I2nsf Working Group                                               J. You
Internet-Draft                                                    Huawei
Intended status: Standards Track                                M. Zarny
Expires: April 20, 2016                                    Goldman Sachs
                                                            C. Jacquenet
                                                            M. Boucadair
                                                          France Telecom
                                                                   Y. Li
                                                                  Huawei
                                                                S. Majee
                                                             F5 Networks
                                                        October 18, 2015


           User-group-based Security Policy for Service Layer
               draft-you-i2nsf-user-group-based-policy-00

Abstract

   This draft discusses the User-group Aware Policy Control (UAPC)
   framework that facilitates consistent enforcement of security
   policies based on user group identity.  The framework calls for: (1)
   a user-group identifier derived from predefined policy criteria
   (e.g., source IP, time-of-day, device certificate, etc.) for security
   policy enforcement; (2) a logical policy server that maintains user-
   group identification policies as well as inter-user-group permission
   policies; and (3) a logical security controller responsible for
   managing Network Security Functions (NSFs), and implementing
   necessary policies on them.  The document discusses key northbound
   APIs of the framework that fall within the scope of the I2NSF Service
   Layer.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.




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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 20, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Abbreviations and acronyms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Use Cases for User-group Aware Policy Control . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  User-group Aware Policy Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Functional Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  User Group  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.4.  Inter-group Policy Enforcement  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.5.  UAPC Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  Requirements for I2NSF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   In traditional networks, network access is typically controlled
   through a combination of mechanisms such as maintaining separate
   static VLAN/IP subnet assignments per organization; applying Access




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   Control Lists (ACLs) on VLANs and/or IP subnets; leveraging Network
   Access Control (NAC); etc.  Common artifacts of these setups are:

      o Network administrators typically assume that users access the
      network from their own static location--from their assigned
      switch, VLAN, IP subnet, etc.

      o MAC or IP address of the users' device is often used as a proxy
      for the user's identity.  As such, filtering (e.g., via ACLs) of
      the user is usually based on IP or MAC addresses.

      o Authentication of the user by the network, if it exists at all,
      typically takes place only at the access switch in conjunction
      with an AAA (Authentication, Authorization, Accounting) server.
      Different authentication mechanisms could be used - from machine-
      based certificates to username/password challenges, to just
      "authenticating" on MAC addresses, etc.

      o Network security functions such as firewalls often act only on
      IP addresses and ports - not on the user's identity.

   Traditional network access control mechanisms
   [I-D.dunbar-i2nsf-problem-statement] do not work well in newer
   network paradigms.

      o First, both clients and servers can move and change their IP
      addresses on a regular basis.  For example, Wi-Fi and VPN clients
      as well as backend Virtual Machine (VM)-based servers can move
      around; their IPs could change as a result.  It means relying on
      well-known network fields like the 5-tuple is increasingly
      inadequate from a consistent security policy enforcement
      standpoint.

      o Secondly, with more people working from non-traditional office
      setups like "working from home", there is now a need to be able to
      apply different security policy to the same set of users under
      different circumstances.  Network access needs to be granted based
      on such criteria as users' location, time-of-day, type of network
      device used (e.g., corporate issued device versus personal
      device), device's security posture, etc.  It means the network
      needs to recognize the users' identity and their current posture,
      and map the users to their correct access entitlement to the
      network.

      o Moreover, implementation of coherent security policy across
      several network and network security devices is almost impossible.
      NSFs in operation could be sourced from different vendors; or
      could be different hardware models/software versions by the same



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      vendor.  As a result, the capabilities as well as APIs of the NSFs
      may not be the same across the board.  Finally, few enterprises,
      if any, have a complete view of all the application flows.  It is
      not uncommon for administrators to update a policy on a firewall
      but only to find out later that they had missed to update ACLs or
      firewall policies elsewhere.

   Today, addressing the above issues takes considerable time and
   effort.  Most network administrators have to manually plan and
   implement necessary changes as little automation, if any, exists
   across diverse sets of network security platforms.  In line with the
   I2NSF effort to standardize APIs so as to facilitate automation, this
   draft discusses the User-group Aware Policy Control (UAPC) that
   facilitates consistent enforcement of policies based on user-group
   identity, and how it operates in the I2NSF Service Layer
   [I-D.merged-i2nsf-framework].  If the approach is accepted, more
   detailed implementation mechanisms can be further explored.

