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**Protected Headers for Cryptographic E-mail**

## **Abstract**

This document describes a common strategy to extend the end-to-end cryptographic protections provided by PGP/MIME, etc. to protect message headers in addition to message bodies. In addition to protecting the authenticity and integrity of headers via signatures, it also describes how to preserve the confidentiality of the Subject header.

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## Table of Contents

- [1. Introduction](#)
  - [1.1. Requirements Language](#)
  - [1.2. Terminology](#)
    - [1.2.1. User-Facing Headers](#)
    - [1.2.2. Structural Headers](#)
- [2. Protected Headers Summary](#)
- [3. Cryptographic MIME Message Structure](#)
  - [3.1. Cryptographic Layers](#)
    - [3.1.1. PGP/MIME Cryptographic Layers](#)
    - [3.1.2. S/MIME Cryptographic Layers](#)
  - [3.2. Cryptographic Envelope](#)
  - [3.3. Cryptographic Payload](#)
    - [3.3.1. Simple Cryptographic Payloads](#)
    - [3.3.2. Multilayer Cryptographic Envelopes](#)
    - [3.3.3. A Baroque Example](#)
  - [3.4. Exposed Headers are Outside](#)
- [4. Message Composition](#)
  - [4.1. Copying All Headers](#)
  - [4.2. Confidential Subject](#)
  - [4.3. Obscured Headers](#)
  - [4.4. Message Composition without Protected Headers](#)
  - [4.5. Message Composition with Protected Headers](#)

## [5. Legacy Display](#)

### [5.1. Message Generation: Including a Legacy Display Part](#)

#### [5.1.1. Legacy Display Transformation](#)

#### [5.1.2. When to Generate Legacy Display](#)

### [5.2. Message Rendering: Omitting a Legacy Display Part](#)

#### [5.2.1. Legacy Display Detection Algorithm](#)

### [5.3. Legacy Display is Decorative and Transitional](#)

## [6. Message Interpretation](#)

### [6.1. Reverse-Copying](#)

### [6.2. Signature Invalidation](#)

### [6.3. The Legacy Display Part](#)

### [6.4. Replying to a Message with Obscured Headers](#)

## [7. Common Pitfalls and Guidelines](#)

### [7.1. Misunderstood Obscured Subjects](#)

### [7.2. Reply/Forward Losing Subjects](#)

### [7.3. Usability Impact of Reduced Metadata](#)

### [7.4. Usability Impact of Obscured Message-ID](#)

### [7.5. Usability Impact of Obscured From/To/Cc](#)

### [7.6. Mailing List Header Modifications](#)

## [8. Comparison with Other Header Protection Schemes](#)

### [8.1. S/MIME 3.1 Header Protection](#)

### [8.2. The Content-Type Property "forwarded=no" {forwarded=no}](#)

### [8.3. pEp Header Protection](#)

### [8.4. DKIM](#)

### [8.5. S/MIME "Secure Headers"](#)

### [8.6. Triple-Wrapping](#)

## [9. Test Vectors](#)

- [9.1. Signed PGP/MIME Message with Protected Headers](#)
- [9.2. S/MIME multipart/signed Message with Protected Headers](#)
- [9.3. S/MIME application/pkcs7-mime SignedData Message with Protected Headers](#)
- [9.4. Signed and Encrypted PGP/MIME Message with Protected Headers](#)
- [9.5. Signed and Encrypted S/MIME Message with Protected Headers](#)
- [9.6. Signed and Encrypted PGP/MIME Message with Protected Headers and Legacy Display Part](#)
- [9.7. Multilayer PGP/MIME Message with Protected Headers](#)
- [9.8. Multilayer PGP/MIME Message with Protected Headers and Legacy Display Part](#)
- [9.9. Signed and Encrypted S/MIME Message with Protected Headers and Legacy Display](#)
- [9.10. Encrypted-only \(unsigned\) S/MIME Message with Protected Headers and Legacy Display](#)
- [9.11. Encrypted-only \(unsigned\) PGP/MIME Message with Protected Headers and Legacy Display](#)
- [9.12. An Unfortunately Complex Example](#)

## [10. IANA Considerations](#)

## [11. Security Considerations](#)

- [11.1. Subject Leak](#)
- [11.2. Signature Replay](#)
- [11.3. Participant Modification](#)

## [12. Privacy Considerations](#)

## [13. Document Considerations](#)

- [13.1. Document History](#)

## [14. Acknowledgements](#)

## [15. References](#)

### [15.1. Normative References](#)

### [15.2. Informative References](#)

## [Authors' Addresses](#)

### **1. Introduction**

E-mail end-to-end security with OpenPGP and S/MIME standards can provide integrity, authentication, non-repudiation and confidentiality to the body of a MIME e-mail message. However, PGP/MIME ([\[RFC3156\]](#)) alone does not protect message headers. And the structure to protect headers defined in S/MIME 3.1 ([\[RFC3851\]](#)) has not seen widespread adoption.

This document defines a scheme, "Protected Headers for Cryptographic E-mail", which has been adopted by multiple existing e-mail clients in order to extend the cryptographic protections provided by PGP/MIME to also protect the message headers. This scheme is also applicable to S/MIME [\[RFC8551\]](#).

This document describes how these protections can be applied to cryptographically signed messages, and also discusses some of the challenges of encrypting many transit-oriented headers.

It offers guidance for protecting the confidentiality of non-transit-oriented headers like Subject, and also offers a means to preserve backwards compatibility so that an encrypted Subject remains available to recipients using software that does not implement support for the Protected Headers scheme.

The document also discusses some of the compatibility constraints and usability concerns which motivated the design of the scheme, as well as limitations and a comparison with other proposals.

This technique has already proven itself as a useful building block for other improvements to cryptographic e-mail, such as the Autocrypt Level 1.1 ([\[Autocrypt\]](#)) "Gossip" mechanism.

### **1.1. Requirements Language**

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [\[RFC2119\]](#) [\[RFC8174\]](#) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

## 1.2. Terminology

For the purposes of this document, we define the following concepts:

\**MUA* is short for Mail User Agent; an e-mail client.

\**Protection* of message data refers to cryptographic encryption and/or signatures, providing confidentiality, authenticity or both.

\**Cryptographic Layer*, *Cryptographic Envelope* and *Cryptographic Payload* are defined in [Section 3](#)

\**Original Headers* are the [[RFC5322](#)] message headers as known to the sending MUA at the time of message composition.

\**Protected Headers* are any headers protected by the scheme described in this document.

\**Exposed Headers* are any headers outside the Cryptographic Payload (protected or not).

\**Obscured Headers* are any Protected Headers which have been modified or removed from the set of Exposed Headers.

\**Legacy Display Part* is a MIME construct which provides visibility for users of legacy clients of data from the Original Headers which may have been removed or obscured from the Exposed Headers. It is defined in [Section 5](#).

\**User-Facing Headers* are explained and enumerated in [Section 1.2.1](#).

\**Structural Headers* are documented in [Section 1.2.2](#).

### 1.2.1. User-Facing Headers

Of all the headers that an e-mail message may contain, only a handful are typically presented directly to the user. The user-facing headers are:

\*Subject

\*From

\*To

\*Cc

\*Date

\*Reply-To

\*Followup-To

The above is a complete list. No other headers are considered "user-facing".

Other headers may affect the visible rendering of the message (e.g., References and In-Reply-To may affect the placement of a message in a threaded discussion), but they are not directly displayed to the user and so are not considered "user-facing" for the purposes of this document.

### 1.2.2. Structural Headers

A message header whose name begins with Content- is referred to in this document as a "structural" header.

These headers indicate something about the specific MIME part they are attached to, and cannot be transferred or copied to other parts without endangering the readability of the message.

This includes (but is not limited to):

\*Content-Type

\*Content-Transfer-Encoding

\*Content-Disposition

Note that no "user-facing" headers ([Section 1.2.1](#)) are also "structural" headers. Of course, many headers are neither "user-facing" nor "structural".

**FIXME:** are there any non-Content-\* headers we should consider as structural?

## 2. Protected Headers Summary

The Protected Headers scheme relies on three backward-compatible changes to a cryptographically-protected e-mail message:

\*Headers known to the composing MUA at message composition time are (in addition to their typical placement as Exposed Headers on the outside of the message) also present in the MIME header of the root of the Cryptographic Payload. These Protected Headers share cryptographic properties with the rest of the Cryptographic Payload.

\*When the Cryptographic Envelope includes encryption, any Exposed Header MAY be *obscured* by a transformation (including deletion).

\*If the composing MUA intends to obscure any user-facing headers, it MAY add a decorative "Legacy Display" MIME part to the Cryptographic Payload which additionally duplicates the original values of the obscured user-facing headers.

When a composing MUA encrypts a message, it SHOULD obscure the Subject: header, by using the literal string ... (three U+002E FULL STOP characters) as the value of the exposed Subject: header.

When a receiving MUA encounters a message with a Cryptographic Envelope, it treats the headers of the Cryptographic Payload as belonging to the message itself, not just the subpart. In particular, when rendering a header for any such message, the renderer SHOULD prefer the header's Protected value over its Exposed value.

A receiving MUA that understands Protected Headers and discovers a Legacy Display part SHOULD hide the Legacy Display part when rendering the message.

The following sections contain more detailed discussion.

### **3. Cryptographic MIME Message Structure**

Implementations use the structure of an e-mail message to protect the headers. This section establishes some conventions about how to think about message structure.

#### **3.1. Cryptographic Layers**

"Cryptographic Layer" refers to a MIME substructure that supplies some cryptographic protections to an internal MIME subtree. The internal subtree is known as the "protected part" though of course it may itself be a multipart object.

In the diagrams below, " $\downarrow$ " (DOWNWARDS ARROW FROM BAR, U+21A7) indicates "decrypts to", and " $\downarrow\downarrow$ " (DOWNWARDS WHITE ARROW, U+21E9) indicates "unwraps to".

##### **3.1.1. PGP/MIME Cryptographic Layers**

For PGP/MIME [[RFC3156](#)] there are two forms of Cryptographic Layers, signing and encryption.

### **3.1.1.1. PGP/MIME Signing Cryptographic Layer (`multipart/signed`)**

```
└─ multipart/signed; protocol="application/pgp-signature"  
    └─ [protected part]  
        └─ application/pgp-signature
```

### **3.1.1.2. PGP/MIME Encryption Cryptographic Layer (`multipart/encrypted`)**

```
└─ multipart/encrypted  
    └─ application/pgp-encrypted  
        └─ application/octet-stream  
            ↓ (decrypts to)  
            └─ [protected part]
```

## **3.1.2. S/MIME Cryptographic Layers**

For S/MIME [[RFC8551](#)], there are four forms of Cryptographic Layers:  
`multipart/signed`, PKCS#7 `signed-data`, PKCS7 `enveloped-data`, PKCS7 `authEnveloped-data`.

### **3.1.2.1. S/MIME Multipart Signed Cryptographic Layer**

```
└─ multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"  
    └─ [protected part]  
        └─ application/pkcs7-signature
```

### **3.1.2.2. S/MIME PKCS7 signed-data Cryptographic Layer**

```
└─ application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="signed-data"  
    ↓ (unwraps to)  
    └─ [protected part]
```

### **3.1.2.3. S/MIME PKCS7 enveloped-data Cryptographic Layer**

```
└─ application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="enveloped-data"  
    ↓ (decrypts to)  
    └─ [protected part]
```

### **3.1.2.4. S/MIME PKCS7 authEnveloped-data Cryptographic Layer**

```
└─ application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type="authEnveloped-data"  
    ↓ (decrypts to)  
    └─ [protected part]
```

Note that enveloped-data ([Section 3.1.2.3](#)) and authEnveloped-data ([Section 3.1.2.4](#)) have identical message structure and semantics.  
The only difference between the two is ciphertext malleability.

The examples in this document only include enveloped-data, but the implications for that layer apply to authEnveloped-data as well.

### **3.1.2.5. PKCS7 Compression is NOT a Cryptographic Layer**

The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) provides a MIME compression layer (`smime-type="compressed-data"`), as defined in [[RFC3274](#)]. While the compression layer is technically a part of CMS, it is not considered a Cryptographic Layer for the purposes of this document.

## **3.2. Cryptographic Envelope**

The Cryptographic Envelope is the largest contiguous set of Cryptographic Layers of an e-mail message starting with the outermost MIME type (that is, with the Content-Type of the message itself).

If the Content-Type of the message itself is not a Cryptographic Layer, then the message has no cryptographic envelope.

"Contiguous" in the definition above indicates that if a Cryptographic Layer is the protected part of another Cryptographic Layer, the layers together comprise a single Cryptographic Envelope.

Note that if a non-Cryptographic Layer intervenes, all Cryptographic Layers within the non-Cryptographic Layer are *not* part of the Cryptographic Envelope (see the example in [Section 3.3.3](#)).

Note also that the ordering of the Cryptographic Layers implies different cryptographic properties. A signed-then-encrypted message is different than an encrypted-then-signed message.

## **3.3. Cryptographic Payload**

The Cryptographic Payload of a message is the first non-Cryptographic Layer - the "protected part" - within the Cryptographic Envelope. Since the Cryptographic Payload itself is a MIME part, it has its own set of headers.

Protected headers are placed on (and read from) the Cryptographic Payload, and should be considered to have the same cryptographic properties as the message itself.

### **3.3.1. Simple Cryptographic Payloads**

As described above, if the "protected part" identified in [Section 3.1.1.1](#) or [Section 3.1.1.2](#) is not itself a Cryptographic Layer, that part is the Cryptographic Payload.

If the application wants to generate a message that is both encrypted and signed, it MAY use the simple MIME structure from [Section 3.1.1.2](#) by ensuring that the [[RFC4880](#)] Encrypted Message

within the application/octet-stream part contains an [[RFC4880](#)]  
Signed Message.

### 3.3.2. Multilayer Cryptographic Envelopes

It is possible to construct a Cryptographic Envelope consisting of multiple layers for PGP/MIME, typically of the following structure:

```
A └── multipart/encrypted
B   ├── application/pgp-encrypted
C   └── application/octet-stream
D     ↻ (decrypts to)
E   └── multipart/signed
F     ├── [Cryptographic Payload]
G     └── application/pgp-signature
```

When handling such a message, the properties of the Cryptographic Envelope are derived from the series A, E.

As noted in [Section 3.3.1](#), PGP/MIME applications also have a simpler MIME construction available with the same cryptographic properties.

### 3.3.3. A Baroque Example

Consider a message with the following overcomplicated structure:

```
H └── multipart/encrypted
I   ├── application/pgp-encrypted
J   └── application/octet-stream
K     ↻ (decrypts to)
L   └── multipart/signed
M     └── multipart/mixed
N       ┌── multipart/signed
O       ┌── text/plain
P       ┌── application/pgp-signature
Q       ┌── text/plain
R       └── application/pgp-signature
```

The 3 Cryptographic Layers in such a message are rooted in parts H, L, and N. But the Cryptographic Envelope of the message consists only of the properties derived from the series H, L. The Cryptographic Payload of the message is part M.

It is NOT RECOMMENDED to generate messages with such complicated structures. Even if a receiving MUA can parse this structure properly, it is nearly impossible to render in a way that the user can reason about the cryptographic properties of part O compared to part Q.

### **3.4. Exposed Headers are Outside**

The Cryptographic Envelope fully encloses the Cryptographic Payload, whether the message is signed or encrypted or both. The Exposed Headers are considered to be outside of both.

## **4. Message Composition**

This section describes the composition of a cryptographically-protected message with Protected Headers.

We document legacy composition of cryptographically-protected messages (without protected headers) in [Section 4.4](#), and then describe a revised version of that algorithm in [Section 4.5](#) that produces conformant Protected Headers.

### **4.1. Copying All Headers**

All non-structural headers known to the composing MUA are copied to the MIME header of the Cryptographic Payload. The composing MUA SHOULD protect all known non-structural headers in this way.

If the composing MUA omits protection for some of the headers, the receiving MUA will have difficulty reasoning about the integrity of the headers (see [Section 11.2](#)).

### **4.2. Confidential Subject**

When a message is encrypted, the Subject should be obscured by replacing the Exposed Subject with three periods: ...

This value (...) was chosen because it is believed to be language agnostic and avoids communicating any potentially misleading information to the recipient (see [Section 7.1](#) for a more detailed discussion).

### **4.3. Obscured Headers**

Due to compatibility and usability concerns, a Mail User Agent SHOULD NOT obscure any of: From, To, Cc, Message-ID, References, Reply-To, In-Reply-To, (FIXME: MORE?) unless the user has indicated they have security constraints which justify the potential downsides (see [Section 7](#) for a more detailed discussion).

Aside from that limitation, this specification does not at this time define or limit the methods a MUA may use to convert Exposed Headers into Obscured Headers.

#### **4.4. Message Composition without Protected Headers**

This section roughly describes the steps that a legacy MUA might use to compose a cryptographically-protected message *without* Protected Headers.

The message composition algorithm takes three parameters:

\*origbody: the traditional unprotected message body as a well-formed MIME tree (possibly just a single MIME leaf part). As a well-formed MIME tree, origbody already has structural headers present (see [Section 1.2.2](#)).

\*origheaders: the intended non-structural headers for the message, represented here as a table mapping from header names to header values.. For example, origheaders['From'] refers to the value of the From header that the composing MUA would typically place on the message before sending it.

\*crypto: The series of cryptographic protections to apply (for example, "sign with the secret key corresponding to OpenPGP certificate X, then encrypt to OpenPGP certificates X and Y"). This is a routine that accepts a MIME tree as input (the Cryptographic Payload), wraps the input in the appropriate Cryptographic Envelope, and returns the resultant MIME tree as output,

The algorithm returns a MIME object that is ready to be injected into the mail system:

\*Apply crypto to origbody, yielding MIME tree output

\*For header name h in origheaders:

-Set header h of output to origheaders[h]

\*Return output

#### **4.5. Message Composition with Protected Headers**

A reasonable sequential algorithm for composing a message *with* protected headers takes two more parameters in addition to origbody, origheaders, and crypto:

\*obscures: a table of headers to be obscured during encryption, mapping header names to their obscuring values. For example, this document recommends only obscuring the subject, so that would be represented by the single-entry table obscures = {'Subject': '...'}.. If header Foo is to be deleted entirely, obscures['Foo'] should be set to the special value null.

