Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft IIJ Research Lab & Arrcus, Inc.
Intended status: Informational K. Patel
Expires: 16 May 2022 Arrcus, Inc.
P. Smith
PFS Internet Development Pty Ltd
M. Tinka
SEACOM
12 November 2021
RPKI Route Origin Validation Without Route Refresh
draft-ymbk-sidrops-rov-no-rr-00
Abstract
A BGP Speaker performing RPKI-based Route Origin Validation should
not issue Route Refresh to its neighbors when receiving new VRPs.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 May 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. Introduction
Memory constraints in early routers caused classic [RFC4271] BGP
implementations to not keep a full Adj-RIB-In (Sec. 1.1). When doing
RPKI-based Route Origin Validation ([RFC6811] and [RFC8481]), if such
a BGP speaker receives new ROAs/VRPs, it might not have kept paths
previously marked as Invalid. Such an implementation must then
request a Route Refresh [RFC7313] from its neighbors to recover the
paths which might be covered by these new VRPs. This will be
perceived as rude by those neighbors as it passes a serious resource
burden on to them. This document recommends implementations keep but
mark Invalidated paths so the Route Refresh is no longer needed.
2. Related Work
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271] and Route
Refresh [RFC7313], the RPKI [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs), [RFC6482], The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to
Router Protocol [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis], RPKI-based Prefix
Validation, [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications,
[RFC8481].
3. Operational Considerations
Operators deploying ROV SHOULD ensure that the router implementation
is not causing unnecessary Route Refresh requests to neighbors.
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If the router does not implement the recommendations here, the
operator SHOULD enable "soft reconfiguration inbound," which should
cause the Adj-RIB-In to be effectively kept. The operator should
then ensure that this stops unnecessary Route Refresh requests to
neighbors.
If the router has insufficient resources to support this, it SHOULD
not be used for Route Origin Validation.
4. Security Considerations
This document adds no additional security considerations to those
already described by the referenced documents.
5. IANA Considerations
None
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 2", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-
03, 15 August 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-03.txt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
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[RFC7313] Patel, K., Chen, E., and B. Venkatachalapathy, "Enhanced
Route Refresh Capability for BGP-4", RFC 7313,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7313, July 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7313>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based
on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481>.
6.2. Informative References
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Philip Smith and Mark Tinka.
Authors' Addresses
Randy Bush
IIJ Research Lab & Arrcus, Inc.
1856 SW Edgewood Dr
Portland, Oregon 97210
United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com
Keyur Patel
Arrcus, Inc.
2077 Gateway Place, Suite #400
San Jose, CA 95119
United States of America
Email: keyur@arrcus.com
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Philip Smith
PFS Internet Development Pty Ltd
PO Box 1908
Milton QLD 4064
Australia
Email: pfsinoz@gmail.com
Mark Tinka
SEACOM
Building 7, Design Quarter District, Leslie Avenue, Magaliessig
Fourways, Gautang
2196
South Africa
Email: mark.tinka@seacom.com
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