Network Working Group Z. Zhu
Internet-Draft UCLA
Intended status: Informational R. Wakikawa
Expires: August 21, 2011 Toyota ITC
L. Zhang
UCLA
S. Cheshire
Apple Inc.
February 17, 2011
Understanding Apple's Back to My Mac Service
draft-zhu-mobileme-doc-03.txt
Abstract
This document describes the implementation of Apple Inc.'s Back to My
Mac (BTMM) service. BTMM provides network connectivity between
devices so that a user can perform file sharing and screen sharing
among multiple computers at home, at work, or on the road. The
implementation of BTMM addresses the issues of single sign-on
authentication, secure data communication, service discovery and end-
to-end connectivity in face of Network Address Translators (NAT) and
mobility of devices.
Status of this Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 21, 2011.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. An Overview of Back to My Mac . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Encoding Host Information in DNS Resource Records . . . . . . 5
4. NAT Traversal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Introduction to NAT-PMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Requesting/Removing a Port Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Obtaining NAT box's Public IP Address . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4. Unsupported Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Handling IP Address or Port Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Updating Local Interfaces and Tunnels . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Dynamically Updating Reachability Information . . . . . . 8
5.3. Getting Up-to-Date DNS Resource Records without Polling . 9
6. IPv6 ULA as Host ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. Reasons for Host Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. Discussion: What to Use As Host Identifier . . . . . . . . 11
6.3. IPv6 ULA Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Securing Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. Authentication for Connecting to Remote Host . . . . . . . 12
7.2. Authentication for DNS Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.3. IPsec for Secure End-to-End Data Communication . . . . . . 13
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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1. Introduction
Apple Inc.'s Back to My Mac (BTMM) service was first shipped with MAC
OS X 10.5 release in October 2007, since then it has been widely
used. BTMM provides an integrated solution to host mobility support,
NAT traversal, and secure end-to-end data delivery through a
combination of several existing protocols and software tools instead
of designing new protocols. This document describes the
implementation of BTMM and we hope the reader find it informative.
BTMM provides secure transport connections among a set of devices
that may be located over a dynamic and heterogeneous network
environment. Independent from whether a user is traveling and
accessing the Internet via airport WiFi, or staying at home behind a
NAT, BTMM allows the user to connect to any of his Mac computers with
a click, after which the user can share files with remote computers
or control the remote Mac through screen sharing. When a user moves
around and changes locations and hence the IP address of his computer
(e.g. roaming around with a laptop and receiving dynamically
allocated IP address), BTMM provides a means for the roaming host to
update its reachability information to keep it reachable by the
user's other Mac devices. BTMM maintains end-to-end transport
connections in face of host IP address changes through the use of
unique host identifiers. It also provides means to reach devices
behind a NAT.
BTMM achieves the above functions mainly by integrating a set of
existing protocols and software tools. It uses DNS-based Service
Discovery [DNS-SD] to announce host reachability information, dynamic
DNS update [RFC 2136] to refresh the DNS resource records (RRs) when
a host detects network changes, and DNS Long-lived Queries (LLQ)
[DNS-LLQ] to notify hosts immediately when the answers to their
earlier DNS queries have changed. BTMM uses IPv6 Unique Local
Address(ULA) [RFC 4193] as the host identifier, and employs the NAT
Port Mapping Protocol (PMP) [NAT-PMP] to assist NAT traversal. It
uses Kerberos [RFC 4120] for end-to-end authentication, and uses
IPsec [RFC 4301] to secure data communications between two end hosts.
2. An Overview of Back to My Mac
To keep an established TCP connection running while either of the two
end hosts may change its IP address requires that the connection use
unique and stable identifiers that do not change with the addresses,
and that a mapping service exists between these stable identifiers
and dynamically changing IP addresses. BTMM uses DNS to provide this
mapping service. Figure 1 provides a sketch of the basic components
in the BTMM implementation.
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DDNS update +--------+ DDNS update
+--------------->| |<-------+
| | DNS | |
| LLQ | | LLQ |
| +---------->| |<----+ |
| | | | | |
| | +--------+ | |
| | | | +----------+
| V +---+--+----+ | |
+-+-------+ | +-------| |
|Endhost N| Tunnel | NAT +------>|Endhost M |
| |<=====================================>| |
+---------+ | | | |
+-----------+ +----------+
Figure 1
Apple Inc. operates a DNS domain called members.me.com, and provides
DNS name resolution services for all the subdomains underneath.