\*legacy: a boolean value, indicating whether any recipient of the message is believed to have a legacy client (that is, a MUA that is capable of decryption, but does not understand protected headers).

The revised algorithm for applying cryptographic protection to a message is as follows:

\*if crypto contains encryption, and legacy is true, and obscures contains any user-facing headers (see [Section 1.2.1](#)), wrap orig in a structure that carries a Legacy Display part:

-Create a new MIME leaf part legacydisplay with header Content-Type: text/plain; protected-headers="v1"

-For each obscured header name obh in obscures:

oIf obh is user-facing:

oAdd obh: origheaders[ob] to the body of legacydisplay.  
For example, if origheaders['Subject'] is lunch plans?,  
then add the line Subject: lunch plans? to the body of  
legacydisplay

-Construct a new MIME part wrapper with Content-Type:  
multipart/mixed

-Give wrapper exactly two subparts: legacydisplay and origbody,  
in that order.

-Let payload be MIME part wrapper

\*Otherwise:

-Let payload be MIME part origbody

\*For each header name h in origheaders:

-Set header h of MIME part payload to origheaders[h]

\*Set the protected-headers parameter on the Content-Type of  
payload to v1

\*Apply crypto to payload, producing MIME tree output

```

*If crypto contains encryption:

    -For each obscured header name obh in obscures:

        oIf obscures[obh] is null:

            oDrop obh from origheaders

        oElse:

            oSet origheaders[obh] to obscures[obh]

*For each header name h in origheaders:

    -Set header h of output to origheaders[h]

*return output

```

Note that both new parameters, obscured and legacy, are effectively ignored if crypto does not contain encryption. This is by design, because they are irrelevant for signed-only cryptographic protections.

## 5. Legacy Display

MUAs typically display user-facing headers ([Section 1.2.1](#)) directly to the user. An encrypted message may be read by a decryption-capable legacy MUA that is unaware of this standard. The user of such a legacy client risks losing access to any obscured headers.

This section presents a workaround to mitigate this risk by restructuring the Cryptographic Payload before encrypting to include a "Legacy Display" part.

### 5.1. Message Generation: Including a Legacy Display Part

A generating MUA that wants to make an Obscured Subject (or any other user-facing header) visible to a recipient using a legacy MUA SHOULD modify the Cryptographic Payload by wrapping the intended body of the message in a multipart/mixed MIME part that prefixes the intended body with a Legacy Display part.

The Legacy Display part MUST be of Content-Type text/plain or text/rfc822-headers (text/plain is RECOMMENDED), and MUST contain a protected-headers parameter whose value is v1. It SHOULD be marked with Content-Disposition: inline to encourage recipients to render it.

The contents of the Legacy Display part MUST be only the user-facing headers that the sending MUA intends to obscure after encryption.

The original body (now a subpart) SHOULD also be marked with Content-Disposition: inline to discourage legacy clients from presenting it as an attachment.

### 5.1.1. Legacy Display Transformation

Consider a message whose Cryptographic Payload, before encrypting, that would have a traditional multipart/alternative structure:

```
X └── multipart/alternative
Y   ├── text/plain
Z   └── text/html
```

When adding a Legacy Display part, this structure becomes:

```
V └── multipart/mixed
W   ├── text/plain ("Legacy Display" part)
X   └── multipart/alternative ("original body")
Y     ├── text/plain
Z     └── text/html
```

Note that with the inclusion of the Legacy Display part, the Cryptographic Payload is the multipart/mixed part (part V in the example above), so Protected Headers should be placed at that part.

### 5.1.2. When to Generate Legacy Display

A MUA SHOULD transform a Cryptographic Payload to include a Legacy Display part only when:

\*The message is going to be encrypted, and

\*At least one user-facing header (see [Section 1.2.1](#)) is going to be obscured

Additionally, if the sender knows that the recipient's MUA is capable of interpreting Protected Headers, it SHOULD NOT attempt to include a Legacy Display part. (Signalling such a capability is out of scope for this document)

## 5.2. Message Rendering: Omitting a Legacy Display Part

A MUA that understands Protected Headers may receive an encrypted message that contains a Legacy Display part. Such an MUA SHOULD avoid rendering the Legacy Display part to the user at all, since it is aware of and can render the actual Protected Headers.

If a Legacy Display part is detected, the Protected Headers should still be pulled from the Cryptographic Payload (part V in the

example above), but the body of message SHOULD be rendered as though it were only the original body (part X in the example above).

#### **5.2.1. Legacy Display Detection Algorithm**

A receiving MUA acting on a message SHOULD detect the presence of a Legacy Display part and the corresponding "original body" with the following simple algorithm:

\*Check that all of the following are true for the message:

\*The Cryptographic Envelope must contain an encrypting Cryptographic Layer

\*The Cryptographic Payload must have a Content-Type of multipart/mixed

\*The Cryptographic Payload must have exactly two subparts

\*The first subpart of the Cryptographic Payload must have a Content-Type of text/plain or text/rfc822-headers

\*The first subpart of the Cryptographic Payload's Content-Type must contain a property of protected-headers, and its value must be v1.

\*If all of the above are true, then the first subpart is the Legacy Display part, and the second subpart is the "original body". Otherwise, the message does not have a Legacy Display part.

#### **5.3. Legacy Display is Decorative and Transitional**

As the above makes clear, the Legacy Display part is strictly decorative, for the benefit of legacy decryption-capable MUAs that may handle the message. As such, the existence of the Legacy Display part and its multipart/mixed wrapper are part of a transition plan.

As the number of decryption-capable clients that understand Protected Headers grows in comparison to the number of legacy decryption-capable clients, it is expected that some senders will decide to stop generating Legacy Display parts entirely.

A MUA developer concerned about accessibility of the Subject header for their users of encrypted mail when Legacy Display parts are omitted SHOULD implement the Protected Headers scheme described in this document.

## 6. Message Interpretation

This document does not currently provide comprehensive recommendations on how to interpret Protected Headers. This is deliberate; research and development is still ongoing. We also recognize that the tolerance of different user groups for false positives (benign conditions misidentified as security risks), vs. their need for strong protections varies a great deal and different MUAs will take different approaches as a result.

Some common approaches are discussed below.

### 6.1. Reverse-Copying

One strategy for interpreting Protected Headers on an incoming message is to simply ignore any Exposed Header for which a Protected counterpart is available. This is often implemented as a copy operation (copying header back out of the Cryptographic Payload into the main message header) within the code which takes care of parsing the message.

A MUA implementing this strategy should pay special attention to any user facing headers ([Section 1.2.1](#)). If a message has Protected Headers, and a user-facing header is among the Exposed Headers but missing from the Protected Headers, then an MUA implementing this strategy SHOULD delete the identified Exposed Header before presenting the message to the user.

This strategy does not risk raising a false alarm about harmless deviations, but conversely it does nothing to inform the user if they are under attack. This strategy does successfully mitigate and thwart some attacks, including signature replay attacks ([Section 11.2](#)) and participant modification attacks ([Section 11.3](#)).

### 6.2. Signature Invalidation

An alternate strategy for interpreting Protected Headers is to consider the cryptographic signature on a message to be invalid if the Exposed Headers deviate from their Protected counterparts.

This state should be presented to the user using the same interface as other signature verification failures.

A MUA implementing this strategy MAY want to make a special exception for the Subject: header, to avoid invalidating the signature on any signed and encrypted message with a confidential subject.

Note that simple signature invalidation may be insufficient to defend against a participant modification attack ([Section 11.3](#)).

### **6.3. The Legacy Display Part**

This part is purely decorative, for the benefit of any recipient using a legacy decryption-capable MUA. See [Section 5.2](#) for details and recommendations on how to handle the Legacy Display part.

### **6.4. Replying to a Message with Obscured Headers**

When replying to a message, many MUAs copy headers from the original message into their reply.

When replying to an encrypted message, users expect the replying MUA to generate an encrypted message if possible. If encryption is not possible, and the reply will be cleartext, users typically want the MUA to avoid leaking previously-encrypted content into the cleartext of the reply.

For this reason, an MUA replying to an encrypted message with Obscured Headers SHOULD NOT leak the cleartext of any Obscured Headers into the cleartext of the reply, whether encrypted or not.

In particular, the contents of any Obscured Protected Header from the original message SHOULD NOT be placed in the Exposed Headers of the reply message.

## **7. Common Pitfalls and Guidelines**

Among the MUA authors who already implemented most of this specification, several alternative or more encompassing specifications were discussed and sometimes tried out in practice. This section highlights a few "pitfalls" and guidelines based on these discussions and lessons learned.

### **7.1. Misunderstood Obscured Subjects**

There were many discussions around what text phrase to use to obscure the Subject:. Text phrases such as Encrypted Message were tried but resulted in both localization problems and user confusion.

If the natural language phrase for the obscured Subject: is not localized (e.g. just English Encrypted Message), then it may be incomprehensible to a non-English-speaking recipient who uses a legacy MUA that renders the obscured Subject: directly.

On the other hand, if it is localized based on the sender's MUA language settings, there is no guarantee that the recipient prefers the same language as the sender (consider a German speaker sending English text to an Anglophone). There is no standard way for a sending MUA to infer the language preferred by the recipient (aside from statistical inference of language based on the composed

message, which would in turn leak information about the supposedly-confidential message body).

Furthermore, implementors found that the phrase Encrypted Message in the subject line was sometimes understood by users to be an indication from the MUA that the message was actually encrypted. In practice, when some MUA failed to encrypt a message in a thread that started off with an obscured Subject:, the value Re: Encrypted Message was retained even on those cleartext replies, resulting in user confusion.

In contrast, using ... as the obscured Subject: was less likely to be seen as an indicator from the MUA of message encryption, and it also neatly sidesteps the localization problems.

### **7.2. Reply/Forward Losing Subjects**

When the user of a legacy MUA replies to or forwards a message where the Subject has been obscured, it is likely that the new subject will be Fwd: ... or Re: ... (or the localized equivalent). This breaks an important feature: people are used to continuity of subject within a thread. It is especially unfortunate when a new participant is added to a conversation who never saw the original subject.

At this time, there is no known workaround for this problem. The only solution is to upgrade the MUA to support Protected Headers.

The authors consider this to be only a minor concern in cases where encryption is being used because confidentiality is important. However, in more opportunistic cases, where encryption is being used routinely regardless of the sensitivity of message contents, this cost becomes higher.

### **7.3. Usability Impact of Reduced Metadata**

Many mail user agents maintain an index of message metadata (including header data), which is used to rapidly construct mailbox overviews and search result listings. If the process which generates this index does not have access to the encrypted payload of a message, or does not implement Protected Headers, then the index will only contain the obscured versions Exposed Headers, in particular an obscured Subject of ....

For sensitive message content, especially in a hosted MUA-as-a-service situation ("webmail") where the metadata index is maintained and stored by a third party, this may be considered a feature as the subject is protected from the third-party. However, for more routine communications, this harms usability and goes against user expectations.

Two simple workarounds exist for this use case:

1. If the metadata index is considered secure enough to handle confidential data, the protected content may be stored directly in the index once it has been decrypted.
2. If the metadata index is not trusted, the protected content could be re-encrypted and encrypted versions stored in the index instead, which are then decrypted by the client at display time.

In both cases, the process which decrypts the message and processes the Protected Headers must be able to update the metadata index.

**FIXME:** add notes about research topics and other non-simple workarounds, like oblivious server-side indexing, or searching on encrypted data.

#### **7.4. Usability Impact of Obscured Message-ID**

Current MUAs rely on the outermost Message-ID for message processing and indexing purposes. This processing often happens before any decryption is even attempted. Attempting to send a message with an obscured Message-ID header would result in several MUAs not correctly processing the message, and would likely be seen as a degradation by users.

Furthermore, a legacy MUA replying to a message with an obscured Message-ID: would be likely to produce threading information (References:, In-Reply-To:) that would be misunderstood by the original sender. Implementors generally disapprove of breaking threads.

#### **7.5. Usability Impact of Obscured From/To/Cc**

The impact of obscuring From:, To:, and Cc: headers has similar issues as discussed with obscuring the Message-ID: header in [Section 7.4](#).

In addition, obscuring these headers is likely to cause difficulties for a legacy client attempting to formulate a correct reply (or "reply all") to a given message.

#### **7.6. Mailing List Header Modifications**

Some popular mailing-list implementations will modify the Exposed Headers of a message in specific, benign ways. In particular, it is common to add markers to the Subject line, and it is also common to modify either From or Reply-To in order to make sure replies go to the list instead of directly to the author of an individual post.

Depending on how the MUA resolves discrepancies between the Protected Headers and the Exposed Headers of a received message, these mailing list "features" may either break or the MUA may incorrectly interpret them as a security breach.

Implementors may for this reason choose to implement slightly different strategies for resolving discrepancies, if a message is known to come from such a mailing list. MUAs should at the very least avoid presenting false alarms in such cases.

## 8. Comparison with Other Header Protection Schemes

Other header protection schemes have been proposed (in the IETF and elsewhere) that are distinct from this mechanism. This section documents the differences between those earlier mechanisms and this one, and hypothesizes why it has seen greater interoperable adoption.

The distinctions include:

\*backward compatibility with legacy clients

\*compatibility across PGP/MIME and S/MIME

\*protection for both confidentiality and signing

### 8.1. S/MIME 3.1 Header Protection

S/MIME 3.1 ([[RFC3851](#)]) introduces header protection via message/rfc822 header parts.

The problem with this mechanism is that many legacy clients encountering such a message were likely to interpret it as either a forwarded message, or as an unreadable substructure.

For signed messages, this is particularly problematic - a message that would otherwise have been easily readable by a client that knows nothing about signed messages suddenly shows up as a message-within-a-message, just by virtue of signing. This has an impact on all clients, whether they are cryptographically-capable or not.

For encrypted messages, whose interpretation only matters on the smaller set of cryptographically-capable legacy clients, the resulting message rendering is awkward at best.

Furthermore, formulating a reply to such a message on a legacy client can also leave the user with badly-structured quoted and attributed content.

Additionally, a message deliberately forwarded in its own right (without preamble or adjacent explanatory notes) could potentially be confused with a message using the declared structure.

The mechanism described here allows cryptographically-incapable legacy MUAs to read and handle cleartext signed messages without any modifications, and permits cryptographically-capable legacy MUAs to handle encrypted messages without any modifications.

In particular, the Legacy Display part described in [Section 5](#) makes it feasible for a conformant MUA to generate messages with obscured Subject lines that nonetheless give access to the obscured Subject header for recipients with legacy MUAs.

## 8.2. The Content-Type Property "forwarded=no" {forwarded=no}

Section A.1.2 of [[I-D.draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-requirements-01](#)] refers to a proposal that attempts to mitigate one of the drawbacks of the scheme described in S/MIME 3.1 ([Section 8.1](#)).

In particular, using the Content-Type property forwarded="no" allows *non-legacy* clients to distinguish between deliberately forwarded messages and those intended to use the defined structure for header protection.

However, this fix has no impact on the confusion experienced by legacy clients.

## 8.3. pEp Header Protection

[[I-D.draft-luck-lamps-pep-header-protection-03](#)] is applicable only to signed+encrypted mail, and does not contemplate protection of signed-only mail.

In addition, the pEp header protection involved for "pEp message format 2" has an additional multipart/mixed layer designed to facilitate transfer of OpenPGP Transferable Public Keys, which seems orthogonal to the effort to protect headers.

Finally, that draft suggests that the exposed Subject header be one of "=?utf-8?Q?p=E2=89=A1p?=", "pEp", or "Encrypted message". "pEp" is a mysterious choice for most users, and see [Section 7.1](#) for more commentary on why "Encrypted message" is likely to be problematic.

## 8.4. DKIM

[[RFC6736](#)] offers DKIM, which is often used to sign headers associated with a message.

DKIM is orthogonal to the work described in this document, since it is typically done by the domain operator and not the end user generating the original message. That is, DKIM is not "end-to-end" and does not represent the intent of the entity generating the message.

Furthermore, a DKIM signer does not have access to headers inside an encrypted Cryptographic Layer, and a DKIM verifier cannot effectively use DKIM to verify such confidential headers.

#### 8.5. S/MIME "Secure Headers"

[[RFC7508](#)] describes a mechanism that embeds message header fields in the S/MIME signature using ASN.1.

The mechanism proposed in that draft is undefined for use with PGP/MIME. While all S/MIME clients must be able to handle CMS and ASN.1 as well as MIME, a standard that works at the MIME layer itself should be applicable to any MUA that can work with MIME, regardless of whether end-to-end security layers are provided by S/MIME or PGP/MIME.

That mechanism also does not propose a means to provide confidentiality protection for headers within an encrypted-but-not-signed message.

Finally, that mechanism offers no equivalent to the Legacy Display described in [Section 5](#). Instead, sender and receiver are expected to negotiate in some unspecified way to ensure that it is safe to remove or modify Exposed Headers in an encrypted message.

#### 8.6. Triple-Wrapping

[[RFC2634](#)] defines "Triple Wrapping" as a means of providing cleartext signatures over signed and encrypted material. This can be used in combination with the mechanism described in [[RFC7508](#)] to authenticate some headers for transport using S/MIME.

But it does not offer confidentiality protection for the protected headers, and the signer of the outer layer of a triple-wrapped message may not be the originator of the message either.

In practice on today's Internet, DKIM ([[RFC6736](#)] provides a more widely-accepted cryptographic header-verification-for-transport mechanism than triple-wrapped messages.

### 9. Test Vectors

The subsections below provide example messages that implement the Protected Header scheme.

The secret keys and OpenPGP certificates from [[I-D.draft-bre-openpgp-samples-00](#)] can be used to decrypt and verify the PGP/MIME messages.

The secret keys and X.509 certificates from [[I-D.draft-dkg-lamps-samples-01](#)] can be used to decrypt and verify the S/MIME messages.

All test vectors are provided in textual source form as [[RFC5322](#)] messages.

