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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07                                       
INTERNET-DRAFT                                                  Y. Deion
<draft-yu-imap-client-id-00.txt>                              LinuxMagic
Intended Status: Standards Track
Expires November 24, 2018                                   May 24, 2018

               IMAP Service Extension for Client Identity
                    <draft-yu-imap-client-id-00.txt>

Abstract

   This document defines an Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP)
   service extension called "CID" which provides a method for clients to
   indicate an identity to the server.

   This identity is an additional token that may be used for security
   and/or informational purposes, and with it a server may optionally
   apply heuristics using this token.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.  Internet-Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
   and its working groups.  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction .................................................  2
   2.  Conventions Used in This Document ............................  3
   3.  CID ..........................................................  3
     3.1.  CID Command ..............................................  3
     3.2.  CID Arguments ............................................  3
     3.3. Advertising the CID capability ............................  4
     3.4. Restrictions on the CID command ...........................  4
   4.  Formal Syntax ................................................  4
   5.  Discussion ...................................................  5
     5.1.  Applying heuristics to CID ...............................  5
     5.2. Utility of CID ............................................  5
     5.3. Use Cases of CID ..........................................  6
     5.4. Other IMAP Client Identifiers .............................  6
     5.5. Future Considerations .....................................  7
   6.  Client Identity Types ........................................  7
   7.  Examples .....................................................  8
     7.1.  UUID as Client Identity ..................................  8
     7.2.  Malformed CID Command ....................................  8
     7.3.  Client Identity Without a TLS/SSL Session ................  9
     7.4.  Client Identity Leading to Rejection .....................  9
   8.  Security Considerations ......................................  9
   9.  IANA Considerations .......................................... 10
   10. References ................................................... 10
     10.1. Normative References ..................................... 10
   Contributors ..................................................... 10
   Authors' Addresses ............................................... 10

1. Introduction

   The [IMAP] protocol and its extensions describe methods whereby an
   client may provide identity and/or authentication information to
   an IMAP server.  However, these existing methods are subject to
   limitations and none offer a way to identify the IMAP client with
   absolute confidence.  This document defines an IMAP service extension
   to provide an additional identity token which can represent the IMAP
   client with a higher degree of certainty when accessing the IMAP
   server.

   Typically IMAP clients enter the authenticated state by using either
   the AUTHENTICATE or LOGIN command.  IMAP servers are often subject to
   malicious clients attempting to use authorization credentials and/or
   identities not intended for their use (e.g. stolen credentials or
   brute force attacks).  When such an attack is attempted, the IMAP
   server may be unable to identify the impersonation and restrict such
   an unintended use by someone other than the authorized user or said
   credentials.  While there are ways to identify the source of the IMAP
   client such as its IP address, it would be useful if there was an
   additional way to uniquely identify the client in a method solely
   available across an encrypted channel.

   Using the CID extension, an IMAP client can provide an additional
   identity token to the server called its "client identity".  The

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   client identity can provide unique characteristics about the client
   accessing the IMAP service and may be combined with existing
   identification mechanisms in order to identify the client.  An IMAP
   server may then apply additional security policies using this
   identity such as restricting use of the service to clients presenting
   recognized client identities or only allowing use of authorized
   identities that match previously established client identities.

   The CID extension is present in any IMAP implementation that returns
   "CID" as one of the supported capabilities to the CAPABILITY
   command.

2. Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [KEYWORDS].

   Formal syntax is specified using [ABNF].

   Example lines prefaced by "C:" are sent by the client and ones
   prefaced by "S:" by the server.

   "Connection" refers to the entire sequence of client/server
   interaction from the initial establishment of the network connection
   until its termination.

3. CID

3.1. CID Command

   Arguments:  client identity type
               client identity token

   Responses:  no specific responses for this command

   Result:     OK - cid completed, client identity information stored
               BAD - command unknown or arguments invalid

   Note that a valid CID command will never return the NO result because
   heuristics MUST NOT be applied to the CID arguments at this stage.
   Instead the client identity information SHOULD be stored and passed
   along to any and all [SASL] authentication mechanisms.

