Network Working Group Xiangyang Zhang
Internet-Draft Tina Tsou
Intended status: Informational Futurewei Technologies, Inc
Expires: April 30, 2012 October 31, 2011
IPsec anti-replay algorithm without bit-shifting
draft-zhang-ipsecme-anti-replay-07
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Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Abstract
This document presents an alternate method to do the anti-replay
checks and updates for IP Authentication Header (AH) and
Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP). The method defined
in this document obviates the need for bit-shifting and it reduces
the number of times anti-replay window is adjusted.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Description of new anti-replay algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Example of new anti-replay algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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1. Introduction
IP Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] and IP Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] define an anti-replay service that employs a
sliding window mechanism. The mechanism, when enabled by a
receiver, uses an anti-replay window of size W. This window limits
how far out of order a packet can be, relative to the packet
with the highest sequence number that has been authenticated so far.
The window can be represented by a range [WB, WT], where WB=WT-W+1. The
whole anti-replay window can be thought of as a string of bits. The
value of each bit indicates whether or not a packet with that sequence
number has been received and authenticated, so that replay packet can
be detected and rejected. If the packet is received, the receiver
gets the sequence number S in the packet. If S is inside window (S<=WT
and S>=WB), then checks the corresponding bit (location is S-WB) in the
window to see if this S has already been seen. If S<WB, the packet is
dropped. If S>WT and is validated, the window is advanced by (S-WT)
bits. The new window becomes [WB+S-WT, S]. The new bits in this
new window are set to indicate that no packets with those sequence
numbers have been received. The typical implementation (for
example, [RFC4302] algorithm) is done by shifting (S-WT) bits.
In normal cases, the packets arrive in order, which results in constant
update and bit shifting operation.
[RFC4302][RFC4303] defined minimum window sizes of 32 and 64. But no
requirement is established for minimum or recommended window sizes
beyond 64-packet. The window size needs to be based on reasonable
expectations for packet re-ordering. For a high-end multi-core network
processor with multiple crypto cores, a window size bigger than 64 or
128 is needed due to the varied IPsec processing latency caused by
different cores. In such a case, the window sliding is tremendous
costly even with hardware acceleration to do the bit shifting.
This draft describes an alternate method to avoid bit-shifting.
It only discusses the anti-replay processing at the receiving side.
The processing is always safe and has no interoperability effects.
Even with the window size beyond the usual 32 or 64 bit window, it
does not cause any interoperability issue.
Any node employing practices that potentially causes reordering
beyond the usual 32 or 64 bit window may lead to interoperability
or performance problems, however. For instance, if either the
sending node or routers on path cause significant re-ordering,
this can lead to inability of the receiving IPsec endpoint to
process the packets, as many current implementations do not support
the extensions defined in this memo. Similarly, such reordering
can cause significant problems for transport and upper layer
protocols, and is generally best avoided.
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2 Description of new anti-replay algorithm
Here we present an easy way to only update the window index and also
reduce the times of updating the window. The basic idea is illustrated
in the following figures. Suppose that we configure the window size W,
which consists of M-1 blocks, where M is power of two (2). Each block
contains N bits, where N is also power of two (2). It can be a byte
(8 bit) or word (32bit), or multiple words. The supported sliding
window size is (M-1)*N. However, it covers up M blocks (four blocks
as shown in Figure 1). All these M blocks are circulated and become
a ring of blocks, each with N bits. In this way, the supported
sliding window (M-1 blocks) is always a subset window of the actual
window when window slides.
Initially the actual window is defined by low and high end index
[WB, WT], as illustrated in Figure 1.
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
|xxxxxxcc|cccccccc|cccccccc|ccccc100|
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
^ ^
| |
WB WT
Figure 1: the sliding window [WB, WT],
in which WT is last validated sequence number
and the supported window size W is WT-WB+1.
(x=don't care bit, c=check bit)
If we receive a packet with the sequence number (S) greater than WT,
we slide the window. But we only change the window index by adding
the difference (S-WT) to both WT (WB is automatically changed as
window size is fixed). So S becomes the largest sequence number of
the received packets. Figure 2 shows the case that the packet with
sequence number S=WT+1 is received.
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
|xxxxxxcc|cccccccc|cccccccc|ccccc110|
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
^ ^
| |
WB WT
Figure 2: the sliding window [WB, WT] after S=WT+1
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If S is in the different block from where WT is, we have to initialize
all bit values in the blocks to 0 without bit shifting. If S passes
several blocks, we have to initialize several blocks instead of only
one block. Figure 3 shows that the sequence number already pass the
block boundary. Immediately after update, all the check bits should
be 0 in the block where WT resides.
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
|ccc10000|xxxxcccc|cccccccc|cccccccc|
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
^ ^
| |
WT WB
Figure 3: the sliding window [WB, WT] after S pass the boundary
After update, the new window still covers the configured window. This
means the configured sub-window also slides, conforming to the sliding
window protocol. The actual effect is somewhat like shifting the block.
In this way, the bit-shifting is deemed unnecessary.
It is also easier and much faster to check the window with the sequence
number because the sequence number check does not depend on the lowest
index WB. Instead, it only depends on the sequence number of the
received packet. If we receive a sequence number S, the bit location
is the lowest several bits of the sequence number, which only depends
on the block size (N). The block index is several bits before the
location bits, which only depends on the window size (M).