For easy access to these test vectors, they are also available at `imap://bob@protected-headers.cmrg.net/inbox` using any password for authentication. This IMAP account is read-only, and any flags set or cleared on the messages will persist only for the duration of the specific IMAP session.

### **9.1. Signed PGP/MIME Message with Protected Headers**

This shows a clearsinged PGP/MIME message. Its MIME message structure is:

```
└── multipart/signed
    ├── text/plain ← Cryptographic Payload
    └── application/pgp-signature
```

Note that if this message had been generated without Protected Headers, then an attacker with access to it could modify the Subject without invalidating the signature. Such an attacker could cause Bob to think that Alice wanted to cancel the contract with BarCorp instead of FooCorp.

```
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]); Sun, 20 Oct 2019  
09:00:17 -0400 (UTC-04:00)  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="fee";  
protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg="pgp-sha512"  
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>  
To: Bob Babbage <bob@openpgp.example>  
Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2019 09:00:00 -0400  
Subject: The FooCorp contract  
Message-ID: <pgpmime-signed@protected-headers.example>
```

```
--fee  
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; protected-headers="v1"  
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>  
To: Bob Babbage <bob@openpgp.example>  
Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2019 09:00:00 -0400  
Subject: The FooCorp contract  
Message-ID: <pgpmime-signed@protected-headers.example>
```

Bob, we need to cancel this contract.

Please start the necessary processes to make that happen today.

(this is the 'pgpmime-signed' message)

Thanks, Alice

--

Alice Lovelace  
President  
Example Corp

```
--fee  
content-type: application/pgp-signature
```

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

```
wnUEARYKAB0FA12sW1AWIQTrbtf0zp14V6UTmPyMVUMT0fjjgAKCRDyMVUMT0fj  
jt10AQDtIsRWZVCjbB3TISlcyxLpBfwjaXXV0is5+c4Gd2NNgwEAipDF3m5zIt7t  
29cFwQusmCqKqKfdJUf6HOUPF5L/zAI=  
=+M9u
```

-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--fee--

## 9.2. S/MIME `multipart/signed` Message with Protected Headers

This shows a signed-only S/MIME message using the `multipart/signed` style (see Section 3.5.3 of [[RFC8551](#)]). Its MIME message structure is:

```
└─ multipart/signed
    ├─ text/plain ← Cryptographic Payload
    └─ application/pkcs7-signature
```

Note that if this message had been generated without Protected Headers, then an attacker with access to it could modify the Subject without invalidating the signature. Such an attacker could cause Bob to think that Alice wanted to cancel the contract with BarCorp instead of FooCorp.

Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]); Tue, 26 Nov 2019  
20:03:17 -0400 (UTC-04:00)  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="179";  
protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg="sha-256"  
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@smime.example>  
To: Bob Babbage <bob@smime.example>  
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2019 20:03:00 -0400  
Subject: The FooCorp contract  
Message-ID: <smime-multipart-signed@protected-headers.example>

--179

Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; protected-headers="v1"  
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@smime.example>  
To: Bob Babbage <bob@smime.example>  
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2019 20:03:00 -0400  
Subject: The FooCorp contract  
Message-ID: <smime-multipart-signed@protected-headers.example>

Bob, we need to cancel this contract.

Please start the necessary processes to make that happen today.

(this is the 'smime-multipart-signed' message)

Thanks, Alice

--

Alice Lovelace  
President  
Example Corp

--179

Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64  
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s"

MIIIfQYJKoZIhvNAQcCoIIFdjCCBXICAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAqEwCwYJKoZI  
hvNAQcBoIIDcjCCA24wggJwoAMCAQICFGeCtFlzUkvB9HFHGWrw/RGKqkwLMA0G  
CSqGSIB3DQEVDQUAMC0xKzApBgNVBAMTI1NhXBsZSBMQU1QUyBDZXJ0awZpY2F0  
ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkwIBcNMTkxMTIwMDY1NDE4WhgPMjA1MjA5MjcwNjU0MThaMBkx  
FzAVBgNVBAMTDkFsawNlIEvxdmVsYWNlMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAOCAQ8A  
MIIBCgKCAQEAw+6t+WXRTiQM8yRjWQ2fbFewCodIZUX6BY02TeZuEXoEAGEsmoON  
6LlotcUTdGr39FE2K8Iyt0KkXVexswgAqBCqv8YjVDrI3yV82wrn5Td32TDlw7IS  
igak4ZSu+UowPQs8Y03oxqImP4onZNHvdZ3it9EggmgUyZX0dmQ6z509yDzHpLMa  
E2rXxfYcPXQwPvx4tcqbTf2htEP7PYnBa8a+sts0F7I7KD5ozGYI9dGg/XGs1lYE  
WAoH5YZgNFdbkJdcKG2FPAwFcVZ/hoGm6soxkDKMrYSCTBp+fqH8MV11DP821Po0  
vtSEnaF8UURbaths2yKpAB2WUJvgw5xa4QIDAQABo4GXMIIGUMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQC  
MAAwHgYDVRORBBCwFYETYWxpY2VAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZTATBgnVHSUEDDAKBgg  
BgEFBQcDBDAPBgNVHQ8BAf8EBQMDB6AAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBSsL1RapP1VGK8u6GZE  
ONE10dcAeTAfBgNVHSMEGDAwgs3UK1zwIg9ssN6Wgzz1Pf3gKJ32zANBgkqhkiG

9w0BAQ0FAA0CAQEAE+q0GM+8q1UhXKV6i63BrXS0Kvd2iglxAggszUC6eMnrIem6  
6mmRzSbcGHCeU6m1MpVYSe9IIiROIxjTfsgGUdZbbXtBxSmCASj0BCbphvvtoam1G  
i8+LZd0gR2kDwr//TYjW06vUfXPwerNwMx4cKpFobdmvgLYCeAZKRvoPjJmTEFfw  
K00cCxSifTpTFiwZhFxXXSCTdB6T2rE9JxJfzJqLUrvvEZwpQIt8hX8kym/vKw+1  
cbsl3rag2enVP/f4qg/0mUuzkCI8sLXd+N5gAs9wdUZRcTB0gOnUAH9m7RrpqkdC  
ogKdypGEQHj6GiamJAe2WndOp4BZdBtBRzjfuzGCAdkwggHVAgEBMEUwLTErMCKG  
A1UEAxMiU2FtcGx1IExBTVBTIENlcnPzmljYXR1IEF1dGhvcml0eQIUZ4K0WXNS  
S8H0cUcZavD9EYqqTAswCwYYIZIAWUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqG  
S1b3DQEHAATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMTkxMTI3MDAwMzAwWjAvBgkqhkiG9w0B  
CQQxIgQgGeoQw8WDmjB606EKGR5n1oMuV7Te1Vjfa2oB2ebW390wDQYJKoZIhvcN  
AQEBBQAEGgEABb1YEWSnYyzL3jTS3AoPr93YKksIZr5q/b8Y5/1rMxdYxPm+iRe0  
RHrgpbFQeiqZXzRXtMohfoIk h7RmdQoSv40pwiumNU+f0ZEAu8cMVJM6gdyUD+1D  
JwDNr+YNLV/1UU Ghqx0FEx0a/4092KYBD4eRQw4KDWrkf h9d1sj0Bs14thrZYGLz  
e7ut3FN5TBruZfmqMy50xZ9yUW91YyQUBLiIcuF185y5ZW/aQCxBKBbrNNGXLJbo  
8yKFJqSPiWZvwUmVQvfgL182hg8230JTtP4VImcUakTF0+k+BM//qqKXYrlX/tZn  
QzG+4ZH/XM1vgH17ShjHS6TS0Hz20DqD6Q==

### **9.3. S/MIME application/pkcs7-mime SignedData Message with Protected Headers**

This shows a signed-only S/MIME message using the multipart/pkcs7-mime style (see Section 3.5.2 of [[RFC8551](#)]). Its MIME message structure is:

```
└─application/pkcs7-mime smime-type="signed-data"
  ↴ (unwraps to)
  └─text/plain ← Cryptographic Payload
```

Note that if this message had been generated without Protected Headers, then an attacker with access to it could modify the Subject without invalidating the signature. Such an attacker could cause Bob to think that Alice wanted to cancel the contract with BarCorp instead of FooCorp.

Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]); Tue, 26 Nov 2019  
20:06:17 -0400 (UTC-04:00)  
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64  
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";  
smime-type="signed-data"  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@smime.example>  
To: Bob Babbage <bob@smime.example>  
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2019 20:06:00 -0400  
Subject: The FooCorp contract  
Message-ID: <smime-onepart-signed@protected-headers.example>

MIIHhQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIHdjCCB3ICAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwggIJBgkq  
hkiG9w0BBwGgggH6BIIB9kNvbnR1bnQtVHlwZTogdGV4dC9wbGFpbjsgY2hhcnNl  
dD0idXMtYXnjawkiOyBwcm90ZWn0ZWQtaGVhZGVycz0idjEiDQpGcm9t0iBBbGlj  
ZSBMb3Z1bGFjZSA8YWxpY2VAc21pbWUUzXhhbXBsZT4NC1Rv0iBCb2IgQmFiYmFn  
ZSA8Ym9iQHntaW11LmV4YW1wbGU+DQpEYXRl0iBuDWUsIDI2IE5vdIAyMDE5IDIw  
0jA20jAwIC0wNDAwDQpTdWJqZWN00iBUaGUgRm9vQ29ycCCbjb250cmFjdA0KTWVz  
c2FnZS1JRDogPHNtaW11Lw9uZXBhcncQtc2lnbmVkQHByb3R1Y3R1ZC1oZWFKZXJz  
LmV4YW1wbGU+DQoNCKJvYiwd2UgbmV1ZCB0byBjYW5jZWwdgdGhpcyBjb250cmFj  
dC4NCg0KUGx1YXN1IHN0YXJ0IHRoZSBuZWN1c3NhcnkgchJvY2Vzc2VzIHRvIG1h  
a2UgdGhhDCBoYXBwZW4gdG9kYXkuDQoNCih0aG1zIG1zIHRoZSAnc21pbWUtB251  
cGFydC1zaWduZwQnIG1lc3NhZ2UpDQoNC1RoYW5rcywgQWxpY2UNCi0tIA0KQWxp  
Y2UgTG92ZwxhY2UNC1ByZXNpZGVudA0KRXhhbXBsZSBD3JwDQqgggNyMIIDbjCC  
AlagAwIBAgIUZ4K0WXNSS8H0cUcZavD9EYqqTAswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQENBQAwLTEr  
MCKGA1UEAxMiU2FtcGx1IExBTVBTIEN1cnRpZmljYXR1IEF1dGhvcml0eTAGFw0x  
OTExmJAwNjU0MThaGA8yMDUyMDkyNzA2NTQxFowGTEXMBUGA1UEAxMOQWxpY2Ug  
TG92ZwxhY2UwggEiMA0GCSqGSIB3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDD7q35ZdG2  
JAzzJGNZDZ9sV7AKh0h1RfofjTZN5m4RegQAYSyag43ouWi1xRN0avf0UTYrwjk0  
4qrDv7GzCACoEKq/xiNUOsjfJXzbCub1N3fZM0XDshKKBqTh1K75Sja9Czxg7ejG  
oiY/iidk0e91neK30SCCaBTJ1fR2ZDrPk73IPMeeksxoTatff9hw9dDA+/Hi1yptN  
/aG0Q/s9icFrxr6y2zQxsjuQPmjMzgj10aD9cazWgRYCgf1hmA0V1uQl1wobYU8  
DAVxVn+GgabqyjGQMoythIK0Gn5+ofwxXXUM/zbU+g6+1ISdoXxRRFtq2GzbIqkA  
HZZQm+BbnFrhAgMBAAGjgZcwgZQwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAeBgNVHREEFzAVgRNh  
bG1jZUBzbWltZS5leGftcGx1MBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMEMA8GA1UdDwEB  
/wQFAwMHoAAwHQYDVR00BBYEKFwuVFqk/VUYry7oZkQ40SXRIwB5MB8GA1UdIwQY  
MBaAFIdSTXPAnD2yw3paDP0U9/eAonfbMA0GCSqGSIB3DQEBDQUAA4IBAQB76o4Y  
z7yrVSFcpXqLrcGtdI4q93aKCXECCCzNQLp4yesh6brqaZHNJtwYcJ5TqbUym9hJ  
70iJE4jGNN+yAZR1ltte0HFYIBKM4EJumG++2hqbUaLz4t106BHaQPCv/9NiNY7  
q9R9c/B6s1YzHhwqkWht2a+AtgJ4BkpG+g+MmZMQV/Ao7RwLFkJ901MWLBmEXFcp  
IJN0HpPasT0nEl/MmotSu+8RnClAi3yFfyTKb+8rD7VxuyXetqdZ6dU/9/iqD/SZ  
S70QIjywtd343mACz3B1R1FxMHSA6dQAf2btGumqR0KiAp3KkYRAePoaJqYkb7za  
d06ngFl0G0FHOn+7MYIB2TCCAdUCAQEwRTAtMSswKQYDVQQDeYJTYw1wbGUgTEFN  
UFMgQ2VydG1maWNhGUGqXV0aG9yaXR5AhRngrRZc1JLwfRxRx1q8P0RiqpMCzAL  
BglghkgBZQMEAgGgaTAYBqkqhkiG9w0BCQMXCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIB3  
DQEJBTEPFw0x0TEXMjcwMDA2MDBaMC8GCSqGSIB3DQEJBDEiBCKADM98nuD198sK  
i4SDvP2x1xr2SdV/xNVYs6SeGCBRuTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQAcryWksibG  
rrc/aDF1Z4KRnoRpr+f0utQLV7k0Tgezt+X/kJCIiuLvjuXrTux1yUWCKUPb6T  
KLYASPJpwDXrNzqmGs1pJmWHTZwUhbfVxt16FaQZkDSATTvhQU39Rsot2j1pP/UV

J7+5FPQwNc4dt7MFW7jU4TBHo2VrzjZ2K8ioELPxsixOCAp3ytkhf1Umw6bC5M/u  
oWjsa6xzA14fw5+pxZw0JdbryN5kmPiekSsYy2/+y0wzrtIYtHw5dY7DoWwXDxtD  
cmCGHk08qry+MnMy3PwvXiX0warQo1fnhXB5tlk2K9YdiDc0tnAshEBXAudnx1PK  
JGzeJVUfbfM0

Unwrapping the PKCS7 SignedData yields the following internal message:

```
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; protected-headers="v1"
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@smime.example>
To: Bob Babbage <bob@smime.example>
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2019 20:06:00 -0400
Subject: The FooCorp contract
Message-ID: <smime-onepart-signed@protected-headers.example>
```

Bob, we need to cancel this contract.

Please start the necessary processes to make that happen today.

(this is the 'smime-onepart-signed' message)

Thanks, Alice

--

Alice Lovelace  
President  
Example Corp

#### 9.4. Signed and Encrypted PGP/MIME Message with Protected Headers

This shows a simple encrypted PGP/MIME message with protected headers. The encryption also contains a signature in the OpenPGP Message structure. Its MIME message structure is:

```
└─ multipart/encrypted
    ├─ application/pgp-encrypted
    └─ application/octet-stream
        ↴ (decrypts to)
        └─ text/plain ← Cryptographic Payload
```

The Subject: header is successfully obscured.

Note that if this message had been generated without Protected Headers, then an attacker with access to it could have read the Subject. Such an attacker would know details about Alice and Bob's business that they wanted to keep confidential.

The protected headers also protect the authenticity of subject line as well.

The session key for this message's Cryptographic Layer is an AES-256 key with value 8df4b2d27d5637138ac6de46415661be0bd01ed12ecf8c1db22a33cf3ede82f2 (in hex).

If Bob's MUA is capable of interpreting these protected headers, it should render the Subject: of this message as BarCorp contract signed, let's go!.

Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]); Mon, 21 Oct 2019  
07:09:28 -0700 (UTC-07:00)  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
Content-Type: multipart/encrypted; boundary="ca4";  
protocol="application/pgp-encrypted"  
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>  
To: Bob Babbage <bob@openpgp.example>  
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 07:09:00 -0700  
Message-ID: <pgpmime-sign+enc@protected-headers.example>  
Subject: ...