3.2. CID Arguments

   The CID command takes the following two arguments:

   1. client identity type: A string identifying the identity type the
      client is providing.  It MUST be between 1 and 16 alphanumeric
      characters.

   2. client identity token: A string identifying the client.  It MUST
      be between 1 and 128 printable characters.

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   The IMAP server MUST reject any CID command with badly formatted
   arguments.  The IMAP server MUST accept the arguments from a valid
   CID command and SHOULD store it at the minimum for the remaining
   duration of the IMAP connection.

3.3. Advertising the CID capability

   The CID capability is used to tell the IMAP client that the IMAP
   server supports the CID extension.  However, certain conditions MUST
   be met before the IMAP server advertises the CID capability.

   1. The IMAP server and IMAP client MUST negotiate encryption via
      STARTTLS/SSL or some other secure mechanism.

   2. The IMAP server MUST be in the non-authenticated state.

   3. The IMAP server MUST have the CID extension support enabled.

   While all the conditions are met, the IMAP server MUST advertise the
   CID capability in all proceeding CAPABILITY commands.

3.4. Restrictions on the CID command

   Under certain circumstances, the use of the CID command will be
   restricted:

   1. Before the CID capability has been advertised, the IMAP server
      MUST reject any issued CID commmand and the IMAP client MUST NOT
      issue the CID command.

   2. Outside of the non-authenticated state, the IMAP server MUST
      reject any CID command issued by the IMAP client and the IMAP
      client MUST NOT issue the CID command.

   3. Once a valid CID command has been issued, the IMAP server MUST
      reject any further CID command issued by the IMAP client and the
      IMAP client MUST NOT issue any subsequent CID commands.

4. Formal Syntax

   The following syntax specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur
   Form notation as specified in [ABNF].  [IMAP] defines the
   non-terminals "capability" and "command-nonauth".

   Except as noted otherwise, all alphabetic characters are case-
   insensitive.  The use of upper or lower case characters to define
   token strings is for editorial clarity only.  Implementations MUST
   accept these strings in a case-insensitive fashion.

   capability      =/ "CID"

   command-nonauth =/ cid

   cid             = "CID" SP client-id-type SP client-id-token

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   client-id-type  = 1*16 ALPHA / DIGIT
                   ;; alphanumeric

   client-id-token = 1*128 VCHAR
                   ;; any printable US-ASCII character

5. Discussion

5.1. Applying heuristics to CID

   This section discusses the possible heuristics that can be applied to
   the information that is presented via the CID command.  This
   information includes whether a valid CID command was issued, the
   client identity type and the client identity token.

   1. The IMAP server MAY choose to require that a successful CID
      command be issued or that a particular client identity type be
      presented.

   2. The IMAP server MAY reject any CID command with a client identity
      type that is not recognized by the IMAP server.

   3. The IMAP server MAY reject any CID command with a client identity
      type that is not supported by the IMAP server.

   4. An IMAP server MAY reject any CID command that contains a client
      identity type or client identity token that the server chooses not
      to accept for any reason such as by policy.

   5. An IMAP server MAY reject any CID command that contains a client
      identity type or client identity that the server has chosen to
      disable or revoke use of either temporarily or permanently.

  The IMAP server SHOULD only ever reject an IMAP client based on CID
  information during or after the authentication process/handler.  In
  the interest of limiting the amount of information being revealed, the
  rejection message SHOULD be as generic as possible and SHOULD NOT
  reveal any information on the heuristics.

  Even if the client identity type and/or client identity token are not
  recognized, supported or permitted by the server and/or the owner the
  authentication credentials, the presented information may still be
  useful for analysis.

5.2. Utility of CID

   Regardless of how much it is frowned upon, common authorization
   information like the username and password pair are reused across
   multiple web services.  When this authorization is compromised on a
   single web service, malicious actors usually also gain access to
   other web services.  Based on this information alone, the utility of
   CID as an additional layer of authentication that is only available
   across an encrypted channel becomes more apparent.


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   The utility of CID may be seen by considering the following:

   1. An IMAP client may utilize the same IMAP server with multiple
      different authorized identities, so an identity that persists
      across authorized identities is lacking.

   2. An authorized identity may make use of multiple discrete devices
      over different IMAP sessions, so an identity persisting on one
      device is lacking.

