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 Synchronizing Internet Clock frequency protocol (sic)

Abstract

Synchronizing Internet Clock (sic) Frequency specifies a new secure method to synchronize clocks on the Internet, assuring smoothness (i.e., frequency stability) and robustness to man-in-the-middle attacks. This protocol is oriented to assure the quality of Internet performance measurements, where they are frequently obtained as the difference of timestamps, hence frequency stability is needed. In 90% of all cases, Synchronized Internet Clock Frequency is highly accurate, with a Maximum Time Interval Error of fewer than 25 microseconds by a minute. Synchronized Internet Clock Frequency is based on a regular packet exchange and works with commodity terminal hardware.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

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1. Introduction

One way metric measurements [[RFC7679](#)] require synchronization of sender and receiver clocks to obtain reliable results. This synchronization should be smooth (i.e., operate without steps in synchronization and detect and reach a stable operation state), offer a precise frequency, easily implemented in any host on the Internet, and faithful. A reliable clock frequency is needed to perform precise differential metric measurements between any two hosts to capture performance metrics like packet delay variation or loss of packets exchanged between arbitrary measurement hosts. The

required clock synchronization is designed to be implementable by software to allow deployment with hosts in arbitrary locations. It cannot replace or compete against commodity clock synchronization standards (and any intent to do so is out of scope). Finally, some security measures are needed to avoid some common types of attacks in the Internet, given more robustness to the system.

There are different types of clock synchronization on the Internet. NTP [[RFC5905](#)] remains one of the most popular because a potential user does not need any extra hardware, and it is practically a standard in most of the operating-systems distributions. Its working principle relies on time servers with precise clock source, as atomic clocks or GPS based. For most of the needs, NTP provides an accurate synchronization. Moreover, NTP recently incorporates some strategies oriented to avoid man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. NTP's potential accuracy is in the order of tens of milliseconds..

Another proposal is the TSClocks [[Ton2008](#)], which take advantage of the internal computers' clock. This work has been shown an attractive solution because it is not expensive and can be used on any computer connected to the Internet. This solution was proposed in the beginning at LAN (Local Area Network) level, and then it has been extended to other situations. In [[Ton2008](#)] authors report a differential clock error of about half of hundred of microseconds for a WAN connection with 40ms of RTT (Round Trip Time), i.e., the absolute error is the same order that RTT.

When accuracy and stability are needed, further options arise, e.g., the PTP clock [[RFC8173](#)] (this mechanism was also defined as the IEEE Std. 1588-2008). However, the PTP clock incorporates specialized hardware to provide a highly accurate clock required in each point to be synchronized. Also, the GPS (Global Position System) requires specialized hardware at every point of measurement. While GPS may be less expensive than PTP, the GPS unit requires a sky-clear view for working. The latter may be costly or impossible in some locations due to the antenna installation.

This document introduces the Synchronizing Internet Clock frequency (sic frequency), which is a protocol providing synchronized differential clocks (i.e., when the amount to measure is the elapsed time between two timestamps) in two endpoints connected to the Internet. While synchronized absolute clocks aim at a measurement of exact time differences between them, synchronized differential clocks allow measurements during identical time intervals at two locations. This property is useful for Internet performance measurements, like congestion, jitter, or delay variation; which are based on the elapsed time between timestamps.

The sic frequency design is close to TSClocks, but it takes advantage of statistics to perform better. The sic frequency synchronization relies on Internet-based delay measurements, including the frequent routes' change detection. Finally, our implementation also contemplates protecting MitM attacks, including light but a powerful signature of measurements in each packet. The sic frequency protocol does neither put constraints on the quality of a server's clock nor require a limitation of synchronized end systems' physical distance. The quality of the absolute synchronization is determined by the stability of the reference clock and the RTT/2 as in NTP, but the sic frequency protocol has a better performance in frequency stability than NTP.

Finally, we mention the [\[ITU-G.8260\]](#) shows a methodology to measure delays in networks. It is based on filtering that selects some packets to perform the delay computation. The packet selection is based on the minimum and average RTT, and we show that both of them have some statistical problems to determine both, the average and the minimum RTT (see [Section 2](#)).

2. The sic frequency protocol overview

Synchronizing Internet Clock frequency (sic frequency) is a protocol providing synchronized differential clocks in two endpoints connected to the Internet. Synchronized differential clocks allow measurements during identical time intervals at two locations. This is useful if congestion, packet loss or a variation in delay is to be measured. The model of typical Internet time-measurement is shown in [Figure 1](#).




Figure 1: The clock synchronization of sic.--

In this model, sic frequency performs measurements with packets in the way shown in

[Figure 2](#).




Figure 2: Time line of packets.--

Here, C_s is the server clock, C_c is the client clock and $t1...t4$ are timestamps.

[Figure 2](#) shows a horizontal timeline for client and server. The diagonal lines depict a packet traversing some physical space (wires, routers, and switches). The packet travel times are not assumed to be identical because routes and background load may differ in each direction.

