |       |      |            PEP1       |
      |      |PEP4     |       |      |                       |
      |      |         |       |      |                       |
      |      |         |       |  +--------+     +--------+   |
      |  +--------+    |       |  | switch | --- | switch |   |
      |  | switch |    |       |  +--------+     +--------+   |
      |  +--------+    |       |      |              |        |
      |      |         |       |      |              |        |
      |      |         |       |  +--------+     +--------+   |
      |  +--------+    |       |  | user1  |     | user3  |   |
      |  | user4  |    |       |  |(group1)|     |(group2)|   |
      |  |(group2)|    |       |  +--------+     +--------+   |
      |  +--------+    |       |                              |
      |                |       |                              |
      |                |       |                              |
      |Branch          |       | Headquarter                  |
      +----------------+       +------------------------------+


               Figure 2: Campus Networks with remote access





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   Some deployment uses a centralized controller to solve this problem.
   Every single AAP reports its IP and group ID mapping information to
   the controller.  When a PEP receives a data packet, it queries the
   controller for the group IDs of the source and/or destination IP
   addresses and then enforce the group based policy.  This approach
   requires an explicit controller able to talk to each and every AAP
   and PEP.  In the deployment where the headquarter and branch campus
   networks are far apart, it will require controllers for each site to
   exchange information or have another super-controller to help
   exchange the information among sites.  It introduces the complexity
   and interoperability issues.

   Autonomic Networking (AN) puts the intelligence at the node level, to
   minimize dependency on human administrators and central management
   such as a controller.  The Autonomic Networking approach discussed in
   this document is based on the assumption that there is a generic
   discovery and negotiation protocol that enables direct negotiation
   between the routers or switches.  GRASP [RFC8990] is intended to be
   such a protocol which can make use of the technical objectives
   defined in the following sections as the basic building blocks of a
   ubiquitous group based policy management solution, especially for a
   campus network.  The ultimate goal is self-management of campus
   networks which can expand over multiple sites and share the same set
   of policies, including self-configuration, self-optimization, self-
   healing and self-protection (sometimes collectively called self-X).

4.  Autonomic IP Address to Access Control Groups Mapping Procedures

   An Autonomic Service Agent (ASA) participates in IP address/prefix to
   access control groups mapping is called
   IPAddressToAccessControlGroups ASA in this document.  The procedures
   carried out by IPAddressToAccessControlGroups ASA is illustrated
   below.

4.1.  Behaviours of IP Address to Access Control Groups Mapping
      Requesting Nodes

   IPAddressToAccessControlGroups requesting node is usually a PEP in a
   domain which executes the group based policy.  So it needs to map an
   IP address/prefix to one or more group IDs first.  Such mapping
   information will be stored locally until either timeout or withdrawn.

   The request can be triggered by a data packet.  Group based policy
   requires both the source and destination group IDs which are normally
   mapped from source and destination IP addresses.  If any of such
   mapping is not locally available, the requesting node needs to ask
   for it.  In some implementation, data packet encapsulation includes
   the source group ID directly such as in the reserved field in VXLAN



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   [RFC7348].  Therefore it is up to the requesting node to determine if
   both source and destination groups or only one of them to be queried.
   In some cases that the requesting node is a tunnel endpoint, it
   should be noted that usually the inner rather than outer IP addresses
   are to be used to query for the corresponding group id.

   The request can also be sent periodically or voluntarily.  It can
   happen when a newly booted requesting node wants to get the whole
   batch of IP address and access control group mapping information or
   when a requesting node would like have an explicit refreshment on the
   information.

   The IPAddressToAccessControlGroups ASA should send out a GRASP
   Discovery message that contains a IPAddressToAccessControlGroups
   Objective option in order to discover peers supporting this option.
   The requesting ASA acts as a GRASP synchronization initiator by
   sending a GRASP Request message with a IPAddressToAccessControlGroups
   Objective option.  The ASA indicates an IP prefix or address in this
   option.  This starts a GRASP synchronization process.