2.  Terminology

2.1.  Abbreviations and acronyms

      AAA: Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting

      ACL: Access Control List

      ADSL: Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line

      AP: Access Point

      LTE: Long Term Evolution

      NAC: Network Admission Control

      NBI: Northbound Interface

      NSF: Network Security Function

      UAPC: User-group Aware Policy Control

      VLAN: Virtual Local Area Network

2.2.  Definitions

      User: An individual or a group of individuals that act as a single
      entity.





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      User-group: A group of users that share one or more
      characteristics and/or behaviors in common.  For example, sales
      employees are treated with equivalent service policy rules when
      accessing the network.

      Profile: A set of capabilities, in terms of functions and
      behaviors, for a given entity or set of entities.

      Role: A role defines a set of responsibilities of an object that
      it is attached to.  This enables the functions and behavior of a
      complex object to be abstracted into just those that are required
      by a client in a particular context.

      User-group Identifier (User-group ID): An identifier that
      represents the collective identity of a group of users, and is
      determined by a set of one or more matching criteria (e.g., roles,
      4-, 5-, and 6-tuples, VLAN ID, etc.) that disambiguates an entity
      from other entities.

3.  Use Cases for User-group Aware Policy Control

   With the increased popularity of enterprise wireless networks and
   remote access technologies such as Virtual Private Networks (VPN),
   enterprise networks have become borderless, and employees' locations
   can be anywhere.  Enabling large-scale employee mobility across many
   access locations improves enterprise production efficiency but also
   introduces challenges related to enterprise network management and
   security.  The IP address of the user can change frequently when the
   user is in motion.  Consequently, IP address-based policies (such as
   forwarding, routing, QoS and security policies) may not be flexible
   enough to accommodate users in motion.

   The User-group Aware Policy Control (UAPC) approach is intended to
   facilitate the consistent enforcement of policies.  As shown in
   Figure 1, a multi-technology network (e.g., Wi-Fi, 3G/LTE, ADSL and
   fiber infrastructures) can connect different types of terminal
   devices (e.g., Smartphone, tablet, and laptop) which should be able
   to access networks in a secure manner.  Whether these terminal
   devices connect to a wired or a wireless infrastructure, security
   policies should be enforced consistently based on their user-group
   identities.










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                                   +--------------------+
                                   |       PDP          |
                                   | (policy, security, |
                                   |  management)       |
                                   +---+--------------+-+
                                       |              |
                                       |              |
                                       |High security |
                                       |across the    |
                                       |entire network|
     +--------------+       +----------+---+      +---+----------+
     |+------------+|       |              |      |              |
     ||smartphone  ||       |              |      |              |
     |+------------+|       |  3G/LTE      |      |              |
     |+------------+|       |              |      |   Data       |
     ||  tablet    ||       |  Pulic WiFi  |      |              |
     |+------------+|       |              |      |   Center     |
     |+------------++-------+- ADSL        +------+              |
     ||  laptop    ||       |              |      |              |
     |+------------+|       |  AP          |      |              |
     |+------------+|       |              |      |              |
     ||    PC      ||       |  ...         |      |              |
     |+------------+|       |              |      |              |
     |              |       | Access       |      | Enterprise   |
     | Devices      |       | Networks     |      | HQ           |
     +--------------+       +--------------+      +--------------+

                     Figure 1: UAPC Framework Example

4.  User-group Aware Policy Control

4.1.  Overview

   At a high level, the UAPC framework is as follows: Users are
   authenticated and classified into different user-groups at the
   network ingress by the Security Controller in consultation with the
   Policy Server, and an authentication server.  The user-group is an
   identifier that represents the collective identity of a group of
   users, and is determined by predefined policy criteria (e.g., source
   IP, geolocation, time of day, device certificate, etc.).  Users may
   be moved to different user-groups if their composite security
   postures change.

   The Security Controller, if necessary, pushes the required changes to
   all the Network Security Functions (NSFs) that need those changes.
   The policies are expressed in user-group (not IP or MAC address) IDs
   so as to decouple the user identity from the network addresses of the
   user's device.



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   (Note that User-group IDs may be implemented in at least two ways:
   (1) the ingress switch inserts the user-group ID into the packets,
   and downstream NSFs match and act on the user-group ID, or (2) the
   Security Controller updates each NSF with the mapping between the
   user-group IDs and the packet tuples; NSFs map incoming packets to
   their rightful user-group IDs, and act on the user-group IDs.  The
   two implementation methodologies are out of scope of this document.)

