

IPv6 Stateless Fragmentation Identification Options
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Abstract

Fragmented IPv6 packets are often dropped because there is no way to identify whether a fragment matches a otherwise permitted packet as the L4 header information is not available on all the fragments.

The document defines hop-by-hop options that can be used to supply the missing information in non initial fragments.

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
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3. Security Considerations

The use of these options will expose nodes to more fragmentation based attacks and potentially more traffic which will ultimately be dropped if a attacker can guess which option values will be permitted.

With the exception of the fragmentation based attacks, permitting fragments with these options is no worse than permitting multiple unfragmented packets based in the same parameters.

Andrews

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hop by hop frag opts

Aug 2013

4. Normative References

[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", [RFC 2460](#), December 1998.

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