--ca4  
content-type: application/pgp-encrypted

Version: 1

--ca4  
content-type: application/octet-stream

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

wV4DR2b2udXyHrYSAQdAH1KRyK7qZzNpI7TVprCPo/a0TW9R5hBKcTkKES1Fo3Yw  
mtDplfGFN2JMzQ10Vbe2gbcyhrYfs+7Fd4eoZ0geE2cUYn5M951I0se1W+MdMZ/j  
wCDMA3wvqk35PDeYAQv/ePyXTBTU98wzM5LcwhWZcCmxCtTgqHmjJmymQKQqJuCA  
flrZPG6V6RyidGwmJYf2uDdm1hAHxFbYAalkI+/V3Sn050SejKvspUtuRnB0W8Ps  
luwQ6ANww/o4y/2/SkIodRmwaIBbs/4CaDQivSeBueHnPu0EqxTBNI47dQx9mkdB  
Z5PsucuUVSq2SmdIrCM9aLyUF60NVhdp3mYQaVH12dX19wjZtc1TR74t66I/wsc  
FHONiGii/ioJS9LGllnaRiS7carLbtw0s2yJJZPZeRozMPi0o8zgne77wdof+NyU  
LkGtqXvLbPPA9SDGTHgkJ6H+wUhh00GWebYwpN3F6R7Su101YRkQ8kok0mJmZokg  
qhDueENW2RsZIg06sydGFaRY5BoGe2EBkcXUVBwqYEMH3Zxz/kAEy1VY5sZ0qcae  
PA1vTF6Y4nNVGVylUvcuJ4DsQbi2Aued7T128ha1xJTkz1H1t4UyU878eUfdVLOM  
FF+hwbxl06RBT4uurMee0sHrAUDHma9Kx6XrALINbI151fMKKXnKhfQYpfbybz8J  
jVFz0zCxMqmdHZLe/G9mxoksvXrbFf8b5DHfDYGCRvbj+CzERo6KCceaVSpKVGL8  
xiwHrjg+vwnf9EG9j+vp3jB39wES/IZZThSnf0JvJA4ePVnfbxcxMqgg/S2isyHf  
NAp89Z1x5mznom9efKUoojodNNFsMIT+YNaHEtnjZl+BXstGkXX0iurEt5HuEyRz  
+cyjwpnQChz6PuY0Ehsj42mMyGa3167H2kIqtKtxIf15/qm1df1m1Ec7SpmU+uHV  
58D22b1/Ukr8vmFu09z7V2U7zXz+FtohuVpeTr3l0UVEFEGIQT4JUqxiaVZqMsZE  
6DKj6X+fzXdxMyrDd/1D2ikZd1lqTuvsuuifW10tEbuIKRoYU16u8t44/KYohCQK  
BWXhyh71Ppf0GkemA3KY0D7yG4caTwmn5GSskGyKqQjiCxa0jKqt1qfnBTxBh4/6  
8Ijf/cmlSNjC6ghzuwtNG7wr0mSC0pjQs17b16Im7F0mP67pputqcFrZ0IzVbrS8  
vVe0+1X3/5VnmYHCilaI41ln3wGRT1C/j41IoGNG1JJ9Le0z0D1fIwfIy9aVUDXo  
48awW8hYu4CK42GIJQP9HsQ9fbFzHmyUHhs4h+xGXHTbPFqiPyzsoAT8KDTLMj4y  
CKWaqqXMKuaD7hMc42xW8ziq2ZXZCv1ajDclbk5rx9R6n4dZL6Cajt7wK2mMht  
giNkCqLU2LuPhw/R9comDDJPfmb6WB/PBrnTrUwrFy4/6du5uK09kwLIUu82UVhm  
5xHVqybxIkHGeVNXqRSe3M3w8ERbkXqNp3s7BrGGb1bYd1rPf8h1PTeWi9vfXUdn  
wFhr0g3xjeQ9orvJZ15jPuk5NryF2J/iNEh7+sE=

=NT2A

-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

--ca4--

Unwrapping the Cryptographic Layer yields the following content:

```
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>
To: Bob Babbage <bob@openpgp.example>
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 07:09:00 -0700
Subject: BarCorp contract signed, let's go!
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; protected-headers="v1"
Message-ID: <pgpmime-sign+enc@protected-headers.example>
```

Hi Bob!

I just signed the contract with BarCorp and they've set us up with an account on their system for testing.

The account information is:

```
Site: https://barcorp.example/
Username: examplecorptest
Password: correct-horse-battery-staple
```

Please get the account set up and apply the test harness.

Let me know when you've got some results.

(this is the 'pgpmime-sign+enc' message)

Thanks, Alice

--

Alice Lovelace  
President  
Example Corp

## 9.5. Signed and Encrypted S/MIME Message with Protected Headers

This shows a simple signed and encrypted S/MIME message with protected headers. Its MIME message structure is:

```
└─application/pkcs7-mime smime-type="enveloped-data"
  └─(decrypts to)
    └─application/pkcs7-mime smime-type="signed-data"
      └─(unwraps to)
        └─text/plain ← Cryptographic Payload
```

The Subject: header is successfully obscured.

Note that if this message had been generated without Protected Headers, then an attacker with access to it could have read the Subject. Such an attacker would know details about Alice and Bob's business that they wanted to keep confidential.

The protected headers also protect the authenticity of subject line as well.

The session key for this message's Cryptographic Layer is an AES-256 key with value  
12e2551896f77e24ce080153cda27dddd789d399bdd87757e65655d956f5f0b7 (in hex).

If Bob's MUA is capable of interpreting these protected headers, it should render the Subject: of this message as BarCorp contract signed, let's go!.

Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]); Wed, 27 Nov 2019  
01:15:28 -0700 (UTC-07:00)  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64  
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";  
smime-type="enveloped-data"  
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@smime.example>  
To: Bob Babbage <bob@smime.example>  
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2019 01:15:00 -0700  
Message-ID: <smime-sign+enc@protected-headers.example>  
Subject: ...

MIIIPVQYJKoZIhvcNAQcDoIIPRjCCD0ICAQAxggLCMIIBXQIBADBFMC0xKzApBgNV  
BAMTI1NhxBsZSBMQU1QUyBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkCFCJT7jBtAgsf  
As31ycE+0t95phvCMA0GCSqGSIB3DQEBAQUABIAKswT1Bs+STeesZIYAf7Gqsj  
Za0rdUeDTSxt8RCa010EHb2lqKzHRwwPJkC1Lm6Gb09nYnQiFrEl6jbWTG3hMRD  
0St9kyqeg+Mxxr2g4LoXAT+8hg/qBoF//tX+bzxhx0gx8wjxbC3bvp4esCJro7Aq  
tx56BtVsI06TA0NT0Ca0cnMhIo09raR6JQX+DoPynKeXihny6TFDP7eopCgorCfR  
o5903ZMvau16Q9KixZy3Yae8fa0ZdJu3FahIZTPdBHzbmirLxcYgp+cbTpW+Yno2  
X5GJ8eq8Y0qcc/8r6Xd3REarUx02Yb02D6cgDj+aNnnsoG1/9psaY18W1MSc2/Qw  
ggFdAgEAMEUwLTErMckGA1UEAxMiU2FtcGx1IExBTVBTIEN1cnRpZmljYXR1IEF1  
dGhvcml0eQIUZ4K0WXNSS8H0cUcZavD9EYqqTAswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEGgEA  
RhhTarDqNLzXSaBokp2L3EwDv11KiGtMSMUQuPelNoC2nNYU1yzAF4jd+1UUo4Uu  
quiHg5Hn44a9MejrVmQRld5IEJiZGD8m5Jguu0jn0ooyA6EEWUpMn6h0AKlacixd  
kwTivKfhQFJe9Eb6TKqtvt2IEu3kXFFJKi+VyQw49+RXBmajDKJoHtumMJs8k4L1  
kJah+wD+snwHg2LCiJeSVHmpf4RvSiIJSvk206IeTxN3JecNbBpKLTIoy/CjWEZv  
G3Pj/zkBbb+XhHbXo+Zk/e3aLToVG/cldx6Ti8zAr0YNAzgt1G7dmJ3mnNPitEwN  
04qIozhT2Qn8P95AEV5PsDCCDHUGCSqGSIB3DQEhATAUBggqhkig9w0DBwQIUzdf  
vwulBs+AggxQMK121v6l07W1r96RW0rs0HzsIvGfyRTT1UuZRxVL09BQZstI5ss  
5Zv8BogoKA0mLaNBKM755joUbzF5f/jMYhkW3q0Het9/HRH0mOnCsnoT4i2yzNdi  
0tj8ixPT4sgPe9F0Tkke9CzoJ967kj9D8u7Ik2goojtt3ViJkv3a1qrWDMiJRIJ  
gOTTA6ZaQep5L92vtCobhD+i7iaktEpmbYucXs8jjMmwyxCFxHXGD/fwDk3UDgeu  
8a5f66YepZdbLKB61A3rBwJMvQubuXEIEb04tG0FgwX3Ao2NshN+XRk/y+uhQkdC  
5ZduTxk5sokA+H4nzVv0IUKAAI+8FwY5ZWFGLncKUM/wvrGHQq3R/utChFau0HxD  
7vZQLM91TcQzVWdHfJGPtp+ekjRlu9UqatQgc1og0bw3PGY1Jc90G17AZHAsYncU  
jsMbdsweuFuYNHJ81R5VMo6L4bCNMy+tQBoFYTF1el+i9S3r3SwdBP+uLiKgDQ52  
/o4shxoi+Y0f9k8wRR0iDKqwzcJuABplpgA9qjsQNqBKF5t5p3l3ihH1mfh8FaPL  
ab0aDC7uunY5g44qXcG9YS+j5wUFuxgYyGkVcJq3xIit9YbEy8uPxJFz4g0vNC+r  
uUSsztbLyHkhv7vnCTAlmjgG9eDpW/tEC/85pL0V1HuooD05eRfkjU+1XsccX8DG  
iCax2C6W3cc1SC/d3a1+270cgvPdDcb7zuL3v6qqqbN+7GDrcHQRFMd2vd6+xGk  
NWZQMBZVHmdCcKG19YaH0RgkGH5beTRKEV1wBafuV0wTEw1/FuZzD4oHr0aP3GL0  
cLxi44her/hNxtxDc2Lw0VQcxD8A550kCt9+u9M5/YPj41FwyH6kdh86p958gzF5  
EpwCnQDe+s70rwFVV00DEJhqtecxRCSSW8dS4hVeHvXQJ561iJP+VZ+LTUJBelt4  
mfSpSqxeJnmyY0nmhEbZKVbK95a1WYMJCepk2n1g/bQGqJKRryGwbEF9WqqHuvPo  
Bv/BfinoUL3Kd3g+hgSCR4mCg5EhEsCx21jEqEggzb2XMca+knGUYxSwj322pZfw  
LDh50gL3GQSmm9fOvjdk40GwZv8HudLXuAQ/J19PafMaDkd4jzRi37VBqdDgLY3  
u6K+oFKhG4oQQYa/er+ZGAqq1dTmu8HGCsjm6kGZvSAocJg0UnLPBNI0/iB0BYGf  
KJk302jy8kfAXGSiwrYDNbTuDzFMD0zsBhbM07A00ROGwKv5TxAf1EHHTxGb3IKI  
jRkVBL7QdRtDH03z1xv0lnFwiuCrzLrQdUuEG/0wt8RaNr+p8hAo0YEGbB9jmbax

CSLLWeNbM0o8eIi3Mft4qmDXp3TEuHHru8kbvA36vQ8+dunSf2BcecyM6UAYBqaw  
SCcxQmEcyMuyjSLVerVfM151w1mM+qabxHq0hpJHnCR3V12qX3CiRWpV1NaBVyTf  
793bAm7DU7G+Tzt5gdgE4s41aZt8fFXyclhH1QLPNsctxJjuW1gJJ0h51iCQJp2  
TgzDw35oqvBxbN3yqCFjScsQXPXYErGWkLrAkUurff4x/ZAizFkmjjdp yaIK9JBw  
QRyrYYQ8pJhXJe9BrP30S6evFlsWZW1MaoQc0UMwsuVucE0e4AQRG1PixDjJWW7L  
I6AQ3KUW6ggzDJksaYHDiuEoBa7vcYoTar+/AhNjYmj kQX/3kptQryqy+xke0t80  
EPQER0Wur2Ip vM6YsvI/SoeFwxMb4Zm5AFvvibiCCmmoJc4A9E1tZ/sMstHyZ5iu  
tJqu1M5B0DIOFdB5pzbZYCkgN2n7EY23JS7E/ozOrzYu0IVUJVtB5awqmuSLmI+N  
R91g4FMEfLYC1HYKY1aknX2zmr x8+Z8MEJNM2K0q8wPBnm860pGeJmlZhFwT2x0R  
eJpKcfLGroXYh2Gb6BxwIfKj00TXCoIFP02JbTJ7clc/2ei0BN6JxywPkH4renaP  
SkuNBgbexfZGBhMT1R+CtKLEUmw5bxBTDwj jcvzWDPhy/VurLQxh0qYnbhZW21SV  
4qMrJ4uGXEHylnP0FD+HR4mB2epYcW3dFj4cGN3B2Y5Nn0Tw0Z7fi4S0BPdvYjP9  
LL5WZ6p90mII9wcunGCRnLUUYUmRnIbhVHIBTTIRI5PUSVFFeuotrDZ9oZcwYk07  
fQX21gJCzvJyp8ft01HX4Kc4mN/FMPgGcmq70N335yQ4mQ/eSvTNn7E+35ZGn9f8  
PI7QPJRhdUkBZCnwyv+0wK2VzySxnqNfPaZk168foGRd9eFCw80L4U+SuLDQH6ZT  
o++VKk4Ce2jx1khoig16wic0dVFwt4bmybNz4u/qdobYr5fs7dKPHH002SBvA160  
16foheiBtV2VA8mEBA1BhcNmKYegu+RGhmGfNDuZB8XdbPQ6M+N+i1Ej/6rr+wgD  
gcmEyAGNwJkmWpbym9M41Dt zemv5N5V32ppGizEt6c0x1kiUL11wGdWey3+YRez  
7b+k1/uIpDuRbp5Tf43dyPsy/cx4DNm5kAB4CcyyV1XPaqXm011EPYBmaMW30+D2  
5v4Wj1qwIR05qgI8FyVnX6sm/oucfg51172edacG8f42gIMNfQBgWVMsSG7Nt00x  
dJo/OGtACwnY47ohMFg0BejWueAksdnqVWCIt0989iBHgegNx5jUCycB/Y0m0xh0  
pfeNjA9PwZMUpjlqrjDFIan/UFYAZH5ISSV7G30oRKJ3TTEshShXP2K3cn7Fa9W+  
H/jyTEQGfcItq7Xx5Fr0IJBmKjy1kF7oGlIBxJgKKRm0iD/sGNTaSJ6P18/K6dEZ  
zSMwEFTawnWVq32Xn3d6/+FADZ91GhC5WwVgaQHrb/9Ejt1mBdptmXjEj5w0Y0ib  
xFer54LrQgvBWEYRqdneh3bI53BudbT17YitqULVGETe+k1T0NbcyElrr2Y/NKhk  
rPMarAfByookkJrDtVh3VrAm2ows70wvKGyoNybjlyczjt7xosatZ1xkgb9mtR5i  
E219ajSR4SzQjHoboRyOCw15ZgLV/+yp3jTkNcUKFDRTkvBGFascBIMe0ifUGfvP  
mJ9AQHZxdfm99K1QjCZzR8CBUvR+zsT43jr91CQKSSEvPM16vVRV2thiWw3VGgP+  
c8i5zj6+zCn1EdSwiEfw0J9/ewKSDu9pGrA00QtXbYQ1DCKuGK1Vgy6jJCeglDH  
T6gVNy5ip593wwWF0VxVEWUygi6JCdS27b5+P/wlNjTrzpZ4yWDCpyogyrT1gf1/  
GgvdGuWWinKSL0yh1fJ1p9WoDWcqH98QhJXLV+X30C+tmMofyt mHgXN8jjVsWSRa  
VwrFUarMs2hZDwf6e6ncwvMC8QliisrzKXQNckxvBuh5hug9WKurVj4CIWnoqXFh  
0q10+vBqZSj+TT5pCN//370vsIZIn5UbrpDmUP0rUvdTGz9iWQRU16R2g2h286s6  
pAGHv9luXCoPJ5uPTwcbBS1/j s6J+K5McyqR14fucacfVFnMuDpET/tT1eAROP3F  
DOBkqV5Y000rWMexzMLJUEQ/eGSwp7wv8on7jeGxAexMqyWCrhRk9G2ZwiT4L7Q  
rX4NIDj6oujCCkeFUATs0pGKwEFGmpbEUFD0sioWoVYJZPs09kAGq6hbKAC0keZ  
v95ha/3CleYXGUUntzLsCx+c9Zp/Wl+0Pct3ZSw hmRbXiIvz+ntHVe47PHxbvH6a  
ZG7YGc/9u3jTvJJyYtQ054uGET/eFWSxCu05/VfsheouLdXN7JnVi6ooF+c7WUzd  
61FwfDwNf8z0Gws3Eeto zrWyBgKS5VFP99vZM64nSqu9v5PSzmb0AY/Zc5KhVXVY  
zQqm03keXq92Fejtgyd/09ITzf5GkMQVU7+IT52JxFRQp1kbTHj4HRGtGHTIyPW  
Rmf9qSzz8QgVyAUkk1k+kLBJTHN3CWIB6S9h042HWEFvLV18wPWW5aLYTsVMGnMU  
aZ35M35odjrvY9B0INMpL53Hm7qH1w/h9QCv+xSFmanYsoylwbuKw2TcSnWB74C7  
Wy0NmCkaM+jweOgygffWicLGJ3jKWccykTUZt o dZ1ectNHh24puZICnvfzwjte+n  
eSqqJfHMsra6V8BcshpwmvPy1HnkU+2KyhQ84300R/qaXAYJ7EWRBEFe4EIpxzfL  
zQF0LwbhpAstpcj01JfEHmQiWx8ASzE1LMSfZo148sXYEWsJL7t5tWs=

Unwrapping the outer Cryptographic Layer of this message yields the following MIME part (with its own Cryptographic Layer):

Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64  
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";  
smime-type="signed-data"

MIIIkwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIIdCCCIACAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgnEwgMXBgkq  
hkiG9w0BBwGgggMIBIIDBEZyb206IEFsawNlIExvdmVsYWNlIDxhbGljZUBzbWlt  
ZS5leGFtcGx1Pg0KVG86IEJYiBCYWiYwd1IDxb2JAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4N  
CkRhGU6IFd1ZCwgMjcgTm92IDIwMTkgMDE6MTU6MDAgLTA3MDANC1N1YmplY3Q6  
IEJhckNvcnAgY29udHjhY3Qgc2lnbmVkLCBsZXQncyBnbyENckNvbnR1bnQtVHlw  
ZTogdGV4dC9wbGFpbjsgY2hhcnNldD0idXmtYXNjawkiOyBwcm90ZWN0ZWQtaGVh  
ZGVycz0idjEiDQpNZXNzYwd1LU1E0iA8c21pbWUtc2lnbit1bmNAcHJvdGVjdGVk  
Lwh1YWRLcmMuZXhhbXBsZT4NCg0KSGkgQm9iIQ0KDQpJIGp1c3Qgc2lnbmVkIHRo  
ZSBjb250cmFjdCB3aXR0IEJhckNvcnAgYW5kIHRoZXkndmUgc2V0IHVzIHWiHdp  
dGgNCmFuIGFjY291bnQgb24gdGhlaXIgc31zdGVtIGZvc1B0ZXN0aW5nLg0KDQpU  
aGUgYWNjb3VudCBpbmZvcm1hdGlvbiBpczoNCg0KICAgICAgICBTaXR10iBodHRw  
czovL2JhcmNvcnAuZXhhbXBsZS8NCiAgICBVC2VybmFtZTogZXhhbXBsZWNvcnB0  
ZXN0DQogICAgUGFzc3dvcnQ6IGNvcnJ1Y3QtaG9yc2UtYmF0dGVyeS1zdGFwbGUN  
Cg0KUGx1YXN1IGd1dCB0aGUgYWNjb3VudCBzzXQgdXAgYW5kIGFwcGx5IHRoZSB0  
ZXN0IGhhcm5lc3MuDQoNCx1dCBtZSBrbm93IhdoZW4geW91J3Z1IGdvdCBzb211  
IHJ1c3VsDHMuDQoNCih0aGlzIGlzIHRoZSAnc21pbWUtc2lnbit1bmMnIG1lc3Nh  
Z2UpDQoNC1RoYW5rcywgQWxpY2UNC10tIA0KQWxpY2UgTG92ZWxhY2UNC1ByZXNp  
ZGVudA0KRXhhbXBsZSBDb3JwDQqgggNyMIIDbjCCAlagAwIBAgIUZ4K0WXNSS8H0  
cUcZavD9EYqqTAswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQENBQAwLTErMCKGA1UEAxMiU2FtcGx1IExB  
TVBTIEnlcnPzmljYXR1IEF1dGhvcm10eTAfFw0xOTExMjAwNjU0MThaGA8yMDUy  
MDkyNzA2NTQxOFowGTEXMBUGA1UEAxMOQWxpY2UgTG92ZWxhY2UwggEiMA0GCSqG  
SIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDD7q35Zdg2JazzJGNZDZ9sV7AKh0h1RfoF  
jTZN5m4RegQAYSyag43ouWi1xRN0avf0UTYrwjK04qRdV7GzCACoEKq/xiNU0sjf  
JXzbCub1N3fZM0XDshKKBqTh1K75Sja9Czxg7ejGoiY/iidk0e91neK30SCCaBTJ  
1fR2ZDrPk73IPMekxoTatfF9hw9dDA+/Hi1yptN/aG0Q/s9icFrxr6y2zQXsjuQ  
PmjMZgj10aD9cazWVgRYCgf1hmA0V1uQ11wobYU8DAVxVn+GgabqyjGQMoythIK0  
Gn5+ofwxXXUM/zbU+g6+1ISdoXxRRFtq2GzbIqkAHZZQm+BbnFrhAgMBAAGjgZcw  
gZQwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAEBgNVHREEFzAVgRNhbGljZUBzbWltZS5leGFtcGx1  
MBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMEMA8GA1UdDwEB/wQFAwMHoAAwHQYDVR0OBBYE  
FKwuVFqk/VUYry7oZkQ40SXR1wB5MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLdSTXPAd2yw3paDPOU  
9/eAonfbMA0GCSqGSIB3DQEVDQUAA4IBAQB76o4Yz7yrVSFcpXqLrcGtdI4q93aK  
CXECCCzNQLp4yesh6brqaZHNJtwYcJ5TqbUym9hJ70iJE4jGNN+yAZR1ltte0HFK  
YIBKM4EJumG++2hqbUaLz4t106BHaQPCv/9NiNY7q9R9c/B6s1YzHhwqkWht2a+A  
tgJ4BkpG+g+MmZMQV/Ao7RwLFKJ901MWLBmEXFcpIJN0HpPasT0nEl/MmotSu+8R  
nClAi3yFfyTKb+8rD7VxuyXetqDZ6dU/9/iqd/SZS70QIjywt343mACz3B1R1Fx  
MHSA6dQAf2btGumqr0KiAp3KKYRAePoaJqYkb7Zad06ngF10G0FHON+7MYIB2TCC  
AdUCAQEwRTAtMSswKQYDVQQDEyJTYw1wbGUgTEFNUFMgQ2VydG1maWNhGUGQXV0  
aG9yaXR5AhRngrRZc1JLwfRxRx1q8P0RiqpMCzALBglghkgBZQMEAgnGgaTAYBqk  
hkiG9w0BCQMxCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCSqGSIB3DQEJBTEPFw0xOTExMjcwODE1  
MDBaMC8GCSqGSIB3DQEJBDEiBCC5A+mnkPofr5VZKP+y+n5m21tx1uYik0ynnkYb  
tCaH+jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQAgfVYYJu+aUcWj1F0T//18p4L0BcB3WBEa  
x7msyZcptuaJtWaLedzgwi+nGHfh1/02wzTvCxjx+LTHGouU83ILpEdDAXEDqzNgd  
gEJF7wsM7N31PhjpQyH+HbrJTH0tF+/xREgCG14yRs5yAX0kvkFDmd55svukInx  
eSb97LhHQGpJLh5FBstWWBKQitNn8eB3g6h+c43zp4nBXoS2aFiUvYdWugw4QHW

7T7dcSX5gAEHt/dm2q4oH0g9YtHmRp0mqdNQSuMkR7vomEk0kv2XWm1f3znKWe8Q  
Pd1ihgrh0ASyT1oBmnpEVwvsSkhqoxkGcrrSefUZy5h0wKfNSqRW

Unwrapping the inner Cryptographic Layer yields the Cryptographic Payload:

```
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@smime.example>
To: Bob Babbage <bob@smime.example>
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2019 01:15:00 -0700
Subject: BarCorp contract signed, let's go!
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; protected-headers="v1"
Message-ID: <smime-sign+enc@protected-headers.example>
```

Hi Bob!

I just signed the contract with BarCorp and they've set us up with an account on their system for testing.

The account information is:

```
Site: https://barcorp.example/
Username: examplecorptest
Password: correct-horse-battery-staple
```

Please get the account set up and apply the test harness.

Let me know when you've got some results.

(this is the 'smime-sign+enc' message)

Thanks, Alice

--

Alice Lovelace  
President  
Example Corp

#### 9.6. Signed and Encrypted PGP/MIME Message with Protected Headers and Legacy Display Part

If Alice's MUA wasn't sure whether Bob's MUA would know to render the obscured Subject: header correctly, it might include a legacy display part in the cryptographic payload.

This PGP/MIME message is structured in the following way:

```
└── multipart/encrypted
    ├── application/pgp-encrypted
    └── application/octet-stream
        └── (decrypts to)
            └── multipart/mixed ← Cryptographic Payload
                ├── text/plain ← Legacy Display Part
                └── text/plain
```

The example below shows the same message as [Section 9.4](#).

If Bob's MUA is capable of handling protected headers, the two messages should render in the same way as the message in [Section 9.4](#), because it will know to omit the Legacy Display part as documented in [Section 5.2](#).

But if Bob's MUA is capable of decryption but is unaware of protected headers, it will likely render the Legacy Display part for him so that he can at least see the originally-intended Subject: line.

For this message, the session key is an AES-256 key with value 95a71b0e344cce43a4dd52c5fd01deec5118290bfd0792a8a733c653a12d223e (in hex).

Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]); Mon, 21 Oct 2019  
07:18:28 -0700 (UTC-07:00)  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
Content-Type: multipart/encrypted; boundary="924";  
protocol="application/pgp-encrypted"  
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>  
To: Bob Babbage <bob@openpgp.example>  
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 07:18:00 -0700  
Message-ID: <pgpmime-sign+enc+legacy-disp@protected-headers.example>  
Subject: ...

--924  
content-type: application/pgp-encrypted

Version: 1

--924  
content-type: application/octet-stream

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

wV4DR2b2udXyHrYSAQdAXX1u0LN gj2o6biKu64RULx3PY/gcetRoyN0WNoXG8zow  
LF4DhnBs27vQkh1BIU4KmJF0wwjLwuRvs/J4NvCqqcEYwiPdhP5q5ftn7wrq2W5s  
wCDMA3wvqk35PDeyAQv+M8gxGXm9ecpcotEX+90M9EY5N8V7FmZ6ydRpBXgWvCpB  
Nr6qk90s0vIlhiN1IJb173mEb5LdMj3wtRwGP3DB4AoPabIMXh/hCcNAhaWusVH0  
AK33oDjH3rhnt0RMve0qq4QhRzUGR1ctYWRNBXgKC/n3Bmp7mHAzfb4RyBGDXsI  
TCXAb2qDnk06vTCVaHJ/ggBInSb12iYPkhDtxbNF0P7U971SVgSoDels6TRDfpb  
9K667gVyhkTnBvys+EqWbe7Bz5MJqxnxNQxh7HTdY2kXSKGGe1DUrAzLKRpT78fQ  
002DLHR9EUh30hYQEpnKAdYHJquXB5Ui0bjpQ5UDEt3Msv0bUD7k21MQk5K6iyh  
1wcxtXm/kPqQ3e0pVm8iaRve/VrpZEgA0/9PcvQJ0VCWQ/fZEBVmh3ojIoZF9WJE  
jB3FwPS21VLJhaZFTGU7x0Ksz/x0K2M8meAsa7nx0TaetmieRA2L+wBaHhoUz77L  
9ihY1IBPNvkb49jnF3ft0sI2AYM9DWi3Ki7uWnw/Ue7jiu8dseBTvuxXU7XYPS+1  
k3nqqtCKjDziq+ojjw3+ahsfNNIrcFTizjZqGG5AK+dwjitiY3T4fJ4b07513+2uj  
/tJE7p6IuuxlE+qlpi1PrX7JFHpihbxsWhwT2RBgo+sdeVko3HbyWtfLnfwI+eNo  
njB1DvhWg4C61ilnbRU+osbnZSoSqJSdHCHqn06YfL75sdHrhDiXzV5+LPiaqHoD  
S1wOLknIFD91G03PXaae3ENJgE9CFz4v0jNw2+kASuH80DwnKiMQrmG78rY4u652  
Hc02p0ZQAX2QeK0UiIdSjQQaKRtz5sys6Qubs461gMSnHljqun4g8h1voDH/7Zz4a  
kMgbZj7TRPU2EaApRX9JZub7nD90DJkqtLJef9ncmI3QwBjClXy1sL/o1UhUjFAZ  
VNbbInqEba+LLio4HUozBAjrVVW0rAt7761BSR4n72DdMjMKZ5osxPLtAVce9KeV  
s1cdKffbF4VDoe97eRq5ua4KJW/c+8WGw1u/vzPA7Zj6rR+gaWKqw4rnlys4+M2b  
LHugg+cF0k/sEf rmEuHyefYvms9Ht2icbiSTbqn+ApXuC9QtNRb/XnEw5lCH+dB0  
EYm/W0qSDXMcv0zaZ379uFkXqiECLF11iA3K89BV1VXFxgatnLhbNBdpn+mmJ1z+  
MY0NTCASFv0Bri4Y7j6kS0ZMnf0l+84j/nVCpBej8QrXqbpL+/6xrBURcA1Sb+Xu  
XRF1Veybr1bj1Tcp7aDLzZtQ8pk+8zyxy9d0ePPcBDZlnDXCALf9eXJ/HX/6EYNT  
30h+kmF7UxghUGUnyTfBMhnBD5oNi+0GVyDwyRv5jfYc5FWwX0mcRjigPlofLmo9  
7eL0mYMmp0L2DdNiVer/Dl5g8HRSVaRceHJVUrNM+M2xzCkdrTHJSh7MBU0TwUd+  
RXYQgfPu8xbeouLnSTVC5Kuu13VA8Q1/Y6KcjQTgjNvr0zjHTxjKek5fokNxvFQj  
1fkAIM9w2k0=  
=+17i

-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

--924--

Decrypting the Cryptographic Layer yields the following content:

```
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>
To: Bob Babbage <bob@openpgp.example>
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 07:18:00 -0700
Subject: BarCorp contract signed, let's go!
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="6ae"; protected-headers="v1"
Message-ID: <pgpmime-sign+enc+legacy-disp@protected-headers.example>
```

```
--6ae
content-type: text/plain; protected-headers="v1"
Content-Disposition: inline
```

Subject: BarCorp contract signed, let's go!

```
--6ae
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
```

Hi Bob!

I just signed the contract with BarCorp and they've set us up with an account on their system for testing.

The account information is:

```
Site: https://barcorp.example/
Username: examplecorptest
Password: correct-horse-battery-staple
```

Please get the account set up and apply the test harness.

Let me know when you've got some results.

(this is the 'pgpmime-sign+enc+legacy-disp' message)

Thanks, Alice

--

Alice Lovelace  
President  
Example Corp

--6ae--

## 9.7. Multilayer PGP/MIME Message with Protected Headers

Some mailers may generate signed and encrypted messages with a multilayer cryptographic envelope. We show here how such a mailer might generate the same message as [Section 9.4](#).

A typical PGP/MIME message like this has the following structure:

```
└─ multipart/encrypted
    ├─ application/pgp-encrypted
    └─ application/octet-stream
        ↳ (decrypts to)
            └─ multipart/signed
                ├─ text/plain ← Cryptographic Payload
                └─ application/pgp-signature
```

For this message, the session key is an AES-256 key with value  
5e67165ed1516333daeba32044f88fd75d4a9485a563d14705e41d31fb61a9e9 (in  
hex).

Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]); Mon, 21 Oct 2019  
07:12:28 -0700 (UTC-07:00)  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
Content-Type: multipart/encrypted; boundary="024";  
protocol="application/pgp-encrypted"  
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>  
To: Bob Babbage <bob@openpgp.example>  
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 07:12:00 -0700  
Message-ID: <pgpmime-layered@protected-headers.example>  
Subject: ...

--024  
content-type: application/pgp-encrypted

Version: 1

--024  
content-type: application/octet-stream

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

wV4DR2b2udXyHrYSAQdApTCCVZLqLBNWL551a9dZGb01aPtMkIFXYo8D0KgIpCcwg  
m5Vfq0ECRjoZqCwveFWGqRknz01c+eau5fcbenmEW8J1E0FjpoBEnFo9vYb6PrU  
wCDMA3wvqk35PDeYAQwAwiuMTVdntVxYn6dnGuoaga2txqCsxiogn4JgfmGrIfBF  
+BEHyt/a43rWwf3QycCKg483Fqx0YG3HHJEiiwdFmE3XdoHmTRKfHuSiyzCNxPz  
AK2cwloBtD3w6zs+m0Y7Ytq83ghyBeX0aGmgCZqGhL60In5Qu+w3Vmxc19d2+BTs  
ZOJzxcHACRvq2tD0RRmyhjWKqvdd2ak1lMy1pcXLiediUiEI5MA3TaWUk/uVDsUq  
S6JtL0dEy0s49Z+f1cGfEyGCGU6TqV0Yun0b13A7/0JjYC+75eCv89s/q4W1UM1M  
ps02X7xN1hgREncwvaoQbvfVfs1xHgWGCZDL8+0/7XC5EDyK4LAR912SG4Desr9e  
k9Fn3bH6Tt71vpH0nByKCh0m2/apFEMLXSq7DMiJEN4spbc4D3iBnxYqEH99e052  
KNjrHaoG59bz6TNJj/JN+E5sQzDxic0004Qccg9M7iFh6eBL0uBhBpRxbeoXQk13  
1mzI8xpyFoGu0HH0I0Cs0sJGAUnVvA0LGq7wjKpy0bWQlB2YVCKU6C8GnX6GUcLm  
SMovYhGKfpb+LUu+UM1BZ9vd9D/tsMd2WBw5tM1ncfRuST0hVeFgTEGiCrBn7sdb  
UFTV+jb5CktQMwj5vw1VPhMIUeISwoAQJ10Nu0qFnVTJ2bZ0dxZeV6NDYPYCERuR  
Sh980UxdjGLvw/LtMTThKJRUr3S2TcmKSwGen5a96S+1AAmMJN5wLrH+X76UuRvV+  
07m6KDAs0+fEIWXKYHGjJI10n8MnkVE4dSDKgUNukVRoBAB9Iqn11zw6IX7f11M  
k8C+8F5Y1xxEG3CCeYdTksIiKdV8oFGrFCYXw02bLWFpcZ0t2qDfwX5Svxj+EZ  
KxAiZobwQEw16WYp4Mk0Ppf0UrBXkfNLBieRg04o5j5Y//EXKpv8TSBxRbe0VfRk  
x11HNbaNeBtID4N2HfjsquX3y2ZH3m7HWLwkQeX6Yw5qqSWQjc8fk1x0ku+brAaM  
ayudhVFKid5PVfe1NrVv5dDSbj5VYQkoESi2zLmd4SLoFIMp8/lfSnp10ZF4krFb  
wIF8wd+zT2307fN4DRKjuqFVr0Y18oh9iPJN0xXSyygeo+JWwfYPu41vf+viRZMh  
aj1nhJoa9UghiYfxDu+VjzzuM22C/9gVbXMSuY1PaKffBleTNhCT7JWlmhNBW6t  
ouh6dZ2X601XEcMByzKy+d8Dun21G2nLuE82QP9y7/QZ2g+OSWZAA2IIDiH2tEIb  
8CNCSVwZXNpSeqH5u3+aRE1M5Ezs1bLU78Ryrxt61NAzEHD42Fif+qaH0WW52wV2H  
vnaxJW0yQ1o4W6W+BPtKqtE7t8JgTEtxldKHIdWCMXg2isxWMMIE12QEe26+bQnz  
h+kDrTqxt8rSfhLSQi4TRoudxx8mMjwFEWnRIFRQG7eGNPaqZYF3dz/neN/fy0p  
Jbf1gFJAtrsI100az+iT8640tcaLOhk0LNGEuyJR1d0C9tuylarvKR0v0i4jhY6  
UxDkknDkq0IzTmczFyAH31BLRPMZNZ1z  
=YU4k

-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

--024--

Decrypting the encryption Cryptographic Layer yields the following content:

```
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="80b";
protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg="pgp-sha512"

--80b
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>
To: Bob Babbage <bob@openpgp.example>
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 07:12:00 -0700
Subject: BarCorp contract signed, let's go!
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; protected-headers="v1"
Message-ID: <pgpmime-layered@protected-headers.example>
```

Hi Bob!

I just signed the contract with BarCorp and they've set us up with an account on their system for testing.

The account information is:

```
Site: https://barcorp.example/
Username: examplecorptest
Password: correct-horse-battery-staple
```

Please get the account set up and apply the test harness.

Let me know when you've got some results.