   The security policy provisioning information can be derived from the
   user's profile and credentials, as well as the group to which the
   user belongs; such information can also be derived from the outcomes
   of the dynamic security service parameter negotiation that could
   possibly take place between the user and the service provider or the
   network administrator (e.g., parameters like whether the user is
   entitled to access the enterprise network while in motion or not, the
   lease time associated to an IP address, whether the user can access
   the Internet or not, whether traffic needs to be encrypted or not,
   etc.).  This information is transferred to the Network Security
   Functions (NSF) from the controller.  Once an incoming packet matches
   a certain user group on the NSF, the corresponding security policy
   will be enforced on the said packet.

4.2.  Functional Entities

   The UAPC framework consists of three main components: (1) Policy
   Server, (2) Security Controller, (3) Network Security Functions:

   o Policy Server

   The Policy Server houses two policy databases: (1) the user-group
   placement criteria by which users are assigned to their user-group;
   and (2) the rule base of what each user group has access to.

      - Contains (G)UI or APIs to enable policies to be created,
      modified, and deleted using command line and/or graphical tools

      - Contains logic to create, read, update, delete policies and
      policy components using one or more policy repositories

      - Contains logic to detect conflicts between policies

      - Contains logic to remediate conflicts between policies

      - Contains logic to broker and/or federate policies between
      domains

   o Security Controller




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   The Security Controller coordinates various network security-related
   tasks on a set of NSFs under its administration.

      - Authenticates the user at the ingress using an authentication
      service.  While the authentication functionality is an integral
      part of the framework, the topics of defining and managing
      authentication rules are out of scope of this document.

      - Asks policy server for decisions to security-related requests;
      takes these decisions and invokes the set of NSFs that are
      required to implement security for that particular packet

      - May perform additional actions as specified by the metadata
      associated with a policy rule (e.g., the "function(s)" to be
      executed after the actions in a policy rule are executed)

      - Has an authoritative database of NSFs under its administration

      - Determines on which NSFs a given policy needs to be implemented

      - Presents a set of NBIs for applications, orchestration engines,
      etc.

      - Interfaces with NSFs via (to-be-developed) I2NSF Capability
      Layer APIs.

   o Network Security Functions

      - Packet classification: Depending on the implementation model,
      the NSF may match on User-group IDs in the packets; or it may
      match on common packet header fields such as the 5-tuple, and map
      the n-tuple to the appropriate User-group ID supplied out-of-band
      by the Security Controller.

      - Policy enforcement: Enforce the corresponding policy (or set of
      policies) if the packet matches a specified User-group ID or set
      of User-group IDs

      - Presents I2NSF Capability Layer APIs

4.3.  User Group

   The user-group is an identifier that represents the collective
   identity of a group of users, and is determined by predefined policy
   criteria (e.g., source IP, geolocation, time of day, device
   certificate, etc.).





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   A given user is authenticated, and classified at the network ingress,
   and assigned to a user-group.  (The term "user" refers to any user of
   the network.  As such servers too are classified and assigned to
   their respective user-groups.)  A user's group membership may change
   as aspects of the user change.  For example, if the user-group
   membership is determined solely by the source IP, then a given user's
   user-group ID will change when the user moves to a new IP address
   that falls outside of the range of addresses of the previous user-
   group.

   User-groups may share several common criteria.  That is, user-group
   criteria are not mutually exclusive.  For example, the policy
   criteria of user-groups R&D Regular and R&D-BYOD may share the same
   set of users that belong to the R&D organization, and differ only in
   the type of client (firm-issued clients versus users' personal
   clients); likewise, the same user may be assigned to different user-
   groups depending on the time of day or the type of day (e.g.,
   weekdays versus weekends); and so on.

   Table 1 shows an example of how user-group definitions may be
   constructed.

