PKIX Working Group J. H. Yoon (KISA)
Internet Draft C. J. Chung
expires May, 2002 Y. Lee
J. I. Lee
November, 2001
Wireless Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format and Protocol (WCRMFP)
<draft-yoon-pkix-wireless-internet-00.txt>
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all
provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026.
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document describes the Wireless Certificate Request
Message Format and Protocol (WCRMFP) in wireless internet
environment. This format and protocol are used to convey a request
for a certificate to a Certification Authority (CA) (possibly via a
Registration Authority (RA)) for the purposes of X.509 certificate
production. The request will typically include a public key and
associated registration information.
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1. Introduction
Differring from wired system terminal, wirelss one has many
limitations in CPU, memory, battery life, and a user interface.
Moreover the wireless network has very low bandwith, latency, and
data loss. For that reasons, using PKCS#10 or CRMF(RFC2511) is
difficult in wireless environment. Actually the problem comes from
ASN.1 encoding. Some big modules, like ASN.1 (compilier) and
LDAP etc., can not be uploaded at mobile terminals. So new format
and protocol in certificate request are needed.
This document describes optimised certificate request format and
protocol using SignText function[WAPscriptCrypto] defined in WAP
specification.
1.1 Protocol requirements
Construction of a certification request involves the following steps:
a) A SignedContent(Certificate Request) value is constructed. This
value may include the public key, a portion of the end-entity's (EE's)
ID and password. Other requested certificate fields, and additional
control information related to the registration process are made in
off-line.
b) A proof of possession (of the private key corresponding to the
public key for which a certificate is being requested) value may
be calculated across the SignedContent value.
c) The CR(Certificate Request) message is securely
communicated to a CA. However the specific methods of secure
transport are beyond the scope of this document.
1.2 Terminology
The key words "MUST", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD",
"RECOMMENDED", and "MAY" in this document (in uppercase, as
shown) are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
The following abbreviations are used in this document.
A) CA: Certification Authority
B) CRL: Certificate Revocation List
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C) CMP: Certificate Management Protocol
D) DN: Distinguished Name
E) DER: Distinguished Encoding Rules
F) LDAP: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
G) POP: Proof of Possession [RFC2510]
H) PEM: Privacy Enhanced Mail
I) RA: Registration Authority
2. Protocol Overview
2.1 Certificate Request Process
To get a certificate, the subscriber MUST be identifed at RA through
direct confrontation and the subscriber makes the document which
contains other information for certificate. Then the RA SHOULD give
an ID and a Password for certificate request to subscriber.
The following describes the procedure that a user receives a digital
signature certificate in wireless PKI model.
a) RA (or CA) MUST confirm the subscriber's identification through
direct confrontation.
b) RA (or CA) SHOULD give an ID (Reference Number) and a
Password (Authorization Code) to subscriber.
c) RA MUST enroll a subscriber's information in its data-base and
sends it to related CA
d) The subscriber SHOULD generate a key pair and certificate
request form, signs on certificate request form, and sends it to RA
(or CA).
e) The RA (or CA) that received the certificate request form and
subscriber's digital signature MUST confirm the ownership of the
public key that actually corresponds to private key through verifying
the subscriber's digital signature. RA MAY send certificate request
form (PKCS#10 or RFC2511) to CA.
f) The CA issues a subscriber's X.509v3 certificate.
g) The CA publishes the certificate on its directory and SHOULD
give a subscriber's certificate or certificate URL [See Appendix C] to
RA or subscriber.
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h) The RA SHOULD send the response[See Appendix C]
information to the subscriber.
2.2 Configuration of certification request format
Subscribers SHOULD generate certificate request format including
their public keys, and configure a request format that can prevent
Replay attack, message counterfeiting and forging, and deliver the
certification request formats to a CA (or through an RA).
2.2.1 Message Format
SignedContent = signText(M|H(M,N), 1, 0, íí) [See Appendix B]
where, M = type | PK | ID
N = Password
H(M,N) [See RFC2104]
"type" : Type string value of management type (digital signature:
110, key distribution: 120) [See appendix A]
PK: digital signature verifying key of subscriber or public key for
key distribution [See appendix D]
ID: reference number of subscriber
Password : authorization code of subscriber
As the option of signText SHOULD be set at 1, PK (public key) and
ID are extracted from M among signed messages.