The difference between the client clock C_c and the server clock C_s can be modeled as:

$$C_c = C_s + \phi ,$$

$$\phi(t) = C_c(t) - C_s(t) , \quad (1)$$

where ϕ is the absolute clock difference. If RTT is constant (i.e. little or no background load) and routes are symmetric in both directions, the difference between clocks can be computed as:

$$\phi[c \rightarrow s] = t1 - (t2 - RTT/2) , \quad (2)$$

$$\phi[c \leftarrow s] = t4 - (t3 + RTT/2) , \quad (3)$$

and $\phi[c \rightarrow s] = \phi[c \leftarrow s]$. The general equation for the RTT is:

$$RTT = (t_2 - t_1) + (t_4 - t_3) . \quad (4)$$

Computing Equations 2 and 3 for this simplified case allows calculation of ϕ as an RTT function. Note that if routes are not symmetrical, it is impossible to determine the absolute clocks' difference.

The sic frequency protocol is based on statistics, background traffic and network behavior observations. The RTT between two endpoints follows a heavy-tailed distribution. An alpha-stable distribution shows as one possible model [[traffic-stable](#)]. This distribution can be characterized by four parameters: the localization " δ ," the stretching " γ ," the tail " α ," and the symmetry " β ," [[alfa-stables](#)]. The location parameter is highly related to the mode of the distribution: $\delta > 0$. The stretching is related to the dispersion: $\gamma > 0$. The symmetry, $-1 \leq \beta \leq 1$, indicates if the distribution is skewed to the right (the tail decays to the left) for positive values or the opposite direction for negatives ones. Finally, the tail α , defined in $(0, 2]$, indicates if the distribution is Gaussian one when $\alpha=2$, a power-law without variance for $\alpha < 2$, and without statistic mean for $\alpha < 1$. The alpha-stable distribution is the generalization of the Central Limit Theorem for any distribution (i.e., it includes the cases without variance or mean).

Then, the $\phi(t)$ estimation involves the subtraction of two alpha-stable random variables, which yields on another alpha-stable distribution but symmetrical [[alfa-stables](#)]. Due to this result's characteristic, i.e., a fixed mode and symmetry, a good estimator of the mode is the median.

Therefore, sic performs periodic measurements to infer the difference of two clocks on the Internet, taking advantage of the empiric observations. The periodicity of RTT measurements is set to 1 second.

The parameters of the simple skew model [[ToN2008](#)] are estimated by the following equation:

$$\phi(t) = K + F * t , \quad (5)$$

where $\phi(t) = C_c - C_s$, K is a constant representing the absolute difference of time of client clock C_c and server clock C_s , and F is the rate parameter. As sic frequency is a differential clock, we only estimate the frequency parameter " F ."

Note that the " K " parameter cannot be estimated using just endpoints measurements. Assessing the " K " parameter accurately is out of scope, and we use $K = \min(RTT)/2$, as it is used in several

synchronization protocols under the assumption of symmetric paths, e.g, NTP. Considering the following asymmetry definition,

$$A = 1 - \frac{t[c \rightarrow s]}{t[c \leftarrow s]}, \quad (6)$$

where $t[c \rightarrow s]$ is the minimum delay measured from the client to the server. The maximum asymmetry A of equation 6 is $A=1$, which is unlucky, and this establishes the hardbound for the error of K as $\min(RTT)$: if $t[c \rightarrow s]$ approaches RTT , $t[c \rightarrow s]$ approaches zero. The difference between the two is $\phi(t)$, and this difference hence is close to $\min(RTT)$, if $A=1$. In our experiments (see [Section 4.1](#)), the error in estimation $\phi(t)$ was always less than $\min(RTT)/2$.

Another problem with most of the synchronization protocols is the minimum RTT estimation, which depends upon the time-window within which the RTT is captured. A minimum RTT can only be measured in the absence of any cross traffic. In the first step, the minimum RTT measured during a window of 10 minutes ($mRTT_{10m}$) is captured. Based on these values, the minimum RTT over a week ($mRTT_w$) is determined. RTT_{ee} is defined as $mRTT_{10m} - mRTT_w$. [Figure 3](#) shows the the RTT estimation error captured during an experiment where the minimum the latency between probes was 9431 microseconds during one week, i.e., $mRTT_w=9431$ microseconds. Notice that $mRTT_{10m}$ varies a lot, and the observed values can be more than 450 microseconds above the minimum RTT over a week. This error is a consequence of the statistical behavior of the RTT, which can be modeled by the alfa-stable distribution.

Finally, it is mostly believed there always exist NTP servers at less than five hops with few milliseconds of RTT because of the NTP deployment. In [Appendix A](#) we show a typical case in Latin America region where the RTT differs notably from a host in the same city (Buenos Aires). This example reveals that some countries could not have this desired situation, and other synchronization tools are needed.