(this is the 'pgpmime-layered' message)

Thanks, Alice

--

Alice Lovelace  
President  
Example Corp

```
--80b
content-type: application/pgp-signature
```

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

```
wnUEARYKAB0FA12tvLAWIQTrhbtf0zp14V6UTmPyMVUMT0fjjgAKCRDyMVUMT0fj
jjiqAPw0j0QI/Sr3vG0hiAKmfBgmB7VhKiUbffWKRaWKKzJ/kAD/e0jMNvaZ5MG1
fw6xQxpB1vRrY9Ttz3zr+TfLnfHFwQM=
=4v4Q
```

-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

```
--80b--
```

Note the placement of the Protected Headers on the Cryptographic Payload specifically, which is not the immediate child of the encryption Cryptographic Layer.

## 9.8. Multilayer PGP/MIME Message with Protected Headers and Legacy Display Part

And, a mailer that generates a multilayer cryptographic envelope might want to provide a Legacy Display part, if it is unsure of the capabilities of the recipient's MUA. We show here how such a mailer might generate the same message as [Section 9.4](#).

Such a PGP/MIME message might have the following structure:

```
└── multipart/encrypted
    ├── application/pgp-encrypted
    └── application/octet-stream
        ↳ (decrypts to)
            └── multipart/signed
                ├── multipart/mixed ← Cryptographic Payload
                |   ├── text/plain ← Legacy Display Part
                |   └── text/plain
                └── application/pgp-signature
```

For this message, the session key is an AES-256 key with value b346a2a50fa0cf62895b74e8c0d2ad9e3ee1f02b5d564c77d879caaee7a0aa70 (in hex).

Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]); Mon, 21 Oct 2019  
07:21:28 -0700 (UTC-07:00)  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
Content-Type: multipart/encrypted; boundary="32c";  
protocol="application/pgp-encrypted"  
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>  
To: Bob Babbage <bob@openpgp.example>  
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 07:21:00 -0700  
Message-ID: <pgpmime-layered+legacy-disp@protected-headers.example>  
Subject: ...

--32c  
content-type: application/pgp-encrypted

Version: 1

--32c  
content-type: application/octet-stream

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

wV4DR2b2udXyHrYSAQdAC1Ly20ZdEVNBoA4HUfvQJgdpSkelPzYiPR/TW0apEx0w  
gPck901y4gnu01fnptzYiIaZKMWis7jPqmH2jQRhnG1Q0JKS1PeCfTS9207oQiD1  
wCDMA3wvqk35PDeyAQwAqIL7jcN2Rm5u4qhMfvT7by7nUKCoaP/H+kMPIsXP2Kxf  
M1RVnrrsCgJ6j5htt48HGddpEgLlZceK3vg8w1RWSpMstpdGxxE7HZqXHKMNk8V+  
8EVw1HGWBmxisA7/J00rt4HQJnHm01drIXgWjIA+Vpu/zFA542qQH78jr9Ghhp/C  
Q32V0rCY/PsFxabPIYS9wWh1Ym3+VQFndCVSpxCZHs1Qilts9XGj4X712QcvgL2Pp  
glaulvNob899d0Io4Noj7p+cx4yMkWpi9dqHu0me23aixieBbzQopzY3gleVgXhc  
HFhUzje7DybtVq0em4xpNPWxq2b+wBeu+SvXFo2buHhWmMC1bKf6ggod3CRKcPt  
h5MLF3dFE1kj3B0LxJqFOIny2EhwZvvmDQgG4uncEGo1siQhEiutQL2WC1zuHGzs  
T8eEHKeATEPqRQHm395Ivr5btQ8gg4tnIkfBBULPgnEfY07L1c+393a0MgW9bLbn  
UZTmNIss1FKXYzHxpUAD0sKBAe03UKSoYJ5b5yBghMZCCS9L9dm811JVsMh022DC  
1MPpRsSm79hnFww0+Yud+i4z24C8WdivWBNoZz0M1hA5cwoQoXaxall5GpZ/UWAd  
XNC6QwaCB2ioTFueq8SJAHzur2V89FMUuPmSaB3y072vko/468nLnjwCcZDpbwCS  
fVwcTz8bvyZfcYA2ugRPii4NM1+bYJHHtr6CIojN0FkE5t0LAX04vPAx5CYABTm7  
HQn063YJJ1TtJB1SJWMzmK5vqxtXFe0Byc/msdQX8goxS3G6RNPVHabESaqVrG4i  
F+TyzqiMFTzdLjiJXiKcFHwDoLUwA/Fxka5/BwRCM5LX3LITAvvqYy0TkaQH0SeN  
bfqCf4kWzuNhTfZM3wFgaA+FvYC8M7PKiE9y1+TiWEUqMa+j0rcrf2+Nzt8mT6WU  
eQRwf9XzgmPVNarQpStomff6dJVaxlonCwKKk3LtGRWkv0EIbKtFwPi+M7h3BgWn  
NQHVT1MXXV8LyKipH1ZpB3WUhjGqL13es0FwR4W+U9/qzgn6kN7kZP+yj0qXutCR  
GsjoVvwN6FU8cjv4nK1H65cobBAqP0iWeVlt1e351cwQWwUL1V/B3jWM3Wqui/hR  
10Q9TW/WdP1/VT2Heb3503IJKJYnt0McT8aYooCLUCQmx1g4Ks1y4hP5mlLurjd  
qBrvDNbRsW27GnyuUm8/oS1qpYS0gIrMe4BMXpwLca6xvXE1Ncm2Lo10qh3Mhw5J  
IVjGkQDV2vM76qsfbdpHeb00XBkfccyx9wZD09MOAOXv08o/yh8H/Mcn/s0paVsv  
gdf6JE1YfwC0d7J44ymzonw0kbC6F7UZgpW1Y5gGlga2EPwwaFkTH22D8MH0rwKA  
JBJCvaGxEmrzrV4WlaE77LUJoDs6chIF/GKcntsBvvyvjsrFLPK/2/RtrUEkP2G4e  
svwDdqSECPYEFYmvzfJMwa2G0uXCLiATP8NTS1e0cZ9sPkE9U162JVJ+y/t0z8z/  
oZ4SdrgAEdJSbwbyev8bd1WCbRn0yOxuQHmVmhtCm4Ps506+sGWL+PDnywrwvyp7  
X1b8YpYCWAHS8md9AW2Jgcdj6p3Hc2Bs7z1Mqzsc0pdvXRs=

=Fb+8

-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

--32c--

Unwrapping the encryption Cryptographic Layer yields the following content:

Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="03a";  
protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg="pgp-sha512"  
  
--03a  
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>  
To: Bob Babbage <bob@openpgp.example>  
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 07:21:00 -0700  
Subject: BarCorp contract signed, let's go!  
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="6ae"; protected-headers="v1"  
Message-ID: <pgpmime-layered+legacy-disp@protected-headers.example>

--6ae  
content-type: text/plain; protected-headers="v1"  
Content-Disposition: inline

Subject: BarCorp contract signed, let's go!

--6ae  
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"

Hi Bob!

I just signed the contract with BarCorp and they've set us up with  
an account on their system for testing.

The account information is:

Site: <https://barcorp.example/>  
Username: examplecorptest  
Password: correct-horse-battery-staple

Please get the account set up and apply the test harness.

Let me know when you've got some results.

(this is the 'pgpmime-layered+legacy-disp' message)

Thanks, Alice  
--  
Alice Lovelace  
President  
Example Corp

--6ae--

--03a  
content-type: application/pgp-signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

wnUEARYKAB0FA12tvswWIQTrhbtf0zp14V6UTmPyMVUMT0fjjgAKCRDyMVUMT0fj  
js14AQD2G0rZXkuKxZPY016AJFKiAFphRt+5V9gj3HEXKvQKPAD/bZy+vW9j1+e4  
MLi0b1ojjFocLx/6MvQBoI3P9a591Qs=  
=l8GL

-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--03a--

## 9.9. Signed and Encrypted S/MIME Message with Protected Headers and Legacy Display

This shows the same signed and encrypted S/MIME message as [Section 9.5](#), but formulated with a Legacy Display part so that its MIME message structure is:

```
└─application/pkcs7-mime smime-type="enveloped-data"
  ├─(decrypts to)
  └─application/pkcs7-mime smime-type="signed-data"
    ├─(unwraps to)
    └─multipart/mixed └─Cryptographic Payload
      ├─text/plain └─Legacy Display Part
      └─text/plain 445 bytes
```

The `Subject:` header is successfully obscured.

Note that if this message had been generated without Protected Headers, then an attacker with access to it could have read the `Subject`. Such an attacker would know details about Alice and Bob's business that they wanted to keep confidential.

The protected headers also protect the authenticity of subject line as well.

The session key for this message's Cryptographic Layer is an AES-256 key with value  
09e8f2a19d9e97deea7d51ee7d401be8763ab0377b6f30a68206e0bed4a0baec (in hex).

If Bob's MUA is capable of interpreting these protected headers, it should render the `Subject:` of this message as BarCorp contract signed, let's go!.

Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]); Wed, 27 Nov 2019  
01:24:28 -0700 (UTC-07:00)  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64  
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";  
smime-type="enveloped-data"  
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@smime.example>  
To: Bob Babbage <bob@smime.example>  
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2019 01:24:00 -0700  
Message-ID: <smime-sign+enc+legacy-disp@protected-headers.example>  
Subject: ...

MIIQjQYJKoZIhvcNAQcDoIIQfjCCEHoCAQAxggLCMIIBXQIBADBFMC0xKzApBgNV  
BAMTI1NhxBsZSBMQU1QUyBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkCFCJT7jBtAgsf  
As31ycE+0t95phvCMA0GCSqGSIB3DQEBAQUABITBAFbDR6j4ZB/Mo9BQygYItwFc  
P+4r04d1ak51hc1DpSqyhiMcGahA3yxDRbZ4W1rbmC/s3d5+OWXKYgs1nNMQJ48F  
f45BtNTNs1PZ1+NZVbkoVJ08Bvx1rjB8/qWuUSroqzn9enS8DUBxxPL5aSWKQQN  
G2IaH9BUkMXLPUYA46GATly94IS4fZqwBtNNBP5eIIIpc90gjy+7At5GG7rVMN0M  
G5FL0oq52SYUe1167jp378JI+2dkA1q5+Cru/ZE2Rdw3DrMDAF05GwC7fWKg4zPm  
IHZj92caVj1IyfTmGogT2o5tLMqn61BkptqxZwHDr3FI/aYo4vcHgm1KR/TdbHww  
ggFdAgEAMEuLTERmckGA1UEAxMiU2FtcGx1IExBTVBTIEN1cnRpZmljYXR1IEF1  
dGhvcml0eQIUZ4K0WXNSS8H0cUcZavD9EYqqTAswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEGgEA  
hXeYVSUsT1EBZ/+AjwyEcnlM0kuFMaNvG1BMhAZzAsy012rrZTwbqWkcA3abgm/M  
CuZX7mQL0I79KZdmClGpLx6gQFjLemHaClQV0ZNdX4DxakWuME/kCMqbo4MZXStT  
a0MH1KUdoMt72Rz4YBzNQCL7ePaii5w6Nd2KD7yJAirLYUMJEjVweVaMI9y9Lmb0  
vb0g0iuoUe0vp9B20LRcIX37nN5D1GG4tHLPjBD43gC8iqxZQf0uah2cWD1mAG5R  
oBgIDKXPY2eVbcMdSa0irDKYZ49WFe9Lad9q3mHHbFs6K6/yuBm/thMEDCJKTTh  
jiPvYdYF8IJfEd368I+DujCCDa0GCSqGSIB3DQEHAUTBggqhkig9w0DBwQIsb1a  
JX/RU9aAgg2I0VXWfs5fc/Yad2qvawUVNX+L0bjA6/+t9WxuV2em0eBYzQGjo7q+  
xaIXQwbbF1ej27efGhxUYDwBNS56c0uI0Ta7jxv50FZhZQGLRzoFp0bbZ+uVC4eP  
bFHarRQiPzlg900XAS00RW+U0tqN5raZ3Ry21KwXxuStZ0pX666Rz4c8PrmMb4/B  
aQYn6iKcT6fDU2TpSbWY9iph6kZczSeewK+pIj9nXfjDKXScs8D2Raezev2ciq/V  
ZRpRH8JxieimI2yeBmEzTCq11TDYycDfMHB6reGaiCGX//8kAWtskzRyN1V61unY  
ZKSnhVKLwKmCQh1V1Nd3oLApt41EeM2oWedUqNBYqb+XGCD4DUYdm1e+4h73d4dn  
JTkCdadxEn+9RRvZ4YMlw3mvT997Dy3rTXT29dj14TstZZf2063pY0TpYy0HZy6Z  
Jug1qoe/vdcJ9SP0SFJE6VWCeVjxB+eGgheFLKqzK8Hs/Bm0/wDKpSFgEp0PnkJ4  
HJ2Uzgn1Emo6gBDJt+qn3s2UnowcMsTgellhKvgzVq59LTyRyWL5U8XMBsXT4qjm  
0LkRvDkOijMQH7kqvWbpPlnWpLko/VVoxifldEegWAqFVrP7f5Y+nNQtAYV79uk  
MXvR+5YFkvmQAerfl1PqXBjdB65ovikSVsy/kAboGpRG1oAZ40DdwdGyiGIzyyc  
1E0x/8+gY8BqWzRtwX4GySKyZ50/+xkJe5ss0IXPCgq/09bdihRsN57v4V4SpdD0  
k3g/Dce+LzCRL8uTbUhrhZnjKSjRc3fFaD/BpLYjEDbnGF0ICs1N3vb2xWUK1u4M  
uUH9r71H/DCb0+TxIBtxOnP7w02bz8gGJAxEVEeqk6pjxx0YqfS9/uBrrAY8P21Y9  
PFLdeHzEdYemq3il+4S70U3uNUuAYijxmCRs7JQxZ9puA0iaTME9gK1yikzsLtVZ  
f+9osk2nYgfXvl0AiYabd5cu2GNw33TkdmNBsB7lx77J9erVLZpPKNo4vgHA7b  
owrDaYe0AgcZm79fvmR0RdtIZI91MouEhkdhPiXmypszzjR/M00t3Y+oU/ks+yV  
Sle0S0h4V8wJRJYg/9VVurm8012ke2U3EGF1VnSv/IYtpssC+U4McRCmakKCrGU7  
0hL5JKBQN/DFTu4pV39IQ1LLhg3wzA2FSkyIL5gEbS6sP9GTPo5L1Nm2nYfJQX9A  
sHKSrfh68dvjSNExxi/8hdMfnnRwbAnUCI/W0bG0kKdheOfdQ1AAhTL07G65X1Cx  
RctbAJWa93M+iRUN6qnB+vIbPPnI1Mc7i6mPYzgtPrM9bYqEZz69pQtHcGTfxOrU

