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Minutes IETF103: pearg
minutes-103-pearg-00

Meeting Minutes Privacy Enhancements and Assessments Research Group (pearg) RG
Date and time 2018-11-07 08:40
Title Minutes IETF103: pearg
State Active
Other versions plain text
Last updated 2018-11-16

minutes-103-pearg-00
Administrivia
===============

Charter:
*Mic-line*
Q: how do you define privacy? Is it about protocols? Maybe look at the business
model of data monetization. A: yes, the privacy of protocols but we will also
look at the application layer. NE: Tim Cook gave a great speach at the EU on
monetization of data

Q: I thought it was notable that privacy beyond just confidentiality was
highlighted, but no particular research items or topics seemed to be suggested.

Presentations:
==============

Presentation 1:
-----------------
Bennett Cyphers (staff technologist) from EFF on Privacy Badgers
-       EFF is member funded non-profit
-       Privacy, free _expression_ and innovation

Context of privacy badgers: a story of how sometimes protocols are not enough.

2009 – 2012: DNT and the dream of a universal opt-out. Let’s do this.  Industry
was interested too, in order to pre-empt (more) regulation, amongst other
reasons.

2012 – 2018. Turn around on DNT in late 2012 because things were breaking down.
EFF saw need for other way to allow people to opt-out of tracking. Privacy
badger is born.

Privacy Badger:
- Both sticks and carrots (stop non-consensual tracking, spread awareness,
promote DNT compliance, publish trackers who don’t DNT by blocking them) - But
faced constraints as small non-profit.

It turns DNT on in your browser.

Next steps: Badger Sett
-  Pre-train privacy badger on popular sites
-  Use privacy badger to survey the web
-  Test out new heuristics and measure the effectiveness
- Privacy Badger mobile is needed bc of the importance of mobile browsing and
apps.

*Mic open*
-    Privacy badger as part of the W3C DNT, why not?
-    Privacy sett does more than you mentioned in your talk, it provides extra
protection ag -   Interaction with other extensions sometimes is a problem - No
telemetry data back to EFF, so your model of doing your own surveying of the
web is great. -  How much of cat and mouse game is it? A: it’s a pretty small
extension, add-blockers operate on such a scale that they consider it to be
much work to avoid privacy badger. - Do you also provide guidance for
privacy-preserving website? A: We refer to the DNT policy that is available for
people who are interested in guidance. - How does it interact with
add-blockers? A: we don’t block adds perse, because they also track. You can
also auto-adjust your settings.

Presentation 2:
---------------
Sofia Celi & Jurren van Bergen (Centro de autonomia digital) No evidence of
communication: Off-the-record messaging protocol in version 4 (OTRv4) -      
Comes out of an academic paper -       Provides encryption w forward secrecy;
authentication, deniability. -       Different version -       Other protocols
drew inspiration for it (like signal)

Why version 4?
-       Deniability is crucial
-       Has a specification
-       Can find more info on the git repo

*Mic open*
-  Work in IETF on MLS, how does it relate? A: MLS does not provide deniability.
-  MLS wants to improve crypto, so it would seem that you have the same
security guarantees, maybe you want to have the same kind of scrutiny applied
to your stuff. We are an inspiration protocol. - Can you explain what is
message and participation deniability? A: it means that no one can prove you
participated and that nobody can prove that you sent that message. - MLS is
agnostic on deniability currently. We would love to have your participation in
the MLS working group.

Presentation 3:
---------------
David Oliver (Guardian Project) pluggable transport (obfuscates the address and
network flows, to prevent DPI.) Surveillance is bad. Privacy is core to
enabling human rights. Guardian Project focuses on mobile operating systems.

DPI:
-       IP was to route, but routing data got weaponized.
-       DPI of traffic analysis, you can see the content of every packet in
your traffic -       Encryption also adheres to recognizable patterns. You can
defend through obfuscation: -       Service address -       Content of the
packet

What is suspicious develops fast and deployment of work should hence also be
faster = pluggable transports.

*Mic open*
- Tensions between scale and half-life of mechanisms, the more successful you
are the quicker you will have to turn over. A: yes, we are on the cutting edge
and we expose a lot of problems so others can get involved. - Could you make
all of the normal things the same? A: good point, lets talk offline. - 
Transport services working group might be relevant. - Have you thought of
use-cases where both end-points are compromised? How do you detect anthrax and
bombs (in the mail analogy). What about security concerns and not just privacy?
A: primarily, with the earlier version the net-effect – we are not exposing
anything that previously got exposed. Let’s take it offline. - What if you want
to inspect traffic for child pornography? A: I can’t speak for the
implementers. There is a tension.

Presenter 4:
------------
Gunes Acar paper on Battery Status not included: assessing privacy in web
standards New web features lead to privacy concerns. W3C has a self-review
questionnaire. Came out of the privacy interest group (PING).

Battery status API introduced in 2011. New research shows multiple privacy
vulnerabilities.

*Mic open*
- Recommendations on measurement are relevant. Participated in it 8 years ago.
I think this should not be standardized. Because there is no way of having the
info in the API without leaking. But drive in the W3C was very strong. This is
an important part of history on device API. Our threat model understanding is
better now but it remains a back-and-forth. - PING group is very happy with
this research. Security and privacy questionnaire in W3C is currently being
updated. We need people to get involved in the work. We should reach out early.
-Implicit assumption in this work that API enable this kind of fingerprinting
are bad, but that’s not the consensus of the browser vendors. It is not
practical to prevent it in many cases.