Figure 3: Min RTT error, estimated every 10 minutes along 7 hours.--

The sic frequency protocol estimates $\phi(t)$ of Equation 5 using measurement statistics and taking advantage of the inherent RTT properties, i.e., the heavy tail distribution and its alpha-stable distribution model. The basic sic frequency operation is to periodically send packets, estimate $\phi(t)$, and correct the local clock with:

$$t_c = t + \phi(t) , \quad (7)$$

where t_c is the corrected time and t the local clock time (notice that $\phi(t)$ is calculated according to Equation 1).

The sic protocol also detects route changes by seeking a non-negligible difference between the minimum RTT of the actual and past round trip measurement. The next section also discusses different mechanisms to detect route changes by RTT evaluation.

3. The formal definition of sic frequency protocol

[Section 3.1](#) presents the sic frequency algorithm. In addition, parameters and their definitions are introduced. Finally, formal packet formats are provided.

The sic frequency protocol MUST sign the packets with the deterministic Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) specified by [\[RFC6979\]](#) to protect sic frequency from MitM attacks.

To avoid delays when a packet is signed, sic frequency signs them in a deferred fashion. That is, in each packet carries the signature of the previous packet (see algorithms in [Figure 6](#) and [Figure 5](#)).

3.1. Algorithm description

A sic frequency implementations MUST support the formal description specified by this section. Once activated, the sic frequency protocol MUST operate permanently while a client and a receiver exchange measurement packets. The sic frequency works with three states: NOSYNC, PRESYNC and SYNC. These states are triggered by the variables errsync, presync, and synck.

Lines 1 to 4 of the pseudocode in [Figure 4](#) initialize the required data structures needed and set the sic frequency state to NOSYNC. In NOSYNC state, a complete measurement window estimates ϕ 's by Equation 2 (see line 8). Notice that also Equation 3 can be used, or an average of both Equations. During the experiments, using a single equation only resulted in estimations with a smaller error. The possible explanation is that measurements are affected by the same type of traffic.

The median of the measurement window is computed in line 9, while lines 10-12 are used to verify if the path changed during the measurements. When an appreciable difference is detected (bounded by errRTT) in line 13, the "else" clause is executed and the systems re-initiates the cycle (see lines 17-22). Notice that line 13 verifies if the minimum RTTs' absolute value is lower than a percentage of minimum over the complete RTT window.

The sic three tables of pseudocode present frequency algorithm specification. The parameters are explained after the third table.

```

=====
|                               sic frequency algorithm                               |
=====
1  Wmedian <-0, Wm <-0, WRTT <-0, actual_m <-0, actual_c <-0
2  presync <- INT_MAX - P, epochsync <- INT_MAX - P, n_to <-0
3  synck <- false, errsync <- epoch, set(0, 0, NOSYNC), e_prev<-epoch
4  send_sic_packet(SERVER_IP, TIMEOUT)
5  for each timer(RUNNING_TIME) == 0
6  |   (epoch, t1, t2, t3, t4, to) <- send_sic_p(SERVER_IP,TIMEOUT)
7  |   if (to == false) then
8  |       |   Wm <- t1 - t2 + (t2 - t1 + t4 - t3)/2
9  |       |   Wmedian <- median(Wm)
10 |       |   WRTT <- t4 - t1 size(W)
11 |       |   RTTf <- min(WRTT[size(WRTT)/2,size(WRTT)])
12 |       |   RTTl <- min(WRTT[0,size(WRTT)/2])
13 |       |   if ((|RTTf - RTTl| <= errRTT * min(WRTT)) then
14 |       |       |   if (epoch >= presynck + P)) then
15 |       |       |       |   presynck <- true
16 |       |       |   end if
17 |       |   else
18 |       |       |   synck <- false, Wmedian <- 0
19 |       |       |   Wm <- 0, errsync <- epoch, n_to <- 0
20 |       |       |   epoch_sync <- INT_MAX - P, pre_sync <- INT_MAX - P
21 |       |       |   set(0, 0, NOSYNC)
22 |       |   end if
23 |       |   if ((synck == true) && (epoch >= epochsync + P)) then
24 |       |       |   (m, c) <- linear_fit(Wmedian)
25 |       |       |   actual_c <- c
26 |       |       |   actual_m <- (1-alpha) * m + alpha * actual_m
27 |       |       |   epochsync <- epoch, n_to <- 0
28 |       |       |   set(actual_m, actual_c, SYNC)
29 |       |   else
30 |       |       |   if (epoch == errsync + MEDIAN_MAX_SIZE) then
31 |       |       |       |   presync <- epoch
32 |       |       |   end if
33 |       |       |   if (epoch >= presync + P) then
34 |       |       |       |   (actual_m, actual_c) <- linear_fit(Wmedian)
35 |       |       |       |   synck <- true , epoch_sync <- epoch
36 |       |       |       |   set(actual_m, actual_c, PRESYNC)
37 |       |       |   end if
38 |       |   end if
39 |   else
40 |       |   to <- false
41 |   end if
42 end for
=====

```

Figure 4: Formal description of sic.--

Several conditions should be verified to pass from NOSYNC to PRESYNC. First, the "else" condition of line 29 should occur, and also the elapsed time between errsync and actual epoch should be MEDIAN_MAX_SIZE (30-32). Therefore, when it also P time is passed from presync, the condition on line 33 is true, and the system arrives at PRESYNC, providing an initial estimation of ϕ .