tm+/h36CRzJBfXodBZbwQ9mZAzfKd1Ar1ZYIeBUw30RQnQ7U1JgG8KsZpUhTxCc  
gvMoExt1vkXcYLURBFZWy0i6FePzQjuCK1w580dweJgXprEAWSvyxhmVdg4jUpX  
MYKE0tZI9xwuujyWjAC00myYqTdmssqyds+BgfBn96XiA90FUH2C0/GAomhNs8uPS0  
T3Gt7Ld/FByxEVrt19A37X6bAwZ001j5tHmdXFpmMveP0R8zsWtPn3RyGAjcgcq6  
50wJRwhvofdI7wilZ0KUBsAapj3MK52cRyD19VXKNNwt2bLDV6gcWQ8+QEMusxfp  
1Dc9N9DSs+w3lGsFfpoeQ53/fxCVNjm6Bv89bH9anLGYdCdRGvZsvw+xRuglykqb  
xLtL21B6wz1RFREJoWTzCVsdpIZ8znPmk1cB0wD1bMeu6sddHmv+6fpyuvQfQmdj  
D8wLRTuyxax94TmBlhJCFYxm0/y4Ivlx5C60GIRTkHpBYL/M0RjrbIszXEqcogzU  
bdwjLIhdEnpJ5vy0uXwhltce8BDpenmHE7y1kHvPBiUG3vB7AIxqhohFsJU3AYUj  
d1TvFKS2AsizUTLuq0Ydbnz3AxMfmnZe8qYkNu2zRygL2xTa58f/MwsHKakk30mS  
9JFZLrkkVWZKXoARctuahYtWBAsykaWVNnB6zGcdX1MGVcc1930Z6QWhyydtZpQc  
ivNdEGdGv9B0K7/ngNdVgD5Wd29AMMFnS8+55mlfRZDCjUmshSySaf6Ein4HD9Hr  
vk6dJvBPjnI5UjeUPjmH+wcZKIjLHW/aV/6/zoxzBh61rWF1r/daec+CFZE/+epr  
LRRYSmv8oY47fF4duDDhoexcvp/CH+A2Hr400fcil4vKy3nuUDCNa59x09JWv4NL  
n3MQypC9bcaVPkXa7TK3Ecq1Jgv8gwfhd5/ovG50dZA4uIc0+aqcskt/PD252c63  
0Znww3RXXf46KT4Gdk05A377ixkUMkznnCMvottmkPxjnhQjAsQg3bJeQk8EoX8f  
Pq0If4i7SRBSDtb20H1pPmk0RVptx1RTDv3vS3Lci4xADFgC09n9nIvP0/55aa  
06StbjtLmpubS5giuDH3uftwuyRiLqm3gtbSKPdoTk+dJhHXbbpBknL4XYTPxSsR  
IIaRds6w30vf7/IscyuuMcquJls0929SSa93UevKEIZbqbV9oGIqwk1UMdVZK09g  
rW0F//Ts4a5nYdEQth/fq3JnwqeHvvUfKdasK4TtrTnUBX7qZk/K3Y1fZwjKdd/8  
t9t1z7Kb2d9hwytY7xP8liDluVFTsq8NM54ZC2218X5ViWz1yFmF2LXvRixsmYJv  
Tz8lUUuNC2B/Etm1KKu4zrYK0/L77EikkV1+B7BXfEqx6ow41j7e1YZYaqmZ9mph+  
UieSdzqVYxhPwT25DrkU3r74iS28gKsbFhUaNk1aF005iDwsKgBXT+wdZqlYQ6Fo  
oPe66025iJMwK8t+d53jEduHezH02sTMAuf2hpdaZo7+rP/hRTReAR6CmI7nkwhP  
z5Kno9S+XhiSP+WTSpsoA4ubx0T94mL8N0VvSZA76TZ30bVAP5VI/bwv6Grighor  
Kpsjt7dhSJrv+RhV95sAwBew1Fgv8X0PSAZ0mpJV2qc3x3Qmj0MXIR+7+3G1Ur8+  
Dit3CE1hwtxg0W0tc8kuBTfQD+wNSa9r0eUyFscEBB1jpEvB1lgjVdNv4Hc+fsbT  
g1JzZuUIDQZoE02xLjxD+I7vLZKQa0J1JeZ70+NqmSxsvSnwCwtJEWNMMxYNfwsP  
rdj1zPLqn3rzSBqhr0NbaDGn86BTwIqfhr+AKbvevxS6bI8IbyKm9u3BFr9cuawx  
Sp1QM3NtqNSTV67qR4A6U/ZyPUJd01bxo8F3oRmJq0t7Jc93rFgkhBJ2+eMtrA75  
0m5tB9LBVS15U5yLP0C001QE5pdk5yuhJLT9Dyss8bWDRbSWKj83e4YXhPnq71Bm  
001czy1LVNU1Dc69Tf7FXjtIxh2yjv0T3zeLBpx0ju0it+gAma4vgrh8/mMxNniq  
0lsVow8aKqm+0fd6m13K5riDFgXgNI91bvPKUSW1EqDMEqXk1oAqD4Nb5NTGSFpQ  
Q4G+cHAxJCu7vcXBaZnP8uMP5IAkdg5jIPvvMRwg/aqk1/KbL98oYZ5+1xr0MuKA  
LT1uCJ4MMB01wsa1He4jPe8LneSupw7vAX1bo2Vzc0I6oCSY5hv+cGQRY+LjW81q  
Cu5nLq8bwgnZMS1Pmwr0YrKmvh8YKyG0rmTadxykC5IC+XbrLDsw2Jd9mLIjuQ/V  
4ibjeb+e0QGob22WOp1CLnHGw/SnYe18KG1dxs/ahs+8vQdrI880ZJx2QJnrz0Ej  
ux6tKv4mvUkqYA5h1TFt3PTr54yA+YLCCLMFBdx4ykPQnYUBj70NHuNSUYt1CJy  
faZ7cWAAbhgH+w1TFdVBVeW5D4FRbM8dMTPXyfC5ygwTJ0iDu3vQKyyDkmiX7sEaC  
P1JN2V55uacyR8ZAG5+M1c4ZMx83kAIzzXTCdqa1Ex8yda31FI2rDHmvW/82bmjL  
pvi4Nnn9+zzJtDVCJ0B2VAZ3Edov5GzPikm3un4+mvyhUZph4sbT0+vHPCsr1+zn  
bDJyNw4AswxaaJKh2+7wBiU6h+9TP/l18SAJhtZL7zHBH8tD10ptksLRWDs9vYqp  
/3T86S2vxJL5DvLFjsazrY0E3InS+keGmTMCdA19I8zIworC/8uQp0N8ESebEVja  
aHotBk591j/0W4JZ3tQkcdQWkpnUfW/x9xE2wthacH1RzYDDsFByjEqkQr0MU8VF  
EGij9RCC97zyFrhv0xJm1C6wX0pcuEcuPTNBF38WytBTIfmVHHz/I5YKk5cdWG7Hq  
fmccV5GKrs2BseR683HM+/u50sq0km9UrqjgFR1DjfDoRKp0guP9PqkJAnwG2nv1  
hmNtXumzkF0otP5LDKLJ84MGP8Wnb006iEdD48Lra+c1RAIIuLX4A0wRQjViDp7n  
0ByI6ZcQd4DTMHnFPRvMkNMLYn13Lghd6P9TTjQZ0KCOcwmC2TMCiHJ1vz0YX6Cc  
wJZYL01ltgfnHEuh8ijv0u3d/BUpsknYKBSJGUyMEZ9iUtbfPVfxBGSTi3gcWht1

IrM7wjswJwHWSvZKWUs+YWWJTwj0apG6ViGllw0AqR9C48uLKgFWPbMoTpolnp69  
eij5ZHxB0i7SI80D+r65b+fqaFzVIJXVEI0zu/mIilbYBnGkhLI/Naw1m2e1qVJ  
mi1JBjXLAT3pEJDh8b3Lpgw=

Unwrapping the outer Cryptographic Layer of this message yields the following MIME part (with its own Cryptographic Layer):

Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64  
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";  
smime-type="signed-data"

MIIJdQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIJzjCCWICAQExDTALBg1ghkgBZQMEAgnEwgP5Bgkq  
hkiG9w0BBwGgggPqBIID5kZyb206IEFsawNlIExdmVsYWNlIDxhbGljZUBzbWlt  
ZS5leGFtcGx1Pg0KVG86IEJYiBCYWiYwd1IDxb2JAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZT4N  
CkRhGU6IFd1ZCwgMjcgTm92IDIwMTkgMDE6MjQ6MDAgLTA3MDANC1N1YmplY3Q6  
IEJhckNvcnAgY29udHjhY3Qgc2lnbmVkLCbsZXQncyBnbyENckNvbnR1bnQtVH1w  
ZTogbXVsdlwYXJ0L21peGVkOyBib3VuZGFyeT0iNmFlIjsgchJvdGVjdGVkLwh1  
YWRLcnM9InYxIg0KTWzc2FnZS1JRDogPHNtaW1lLNpZ24rZW5jK2x1Z2FjeS1k  
aNwQHByb3R1Y3R1ZC1oZWfkZXJzLmV4Yw1wbGU+DQoNCi0tNmFlDQpjB250ZW50  
LXR5cGU6IHR1eHQvcGxhaW47IHByb3R1Y3R1ZC1oZWfkZXJzPSJ2MSINckNvbnR1  
bnQtRG1zcG9zaXRpb246IGlubGluZQ0KDQpTdWJqZWN00iBCYXJdb3JwIGNvbnRy  
YwN0IHNpZ251ZCwgbGV0J3MgZ28hDQoNCi0tNmFlDQpDb250ZW50LVR5cGU6IHR1  
eHQvcGxhaW47IGNoYXJzZXQ9InVzLWFzY2lpIg0KDQpIaSBCb2IhDQoNCkkganVz  
dCBzaWduZWQgdGh1IGNvbnRyYwN0IhdpdGggQmFyQ29ycCBhmQgdGh1eSd2ZSBz  
ZXQgdXMgdXAgd210aA0KYw4gYwnjb3VudCBvbIB0aGvpcibzeXN0ZW0gZm9yIHR1  
c3RpbumcuDQoNC1RoZSBhY2Nvdw50IGluZm9ybWF0aW9uIG1z0g0KDQogICAgICAg  
IFNpdGU6IGH0dBz0i8vYmFyY29yc51eGFtcGx1Lw0KICAgIFVzzXJuYw1l0iB1  
eGFtcGx1Y29ycHR1c3QNCiAgICBQYXNzd29yZDogY29ycmVjdC1ob3JzZS1iYXR0  
ZXJ5LXN0YXBsZQ0KDQpQbGVhc2UgZ2V0IHRoZSBhY2Nvdw50IHN1dCB1cCBhmQg  
YXBwbHkgdGh1IHR1c3QgaGFybmVzcy4NCg0KTGV0IG11IGtub3cgd2h1biB5b3Un  
dmUgZ290IHNvbWUgcmVzdWx0cy4NCg0KKHroaXMgaXMgdGh1ICdzbwltZS1zaWdu  
K2VuYytsZwdhY3ktZG1zcCcgbWVzc2FnZSkNCg0KVGhhbmtzLCBbbGljZQ0KLS0g  
DQpBbGljZSBMbz1bGFjZQ0KUHJlc21kZW50DQpFeGFtcGx1IENvcnANCg0KLS02  
YWUtLQ0KoIIDcjCCA24wggJwoAMCAQICFGeCtFlzUkvB9HFHGWrw/RGKqkwLMA0G  
CSqGS1b3DQEBDQUAMC0xKzApBgNVBAMTI1NhbxBSZSBMQU1QuyBDZXJ0awZpy2F0  
ZSBbdXRob3JpdHkwIBcNMTkxMTIwMDY1NDE4WhgPMjA1MjA5MjcwNjU0MThaMBkx  
FzAVBgNVBAMTDkFsaWNlIExdmVsYWNlMIIBIjANBkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAOCAQ8A  
MIIBCgKCAQEAw+6t+WXRtiQM8yRjWQ2fbFewCodIZUX6BY02TezuEXoEAGEsmoON  
6LlotcUTdGr39FE2K8Iyt0KkXVexswgAqBCqv8YjVDrI3yV82wrn5Td32TD1w7IS  
igak4ZSu+UowPQs8Y03oxqImP4onZNHvdZ3it9EggmgUyZX0dmQ6z509yDzHpLMa  
E2rXxfYcPXQwPx4tcqbTf2htEP7PYnBa8a+sts0F7I7kD5ozGYI9dGg/XGs1lYE  
WAoH5YZgNFdbkJdcKG2FPAwFcVZ/hogm6soxkDKMrYSCTBp+fqH8MV11DP821Po0  
vtSEnaF8UURbaths2yKpAB2WUJvgW5xa4QIDAQABo4GXIMIGUMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQC  
MAAwHgYDVR0RBBcwFYETYWxpY2VAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZTATBgnVHSUEDDAKBggr  
BgeFBQcDBDAPBgnVHQ8BAF8EBQMDB6AAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBSsL1RapP1VGK8u6GZE  
ONEl0dcAeTafBgnVHSMEGDAwgsB3UK1zwIg9ssN6Wgzz1Pf3gKJ32zANBkqhkiG  
9w0BAQ0FAAACQAQEAe+q0GM+8q1UhXKV6i63Brxs0Kvd2iglxAggszUC6eMnrIem6  
6mmRzSbcGHCeU6m1MpVYSe9IiR0IxjTfsgGUdZbbXtBxSmCASj0BCbphvvtoam1G  
i8+LZd0gR2kDwr//TYjw06vufXPwerNwmx4cKpFobdmvgLYCeAZKRvoPjJmTEFfw  
K00cCxSifTpTFiwZhFxXKSCTdb6T2rE9JxJfzJqlUrvvEZwpQIt8hX8kym/vKw+1  
cb5l3rag2enVP/f4qg/0mUuzkCI8sLXd+N5gAs9wdUZRcTB0gOnUAH9m7RrpqkdC  
ogKdypGEQHj6GiamJAe2WndOp4BZdBtBRzjfuzGCAdkwggHVAgEBMEUwLTErMCKG  
A1UEAxMiU2FtcGx1IExBTVTIEnlcnRpZmljYXR1IEF1dGhvcml0eQIUZ4K0WXNS  
S8H0cUcZavD9EYqqTAswCwYJYIZIAwUDBAIBoGkwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqG  
SIb3DQEhATAcBpkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMtkxMTI3MDgyNDAwJwAvBpkqhkiG9w0B  
CQQxIgQgX1r//iHA8sj6FZnDpQl9jK7M6APu04IWNEm5nuSzt7MwDQYJKoZIhvcN

AQEBBQAEggEAaeYcpNS50N33UDUW0/kaI0KbD1JQRDsoldNC/UNl01X1PzvL43sR  
g77FEV6bc13kwReTz5aYHr4PFjoQspeGWQvQpeUw8bIlZ5nxb50/zUcx62mbciHZ  
C2quuvTBGoJRFxMTD6pCPoyRw9PF2o904eB810RQ0xML3jXb3oN1EF0nFXXs7Fe7  
8KRWA4FV1dJDrgRLGdrrF73kvpTZuVGkMYb2sCosRiB0+rk0LFv0cBIQ03DjbBEM  
dy5zeex+eN5wMbI+1FJt8eM0fDQencMHIp2AmP4AVAashtXomx7ZIMI/fDdVx1x0  
0cDnTZCx0+vVBfM7d6TE91Uky6ELrMbq/Q==

Unwrapping the inner Cryptographic Layer yields the Cryptographic Payload, which includes the Legacy Display part:

```
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@smime.example>
To: Bob Babbage <bob@smime.example>
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2019 01:24:00 -0700
Subject: BarCorp contract signed, let's go!
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="6ae"; protected-headers="v1"
Message-ID: <smime-sign+enc+legacy-disp@protected-headers.example>
```

```
--6ae
content-type: text/plain; protected-headers="v1"
Content-Disposition: inline
```

Subject: BarCorp contract signed, let's go!

```
--6ae
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
```

Hi Bob!

I just signed the contract with BarCorp and they've set us up with an account on their system for testing.

The account information is:

```
Site: https://barcorp.example/
Username: examplecorptest
Password: correct-horse-battery-staple
```

Please get the account set up and apply the test harness.

Let me know when you've got some results.

(this is the 'smime-sign+enc+legacy-disp' message)

Thanks, Alice

--

Alice Lovelace  
President  
Example Corp

--6ae--

#### **9.10. Encrypted-only (unsigned) S/MIME Message with Protected Headers and Legacy Display**

This shows the same encrypted message as [Section 9.9](#), but formulated without a signature layer, so it is "encrypted-only".

Note that the lack of any signature layer means that the only forms of cryptographic protection these header receive is confidentiality.

An arbitrary adversary could forge a message with arbitrary headers (and content), and package it in this same form. Consequently, the only thing "protected" about the headers in this example is confidentiality for any obscured headers (just the Subject in this case).

Presenting the cryptographic properties of the headers of such a message in a meaningful way to the end user is a subtle and challenging task, which this document cannot cover.

Its MIME message structure is:

```
└─application/pkcs7-mime smime-type="enveloped-data"
  ├ (decrypts to)
  └─multipart/mixed ← Cryptographic Payload
    ├─text/plain ← Legacy Display
    └─text/plain
```

For this message, the session key is an AES-256 key with value e94f6aaef7f14d6ceeac770c46d7f4885e81fbeaf1462d0fdadfce6c581525e2 (in hex).

Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]); Wed, 27 Nov 2019  
01:27:28 -0700 (UTC-07:00)  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64  
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; name="smime.p7m";  
smime-type="enveloped-data"  
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@smime.example>  
To: Bob Babbage <bob@smime.example>  
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2019 01:27:00 -0700  
Message-ID: <smime-enc+legacy-disp@protected-headers.example>  
Subject: ...

MIIG5QYJKoZIhvcNAQcDoIIG1jCCBtICAQAxggLCMIIBXQIBADBFMC0xKzApBgNV  
BAMTI1NhxBsZSBMQU1QUyBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkCFCJT7jBtAgsf  
As31ycE+0t95phvCMA0GCSqGSib3DQEBAQUABIBADEh1zhFzYj6tuAdsRCrSiLl  
d9cgKt1AesJ4cDY4szFWAbnwrCmEcFxjfDU0jbfcQCYCG80Sxd+xntni73I7PI2rR  
QLjk3w9VhLwFRyzy7qyJi2CavjKTxysX9f36+FXA+THfVQRM5yiyYJg91X51PNX  
hJj3DHrnxqKeS1/z1hdt9r+s6XAUCBSvL99BGnODWhNIZtPDzt8fMNcgarfw+D5F  
IZJb6+wX30tkztHkpHHKrrDPveyfn1S/p06Gi3ekrrhBtMQMRb9PA/E+ivDPktsm  
aKg00auw4oZSKW3f4ukYhbnnbdbbagNsntfs/QFy/p+hhKTrfCd0h1N8mTzedVX0w  
ggFdAgEAMEUwLTErMCKGA1UEAxMiU2FtcGx1IExBTVBTIEN1cnRpZmljYXR1IEF1  
dGhvcml0eQIUZ4K0WXNSS8H0cUcZavD9EYqqTAswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEGgEA  
FAk5QaPXJ133D2uybQt//oeDm6PkCAFw9YV0gjnLLz6FD54Dt2i1KCQu1Xlg9W3P  
1zJdYX0ftDgily1Nfmt/muEsvbRfFtMWUq0VGirHz//BwmY2cW/ocinF0514ivIL  
MLE1umsXRNwVIVIk/uh7AmqXjPkRZgRgIMUbSbtmW4DDja+ZM0vmqFQ1iUI1Apth  
FpjFFPDHHD8isLTbGi2iK6dEN3DIJFGbg5o3nK6yAhVZ7x3LfFNSNVDDSY5mPFG9  
Vm6uRgEE3Y5P6DbXXo6MHTgg0XY2f4y6MEWh0g37NT9aFAfzBBxJ1oSBWp00fZnV  
K1DvAwPaemSRz9oWDcBM8DCCBAUGCSqGSib3DQEHAТАUBggqhkiG9w0DBwQIsFkN  
8DEx8muAggPgWGF2WsPq3/a9jua5GA0YFPiINuETCGTNaEXiVxnT0h0CF+EhZ0T2  
HFCiZEM0dz005zt9WdVvAREaCsh7ZWG9D9wJF9x+tqQbzMuJ2AdKuo0H73kClvkx  
pHxANLhkY7hzIqRb/eLG5D7Xh8iCDiFecXDh7EHqD/R+sFLN9aHK0cKyY36kesBQ  
R8aHZbbFnnD+oXSDNIPcntGG3BSGMxsWuOp+rptKeIHWF1ungDNKsLIy3kWleENw  
FVIcjUF6QhI1HYW6BeXuVq40GV200kmB24rYE1Jg0hAtY+5rn2mRoyxvUC87bjQ  
hLu6xgPmhun9J324eM5aYVwkmVBnRW9hyxC1z7Sv0z1L71GQ0VQG+zWHeJ+h/M2j  
mQpLgAUEGxxNCm5ASHuXPIN6pSvr0Vp1rT8kKLPPmMYEwmTX2/rB04P8I8uNrqYD  
AyX8p0/12ArczkWzGTz2luBahrD+cTZPApe5SeyX0xWB1Lmb0G8o4twBeeBLiHP  
XwYvtx0JYg/hc/lmMpEemJqwj9uZ3wGD03dIhhDX20j4ek/7jT6yqJh8C1H+PqA  
+HNfNXsFQDrR0RoqJS8YVEiYRDQNyepY2ugzLTh88nPtJp92hY7bk9z13AYaiVFH  
+sz1LoyzfM9D+geZemR8XF12ijGnrWMlnyPah/za6J6RwemhuiMklZGYG85hMU9H  
K4CFVM+m7xYxKpwFVnmkVZjzwInirJhehElhtCxpx/IFGxH9CPbCyEZV1WVStr1/  
0fwTGicMXez6hVQCadWCXy96/eLIXOrC54gSoIJX2TD6jdVEu1YptutyGI6KdQ2p  
yXwhs98Uj7DM3nmFeAcjjN3e8pPoX7aG8eP+Mfmh1Wn6jA44jMaJmIdp9J20g74J  
MdjvnHa/cGibW/RamPiF0bN0F94A83vcpUfU/zZ8cFHi/3/1N6Rm9+3/giGRZa9E  
Y6e2/CEq1cUbPQ09fPwRJmjZCfDce71DKe+ZFGdYtFR7JwDEeZ6BB4Ff4rXctcWD  
PgUJqUGv/SXBcFn4cNUK9MYYqVu1ovd/T7FMf+i3c5MH6BRCvft/i5aeBR+A26Gk  
2awtBPYdHW6+As1rFjncBbtPD1U6vX9AWuC0k0MQYnNkTWS8gTvsriXJZ6Zu5iFE  
ExNuFz7YcnMKnguOn2ph5azzeMm83AYzWxZZPu3mdr5Siuu/Ke38oADKP+BZ08Za  
XvvKvvfnRPX09kG9hgvEMRU9K0cxn82XoGPNZib+9SPa2zYx5P6HX1Bqe/cmKAen  
FKEiJLSTP2/pc6AWAICqJ1978HaUHfMFIn7jEUpaifpAwqNcIGSw5w=

Unwrapping the single-layer Cryptographic Envelope of this message yields the following MIME structure:

```
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@smime.example>
To: Bob Babbage <bob@smime.example>
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2019 01:27:00 -0700
Subject: BarCorp contract signed, let's go!
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="6ae"; protected-headers="v1"
Message-ID: <smime-enc+legacy-disp@protected-headers.example>
```

```
--6ae
content-type: text/plain; protected-headers="v1"
Content-Disposition: inline
```

Subject: BarCorp contract signed, let's go!

```
--6ae
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
```

Hi Bob!