Every BTMM user is assigned a DNS subdomain under members.me.com,
e.g. alice.members.me.com. The user then assigns a DNS name for each
of her computers, e.g. myMacPro.alice.members.me.com. The
reachability information of each of the user's machines is encoded in
DNS resources records and published in the DNS. For example, If the
machine myMacPro.alice.members.me.com has a public IPv4 address P, P
represents the reachability information to the machine. On the other
hand, if the machine is behind an NAT, its reachability information
is composed of the public IP address of the NAT box and the port
number opened on the NAT to reach the internal host. In this case
both the public IP address of the NAT box and the port number are
encoded into DNS using DNS SRV records [RFC 2782], as we explain in
the next section. When a user logs in from a machine M, M starts
updating the DNS server about its reachability information. If the
user has multiple machines, M also sets up LLQs with the DNS server
for her other machines, so that the DNS server can push any
reachability changes of these other machines to M immediately.
To obtain a unique identifier for each host, BTMM automatically
generates an IPv6 ULA for each host as its identifier at machine boot
time. This design choice allows BTMM to reuse all the existing code
of applications and protocols that already support IPv6. To ensure
end-to-end data security, BTMM leverages the existing IPsec to
protect the communications, and Kerberos to perform end-to-end
authentication.
BTMM provides an IPv6 socket interface to user applications. It then
wraps the IPv6 packets with IPSec ESP [RFC 2406], and encapsulates
the packets in a UDP/IP tunnel, as illustrated in Figure 2. Note
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that this is the case even when both ends have public IPv4 addresses.
+-------------+------------+------------+---------------+
| IPv4 Header | UDP Header | IPsec ESP | IPv6 Packet |
+-------------+------------+------------+---------------+
Figure 2
The following sections describe each of the basic components in BTMM.
Since this document is intended to be an informal description of the
BTMM implementation, it does not include all the details (e.g. packet
format, error code, etc) of each component.
3. Encoding Host Information in DNS Resource Records
For each host, BTMM encodes into DNS both the host identifier and its
current location information. BTMM stores the host identifier (IPv6
ULA) in a DNS AAAA RR, and uses a DNS SRV RR [RFC 2782] to represent
the host's current location information. For hosts behind a NAT box,
the use of a DNS SRV RR allows BTMM to store both the public IP
address of the NAT box and also the port opened for the host.
The SRV RR consists of seven fields: _Service._Proto.Name, TTL,
Class, Type, Priority, Weight, Port, and Target. BTMM uses SRV RRs
in the following way.
Service is the symbolic name of the desired service. In BTMM case,
the service is named "autotunnel", which means that the information
contained in the SRV RR is used by BTMM to automatically set up a
tunnel between two end hosts.
Proto is the symbolic name of desired protocol. Typically it is
either "_tcp" or "_udp". BTMM uses "_udp" to tunnel packets between
the two ends to achieve NAT traversal.
Name is the domain this RR refers to. When a user subscribes to BTMM
service with the username "alice", a domain name
"alice.members.me.com" is assigned to her. The user assigns a name,
such as "myMacPro", to each machine which is appended to the assigned
domain name. Hence, the first part of SRV record would look like
"_autotunnel._udp.myMacPro.alice.members.me.com".
Priority and Weight are set to zero, since there is only one instance
that provides "autotunnel" service for each name in BTMM.
Port is the port opened on the target host of the service. In BTMM,
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most likely it is the external port a NAT opened for the host behind
it. Knowing the port number is the basic requirement for NAT
traversal via UDP encapsulation. If the host is not behind a NAT,
the port opened on the host for autotunnel service is placed here.
Target is the canonical hostname of the machine that provides the
service. In BTMM it refers to a name constructed by appending the
user's domain name to an autotunnel label, which identifies the
machine and is not generally user-visible. The autotunnel label is
created by concatenating "AutoTunnel" with the IEEE EUI-64 identifier
[EUI64] of the primary network interface. Hence, an example for the
Target field would look like: AutoTunnel-00-22-69-FF-FE-8E-34-
2A.alice.members.me.com. After obtaining the SRV RR, the remote host
can query the A RR for the Target and get the external tunnel address
for the BTMM client during the NAT Traversal.
4. NAT Traversal
BTMM's NAT traversal function requires NAT router devices to support
NAT-PMP or UPnP IGD. NAT-PMP is the alternative introduced by Apple
Inc. to the more common Internet Gateway Device (IGD) Standardized
Device Control Protocol [IGD] as published in UPnP forum. Both NAT-
PMP and IGD require the NAT devices to be able to open a port for
inbound traffic to some host behind it and to inform the host about
its public IP address. The differences between IGD and NAT-PMP can
be found in [NAT-PMP]. This section focuses on NAT-PMP.