4.2.  Behaviours of IP Address to Access Control Groups Mapping
      Providing Nodes

   IPAddressToAccessControlGroups providing node is usually an AAP of a
   user in a domain.  It obtains the mapping of IP address and group IDs
   of an endpoint in various ways.  For instance, use RADIUS [RFC2865]
   or CAPWAP [RFC5415] to get the user's access control group IDs during
   authentication phase and/or use DHCP snooping to get the user's
   assigned IP address.  Sometimes such mapping information can be
   statically provisioned based on port or VLAN.  The mapping
   information is stored locally on AAP.

   A device that receives a Discovery message with a
   IPAddressToAccessControlGroups Objective option should respond with a
   GRASP Response message if it contains a
   IPAddressToAccessControlGroups ASA.  When this ASA receives a
   subsequent Request message, it should reply with a GRASP
   Synchronization messages.  The Synchronization messages carry a
   IPAddressToAccessControlGroups Objective option, which will indicate
   the mappings between the IP address/prefix and group IDs.  Optionally
   the expiration time can be tied to each mapping.

   The IP address to access control groups mapping providing node can
   send the Flood Synchronization message if it has any update or
   withdraw regarding its providing mapping information.

   The providing nodes of address to access control groups mapping
   information are usually at the edges and can be added or replaced



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   with the expansion of the network.  The requesting nodes are normally
   aggregation or core nodes with more storage and capability to enforce
   the policy.  Therefore the number of mapping information providing
   nodes is usually more than the number of requesting nodes.  The
   providing node can be the one initiating the GRASP Discovery message
   as well and/or send the unsolicited Synchronization message
   [I-D.ietf-anima-grasp-distribution].

5.  Autonomic IP Address to Access Control Groups Objectives

   This section defines the GRASP technical objective options that are
   used to support autonomic IP address/prefix to access control groups
   mapping.

5.1.  IPAddressToAccessControlGroups Objective Option

   The IPAddressToAccessControlGroups Objective option is a GRASP
   objective option conforming to [RFC8990].  The name of this option is
   "IPAddressToAccessControlGroups".  It carries the IP prefix/address
   and its mapping access control group id.  The format of
   IPAddressToAccessControlGroups Objective option in CBOR (Concise
   Binary Object Representation [RFC8949]) is show in Concise data
   definition language (CDDL) [RFC8610] as follows.  Tags for general
   IPv4 and IPv6 addresses and prefixes defined in
   [I-D.ietf-cbor-network-addresses] are used.


























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   objective = ["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups",
                objective-flags, loop-count,
                [ip-address-or-prefix, *group-id]]

   group-id = uint

   ; copied from draft-ietf-cbor-network-addresses, RFC YYYY TBD:

   ip-address-or-prefix = ipv6-address-or-prefix/ipv4-address-or-prefix

   ipv6-address-or-prefix = #6.54(ipv6-address / ipv6-prefix)
   ipv4-address-or-prefix = #6.52(ipv4-address / ipv4-prefix)

   ipv6-prefix = [ipv6-prefix-length, ipv6-prefix-bytes]
   ipv4-prefix = [ipv4-prefix-length, ipv4-prefix-bytes]

   ipv6-prefix-length = 0..128
   ipv4-prefix-length = 0..32

   ipv6-prefix-bytes = bytes .size (uint .le 16)
   ipv4-prefix-bytes = bytes .size (uint .le 4)

   ipv6-address = bytes .size 16
   ipv4-address = bytes .size 4

   ; copied from the GRASP specification, RFC 8990:

      objective-flags = uint .bits objective-flag

      objective-flag = &(
        F_DISC: 0    ; valid for discovery
        F_NEG: 1     ; valid for negotiation
        F_SYNCH: 2   ; valid for synchronization
        F_NEG_DRY: 3 ; negotiation is a dry run
      )
      loop-count = 0..255


   A common practice currently usually uses 16 bits to present a group
   ID.  But the representation does not limit that.  Zero group ID would
   be used for full retraction of a prefix or address.

6.  Security Considerations

   Security consideration for GRASP [RFC8990] applies in this document.
   The preferred security model is that devices are trusted following
   the secure bootstrap procedure [RFC8995] and that a secure Autonomic
   Control Plane (ACP) [RFC8994] is in place.



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7.  IANA Considerations

   This document defines a new GRASP Objective option name:
   "IPAddressToAccessControlGroups".  The IANA is requested to added it
   to the "GRASP Objective Names" subregistry defined by [RFC8990].