Then, if there is no route change, the condition in line 14 will be true when the time was increased in another P period. Then, the system is in the SYNC state, and it provides the estimation of $\phi(t)$ in line 28. Notice that every P time, the estimation of $\phi(t)$ is computed unless a route change occurs (lines 13 and 17-22).

The function in line 6: (epoch, t1, t2, t3, t4, to) <- send_sic_packet(SERVER_IP, TIMEOUT), has a special treatment. It sends the packets specified in [Section 3.3](#), which have signatures. To avoid the processing delay caused by the signature computation, we implemented a policy to send the signature of the previous packet, and if an error is detected, we can stop the synchronization just one loop ahead.

[Figure 5](#) illustrates how the client-side MUST implement the function send_sic_p (SERVER_IP, TIMEOUT). This function computes the timestamp t1 in line 1 and builds and sends the UDP packet in lines 2-3. Then, if there is no timeout, it calculates the t4 timestamp (line 5), and if no packets were lost, verifies the signature of the previous one in lines 8-18. If the signature is not valid with the received certificate, then the system MUST change to NOSYNC state immediately (see line 11). NOSYNC state MUST also be set if the limit of time without receiving packets MAX_to is reached. Finally, it stores the received packet into prev_rcv_pck (a global variable) to use in the next packet (line 19). Notice that n_to, the lost packets, is a global variable, as well as the epoch of the previous packet: e_prev.

```

=====
|                               function: send_sic_p(server, TIMEOUT)                               |
=====
1  t1 <- get_timestamp()
2  sic_P <- sic_pck(t1, 0, 0, prev_sig)
3  (to, rcv_sic_pck) <- send(sic_P,UDP_PORT, SERVER_IP, TIMEOUT)
4  if (to == false) then
5    | t4 <- get_timestamp()
6    | epoch <- trunc_to_seconds(t1)
7    | prev_sig <- get_signature(sic_P)
8    | if (epoch - e_prev <= RUNNING_TIME) then
9    |   | if (n_to < MAX_to) then
10   |   |   | if (verify(prev_rcv_pck,rcv_sic.CERT) == false) then
11   |   |   |   | set(0, 0, NOSYNC)
12   |   |   | else
13   |   |   |   | n_to <- 0, e_prev <- epoch
14   |   |   | end if
15   |   | else
16   |   |   | set(0, 0, NOSYNC)
17   |   | end if
18   | end if
19   | prev_rcv_pck <- rcv_sic_pck
20   | t2 <- rcv_sic_pck.t2
21   | t3 <- rcv_sic_pck.t3
22 else
23   | n_to <- n_to + 1
24 end if
25 return (epoch, t1, t2, t3, t4, to)
=====

```

Figure 5: The send_sic_p function.--

The server sic algorithm is presented in [Figure 6](#). It uses prev_sic_P{}, which is a structure to store the received previous signatures, indexed by the IP client addresses (CLIENT_add contains its IP and UDP port), and the same for prev_sig{} with the previously sent signatures. Line 6 verifies either signature is null because it is the first packet or a valid signature. In both cases, the algorithm process the packet computing t3, building up the sic frequency packet, sending it, and computing its signature (stored to send in the next reply) in lines 7-11. Next, the actual packet is stored in the prev_sic_P{} structure, line 13.

```

=====
|                               sic Server algorithm                               |
=====
1 prev_sic_P{} <- null, prev_sig{} <-- null
2 while (RUNNING == true) then
3   |   if (receive() == true) then
4   |   |   t2 <- get_timestamp()
5   |   |   prev_sig <- get_signature(prev_sic_P{receive().CLIENT_add})
6   |   |   if (prev_sig == null) ||
7   |   |   |   (verify(prev_sig, CLIENT_add.CERT) == true) then
8   |   |   |   t3 <- get_timestamp()
9   |   |   |   sic_P<-sic_pack(t1, t2, t3, prev_sig)
10  |   |   |   send(sic_P, CLIENT_add.UDP, CLIENT_add.IP, TIMEOUT)
11  |   |   |   prev_sig <- get_signature(sic_P)
12  |   |   |   prev_sig{receive().CLIENT_add} <- prev_sig
13  |   |   end if
14  |   |   prev_sic_P{receive().CLIENT_add} <- receive().sic_pack
15  |   end if
16 end while
=====

```

Figure 6: Algorithm sic for the Server.--

3.2. Protocol definitions

We provide a formal definition of each used constant and variables; the RECOMMENDED values are displayed in parentheses at the end of the description. These constant and variables MUST be represented in a sic frequency implementation. All the types MUST be respected. They are expressed in "C" programming language running on a 64-bit processor.

a. Constants used for the sic frequency algorithm ([Figure 4](#))

1. RUNNING_TIME: is the period between sic packets are sent (1 second).
2. MEDIAN_MAX_SIZE: is the window size used to compute the median of the measurements (600).
3. P: is the period between phi's estimation (60).
4. alpha: is a float in the [0,1], the coefficient of the autoregressive estimation of the slope of phi(t) (0.05).
5. TIMEOUT: is the maximum time in seconds that a sic packet reply is expected (0.8 seconds).