4.1. Introduction to NAT-PMP
NAT-PMP is a protocol that is designed specifically to handle the NAT
traversal without manual configuration. When a host determines that
its primary IPv4 address is in one of the private IP address ranges
defined in "Address Allocation for Private Internets" [RFC1918], it
invokes NAT-PMP to communicate with the NAT gateway to request the
creation of inbound mappings on demand. Having created a NAT mapping
to allow inbound traffic, the client host then publishes its NAT
box's public IP address and external port number in a DNS server.
A host sends its Port Mapping Protocol request to the default
gateway, which means that by default, this protocol is designed for
small home networks where the host's default gateway is the NAT
router. If the host finds that NAT-PMP or UPnP IGD is not available
on its network, it would proceed under the assumption that the
network is a public network.
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4.2. Requesting/Removing a Port Mapping
To request a port mapping, the client host sends its request packet
to port 5351 of its configured gateway address, and waits 250ms for a
response. If no response is received after 250ms, the host repeats
the process with exponential back-off.
While requesting the port mapping, the host can specify the desired
external port (e.g. the port that is identical to the internal port
opened on the host), but the NAT device is not obliged to allocate
the desired one. If such port is not available, NAT device responds
with another port. The primary reason for allowing host to request a
specific port is to help recovery from the NAT device crash, to allow
the host to request the same port number used before the crash. This
simple mechanism allows the end hosts, instead of the NAT box, to
keep the mapping states, which turns hard state in the network into
soft state, and enables automatic recovery whenever possible.
The default port mapping lifetime is 3600 seconds. The host tries to
renew the mapping at every 1800 seconds. The renewal sent by client
host, whether for the purpose of the extending the lease or
recreating mappings after NAT device reboots, is the same as
requesting a port mapping.
A mapping may be removed in a variety of ways. If a client host
fails to renew a mapping, then when its lifetime expires the mapping
is automatically deleted. Or if the client host's DHCP address lease
expires, the NAT device also automatically deletes the mapping. A
client host can also send an explicit packet to request the deletion
of a mapping that is no longer needed.
4.3. Obtaining NAT box's Public IP Address
To determine the public IP address of the NAT, the client host also
sends the query packet to port 5351 of the configured gateway
address. NAT device responses with a packet containing the public IP
address of NAT.
In case the public IP address of the NAT changes, the NAT gateway
sends a gratuitous response to the link-local multicast address
224.0.0.1, port 5350 to notify the clients about the new IP address,
and the host can then update its DNS SRV record to reflect its new
reachability as we describe in the next section.
4.4. Unsupported Scenarios
There are a number of situations where NAT-PMP (and consequently
BTMM) does not work.
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4.4.1. NAT Behind NAT
Some people's primary IP address assigned by their ISPs may itself be
a NAT address. In addition, some people may have a public IP
address, but may put their machines (perhaps unknowingly) behind
multiple nested NAT boxes. NAT traversal cannot be achieved with
NAT-PMP in such situations.
4.4.2. NATs and Routed Private Networks
In some cases, a site may run subnet in the private network behind a
NAT gateway. Such subnetting breaks the assumption of NAT-PMP
protocol because a host's default router is not necessarily the
device performing NAT.
5. Handling IP Address or Port Changes
This section describes how BTMM handles IP address or port number
changes, so that the hosts of the same user can find each other and
keep ongoing TCP connections even after the changes happen at one or
both ends.
5.1. Updating Local Interfaces and Tunnels
After BTMM client receives the notification about the network
changes, it updates the list of active interfaces. Then, BTMM sends
requests to the NAT device (if it is behind a NAT) in order to create
a port mapping and obtain the new public IP address.
Next step, BTMM makes changes to the local autotunnel interface, i.e.
configures the IPv6 interface for the inner address of tunnel. If
there are established tunnels, it scans to find those whose local
inner/outer addresses have been changed since the tunnel was set up,
and then puts in the current addresses.
With all these done, now the BTMM client publishes the changes to
DNS.
5.2. Dynamically Updating Reachability Information
The mobile nature of the BTMM clients implies that dynamic DNS update
is required if the location information of hosts are going to be
published via DNS.
However, the dynamically updated RRs are often not properly removed,
leaving stale RRs in DNS server. Hence, Dynamic DNS Update Leases
(DDUL) [DDUL] is employed by BTMM to reduce the impact of stale RRs.