8.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Carsten Bormann, Brian Carpenter and Michael Richardson for
   useful suggestions and revising CDDL representations.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC7575]  Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., Bjarnason, S., Clemm, A.,
              Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and L. Ciavaglia, "Autonomic
              Networking: Definitions and Design Goals", RFC 7575,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7575, June 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7575>.

   [RFC8610]  Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
              Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
              Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
              JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
              June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.

   [RFC8990]  Bormann, C., Carpenter, B., Ed., and B. Liu, Ed., "GeneRic
              Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", RFC 8990,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8990, May 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8990>.

   [I-D.ietf-anima-grasp-distribution]
              Liu, B., Xiao, X., Hecker, A., Jiang, S., Despotovic, Z.,
              and Brian, "Information Distribution over GRASP", draft-
              ietf-anima-grasp-distribution-02 (work in progress), March
              2021.

   [I-D.ietf-cbor-network-addresses]
              Richardson, M., "CBOR tags for IPv4 and IPv6 addresses and
              prefixes", draft-ietf-cbor-network-addresses-04 (work in
              progress), April 2021.

9.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2131]  Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
              RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131>.



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   [RFC2865]  Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
              "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
              RFC 2865, DOI 10.17487/RFC2865, June 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2865>.

   [RFC3198]  Westerinen, A., Schnizlein, J., Strassner, J., Scherling,
              M., Quinn, B., Herzog, S., Huynh, A., Carlson, M., Perry,
              J., and S. Waldbusser, "Terminology for Policy-Based
              Management", RFC 3198, DOI 10.17487/RFC3198, November
              2001, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3198>.

   [RFC5415]  Calhoun, P., Ed., Montemurro, M., Ed., and D. Stanley,
              Ed., "Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Points
              (CAPWAP) Protocol Specification", RFC 5415,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5415, March 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5415>.

   [RFC7348]  Mahalingam, M., Dutt, D., Duda, K., Agarwal, P., Kreeger,
              L., Sridhar, T., Bursell, M., and C. Wright, "Virtual
              eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN): A Framework for
              Overlaying Virtualized Layer 2 Networks over Layer 3
              Networks", RFC 7348, DOI 10.17487/RFC7348, August 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7348>.

   [RFC8415]  Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
              Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
              "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
              RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.

   [RFC8949]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.

   [RFC8994]  Eckert, T., Ed., Behringer, M., Ed., and S. Bjarnason, "An
              Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)", RFC 8994,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8994, May 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8994>.

   [RFC8995]  Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
              and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
              Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
              May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8995>.







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Appendix A.  Objective Examples

   This appendix shows a number of examples of objective defined in this
   document conforming to the CDDL syntax given in Section 5.1.

   ["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 101,
      [54([4, h'A50386A78BA56FA4BBC734281C51']), 3506, 2698, 4562]]

   ["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 5, 73, [52(h'9946B8A3'), 2881,
              2265, 1720, 2450]]

   ["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 161,
              [54(h'39F3045B641AD291B057CD1857A7314A')]]

   ["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 2, [52(h'98A1CE4F')]]

   ["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 66, [52(h'69A16BFE'), 2601,
              1851, 3876, 1405]]

   ["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 254,
     [54(h'38AB303B8895DC95068CE00248D2FE91'), 4019, 1166, 3113]]

   ["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 63, [52([4, h'0B48']), 3035,
              1181]]

   ["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 44, [52(h'01F1D8FF'), 3099,
              1577, 1138, 1670]]

   ["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 181,
              [54(h'2C74719F9355BA4E3BDE5689D1FE4CB0')]]

   ["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 129, [52(h'A2EF97C7'), 3149,
              2728]]

   ["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 18,
      [54(h'CD3868615B00D72A61A028822FEE6407'), 1832, 4605, 360, 3030]]

   ["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 171,
              [54(h'46929AE1103FDF6407A239323F71C234')]]

   ["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 42, [52([7, h'8E05'])]]

   ["IPAddressToAccessControlGroups", 15, 180,
              [54([41, h'2D85855FA9C3772AAB2F']), 672, 1205]]







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Authors' Addresses

   Yizhou Li
   Huawei Technologies

   Email: liyizhou@huawei.com


   Li Shen
   Huawei Technologies

   Email: kevin.shenli@huawei.com







































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