6. SERVER_IP: is the IP address of the server (@IP in version 4 or 6).
7. errRTT: is a float that bounds the maximum difference to detect a route change (0.2).
8. MAX_to: is an integer representing the maximum number of packet lost ($P/10$).
9. CERT: is a public certificate of the other end, it is used to verify signs of the packets.
10. UDP_PORT: is an integer with the port UDP where the service is running on the server. (4444)
11. SERVER_IP: is the IP address of the server.
12. CLIENT_IP: is the IP address of the client.

b. States used for the sic frequency algorithm ([Figure 4](#))

1. NOSYNC: a boolean indicates that it is not possible to correct the local time.
2. PRESYNC: an integer indicates that sic is almost ($P \text{ RUNNING_TIME}$) seconds from the synchronization.
3. SYNC: a boolean indicates that sic is synchronized.

c. Variables used for the sic frequency algorithms ([Figure 4](#), [Figure 5](#) and [Figure 6](#))

1. errsync: is an integer with the UNIX timestamp epoch of the initial NOSYNC cycle. It is used to complete the window or measurements (W_m) to compute their medians.
2. presync: is an integer with the UNIX timestamp epoch of the initial PRESYNC cycle. It is used to wait until ($P \text{ RUNNING_TIME}$) seconds to the linear fit of $\phi(t)$.
3. synck: is an integer with the UNIX timestamp epoch of the initial SYNC cycle. Every $P \text{ RUNNING_TIME}$ seconds the $\phi(t)$ function is estimated.
4. epochsync: is an integer with the last UNIX timestamp epoch of synchronization. It is used to compute a new estimation of $\phi(t)$, every ($P \text{ RUNNING_TIME}$) seconds.
5. epoch: is an integer with UNIX timestamp in seconds. It carries the initial epoch of each sic measurement packet.

6. `t1, t2, t3, t4`: are long long integers to store the t UNIX timestamps in microseconds.
7. `actual_m` : is a double with the slope for the $\phi(t)$ estimation.
8. `actual_c`: is a double with the intercept for the $\phi(t)$ estimation.
9. `Wm`: is an array of doubles of `MEDIAN_MAX_SIZE`. It stores the instantaneous estimates of $\phi(t)$.
10. `Wmedian`: is an array of doubles of `P` size. It saves the computed medians of `Wm` every `RUNNING_TIME`.
11. `WRTT`: is an array of doubles of `(2 P)` size. It stores the calculated RTT of last measurements.
12. `RTTl`: is a double with the minimum of last `P` RTTs. It is used to detect changes on the route from the client to the server.
13. `RTTf`: is a double with the minimum of previous `P` RTTs. It is used to detect changes on the route from the client to the server.
14. `n_to`: is an integer representing the number of lost packets in the actual synchronization window `P`.
15. `e_prev`: is an integer with the UNIX timestamp epoch of the last valid packet.
16. `prev_rcv_pck`: is a sic packet structure, the previous received one.

3.3. Protocol packet specification

The sic frequency uses UNIX microsecond format timestamps. Regarding Figure 2, the client takes a timestamp `t1` just before it sends the packet. When the server receives the packet, it immediately computes `t2`, and just before it is sent back to the client, it computes `t3`. When the client receives the packet, it calculates `t4`.

The server does not need the timestamp `t1` because the proposed protocol synchronizes a client with the server clock. This information could, however, be useful for the server for future use.

The packets respect the NTP4 format as they are defined in the Section A.1.2 of [[RFC5905](#)] and the signature of the fields, shown in [Figure 7](#). We use the time formats of 64 bits with seconds and a

fraction of seconds. They MUST be sent as UDP data, and it MUST have the mentioned fields.

The client and server certificates SHOULD be valid and signed ones (only for experimentation, the user MAY use autogenerated ones).




Figure 7: Packet format for the sic protocol.--

3.4. Minimum sic deployment

To deploy the sic frequency algorithm, as a minimum, a Server and one Client are needed. The Server can support multiple clients. The maximum number of clients is for further study. The Server clock is considered the master one, and all clients synchronize with it. The Server-side runs sic frequency as a server with a UDP_PORT number, as specified by the algorithm shown in [Figure 6](#).

Client sic runs the algorithm shown in [Figure 4](#) and also SHOULD provide the corrected time as

$$t = \text{actual_c} + \text{actual_m} * \text{timestamp} \quad (8)$$

Figure 8

Different ways of doing this task are possible:

Providing a client capable of reading the variables actual_m and actual_c in shared memory and producing the result of Equation 8.

Providing a service in a UDP port answering the correct timestamp queries with Equation 8.