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Another possible choice is to overload the RRs' TTL as the removal
timer. However, there is a concern about unacceptable amount of
network traffic due to refreshes if TTL were used to clear stale
resource record, because TTL is usually set to be very short in order
to minimize stale cached data in intermediate DNS.
In case of network changes, the RRs of a host are updated immediately
after local interfaces are properly configured and port mapping as
well as the public IP address of the NAT are obtained. Usually there
are 4 types of RRs involved. An AAAA RR for updating the new host
identifier of the host (possibly the same as the old one); an SRV RR
for updating the autotunnel service information, which includes the
new external port; an A RR for updating the new public IP address;
and a TXT RR for describing the autotunnel device information. The
host then constructs and sends an SRV query for the dynamic DNS
server to which it should send updates. Following our example for
alice, it queries the SRV RR for _dns-
update._udp.alice.members.me.com. Then the updates are sent to the
dynamic DNS server returned in the target field of query response.
Besides that, periodic refreshes are also required by the DDUL even
though the network has not experienced any change. The update
requests contain a signed 32-bit integer indicating the lease life in
seconds. To reduce network and server load, a minimum lease of 30
minutes is required. On the other hand, to avoid stale information,
a lease longer than 2 hours is not allowed in BTMM. The typical
length is 90 minutes. RRs not to be deleted by the server are
refreshed by the client host before the lease expires.
5.3. Getting Up-to-Date DNS Resource Records without Polling
In dynamic environments, changes to DNS information are often
frequent. How to let the hosts that are concerned about particular
DNS RRs know the changes efficiently is a challenging question. In
traditional DNS, queries are "one-shot" -- a name server will answer
a query once, returning the results available at that instant in
time. Thus, polling is necessary to learn the changes. This
solution is not scalable, however, as low polling rate could leave
the client with stale information and a high polling rate would have
an adverse impact on the network and server.
BTMM relies on DNS Long-Lived Queries (LLQ) [DNS-LLQ] to allow the
DNS server to notify the client host about the changes to DNS data.
To obtain the LLQ server information, the client also issues an SRV
query. So alice's machine issues a query for _dns-
llq._udp.alice.members.me.com and obtains the server that provides
LLQ service. LLQs are initiated by a client and are completed via a
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four-way handshake: Initial Request, Challenge, Challenge Response,
and ACK + Answers. During the Challenge phase, the DNS server
provides a unique identifier for the request and the client is
required to echo this identifier in Challenge Response phase. This
handshake provides resilience to packet loss, demonstrates client
reachability and reduces denial-of-service attack opportunities.
LLQ lease is negotiated during the handshake. In BTMM, the minimum
lease is 15 minutes and the maximum lease is 2 hours. Leases are
refreshed before they expire.
When a change ("event") occurs to a name server's domain, the server
checks if the new or deleted RRs answer any LLQs. If so, the RRs are
sent to the LLQ issuers in the form of a gratuitous DNS response.
The client acknowledges the reception of the notification; otherwise
the server re-sends the response. If a total of 3 transmissions
fail, the client is considered unreachable and the LLQ is deleted.
A BTMM client then updates its tunnels according to the query
answers. The callback function for automatically updating tunnels is
depicted Figure 3.
1: Push Updated AAAA RR +------------+
<----------------------------------- | |
2: Query for autotunnel SRV RR | |
+--------+ -----------------------------------> | |
| | 3: Reply Updated SRV RR | DNS server |
| client | <----------------------------------- | |
| | 4: Query for Target in SRV RR | |
+--------+ -----------------------------------> | |
5: Reply Updated A RR of Target | |
<----------------------------------- | |
+------------+
In Step
1: client learns the inner IP address of the tunnel
3: client learns the port opened for UDP NAT traversal
5: client learns the public IP address of the remote NAT,
i.e. the outer IP address of the tunnel
Figure 3
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6. IPv6 ULA as Host ID
6.1. Reasons for Host Identifiers
There are a number of reasons why BTMM needs a topology-independent
identifier for each client host.
o A host may be on the move, thus any identifier that is related to
the topology would be constantly changing, which causes great
troubles for mobility support and other services.
o The two ends may wish to have the established TCP connections
survive network changes.
o Sometimes a constant identifier needs to be associated with a key
so that the security association can survive the location changes.