   3. Existing identity information available from the connection such
      as network address or IP changes frequently as devices are
      becoming more mobile in nature.

   4. Individual IMAP services have no method to determine if devices
      types should be permitted e.g. private IMAP services that do not
      persist across different connections.

   5. There is no method for legacy authentication methods to associate
      a given set of authentication tokens to an individual and or that
      individuals registered devices.

5.3. Use Cases of CID

   With CID the IMAP server has additional information it may use in its
   interactions with the client.  It may:

   1. Restrict use of an authorization tokens to a set of client
      identities, thereby offering an added level of security.  For
      example the use of an authorization token may only be accompanied
      by a specified set of CID tokens and/or types.

   2. Identify that the same CID token is used to access multiple
      authorized identities, and restrict access to the IMAP service.
      For example a malicious client that has attempted to gain access
      using multiple authorization tokens may be identified through its
      unusual behavior.

   3. Retain knowledge of CID tokens previously presented with specific
      authorization credentials, and if the token has not been
      previously seen, restrict access to the IMAP service.

   4. Require that the IMAP client present a token such as a license key
      established outside of the IMAP session in order to make use of
      any authorized identity.

   5. Apply different security policies to clients that provide a CID
      token versus those which do not.  For example, provide clients
      providing such an identity with additional trust.

5.4. Other IMAP Client Identifiers

   The [IMAP] protocol and its extensions describe methods whereby an
   IMAP client may provide identity information to an IMAP server.  Some

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   of these identitiers are listed for contrast:

   1. The client connection provides a source IP address associated
      with the IMAP session. This may be accompanied by a PTR record
      and/or GeoIP information.

   2. The AUTHENTICATE and LOGIN command allows the client to present
      a user and/or password/authentication mechanism for an IMAP
      session.

5.5. Future Considerations

   In the future there may be a demand for being able to provide
   multiple CID commands with different cid types.

6. Client Identity Types

   This document does not specify any CID identity type that MUST be
   supported.  Some examples of identity type are UUID, LICENSE,
   DEVICE_ID, MAC and COOKIE.  To start with certain types such as UUID
   and LICENSE SHOULD be supported.  It is intended that any CID type be
   accepted but in the future standards on types may be set but a IMAP
   server SHOULD NOT reject an unidentified CID type, except for
   specific policy use cases.

   It is envisioned that in the future it will be useful to propose
   identity types to support.

   1. UUID

      UUID is a common practice to represent either a individual user,
      hardware device or software installation associated with a
      specific individual. The support of UUID enables existing UUID
      implementations to be used to semi-uniquely identify a device
      associated with an individual.

   2. LICENSE

      An IMAP client may find it useful to identify the license key of
      software it is using.  Such licenses are typically crafted such
      that they are unique and useful to identify a software
      installation.

   3. DEVICE_ID

      Many hardware devices are designed to be used by a single
      individual and already have an associated hardware device id.

   4. MAC

      The MAC address is not always available or consistent. However,
      for certain use cases the MAC may be the only information
      available to specify a specific device.


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   5. COOKIE

      While not guranteed to be consistent many web applications are
      designed to access IMAP directly and may need to have a
      semi-unique identifier available as part of the web based
      transaction.

   This document recommends that an IMAP server handle any given client
   identity type from a CID command in one or more of the following
   manners.

   1. Handled but treat as not presented
   2. Store in session but treat as not presented (useful for debugging)
   3. System log
   4. User log
   5. Use for authentication
   6. Use for alert when authentication fails
   7. Use for alert when authentication succeeds
   8. Unused

7. Examples

7.1. UUID as Client Identity

   C: [connection established over a plaintext connection]
   C: a001 CAPABILITY
   S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 STARTTLS AUTH=GSSAPI LOGINDISABLED
   S: a001 OK CAPABILITY completed
   C: a002 STARTTLS
   S: a002 OK STARTLS completed
   <TLS negotiation, further commands are under [TLS] layer>
   C: a003 CAPABILITY
   S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=GSSAPI AUTH=PLAIN CID
   S: a003 OK CAPABILITY completed
   C: a004 CID UUID 23bf83be-aad7-46aa-9e0f-39191ccf402f
   S: a004 OK CID completed
   C: a005 LOGIN joe password
   S: a005 OK LOGIN completed