Other solution.

4. Implementation of sic frequency protocol

In this section we present the prove of the sic concept through some test that we already performed, and the current implementation of

sic in C language. Our implementation is publicly available [[sic-implementation](#)].

This protocol implements protection against MitM attacks. The identity of endpoints is guaranteed by signed certificates using the deterministic Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) specified in the [[RFC6979](#)]. Server and Client should use signed and valid ECDSA certificates to ensure their identity, and each side has responsible to verify the public certificate of the other side before to run the algorithm in [Figure 4](#).

4.1. Evaluation

To verify the sic proposal, we tested it using three hosts with GPS units. The first two were located in Buenos Aires, and the third at Los Angeles. We slightly modified the algorithm in [Figure 4](#) to trigger each measurement using the PPS (pulse per second) the signal provided by the GPS unit. Then, recording the client and server clocks with the PPS signal, we can determine the real phi function of Equation 1, within the GPS error (it is several orders of magnitude smaller than the error of the sic frequency protocol).

We use MTIE defined as follows (Maximum Time Interval Error, see [[ToIM1996](#)]):

$$\text{MTIE} = \max [\phi(t')] - \min [\phi(t)] , \quad (9)$$

for every t' and t in the interval $[t, t+s]$; and we chose $s=60$ seconds. We first used two host (RaspBerriesPI-2) connected back to back to analyze the minimum achievable precision, yielding an MTIE of 15.8 microseconds for the 90 percentile. Then, we selected two real cases of study, one national and the other international. In [Figure 9](#) we show the result of the MTIE, evaluated in 60 seconds intervals, for the experiment Buenos Aires-Buenos Aires (RTT of 10ms) and Buenos Aires-Los Angeles (RTT of 198ms). The percentile 90 corresponds to 18.35 microseconds for the Buenos Aires case, and 25.4 microseconds for the Los Angeles case. The percentile 97.5 corresponds to 30 microseconds for the Buenos Aires case, and 42 microseconds for the Los Angeles case. We display the quartiles in [Figure 10](#). These measurements were performed during a week in each case.




Figure 9: Cumulative distribution function of the MTIE (60s).--

	Buenos Aires (10ms)	Los Angeles (198ms)	local NTP4 (12ms)
Q3	14.69	19.29	9059
Q2	11.60	14.93	5245
Q1	9.41	12.26	3338

Figure 10: Table with MTIE quartiles for two RTT sic cases, and for a local NTP4 system (the numbers indicate microseconds).--

We also conducted another test for NTP4 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. We used a host with GPS, whose PPS signal triggered a process to log actual timestamps. This host was also running NTP4 with the server time.afip.gov.ar, also located in Buenos Aires city, with an average RTT of 12ms. Applying the same process of the previous cases, we obtained that the following quartiles Q3: 9.1ms, Q2: 5.2ms, and Q1: 3.3ms for the MTIE of the NTP4 measurements (also reported in [Figure 10](#)). Finally, percentile 90 of the NTP4's MTIE is 11.1ms.

The comparison of NTP4 with frequency sic shows that this new method performs two orders of magnitude better.

5. Conclusions

This document presents the sic frequency protocol, employed to synchronize host clock frequency across the Internet, and which is also resistant to MitM attacks. The main field of application is the Internet performance analysis, e.g., to measure congestion, jitter, or delay variations parameters; all of them are based on a difference of timestamps. It shows the complete specification, implementation, and experiment results that support its working principle. In particular, sic frequency provides a clock rate stability of less than 1ppm for most of the time.

6. Security Considerations

Following [\[RFC7384\]](#) enumeration of Time Protocols in packet-switched networks, the proposed encryption of timing packets, based on a mechanism of secure key distribution, provides the following characteristics:

3.2.1 Packet Manipulation: Prevented by packet signature.

3.2.2 Spoofing: Prevented by packet signature and secure key distribution.

3.2.3 Replay Attack: Prevented by chain signing of packets.

3.2.4 Rogue Master Attack: Prevented by secure key distribution.

3.2.5 Packet Interception and Removal: If several packets are removal, the protocol does not arrive at SYNC state.

3.2.6 Packet Delay Manipulation: Not prevented. Future versions may prevent this using over-specification of timing (using redundant masters)

3.2.7 L2/L3 DoS attacks: Not prevented. This attack can be prevented in future versions using over-specification of timing and redundant masters time servers.

3.2.8 Cryptographic performance attacks: Not an issue in ECDSA.

3.2.9 DoS attacks against the time protocol: Prevented by secure key distribution.

3.2.10 Grandmaster Time source attack (GPS attacks): Not prevented. Future versions may prevent this using over-specification of timing (using several time servers) .