2.2.2 Structure of certification request protocol
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Subscriber | | RA (or CA)
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
CR = SignedContent | |
| -----> |
| | SignedContent = CR
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
RA(or CA) MUST verify SignedContent by means of PK (public
key). (POP verification process [RFC2510])
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RA (or CA) retrieves the Password corresponding to ID from its
database, and composes N. Then, RA (or CA) calculates H(M,N),
where the M is in the Subscriber's signed CR message. And RA
(or CA) compares calculated value with subscriber's hash value
which is in the Subscriber's signed CR message. (user
authentication)
3. References
[WAP211] Forum Proposed Version 9-Mar-2000, WAP-211-X.509:
WAP Certificate and CRL Profile
[WAP217] WAP Forum Proposed Version 3-Mar-2000,
WAP-217-WPKI: Wireless Application Protocol Public Key
Infrastructure Definition
[WAPe2e] WAP Forum Approved Version 11-July-2000, WAPTM
Transport Layer E2E Security Document
[WAPscriptCrypto] WAP Forum Proposed Version 05-Nov-1999,
WMLScript Crypto Library
[WAP261] WAP Forum Approved Version 06-April-2001, Wireless
Transport Layer Security
[RFC2104] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare,R. Canetti, "HMAC:
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", February 1997.
[RFC1521] N. Borenstein, N. Freed, "MIME (Multipurpose Internet
Mail Extensions) Part One: Mechanisms for Specifying and
Describing the Format of Internet Message Bodies", September
1993.
[RFC2560] M. Myers, R. Ankney, A. Malpani, S. Galperin, C.
Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate
Status Protocols", June 1999.
[RFC2510] C. Adams, S. Farrell, "Internet X.5.09 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols", March 1999
[RFC2511] M. Myers, C. Adams, D. Solo, D. Kemp, "Internet
X.5.09 Certificate Request Message Format", March 1999
[ITUTX509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509(1997), Information
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technology - Open System Interconnection - The Directory :
Authentication Framework
[RFC2459] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, D. Solo, "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", January 1999
[PKCS10] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS#10, Certification Request
Syntax Format", 1999.
[PKCS12]RSA Laboratories, "PKCS#12, Personal Information
Exchange Standard", 1999.
4. Security Considerations
To apply the PKI solution in wireless environment, X.509v3
certificate is needed at the mobile terminal. However because of its
limitation, the certificate management protocol, like PKCS#10 or
RFC2510, can not be implemented in it. Thus new certificate
management protocol and format is required. And the this
protocol and format should be securely transferred between
subscriber and RA or CA.
This document describes the certificate request format and protocol
which can provide the message integrity and proof of possession
concerning with protection from replay attack and DoS attack.
5. Intellectual Property Rights
The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in
regard to some or all of the specification contained in this
document. For more information consult the online list of claimed
rights (see http://www.ietf.org/ipr.html).
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies
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of claims of rights made available for publication and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
of such proprietary rights by implementors or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
Appendix A. Definition of management type string, and encoding &
decoding rules
í Definition of management type string
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Type| Encryption & digital signature | Digital signature | Encryption
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Request | 100 110 120
Re-issuing | 200 210 220
Update | 300 310 320
Update (key) | 400 410 420
Suspension | 500 510 520
Revocation | 600 610 620
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
type = 3byte(string) & req = Base64 encoded(string) : POST mode
is used.
í Encoding & Decoding rules
- In this document, all binary data MUST comply with the base64
encoding rules.
- The vertical line (|) is used as the separator, but it will not be
used for hash message concatenation.
- The vertical line (|) will be excluded from the range of characters
that can be used as reference numbers (ID).
- The maximum length of the reference number is 10 characters,
and it is alphanumeric and case-sensitive.
- The maximum length of the authorization code is 30 characters,
and it is alphanumeric and case-sensitive.
- The minimum length of the authorization code varies depending
on the period.
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+++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Period Length
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 day 12 characters
3 days 13 characters
1 week 14 characters
10 days 14 characters
2 weeks 15 characters
1 month 16 characters
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++
íÛ In case that ECDSA key is 20 bytes long, and the reference
number is 8 bytes long
Appendix B. SignText function [WAPscriptCrypto]
B.1 SignText configuration
signedString = Crypto.signText(StringToSign, options,
keyIdType, keyId)
B.2 Parameters
íñstringToSign = String
: contents of actual message
íñoptions = Integer
: OR operation of several optional values is possible.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
value description
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
0x0001 INCLUDE_CONTENT: Information is transferred.