7.2. Malformed CID Command

   C: [connection established over a plaintext connection]
   C: a001 CAPABILITY
   S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 STARTTLS AUTH=GSSAPI LOGINDISABLED
   S: a001 OK CAPABILITY completed
   C: a002 STARTTLS
   S: a002 OK STARTLS completed
   <TLS negotiation, further commands are under [TLS] layer>
   C: a003 CAPABILITY
   S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=GSSAPI AUTH=PLAIN CID
   S: a003 OK CAPABILITY completed
   C: a004 CID UUID
   S: a004 BAD Error in IMAP command received by server


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   The IMAP server rejects the CID command as it is not well formed due
   to there being only a single parameter provided.

7.3. Client Identity without TLS/SSL Session

   C: [connection established over a plaintext connection]
   C: a001 CAPABILITY
   S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 STARTTLS AUTH=GSSAPI LOGINDISABLED
   S: a001 OK CAPABILITY completed
   C: a002 CID UUID 23bf83be-aad7-46aa-9e0f-39191ccf402f
   S: a002 BAD Unknown IMAP command received by server

   The IMAP server rejects use of the CID command as the CID capability
   had not been advertised because no encryption was negotiated between
   the IMAP server and IMAP client.

7.4. Client Identity Leading to Rejection

   C: [connection established over a plaintext connection]
   C: a001 CAPABILITY
   S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 STARTTLS AUTH=GSSAPI LOGINDISABLED
   S: a001 OK CAPABILITY completed
   C: a002 STARTTLS
   S: a002 OK STARTLS completed
   <TLS negotiation, further commands are under [TLS] layer>
   C: a003 CAPABILITY
   S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=GSSAPI AUTH=PLAIN CID
   S: a003 OK CAPABILITY completed
   C: a004 CID UUID 23bf83be-aad7-46aa-9e0f-39191ccf402f
   S: a004 OK CID completed
   C: a005 LOGIN joe password
   S: a005 BAD Failed to authenticate

   The IMAP server rejects use of the system during the LOGIN command
   after deciding that the provided client identity does not establish
   sufficient privileges.  Note that the error message that's returned
   to the client is very generic and does not reveal any information
   about CID and/or the existence of 'joe' and/or the validity of the
   password.

8. Security Considerations

   As this extension provides an additional means of communicating
   information from a client to a server it is clear there is additional
   information divulged to the server.  This may have privacy
   considerations depending on the client identity type or its contents.
   For example, it may reveal a MAC address of the device used to
   communicate with a server that would not previously have been
   revealed. While it has been useful to use identifier such as email
   address for authentication it is easy for these authetication tokens
   to be shared and/or reused and/or be publically available for other
   purposes.  An IMAP server and or its operators SHOULD not share
   any CID information presented with a third party as it may represent
   or be linked to an individual and SHOULD never be shared in

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   association with authentication tokens.

   As well, while this service extension requires that the identity
   information only be transmitted over an encrypted channel to reduce
   the risk of eavesdropping, it does not specify any policies or
   practices required in the establishment of such a channel, and so it
   is the responsibility of the client and the server to determine that
   the communication medium meets their requirements.

9. IANA Considerations

   The IANA is requested to add CID to the "IMAP 4 Capabilities"
   registry, http://www.iana.org/assignments/imap4-capabilities.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [ABNF]      Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for
               Syntax Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234,
               November 1997.

   [IMAP]      Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
               4rev1", RFC 3501, March 2003.

   [KEYWORDS]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
               Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI
               10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-
               editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [SASL]      Myers, J., "Simple Authentication and Security
               Layer (SASL)", RFC 2222, October 1997.

   [TLS]       Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol
               Version 1.0", RFC 2246, January 1999.

Contributors

   Michael Peddemors
   LinuxMagic

Authors' Addresses

   Deion Yu
   LinuxMagic
   #405 - 860 Homer St.
   Vancouver, British Columbia
   CA V6B 2W5

   EMail: deiony@linuxmagic.com





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