We do not specify how many redundancy bits needed except that it should
be power of two (2) for computation efficiency. If microprocessor is
32 bit, 32 might be a better choice while 64 might be better for 64 bit
microprocessor. For microprocessor with cache support, one cache line
is also a good choice. It also depends on how big the sliding window
size is. If we have N redundancy bits (for example, 32 bit in the above
description), we only need 1/N times update of blocks, comparing to the
bit-shifting algorithm in [RFC4302].
The cost of this method is extra byte or bytes used as redundant window.
The cost will be minimal if the window size is big enough. Actually
the extra redundant bits are not completely wasted. We could reuse the
unused bits in the block where index WB resides, i.e. the supported
window size could be (M-1)*N, plus the unused bits in the last block.
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3 Example of new anti-replay algorithm
Here is the example code to implement the algorithm of anti-replay
check and update, which is described in the previous sections.
<CODE BEGINS>
/**
* Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust, Xiangyang Zhang and Tina Tsou.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license
* terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section
* 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
* (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
*
*/
/**
* In this algorithm, the hidden window size must be a power of two,
* for example, 1024 bits. The redundant bits must also be a power of
* two, for example 32 bits. Thus, the supported anti-replay window
* size is the hidden window size minus the redundant bits. It is 992
* in this example. The size of integer depends on microprocessor
* architecture. In this example, we assume that the software runs on
* 32 bit microprocessor. So the size of integer is 32. In order to
* convert the bitmap into an array of integer, the total number of
* integers is the hidden window size divided by size of integer.
*
* struct ipsec_sa contains the window and window related parameters,
* such as the window size, the last acknowledged sequence number.
*
* all the value of macro can be changed, but must follow the rule
* defined in the algorithm.
*/
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#define SIZE_OF_INTEGER 32 /** 32 bit microprocessor */
#define BITMAP_LEN (1024/ SIZE_OF_INTEGER)
/** in terms of 32 bit integer */
#define BITMAP_INDEX_MASK (IPSEC_BITMAP_LEN-1)
#define REDUNDANT_BIT_SHIFTS 5
#define REDUNDANT_BITS (1<<REDUNDANT_BIT_SHIFTS)
#define BITMAP_LOC_MASK (IPSEC_REDUNDANT_BITS-1)
int
ipsec_check_replay_window (struct ipsec_sa *ipsa,
uint32_t sequence_number)
{
int bit_location;
int index;
/**
* replay shut off
*/
if (ipsa->replaywin_size == 0) {
return 1;
}
/**
* first == 0 or wrapped
*/
if (sequence_number == 0) {
return 0;
}
/**
* first check if the sequence number is in the range
*/
if (sequence_number>ipsa->replaywin_lastseq) {
return 1; /** larger is always good */
}
/**
* The packet is too old and out of the window
*/
if ((sequence_number + ipsa->replaywin_size) <
ipsa->replaywin_lastseq) {
return 0;
}
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/**
* The sequence is inside the sliding window
* now check the bit in the bitmap
* bit location only depends on sequence number
*/
bit_location = sequence_number&BITMAP_LOC_MASK;
index = (sequence_number>>REDUNDANT_BIT_SHIFTS)&BITMAP_INDEX_MASK;
/*
* this packet already seen
*/
if (ipsa->replaywin_bitmap[index]&(1<<bit_location)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int
ipsec_update_replay_window (struct ipsec_sa *ipsa,
uint32_t sequence_number)
{
int bit_location;
int index, index_cur, id;
int diff;
if (ipsa->replaywin_size == 0) { /** replay shut off */
return 1;
}
if (sequence_number == 0) {
return 0; /** first == 0 or wrapped */
}
/**
* the packet is too old, no need to update
*/
if ((ipsa->replaywin_size + sequence_number) <
ipsa->replaywin_lastseq) {
return 0;
}
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/**
* now update the bit
*/
index = (sequence_number>>REDUNDANT_BIT_SHIFTS);
/**
* first check if the sequence number is in the range
*/
if (sequence_number>ipsa->replaywin_lastseq) {
index_cur = ipsa->replaywin_lastseq>>REDUNDANT_BIT_SHIFTS;
diff = index - index_cur;
if (diff > BITMAP_LEN) { /* something unusual in this case */
diff = BITMAP_LEN;
}
for (id = 0; id < diff; ++id) {
ipsa->replaywin_bitmap[(id+index_cur+1)&BITMAP_INDEX_MASK]
= 0;
}
ipsa->replaywin_lastseq = sequence_number;
}
index &= BITMAP_INDEX_MASK;
bit_location = sequence_number&BITMAP_LOC_MASK;
/* this packet already seen */
if (ipsa->replaywin_bitmap[index]&(1<<bit_location)) {
return 0;
}
ipsa->replaywin_bitmap[index] |= (1<<bit_location);
return 1;
}
<CODE ENDS>
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4. Acknowledgements
The idea in this document came from the software design on one
high-performance multi-core network processor. The new network
processor core integrates a dozen of crypto core in distributed way,
which makes hardware anti-replay service impossible.
5. Security considerations
This document does not change [RFC4302] or [RFC4303]. It provides
an alternate method for anti-replay.
6. IANA Considerations
None.
7. Normative References
[RFC4302] "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302.
[RFC4303] "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303.
Author's address
Xiangyang Zhang
Futurewei Technologies
2330 Central Expressway
Santa Clara, California 95051
USA
Phone: +1-408-330-4545
Email: xiangyang.zhang@huawei.com
Tina TSOU (Ting ZOU)
Futurewei Technologies
2330 Central Expressway
Santa Clara, California 95051
USA
Phone: +1-408-859-4996
Email: tena@huawei.com
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