                  Table 1: User-Group Example
    +--------------+------------+--------------------------------+
    |  Group Name  |  Group ID  |        Group Definition        |
    +--------------+------------+--------------------------------+
    |   R&D        |     10     |  R&D employees                 |
    +--------------+------------+--------------------------------+
    |   R&D BYOD   |     11     |  Personal devices of R&D       |
    |              |            |  employees                     |
    +--------------+------------+--------------------------------+
    |   Sales      |     20     |  Sales employees               |
    +--------------+------------+--------------------------------+
    |   VIP        |     30     |  VIP employees                 |
    +--------------+------------+--------------------------------+
    |   Workflow   |     40     |  IP addresses of Workflow      |
    |              |            |  resource servers              |
    +--------------+------------+--------------------------------+
    | R&D Resource |     50     | IP addresses of R&D resource   |
    |              |            | servers                        |
    +--------------+------------+--------------------------------+
    |Sales Resource|     54     | IP addresses of Sales resource |
    |              |            | servers                        |
    +--------------+------------+--------------------------------+







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4.4.  Inter-group Policy Enforcement

   Within the UAPC framework, inter-group policy enforcement requires
   two key components: (1) user-group-to-user-group access policies, and
   (2) sets of NSFs on which individual policies need to be applied.

   First, the framework calls for an authoritative rule-base that lists
   all the destination user-groups to which all the source user-groups
   are entitled to access.  The rule-base, hosted on the Policy Server,
   enables administrators to construct authorized inter-group access
   relationships.  The simple example in Table 2 shows a policy matrix
   in which the row represents source user-groups and the column
   represents destination ones.  The inter-group rule-base is similar to
   firewall rule-bases, which are mostly made up of the five-tuple.
   (Firewall rule-bases could and do include criteria other than the
   standard five-tuple.  And the user-group rule-base could consist of
   other criteria.  Actual implementation details are out of scope of
   this document.)

                   Table 2: Inter-group Policy Example
    +-----------------+----------------------------------------------+
    |                 |             Destination Group                |
    |                 +-------------+----------------+---------------+
    |                 |  Workflow   |  R&D Resource  | Sales Resource|
    |Source Group     |   Group     |     Group      |     Group     |
    +-----------------+-------------+----------------+---------------+
    |     R&D group   |   Permit    |     Permit     |      Deny     |
    +-----------------+-------------+----------------+---------------+
    |  R&D BYOD group |   Permit    |      Deny      |      Deny     |
    +-----------------+-------------+----------------+---------------+
    |    Sales group  |   Permit    |      Deny      |     Permit    |
    +-----------------+-------------+----------------+---------------+
    |  VIP user group |   Permit    |     Permit     |     Permit    |
    +-----------------+-------------+----------------+---------------+

   The responsibility of implementing and managing the inter-group
   policies falls to the Security Controller.  The controller first
   needs to determine, (or is told) the specific NSFs on which a given
   policy is to be implemented.  The controller then communicates with
   each NSF via the I2NSF APIs to execute the required tasks.

   Inter-user-group rules are configurable.  Figure 2 illustrates how
   various user-groups and their entitlements may be structured.  The
   example shows a "north-south" model in which how users may access
   internal network resources.  Similar models can be developed for
   "east-west" intra-data center traffic flows.





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             +---------------------------------+
             |  Authentication Domain          |
             |+------------------------------+ |
             || DemilitarizedZone            | |
             ||+---------------------------+ | |
             ||| General Service           | | |
Common BYOD  |||+------------------------+ | | |
User --------++++ Common Service         | | | |
             ||||+---------------------+ | | | |
Guest--------++|||Limited Service      | | | | |
             |||||+------------------+ | | | | |
Insecure     ||||||Important Service +-+-+-+-+-+-- Partner
User    -----+|||||   +------------+ | | | | | |
             ||||||   |Core Service+-+-+-+-+-+-+-- Executive
User at   ---+++++|   +------------+ +-+-+-+-+-+-- User at office
non-office   |||||+------------------+ | | | | |   hours
hours        ||||+---------------------+ | | | |
             |||+------------------------+ | | |
             ||+---------------------------+ | |
             |+------------------------------+ |
             +---------------------------------+

             Unauthorized user (X)
             User using an unregistered device (X)

Figure 2: Sample Authorization Rules for User-group Aware Policy Control

4.5.  UAPC Implementation

   The security policies are instantiated and maintained by the policy
   server.  The associated computation logic (to instantiate such
   policies) may be dynamically fed with instructions coming from the
   application.  The policy decisions could also be from the outcomes of
   dynamic security service parameter negotiations that typically take
   place at the management plane between the user and the service
   provider [RFC7297].