Return value includes StringToSign.
0x0002 INCLUDE_KEY_HASH: Return value includes
the public key hash value corresponding to the signature key.
0x0004 INCLUDE_CERTIFICATE: Return value includes
the certificate or the URL of the certificate. If the Browser cannot
obtain the certificate, íerror:noCert" value must be returned.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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íñKeyIdType = Integer
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
value description
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
0 None:Used when Key Identifier is not used.
1 User_Key_HASH: User public key hash value is
offered to the next parameter (keyId).
2 TRUSTED_Key_HASH: The public key hash
value of the Trusted CA is offered to the next parameter (keyId).
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
íñkeyId = String
: Hash value defined in accordance with KeyIdType. For
instance, SHA-1 public key hash value is 20 bytes.
B.3 Return value
íñReturn value = String or Invalid
: If the return value is without errors, it is the base-64
[RFC1521] encoding of SignedContent.
Appendix C. Response to certification request format
C.1 Success
í MIME Type : application/vnd.wap.cert-response
í Content : Base64-encoded CertResponse
enum { cert_info(0), cert(1), referral(2), (255) } CertRespType;
struct {
CharacterSet character_set;
opaque displayName <1 .. 2^8 - 1>;
} CertDisplayName;
struct {
opaque url <0 .. 128>;
} UrlPoint;
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struct {
unit8 version;
CertRespType type;
select (type) {
case cert_info:
CertDisplayName display_name;
Identifier ca_domain;
UrlPoint url;
case cert:
CertDisplayName display_name;
Identifier ca_domain;
X509Certificate cert;
case referral:
UrlPoint url;
unit32 seconds_to_wait;
}
} CertResponse;
C.2 Fail
í MIME Type : text/plain
í Content : Error message of ascii text value
Appendix D. Structure of PK(Public Key)
enum { rsa(2), ecdh(3), ecdsa(4), (255) } PublicKeyType ;
struct {
PublicKeyType publicKeyType;
select (publicKeyType) {
case ecdh : ECPublicKey ;
case ecdsa : ECPublicKey ;
case rsa : RSAPublicKey ;
} ;
} PublicKey ;
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struct {
opaque url <0 .. 128>;
} UrlPoint;
struct {
opaque rsa_exponent<1..2^16-1> ;
opaque rsa_modulus<1..2^16-1> ;
} RSAPublicKey ;
enum { ECunNamed(0), ECNamed(1), implicitlyCA(2), (255) }
ECNameType;
struct {
ECNameType ecNameType;
select (ecNameType) {
case ECunNamed :
ECParameters ecParameters;
case ECNamed :
opaque oid<1..2^8-1> ;
case implicitlyCA :
struct { };
} ;
opaque public_key_point<1..2^8-1> ;
} ECPublicKey ;
enum { ec_prime_p(1), ec_characteristic_two(2), (255) } ECFieldID;
enum { ec_basis_onb(1), ec_basis_trinomial(2),
ec_basis_pentanomial(3), ec_basis_polynomial(4) } ECBasisType;
struct {
opaque a <1..2^8-1>;
opaque b <1..2^8-1>;
opaque seed <0..2^8-1>;
} ECCurve;
struct {
ECFieldID field;
select (field) {
case ec_prime_p: opaque prime_p <1..2^8-1>;
case ec_characteristic_two:
uint16 m;
ECBasisType basis;
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select (basis) {
case ec_basis_onb:
struct { };
case ec_trinomial:
uint16 k;
case ec_pentanomial:
uint16 k1;
uint16 k2;
uint16 k3;
case ec_basis_polynomial:
opaque irreducible <1..2^8-1>
};
};
ECCurve curve;
ECPoint base;
opaque order <1..2^8-1>;
opaque cofactor <1..2^8-1>;
} ECParameters;
Appendix E. Author Addresses:
Jaeil Lee
78, Garak-dong, Songpa-Gu, Seoul, Korea, 138-803
Korea Information Security Agency
E-Mail: jilee@kisa.or.kr
Young Lee
Korea Information Security Agency
E-Mail: ylee@kisa.or.kr
Chanju Chung
Korea Information Security Agency
E-Mail: cjchung@kisa.or.kr
Jaeho Yoon
Korea Information Security Agency
E-Mail: jhyoon@kisa.or.kr
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