3.2.11 Exploiting vulnerabilities in the time protocol: Not prevented, future vulnerabilities are unknown.

3.2.12 Network Reconnaissance: Not prevented in this version. No countermeasures were done in node anonymization.

The Packet Delay manipulation is one of the hardest problems to solve because there exist some smart ways to attack any synchronization protocol. Even though, the sic frequency protocol can protect itself because it can identify several attacks of this type, i.e., it is challenging to mimic traffic behavior. This emulation of behavior can be easily overcome regarding the RTTs' distribution, which has to be a heavy-tailed one. This way, the analysis should be studied to ensure the implementation of a robust and light test of the raw data.

7. IANA Considerations

This memo makes no requests of IANA.

8. Acknowledgements

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Appendix A. Example of RTT to NTP servers

This appendix shows an experiment to measure the RTT and the distance in hops from four different points to a time server in Buenos Aires city (the capital of Argentina). We did the measures two times from the four points, and we used one hundred packets to determine some statistical parameters. Next traceroute measurements show that the number of hops and RTT are very different from each point also changes a lot. For instance, taking a distinctive look at the STD, average, and maximum is possible to detect huge variations. We provide here a case in Argentina, trying to reach an NTP server from 4 different points at the Buenos Aires city.

```
host1$ mtr -r -c 100 time.afip.gov.ar
```

```
Start: Tue Mar 27 19:03:51 2018
```

HOST: raspbian-server	Loss%	Snt	Last	Avg	Best	Wrst	StDe
1. -- gw-vlan-srv.innova-red.ne	0.0%	100	2.2	2.8	2.1	37.7	4.
2. -- rnoc5.BUENOS-AIRES.innova	0.0%	100	2.3	3.8	2.1	55.8	7.
3. -- 10.5.10.2	0.0%	100	2.5	2.6	2.2	3.1	0.
4. -- 200.0.17.104	0.0%	100	3.1	3.1	2.4	13.7	1.
5. -- 172.18.2.53	0.0%	100	4.8	5.7	3.8	12.4	1.
6. -- time.afip.gob.ar	0.0%	100	5.2	5.2	3.8	12.0	1.

```
host1$ mtr -r -c 100 time.afip.gov.ar
```

```
Start: Tue Mar 27 18:57:06 2018
```

HOST: raspbian-server	Loss%	Snt	Last	Avg	Best	Wrst	StDe
1. -- gw-vlan-srv.innova-red.ne	0.0%	50	2.4	2.8	2.0	34.2	4.
2. -- rnoc5.BUENOS-AIRES.innova	0.0%	50	2.1	3.8	2.1	52.8	7.
3. -- 10.5.10.2	0.0%	50	2.7	2.9	2.2	15.6	1.
4. -- 200.0.17.104	0.0%	50	2.8	3.0	2.3	3.9	0.
5. -- 172.18.2.53	0.0%	50	4.5	5.8	3.8	17.8	2.
6. -- time.afip.gob.ar	0.0%	50	4.7	9.9	4.2	238.5	33.

```
host2$ mtr -r -c 100 time.afip.gov.ar
```

```
Start: Tue Mar 27 19:03:47 2018
```

HOST: ws-david	Loss%	Snt	Last	Avg	Best	Wrst	StDe
1. -- 10.10.96.1	0.0%	100	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.
2. -- 200.16.116.171	0.0%	100	1.0	5.9	0.6	158.4	22.
3. -- static.33.229.104.190.cps	1.0%	100	1.6	2.5	1.5	80.6	8.
4. -- static.129.192.104.190.cp	0.0%	100	2.1	1.9	1.8	3.0	0.
5. -- 200.0.17.104	1.0%	100	2.0	2.2	1.8	9.4	0.
6. -- 172.18.2.53	0.0%	100	3.2	4.2	3.1	12.0	1.
7. -- auth.afip.gob.ar	0.0%	100	4.2	4.5	3.3	9.8	1.

```
host2$ mtr -r -c 100 time.afip.gov.ar
```

```
Start: Tue Mar 27 18:57:00 2018
```

HOST: ws-david	Loss%	Snt	Last	Avg	Best	Wrst	StDe
1. -- 10.10.96.1	0.0%	50	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.7	0.
2. -- 200.16.116.171	0.0%	50	0.9	6.7	0.7	196.5	29.
3. -- static.33.229.104.190.cps	2.0%	50	1.6	1.7	1.5	2.2	0.
4. -- static.129.192.104.190.cp	0.0%	50	2.1	2.0	1.7	2.4	0.
5. -- 200.0.17.104	0.0%	50	2.0	2.1	1.8	2.6	0.
6. -- 172.18.2.53	0.0%	50	4.8	4.3	3.2	9.1	1.
7. -- time.afip.gob.ar	0.0%	50	4.3	9.4	3.3	234.9	32.

```
host3$ mtr -r -c 100 time.afip.gov.ar
```