   The NSFs receive group-based policy provisioning information from the
   security controller.  The security policies will be enforced so that
   participating NSFs can process traffic accordingly.











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                                +-----------------+
                                |   Orchestrator  |
                                +-+-------------+-+
                                  |             |
            ======================|=============|==============
                             +----+---+        ++---------+
                             | Policy |        |Security  |
                             | Server +--------+Controller|
                             +--------+        +-+---+----+
                             (Step 1)            |   | (Step 2)
                                                 |   |
                             (Step 4)   +------+-+   |
                                      ----------------
          (Step 3)                ///// |      |     | \\\\\
         +-------------+       ///      |      |     |      \\\
    Site1|Wireless User+--------        |      |     |         \\
         +-------------+   ||        +--+-+ +--+-+ +-+--+        ||
         +-------------+   |         |    | |    | |    |         |
    Site2|Wired User   +--+          |NSFs| |NSFs| |NSFs|          |
         +-------------+   |         |    | |    | |    |         |
         +-------------+   ||        +----+ +----+ +----+        ||
    Site3|Remoter User +-------         (Step 5)               //
         +-------------+       \\\                          ///
                                  \\\\\                /////
                                       ----------------

                   Figure 3: Unified Policy Procedures

      1.  User-group identification policies and inter-user-group access
      polices on the Policy Server are managed by the authorized
      team(s).

      2.  The user-group-based policies are implemented on the NSFs
      under the Security Controller's management.

      3.  When a given user first comes up on the network, the user is
      authenticated at the ingress switch.

      4.  If the authentication is successful, the user is placed in a
      user-group, as determined by the Policy Server.

      5.  The user's subsequent traffic is allowed or permitted based on
      the user-group ID by the NSFs per the inter-user-group access
      policies.  (It is beyond the scope of this document as to how
      user-group IDs may be delivered to non-ingress NSFs.  See
      Section 4.1 for a brief overview of possible implementation
      methods.)




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5.  Requirements for I2NSF

   Key aspects of the UAPC framework falls within the Service Layer of
   the I2NSF charter.  If the community adopts the approach as one
   possible framework for the Service Layer, the I2NSF Service Layer
   MUST support at least the following northbound APIs (NBIs):

      o The user-group classification policy database on the Policy
      Server

      o The inter-user-group access policy rule-base on the Policy
      Server

      o The inventory of NSFs under management by the Security
      Controller

      o The list of NSFs on which a given inter-user-group policy is to
      be implemented by the Security Controller.

   The framework also assumes that the I2NSF Capability Layer APIs will
   be there for the NSFs.

6.  Acknowledgement

   The editors would like to thank Linda Dunbar and John Strassner for a
   thorough review and useful comments.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7297]  Boucadair, M., Jacquenet, C., and N. Wang, "IP
              Connectivity Provisioning Profile (CPP)", RFC 7297,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7297, July 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7297>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.dunbar-i2nsf-problem-statement]
              Dunbar, L., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Boucadair, M., and
              S. Chakrabarty, "Interface to Network Security Functions
              (I2NSF) Problem Statement", draft-dunbar-i2nsf-problem-
              statement-05 (work in progress), May 2015.



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   [I-D.merged-i2nsf-framework]
              Ed, E., Lopez, D., Dunbar, L., Zhuang, X., Parrott, J.,
              Krishnan, R., and S. Durbha, "Framework for Interface to
              Network Security Functions", draft-merged-i2nsf-
              framework-03 (work in progress), October 2015.

Authors' Addresses

   Jianjie You
   Huawei
   101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
   Nanjing,  210012
   China

   Email: youjianjie@huawei.com


   Myo Zarny
   Goldman Sachs
   30 Hudson Street
   Jersey City,  NJ 07302
   USA

   Email: myo.zarny@gs.com


   Christian Jacquenet
   France Telecom
   Rennes 35000
   France

   Email: christian.jacquenet@orange.com


   Mohamed Boucadair
   France Telecom
   Rennes 35000
   France

   Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com











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Internet-Draft           User-group based Policy            October 2015


   Yizhou Li
   Huawei
   101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
   Nanjing,  210012
   China

   Email: liyizhou@huawei.com


   Sumandra Majee
   F5 Networks
   3545 N 1st St
   San Jose,  CA 95134

   Email: S.Majee@f5.com




































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