6.2. Discussion: What to Use As Host Identifier
There are several candidates for host identifiers, such as DNS name,
Host Identity Tag (HIT) in HIP [RFC 4423], and IPv6 address. To be
accurate, the last one should be IPv6 ULA, because the globally
routable IPv6 addresses are dependent on the topology. BTMM chooses
the IPv6 ULA to be the host identifier.
A very pragmatic concern about introducing a host identifier is: do
we need to re-write all the protocol and application code? It would
be a tedious and error-prone work to migrate all the existing
implementations. This gives us a hint: the host identifier should be
compatible with existing protocol and application implementations,
e.g. something in the same form and length as IP address. This rules
out DNS name, which has variable length.
For HIP, although publickey-based HIT has the same length as IPv6
address, we still lack a secure way to retrieve the public keys.
Under this condition, using HIT would not bring us much benefit.
On the other hand, with IPv6 ULA as host identifier, all the existing
code can be used directly. And since in BTMM all the IPv6 ULAs are
not leaked to the public network, it would not cause any problem to
the global routing system.
6.3. IPv6 ULA Configuration
In BTMM, IPv6 ULA is advertised to be used in the autotunnel service
of the host. Thus, the IPv6 address needs to be configured before
BTMM starts its service.
When the machine boots up, the IPv6 address for autotunnel service is
initialized as zeros and the autotunnel interface is marked as
inactive. During the process when BTMM updates the interfaces list
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(which is performed every time the network changes), BTMM would
randomly generate an IPv6 ULA according to [RFC 4193], if the IPv6
address is found uninitialized. The first octet of the ULA is set to
be "0xFD", and the following 7 octets are randomly selected from
0~255. Finally, the EUI-64 identifier fills up the rest 8 octets.
Since there are 56 random bits plus a theoretically unique EUI-64
identifier, it is unlikely to have the IPv6 ULA collision between any
two machines of the same subscriber.
This locally generated ULA keeps unchanged when the machine is on,
despite its location changes. Hence the user can fully enjoy the
benefits brought by topology-independent host identifiers. After the
machine is turned off, this particular ULA is no longer kept.
7. Securing Communication
BTMM users often have to fetch their personal data via a network they
don't trust (or have no idea whether it's trustworthy). Hence, it is
important for BTMM to have effective means to secure the
communications.
7.1. Authentication for Connecting to Remote Host
Kerberos is a "single sign on" technology and is supported in Apple's
products since Mac OS X 10.5. Each Mac OS X client maintains a local
Key Distribution Center (KDC) for the use of Bonjour and peer-to-peer
security.
When the user first signs in to MobileMe on a host, it automatically
receives from KDC a digital certificate and private key for "Back to
My Mac Encryption Certificate". When the user connects to another
system using BTMM, authentication is performed using the standard
Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos
(PKINIT) protocol [RFC 4556] with that certificate. After that, the
user is granted a "ticket" that permits it to continue to use the
services on the remote machine, without re-authenticating, until the
ticket expires, which usually has 10 hours lifetime.
7.2. Authentication for DNS Exchanges
BTMM uses Transaction SIGnature (TSIG) to authenticate user when
dynamic DNS update is performed [RFC 2845]. Also, to protect the
subscriber's privacy, LLQ is required to contain TSIG. This
authentication mechanism is based on the shared secret key, which in
BTMM's case is derived from the subscriber's MobileMe account
password.
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Every time a DNS request/response is going to be issued, a TSIG RR is
dynamically computed with HMAC-MD5 message digest algorithm [RFC
2104] (and the TSIG RR will be discarded once its has been used).
Inside the TSIG RR, a name of the shared secret key in domain name
syntax is included, so the receiver knows which key to used
(especially useful if the receiver is the DNS server). This TSIG RR
is appended to the additional data section before the message is send
out. The receiver of the message verifies the TSIG RR and proceeds
only if the TSIG is valid.
Besides, the DNS messages are also protected by TLS [RFC 2246] to
prevent eavesdropping.
7.3. IPsec for Secure End-to-End Data Communication
7.3.1. Internet Key Exchange
Before the Security Association can be established between two end
hosts, Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [RFC 2409] process needs to be
accomplished.
BTMM calls Racoon [Racoon], the IKE daemon, to do the key exchange,
after which the key is put into Security Association Database (SAD).
The exchange mode is set to be aggressive so that it would not take
too long. And it uses pre-shared key to do the user authentication.
The subscriber's FQDN is used as both identifier and pre-shared key
during the IKE process.
7.3.2. Discussion: End-to-End Encryption
When it comes the time to set up Security Associations between two
BTMM clients, we have two choices: either to put the other host's
IPv4 address in the destination address field, or otherwise put in
the IPv6 address of the remote end.