Start: 2018-03-27T19:03:51-0300

HOST: aleph.local	Loss%	Snt	Last	Avg	Best	Wrst	StDe
1. -- 10.17.71.254	0.0%	100	4.7	30.3	3.5	280.4	52.
2. -- 10.255.254.250	0.0%	100	2.5	31.1	1.8	285.4	59.
3. -- 209.13.133.10	0.0%	100	30.5	43.9	2.3	237.2	64.
4. -- host169.advance.com.ar	3.0%	100	36.0	64.8	3.1	404.4	86.
5. -- 200.32.33.33	2.0%	100	106.9	70.6	2.8	315.0	80.
6. -- 200.32.34.66	5.0%	100	93.1	56.8	2.7	336.1	74.
7. -- 200.32.33.38	7.0%	100	42.8	58.0	2.9	357.8	76.
8. -- 209.13.139.211	4.0%	100	46.2	56.7	2.8	298.8	69.
9. -- 209.13.139.209	1.0%	100	84.5	57.1	2.6	277.7	72.
10. -- 209.13.166.211	1.0%	100	43.4	63.5	3.2	390.6	78.
11. -- 200.32.34.137	2.0%	100	68.7	64.1	3.7	259.5	75.
12. -- 200.32.33.37	0.0%	100	4.1	56.9	3.3	249.6	64.
13. -- 200.32.34.121	3.0%	100	10.9	65.0	4.1	415.7	85.
14. -- 200.32.33.241	2.0%	100	252.6	61.8	3.8	355.9	74.
15. -- 200.16.206.198	3.0%	100	188.0	54.6	3.1	461.7	74.
16. -- 172.18.2.53	2.0%	100	133.4	53.1	4.3	402.1	69.
17. -- time.afip.gob.ar	4.0%	100	72.5	54.1	4.9	343.2	66.

host3\$ mtr -r -c 100 time.afip.gov.ar

Start: 2018-03-27T18:57:05-0300

HOST: aleph.local	Loss%	Snt	Last	Avg	Best	Wrst	StDe
1. -- 10.17.71.254	0.0%	50	125.6	88.1	3.7	392.4	79.
2. -- 10.255.254.250	0.0%	50	62.1	54.8	2.1	333.2	68.
3. -- 209.13.133.10	0.0%	50	4.0	33.9	2.4	280.8	51.
4. -- host169.advance.com.ar	2.0%	50	4.1	21.3	2.9	236.7	40.
5. -- 200.32.33.33	2.0%	50	4.5	32.2	3.2	341.3	69.
6. -- 200.32.34.66	4.0%	50	7.7	26.0	3.5	278.8	55.
7. -- 200.32.33.38	2.0%	50	4.8	29.4	3.0	221.3	43.
8. -- 209.13.139.211	0.0%	50	84.8	40.3	3.1	250.4	53.
9. -- 209.13.139.209	0.0%	50	25.1	35.0	2.8	249.2	55.
10. -- 209.13.166.211	0.0%	50	3.7	33.5	2.6	188.9	54.
11. -- 200.32.34.137	0.0%	50	5.6	28.2	3.7	224.3	51.
12. -- 200.32.33.37	0.0%	50	3.7	24.2	3.5	189.5	44.
13. -- 200.32.34.121	0.0%	50	4.7	30.8	4.0	213.2	51.
14. -- 200.32.33.241	0.0%	50	14.4	33.1	3.9	364.6	67.
15. -- 200.16.206.198	0.0%	50	5.0	58.2	3.1	300.7	88.
16. -- 172.18.2.53	0.0%	50	9.4	117.8	4.4	315.1	103.
17. -- time.afip.gob.ar	0.0%	50	199.6	120.2	5.2	484.0	96.

host4\$ mtr -r -c 100 time.afip.gov.ar

Start: 2018-03-27T19:03:51-0300

HOST: cnet	Loss%	Snt	Last	Avg	Best	Wrst	StDe
1. -- 157.92.58.1	0.0%	100	6.6	2.8	0.3	12.8	2.
2. -- ???	100.0	100	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.
3. -- ???	100.0	100	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.

4.	-- host98.131-100-186.static	0.0%	100	5.7	5.6	1.5	9.4	2.
5.	-- host130.131-100-186.stati	0.0%	100	6.5	6.3	2.5	10.3	2.
6.	-- 200.0.17.104	0.0%	100	2.4	2.7	2.3	15.6	1.
7.	-- ???	100.0	100	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.
8.	-- time.afip.gob.ar	0.0%	100	4.9	7.6	3.9	243.0	23.

host4\$ mtr -r -c 100 time.afip.gov.ar

Start: Tue Mar 27 18:41:40 2018

HOST:	cnet	Loss%	Snt	Last	Avg	Best	Wrst	StDe
1.	-- 157.92.58.1	0.0%	50	4.0	1.6	0.3	9.1	1.
2.	-- ???	100.0	50	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.
3.	-- ???	100.0	50	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.
4.	-- host98.131-100-186.static	0.0%	50	4.7	5.5	1.5	10.9	2.
5.	-- host130.131-100-186.stati	0.0%	50	8.4	6.5	2.6	10.5	2.
6.	-- 200.0.17.104	0.0%	50	2.5	2.8	2.3	11.0	1.
7.	-- ???	100.0	50	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.
8.	-- time.afip.gob.ar	0.0%	50	4.9	9.2	3.8	226.7	31.

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