

**Configuration Issues Facing Full Service DNS Resolvers In The Presence
of Private Network Addressing
draft-andrews-full-service-resolvers-02**

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Abstract

Practice has shown that there are a number of zones all full service resolvers should, unless configured otherwise, automatically serve. [RFC4193](#) already specifies that this should occur for D.F.IP6.ARPA. This document extends the practice to cover the IN-ADDR.ARPA zones for [RFC1918](#) address space and other well known zones with similar usage constraints.

Table of Contents

1.	Introduction	3
1.1.	Reserved Words	3
2.	Effects on sites using RFC1918 addresses.	3
3.	Changes To Full Service Resolver Behaviour.	4
4.	Lists Of Zones Covered	4
4.1.	RFC1918 Zones	4
4.2.	RFC3330 Zones	5
4.3.	Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses	5
4.4.	IPv6 Locally Assigned Local Addresses	5
4.5.	IPv6 Link Local Addresses	5
5.	Author's Note	5
6.	IANA Considerations	6
7.	Security Considerations	6
8.	Acknowledgements	7
9.	Change History	7
10.	References	7
10.1.	Normative References	7
10.2.	Informative References	7
	Author's Address	8
	Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements	9

1. Introduction

Practice has shown that there are a number of zones all full service resolvers should, unless configured otherwise, automatically serve. These zones include, but are not limited to, the IN-ADDR.ARPA zones for the address space allocated by [\[RFC1918\]](#) and the IP6.ARPA zones for locally assigned local IPv6 addresses, [\[RFC4193\]](#).

This recommendation is made because data has shown that significant leakage of queries for these name spaces is occurring, despite instructions to restrict them, and because sacrificial name servers have been deployed to protect the immediate parent name servers for these zones from excessive, unintentional, query load [\[AS112\]](#). There is every expectation that the query load will continue to increase unless steps are taken as outlined here.

Additionally, queries from clients behind badly configured firewalls that allow outgoing queries but drop responses for these name spaces also puts a significant load on the root servers. They also cause operational load for the root server operators as they have to reply to queries about why the root servers are "attacking" these clients. Changing the default configuration will address all these issues for the zones below.

[\[RFC4193\]](#) already recommends that queries for D.F.IP6.ARPA be handled locally. This document extends the recommendation to cover the IN-ADDR.ARPA zones for [\[RFC1918\]](#) and other well known IN-ADDR.ARPA and IP6.ARPA zones for which queries should not appear on the Internet.

It is hoped that by doing this the number of sacrificial servers [\[AS112\]](#) will not have to be increased and may in time be reduced.

It should also help DNS responsiveness for sites which are using [\[RFC1918\]](#) addresses but are misconfigured.

1.1. Reserved Words

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [\[RFC2119\]](#).

2. Effects on sites using [RFC1918](#) addresses.

Sites using [\[RFC1918\]](#) addresses should already be serving these queries internally, without referring them to public name servers on the Internet.

The main impact will be felt on sites that make use of recursion for reverse lookups for [[RFC1918](#)] addresses and have populated these zones. Typically, such sites will be fully disconnected from the Internet and have their own root servers for their own non-Internet DNS tree or make use of local delegation overrides (otherwise known as "forwarding") to reach the private servers for these reverse zones. These sites will need to override the default configuration proposed in this draft to allow resolution to continue.

Other sites that use [[RFC1918](#)] addresses and either have local copies of the reverse zones or don't have reverse zones configured should see no difference other than the name error appearing to come from a different source.

3. Changes To Full Service Resolver Behaviour.

Unless configured otherwise, a full service resolver will return name errors for queries within the lists of zones covered below. One common way to do this is to serve empty (SOA and NS only) zones.

A server doing this MUST provide a mechanism to disable this behaviour, preferably on a zone by zone basis.

If using empty zones one should not use the same NS and SOA records as used on the public Internet servers as that will make it harder to detect leakage from the public Internet servers. This document recommends that the NS record default to the name of the zone and the SOA MNAME default to the name of the zone. The SOA RNAME should default to ".". Implementations SHOULD provide a mechanism to set these values. No address records need to be provided for the name server.

```
@ 10800 IN SOA @ . 1 3600 1200 604800 10800
@ 10800 IN NS @
```

4. Lists Of Zones Covered

4.1. [RFC1918](#) Zones

```
10.IN-ADDR.ARPA
16.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA
17.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA
18.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA
19.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA
```

Andrews

Expires August 27, 2006

[Page 4]

20.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA
21.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA
22.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA
23.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA
24.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA
25.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA
26.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA
27.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA
28.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA
29.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA
30.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA
31.172.IN-ADDR.ARPA
168.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA

4.2. [RFC3330](#) Zones

```
0.IN-ADDR.ARPA /* IPv4 "THIS" NETWORK */
127.IN-ADDR.ARPA /* IPv4 LOOP-BACK NETWORK */
254.169.IN-ADDR.ARPA /* IPv4 LINK LOCAL */
2.0.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA /* IPv4 TEST NET */
255.255.255.255.IN-ADDR.ARPA /* IPv4 BROADCAST */
```

4.3. Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses

[illegible]

4.4. IPv6 Locally Assigned Local Addresses

D.F.IP6.ARPA

4.5. IPv6 Link Local Addresses

8.E.F.IP6.ARPA
9.E.F.IP6.ARPA
A.E.F.IP6.ARPA
B.E.F.IP6.ARPA

5. Author's Note

IPv6 site-local addresses and IPv6 Globally Assigned Local addresses are not covered here. It is expected that IPv6 site-local addresses will be self correcting as IPv6 implementations remove support for site-local addresses however, sacrificial servers for C.E.F.IP6.ARPA to F.E.F.IP6.ARPA may still need to be deployed in the short term if

the traffic becomes excessive.

For IPv6 Globally Assigned Local addresses there has been no decision made about whether the registries will provide delegations in this space or not. If they don't then C.F.IP6.ARPA will need to be added to the list above. If they do then registries will need to take steps to ensure that name servers are provided for these addresses.

This document is also ignoring the IP6.INT counterpart for the IP6.ARPA addresses above. IP6.INT is in the process of being wound up with clients already not querying for this suffix.

This document has also deliberately ignored zones immediately under the root. The author believes other methods would be more applicable for dealing with the excess / bogus traffic these generate.

6. IANA Considerations

This document recommends that IANA establish a registry of zones which require this default behaviour, the initial contents are above. More zones are expected to be added, and possibly deleted from this registry over time. Name server implementors are encouraged to check this registry and adjust their implementations to reflect changes therein.

This registry can be amended through IESG reviewed RFC publication.

7. Security Considerations

During the initial deployment phase, particularly where [\[RFC1918\]](#) addresses are in use, there may be some clients that unexpectedly receive name error rather than a PTR record. This may cause some service disruption until full service resolvers have been re-configured.

When DNSSEC is deployed within the IN-ADDR.ARPA and IP6.ARPA namespaces, the zones listed above will need to be delegated as insecure delegations. This will allow DNSSEC validation to succeed for queries in these spaces despite not being answered from the delegated servers.

It is recommended that sites actively using these namespaces secure them using DNSSEC. This is good just on general principles. It will also protect the clients from accidental leakage of answers from the Internet which will be unsigned.

8. Acknowledgements

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9. Change History

Changes from [draft-andrews-full-service-resolvers-01.txt](#). Added 0.IN-ADDR.ARPA.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

- [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G., and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", [RFC 1918](#), February 1996.

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 2119](#), March 1997.

10.2. Informative References

- [AS112] "AS112 Project", <<http://as112.net/>>.

- [RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses", [RFC 4193](#), October 2005.

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