Minutes interim-2020-drip-05: Wed 11:00

Meeting Minutes Drone Remote ID Protocol (drip) WG
Title Minutes interim-2020-drip-05: Wed 11:00
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Last updated 2020-08-26

Meeting Minutes

Drone Remote ID Protocol (drip)
interim meeting Agenda
Wed, August 26, 2020 15:00-16:00 UTC
Co-Chairs: Daniel Migault & Mohamed Boucadair

* [Meeting
* [WG page](https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/drip/documents/) *

# Agenda

## 1. [Note well](https://www.ietf.org/about/note-well/)
 logistics, and introduction 5 min

Comments on agenda? None.

## 2. Requirements Discussion Stuart Card 10 min (need 15)

Requirements (Stu Card)
- Slide 2
    - Update, now rev4
    - Try to address all points as understood
    - Added missing context, ignored if no consensus
    - Definitions? A lot of them not used in reqs.
    - Structure or restructure?
- Slide 3
    - GEN 1 out into multiple sub reqs, thanks Michael R.
- Slide 4 (with updates in red)
    - Daniel; Concur, different characteristics. Maybe not 5 but a middle ground
    - Bob; also agree
    - Danel; lack of context maybe, do not understand why current sender of
    message...is this the simplest way (wording)? - Many short messages, but no
    session or connection, so a lot of technology doesn't work. Think UDP
    datagrams and can not correlate one message from another - Daniel; what
    about sender, UA or GCS? When speaking of UAS, drone can broadcast or has
    network connection - Bob; Broadcast assumes it is always coming from air.
    Network assumes either - both UA and GCS are allowed to do Network RID. -
    Stu; who is provider? - Dnaiel; whoever is collection location information
    - Stu; Broadcast the provider is Observer devices - Daniel; so non-IP
    communication, ....
- Slide 5
    - GEN 4 not really need?
- Slide 6
    - Remain unchanged.
    - Explinatory text in places
    - Even GCS could be mobile - yes.
- Slide 7
    - Uniqueness in a defined scope ... need to define this
    - Hoped it would just appear
    - Daniel; won't be unique for a long time
    - How wide and long it needs to be
    - Daniel; too specific - must provide ways to avoid collisions
    - Bob; FAA conops wording about avoiding ID use in operation conflict
    - 6 month period of relevance
    - Daniel; solution really match reqs at the end
- Slide 8
    - Action time
    - PRIV3, prior at 108 it was narrowed
    - PRIV2, trasparency vs. privacy
    - Bob; is happy with it
    - Daniel; is storage in scope?
    - Talks about in explanitory text
- Slide 9
    - PRIV4; new. Results for Amelia's review.
    - PRIV5; new. Michael R. make themselves mutually reachable while masking
    location of pilot location and ID - Daniel; I can talk to pilot of drone
    w/o ??? - Not really a requirment its a MAY - Daniel; why not a SHOULD? -
    Can upgrade if we all agree - Tactical deconfliction, when its automated
    its called DAA - Daniel; not much of a difference between MAY/SHOULD and if
    we don't have it - Michael R; not required, but its interesting! Enabling
    it for more than security it would get additional traction and mindshare.
    "I just got footage of mugging, but didn't get face, did you?" - Any
    objection of MAY to SHOULD? -- no push back will do so

- Wrap up
    - Daniel; can we start WGLC on this Sept 1?
    - 1 yes...
    - Bob; need GEN1 changes on list and then call WGLC, also PRIV3 -->
    PRIV5 so just a reorder - Daniel; minor changes but next ver. can be
    discussed on list and do WGLC - Dan; want to reach other to other orgs for
    this - Dan; long WGLC? Shouldn't stop solution stuff - Dan; any opinion? -
    Michael; start after labor day - but no need to make it long - Bob; Silva
    could comment from ICAO? - Bob; end of Oct to finish up? - Dan; WGLC for a
    month? So mid-Sept to Oct 15 - Michael; sounds too long, you will lose
    focus. Never really get any comments until final review. outside ORG
    different story - Dan; good points - Stu; start on Sept 8

## 3. Solution Discussion

### 3.1. UAS Remote ID Robert Moskowitz 10 min
* draft-moskowitz-drip-uas-rid

Slide 3
    - limited by outside groups
    - 200 bytes max size of auth messages
    - challenging in practice for BT4 to get all frames
    - Dan; 10 is BT restriction?
    - no, more from other groups and previous decisions
Slide 4
    - self explained
Slide 5
    - Certs? Cert isn't but name inside is
    - This is being discussed in ICAO Digital Identity group for their PKI
    model (manned aircraft and services) - Daniel; 20 bytes or characters? -
    bytes but assumed printable ascii - Russ; don't understand Certs are
    non-spoofable - certificate can not prove name - Russ; depends on ppolicy
    and CA is following rules - multiple CAs! - Russ; or they split up the
    namespace - lost ??? - Russ; if ICAO runs the root, then they can audit
    subordinates - ICAO is expanding to federated model - Russ; doesn't
    change...can still audit - after damage has been done - Russ; so if you
    don't trust CA then can't trust name - I agree with that - maybe Bob being
    gun-rush? - Russ; if policy in place and being enforced they will get
    caught if breaking it! - will send to Russ current draft (Silva confirms in
Slide 6
    - ????
Slide 7
    - statistical uniqueness is not sufficient
Slide 8
    - ???
    (test ignore)
    Another possible approach is the use of return tests: ping it and if it
    replies now, or in the time 4th dimension, then that's who s/he is, else
    no. I must say I dont know Host Identity Tag
Slide 9
    - HHIT is chosen approach
Slide 10
    - EPP is probably better and need stuff from Michael P.
    - Better/simpler approach to how lookup would work
    - RDAP approach as well
    - leverage EPP/RDAP is probably way forward
    - do not have best DNS structure
    - Alexandre Petrescu; not clear how IPv6 comes into opicture here if we
    said earlier that this is bluetooth, not IP.  Not sure how to use that IP
    reverse lookup, although I do see how IP reverse lookups work. - Adam; IPv6
    comes into play when the ID is recieved by an Observer (either via
    Broadcast or Network) and can lookup the public key and other public
    information using it as a key. - Alex; at that point, we want to do reverse
    lookup on an IP address, and the ownership of that IP address is what might
    be at risk (claimed by an attacker).
Slide 11
    - Stu; also supporting ID6

### 3.2. DRIP Authentication Formats Adam Wiethuechter 10 min

* draft-wiethuechter-drip-auth

postponed until next inteim (but critically important)

### 3.3 DRIP Identity Claims Adam Wiethuechter 10 min
* draft-wiethuechter-drip-identity-claims

postponed until next interim (but critically important)

### 3.4 DRIP Operator Privacy
* draft-moskowitz-drip-operator-privacy

also postponed

## 4 Closing                                                   5 min
WG last call on -reqs to start shortly if Med agrees
call for UAS RID draft adoption also soon
closing ~12:01 EDT

Stuart Card AX Enterprize
Bob Moskowitz HTT Consaulting
Adam Wiethuechter AX Enterprize, LLC
Russ Housley, Vigil Security
Alexandre Petrescu, CEA
Peter Yee, Spyrus
Sao Da Silva, ICAO
Michael Richardson, MCR
Shuai Zhao, Tencent
Michael Palage,
Daniel Migault, Ericsson