If the IPv4 address (which is the public address of a NAT) is chosen
to associate with a Security Association, that means we set up a
Security Association between one end host and the NAT of the other
host. The IPv6 packet would then be wrapped by UDP header and then
get encrypted by ESP. After the encrypted packet arrives at the NAT,
the NAT device decrypts the packet and sends it to the destination
according to the port mapping. Although this approach seems viable,
there are 3 drawbacks:
o First, the encryption is not really end-to-end, i.e. only the path
between one end host and the NAT device of the other end is
protected. The rest of the path, from the NAT device to the other
BTMM client, is unprotected and vulnerable to attacks. If the NAT
device is not trustworthy, the communication is at high risk.
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Even if the NAT device is trustworthy (e.g. the user owns the
NAT), it is not uncommon that the NAT communicates with the host
through broadcast channel, which provides opportunities for an
eavesdropper to sniff the sensitive data (consider the unlocked
"free" WiFi access near your neighborhood).
o Second, quite a lot BTMM clients are on the move very often.
Every time they change their attachment points to the Internet
they will get different IPv4 addresses. As a result, the
previously established Security Associations become obsoleted and
the two end hosts need to re-establish them again. This is a
waste of time and resources.
o Third, this approach assumes that the NAT device is able and
willing to do the IPsec ESP for the host behind it, which is not
always the case.
Consequently, BTMM decides to put the IPv6 ULA into the destination
field of IPsec Security Associations. In this way, the end-to-end
path between the hosts are fully protected, and the Security
Associations survive the network changes since the IPv6 ULA remains
the same even the BTMM client changes its location. Furthermore, the
encryption is transparent to the NAT device, which means the NAT
device is not required to interfere with the IPsec protection.
8. References
[DDUL] "Dynamic DNS Update Leases", draft -sekar-dns-ul-01.txt.
[DNS-LLQ] "DNS Long-Lived Queries",
draft draft-cheshire-dns-llq-01.txt.
[DNS-SD] "DNS-Based Service Discovery",
draft draft-cheshire-dnsext-dns-sd-08.txt.
[EUI64] "Guidelines for 64-bit Global Identifier (EUI-64)", http :
//standards.ieee.org/regauth/oui/tutorials/EUI64.html.
[IGD] "Internet Gateway Device(IGD) Standard Device Control
Protocol", http ://www.upnp.org/standardizeddcps/igd.asp.
[NAT-PMP] "NAT Port Mapping Protocol",
draft draft-cheshire-nat-pmp-03.txt.
[RFC 2104]
"HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication",
RFC 2104.
[RFC 2136]
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"Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
RFC 2136.
[RFC 2246]
"The TLS Protocol", RFC 2246.
[RFC 2406]
"IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)".
[RFC 2409]
"The Internet Key Exchange", RFC 2409.
[RFC 2782]
"A DNS RR for specifying the location of services (DNS
SRV)", RFC 2782.
[RFC 2845]
"Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)",
RFC 2845.
[RFC 3948]
"UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets".
[RFC 4120]
"The Kerberos Network Authentication Services (V5)",
RFC 4120.
[RFC 4193]
"Unique Local IPv6 Unicast Address", RFC 4193.
[RFC 4301]
"Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol",
RFC 4301.
[RFC 4423]
"Host Identify Protocol (HIP) Architecture", RFC 4423.
[RFC 4556]
"Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in
Kerberos (PKINIT)", RFC 4556.
[RFC1035] "Domain Names - implementation and specification",
RFC 1035.
[RFC1918] "Address Allocation for Private Internets", RFC 1918.
[Racoon] "Racoon", http ://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/
man-cgi?racoon++NetBSD-current.
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Authors' Addresses
Zhenkai Zhu
UCLA
4805 Boelter Hall, UCLA
Los Angeles, CA 90095
US
Phone: +1 310 993 7128
Email: zhenkai@cs.ucla.edu
Ryuji Wakikawa
Toyota ITC
465 Bernardo Avenue
Mountain View, CA 94043
US
Email: ryuji@jp.toyota-itc.com
Lixia Zhang
UCLA
3713 Boelter Hall, UCLA
Los Angeles, CA 90095
US
Phone: +1 310 825 2695
Email: lixia@cs.ucla.edu
Stuart Cheshire
Apple Inc.
1 Infinite Loop
Cupertino, CA 95014
US
Phone: +1 408 974 3207
Email: cheshire@apple.com
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