I just signed the contract with BarCorp and they've set us up with an account on their system for testing.

The account information is:

```
Site: https://barcorp.example/
Username: examplecorptest
Password: correct-horse-battery-staple
```

Please get the account set up and apply the test harness.

Let me know when you've got some results.

(this is the 'smime-enc+legacy-disp' message)

Thanks, Alice

--

Alice Lovelace  
President  
Example Corp

--6ae--

### **9.11. Encrypted-only (unsigned) PGP/MIME Message with Protected Headers and Legacy Display**

This shows a comparable encrypted-only (unsigned) message, like [Section 9.10](#), but using PGP/MIME instead of S/MIME.

Note that the lack of any signature layer means that the only forms of cryptographic protection these header receive is confidentiality.

An arbitrary adversary could forge a message with arbitrary headers (and content), and package it in this same form. Consequently, the only thing "protected" about the headers in this example is confidentiality for any obscured headers (just the Subject in this case).

Presenting the cryptographic properties of the headers of such a message in a meaningful way to the end user is a subtle and challenging task, which this document cannot cover.

Its MIME message structure is:

```
└── multipart/encrypted
    ├── application/pgp-encrypted
    └── application/octet-stream
        ↳ (decrypts to)
            └── multipart/mixed ← Cryptographic Payload
                ├── text/plain ← Legacy Display
                └── text/plain
```

For this message, the session key is an AES-256 key with value 4f3e7e3cb4a49747f88d232601fa98a29d7427e8f80882464cfbca3dcb847356 (in hex).

Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]); Mon, 21 Oct 2019  
07:30:28 -0700 (UTC-07:00)  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
Content-Type: multipart/encrypted; boundary="c07";  
protocol="application/pgp-encrypted"  
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>  
To: Bob Babbage <bob@openpgp.example>  
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 07:30:00 -0700  
Message-ID: <pgpmime-enc+legacy-disp@protected-headers.example>  
Subject: ...

--c07  
content-type: application/pgp-encrypted

Version: 1

--c07  
content-type: application/octet-stream

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

wV4DR2b2udXyHrYSAQdAX8p0+U8WbFNTCeGX5no1X1mSPqdmwrJIVWVZT8LS/yIw  
1v+vor/Wsh7cKBofs1yIlPR4u/01EKjj+XkgD+h1BEtHDHp9ckuzBHm0I6YL0AZU  
wCDMA3wvqk35PDeYAQwAiGcX6KN1js+gHFAucWvc672CPP0hIhs91BGz4MMiV/G  
Prm+dwIE5V7I6Sh7XMEons1Z7EdUbxpxP/OufCTQwrkX1zTTIt/0TMZkZxpDvLPpA  
EzkdW2edtMhbTtqbGzjXgOsBvqnRZP6CaTfCba5tsVF0J8X0+WL1ARQSDVKWPuob  
uXT+s4sZIam0JjnrxGYCD5NTjQt4UUmxlyXxQLEwN90wMLs8DrQ5kxcMHUU6kjDT  
7icQRtsuIXXzrj0AVie0/Vd1ItKjrIo3eMvpi8G3GtB5VXYB2RPGKY6/cMISYGbx  
s7aJVlWOTrrri04p4vFi0I6iM1Y0dinbgCbzTXK+aYJpw5TmG/V5sHfRQXu77HB11  
8BZdC+s6v5MWsdb9qVvnd/e97mfi+ySa4Lw4yeLJFz70euL8C1SeQWhTmWIkw6  
FjiLFoxzkkLUE8vxcAYIUuzFMPCUeExjH8EoLBwFz4jDOTQ4FJqn61v9AEiJS4P4  
mkgKdrvGqCSkZu6DpLgi0sGGAYu7ECCJLDcNTM6/S6o9AU9LcJJPgbd2wIylJyFY  
D6ygG0D5skuKRsJ7I/VJLx5SI6rkfTqd+vXcVcEX7vuhFAap988haqxS4fsFb/0L  
CeLwZH94Y9hAP7Rz/hDiwHKcv1S0eAFFEfZ3u7kmMM2+o7zePIeimHbjSDjSATs5  
GhZV7UDFyy6RnhSYgTNHwOhZToEPPLbH0mTzNZNp3tiS3apvYe6Yx9fCspd63Cet  
tw5Y0vCpH00hJPIIv0ucVzsstn56SDBaYh70Fgq7M5UeK3AZ5KvH4cee4qd0KBgK  
JZXbtIsoMICQj6Xw7ecmwP05huh1EQ0cfqdSuEu+k2ifgnOMAPe85syK/d4yVxUB  
wSj7Jk5r2Ytqe8ZXVoM4kYIKxVpuXmxb78KoUpvBUkLzqOMHwYpk2BjPQjZ8xql7  
oKQ8ywpm90SBB7DCgES7oIgrG5ZMovqVknppdJ3TrvkdgWtctbGe/Pb1WapMamQ/  
a99+zfc9k63hDV6GW7mM7AiT05cqk0vYEYnJShTpszf0eiIe+smM/3As4HJstCx7  
Wiej+1M/Rqxp81nP8R78+al6iyIdbHZ6LSxD5vKgZbhT30Qng0goZ3XQZxmIV/cZ  
hVpPIEDgUzQi3qJq9POPejosLQZhU41k0cyDdLZmPm70IRG7+b2X8JRbmhtg8FMA  
szxT753uRpIGsKYb3dm0X9JYcDVbe9gFoIj2PktU2L96I9J79IVn9gtEeMYdR6Xn  
w9rKgAyGieepz5ygl9cRaGVFFLnesAB  
=zBUs

-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

--c07--

Unwrapping the single-layer Cryptographic Envelope of this message yields the following MIME structure:

```
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>
To: Bob Babbage <bob@openpgp.example>
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 07:30:00 -0700
Subject: BarCorp contract signed, let's go!
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="6ae"; protected-headers="v1"
Message-ID: <pgpmime-enc+legacy-disp@protected-headers.example>
```

```
--6ae
content-type: text/plain; protected-headers="v1"
Content-Disposition: inline
```

Subject: BarCorp contract signed, let's go!

```
--6ae
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
```

Hi Bob!

I just signed the contract with BarCorp and they've set us up with an account on their system for testing.

The account information is:

```
Site: https://barcorp.example/
Username: examplecorptest
Password: correct-horse-battery-staple
```

Please get the account set up and apply the test harness.

Let me know when you've got some results.

(this is the 'pgpmime-enc+legacy-disp' message)

Thanks, Alice

--

Alice Lovelace  
President  
Example Corp

--6ae--

## 9.12. An Unfortunately Complex Example

For all of the potential complexity of the Cryptographic Envelope, the Cryptographic Payload itself can be complex. The Cryptographic Envelope in this example is the same as ([Section 9.8](#)). The Cryptographic Payload has protected headers and a legacy display

part (also the same as [Section 9.8](#)), but in addition Alice's MUA composes a message with both plaintext and HTML variants, and Alice includes a single attachment as well.

While this PGP/MIME message is complex, a modern MUA could also plausibly generate such a structure based on reasonable commands from the user composing the message (e.g., Alice composes the message with a rich text editor, and attaches a file to the message).

The key takeaway of this example is that the complexity of the Cryptographic Payload (which may contain a Legacy Display part) is independent of and distinct from the complexity of the Cryptographic Envelope.

This message has the following structure:

```
└── multipart/encrypted
    ├── application/pgp-encrypted
    └── application/octet-stream
        ↳ (decrypts to)
            └── multipart/signed
                ├── multipart/mixed ← Cryptographic Payload
                |   └── text/plain ← Legacy Display Part
                |   └── multipart/mixed
                |       └── multipart/alternative
                |           ├── text/plain
                |           └── text/html
                |           └── text/x-diff ← attachment
                └── application/pgp-signature
```

For this message, the session key is an AES-256 key with value 1c489cfad9f3c0bf3214bf34e6da42b7f64005e59726baa1b17ffdefe6ecbb52 (in hex).

Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]); Mon, 21 Oct 2019  
07:33:28 -0700 (UTC-07:00)  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
Content-Type: multipart/encrypted; boundary="241";  
protocol="application/pgp-encrypted"  
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>  
To: Bob Babbage <bob@openpgp.example>  
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 07:33:00 -0700  
Message-ID: <unfortunately-complex@protected-headers.example>  
Subject: ...

--241  
content-type: application/pgp-encrypted

Version: 1

--241  
content-type: application/octet-stream

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

wV4DR2b2udXyHrYSAQdArYyyCfDzUyr02W1QjJmXivzmT6XooGh6HMhPLmD/pkIw  
jPsIvobM6mmvctBWNsGsg2IUvX3c1XJum+/UmVuk5BQv0xk6x6kDt2WtwE3fwhop3  
wCDMA3wvqk35PDeyAQv+JZG91UzU5NJ0Y1Yxoadl8bNBkTdlBWN8DJEMhJd+Hm5  
KDjxBtAHWcsjzkiEdZcoR9EvrfFWBCTo+AmfnDi5YEJaX6GNr61VHKDcxowCrNsC  
1wfdXX+T1e0cwX7RW1yvWGxCs7alVHuxUa/hDe7Dk1AIx0icdTkz+1pDYFTr8T9E  
Q/jtkk95paCzmtZ53RKaEMziaJXD+B2s0/pBp6aJGxYMRF4yhez+b4HakUz2GK6  
tvFoN/qqXT97+cpREAhDFqtgHp6QmW4UUTgWaZ7G7TSDU7AuuizxGCC5yGj0119B  
iwm9xoG6YvjQxKbq6klaRZabUzFxyIKcuU8iDM9eZf1Hu0QFhZKYSEmVaVNb9G1C  
i30ncaq7Y1kj73o90ogsiLQwqdTRNZKz+65mPSzKj6HI7gu1w9Yf0MHcsHNPG9sI  
qTE/a88b17fc5qEEzkk8gmtnKyDI1bRhvxkrRNGWNeW6ZUEFdinYi5fAD5QYXMSW  
rIB+ELy/ZUYHHy31UAvS0sPRAXgbRmpFyrfzGgZMfkSbH2n+ngl+21rDjnABUetE  
vSdvPCL57js+w4MaUHz7wSjv1QnzBvRts/AJAvnFYhRYe5vP3wfDIKndpnhCz7EE  
QUE5d3upWL2fQ2UP/hLWUjbC6FhD+GFbyw38XomjBvvznT2NAFdZRLqqXfdw+dkG  
/daknCkHtyZ3Z1kQkTyyE0kuIopr2cJUWLgh0Euv00Ei842NsadeKa05GepNX10c  
9M9ScoUurCUGCa31tCe54GyceWs390ir6uiTeij5m11N0KpuoDfiHKvVdM05Ge8+  
SLxz03gyXEUPV//lhqqy3DwgYmL4M7SjxpJFLeu/YbguQuu4jpp/XBgZkc0eB//F  
FHShbmH6oEI59auutJ3I/NWI6n8EI0mRex64RYp8Bu3SLvVfsx1kjXHZk3XX52n  
vU4oUgHTpzUkJ8Nx xmPOZY8tu5MB7wBRp2Cqxq+r0KyHQPOrLU7iej0tXMHyHzwh  
QZ3/6BX9GR9ZBovqdZW0IzswjEradRfJxv0dL9QEL6V41m1tnFpeuaeNGCpMVqxN  
zvQf1T6z1JnX/hG0XwkKmFYz92MaeofNjx6ke++cAgfdRAqQxp77RkfBZdjtdFVV  
DggHI67I7DSs/sF+0ftJRet6E7rJ1XYKJ24aB8Zkp1RU/eRVpXTaNnluoI7nMG2p  
Uf/lBTS+H+2jd5PB7vcIsrvrTRuvCDqktniTk2eF3yYNHVEP1P7TmpqIV1XIFgc2Z  
NygS02HGQ56Cv8/HZKxaJ1tZDbUy9fVRtetj11psol5CfoGi8IVInI6gMWu3IBbb  
gqpv00Y1dQintY/BK49Q0y31Sh/5tgz+n6CZVxPxP1j+kVz0UGNy+SeThDC+H+1Y  
d6Dd5+M+H5b/+XAnBMKArzQVxDCSPtPVI08qF1bwmZBB/ryylpLLDHpoYgOLC3Dk  
X/ICCAyK6n3Rz4IyupFuKNaEaiIwpjZZjqYtHbvMNJj+55crArYLfdadpTPeX5q8  
2QUg03J5ShkTlgp/a6qBuoUC3yHDcA0Ei9GCMsF4Mmny6MtyzkKQX1gBHCDSG0y0  
NTnhfJxiKs1cahWf7ix9p05dn31Tqr1+t9usJtrZuhugVw0nbzQgfa4DNULbTsu5

odSTwvrBczga7+JcvDJ+QELLiP8n1QcU2VkvCVwy5RHkwWzY0J84jYLh1VZEbbWa  
YDFXbQzCWGRcjubwb5Eet6pEPiNnTVvo6gGQx21Bue5kTs1IZ01wRLlioU3vP4T0  
x4/6AaJt8MmSxXiGd9fjTT5ej7iawzH9qXQ40Umj3MvWNi0rhRittRZyjXVAxdYG  
/F9sj5kkN0zFsSNaK3+Mi96I16h6h4aYMvbrd1zapA8oqj6MpZRSelL0HiHqmbcC  
IMXywNeKw2ZZSM6FNjU33fEDIQn0+jXLVazdkmqtBB0sUiuBuvMrKoJtr79rmiXC  
K77CmcJbikYpM0hnMyDfrtQqCEW4dKZ1c8uuFJQrEhRbQ24KP+Dq70ynNi0Da1KN  
s4RgECgNgjES6ow4eIDS7vTo3xctCtXfzI5pkw8ub1rSM+Q=  
=wxHa

-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

--241--

Unwrapping the encryption Cryptographic Layer yields the following content:

Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="c72";  
protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg="pgp-sha512"  
  
--c72  
From: Alice Lovelace <alice@openpgp.example>  
To: Bob Babbage <bob@openpgp.example>  
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2019 07:33:00 -0700  
Subject: BarCorp contract signed, let's go!  
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="6ae"; protected-headers="v1"  
Message-ID: <unfortunately-complex@protected-headers.example>

--6ae  
content-type: text/plain; protected-headers="v1"  
Content-Disposition: inline

Subject: BarCorp contract signed, let's go!

--6ae  
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="8df"

--8df  
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="32c"

--32c  
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"

Hi Bob!

I just signed the contract with BarCorp and they've set us up with  
an account on their system for testing.

The account information is:

Site: <https://barcorp.example/>  
Username: examplecorptest  
Password: correct-horse-battery-staple

Please get the account set up and apply the test harness.

Let me know when you've got some results.

(this is the 'unfortunately-complex' message)

Thanks, Alice

--

Alice Lovelace  
President  
Example Corp

--32c

Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"

```
<html><head></head><body><p>Hi Bob!
</p><p>
I just signed the contract with BarCorp and they've set us up with
an account on their system for testing.
</p><p>
The account information is:
</p><dl>
<dt>Site</dt><dd>
<a href="https://barcorp.example/">https://barcorp.example/</a>
</dd>
<dt>Username</dt><dd><tt>examplecorptest</tt></dd>
<dt>Password</dt><dd>correct-horse-battery-staple</dd>
</dl><p>
Please get the account set up and apply the test harness.
</p><p>
Let me know when you've got some results.
</p><p>
(this is the 'unfortunately-complex' message)
</p><p>
Thanks, Alice<br/>
-- <br/>
Alice Lovelace<br/>
President<br/>
Example Corp<br/>
</p></body></html>
```

--32c--

--8df

Content-Type: text/x-diff; charset="us-ascii"  
Content-Disposition: inline; filename="testharness-config.diff"

```
diff -ruN a/testharness.cfg b/testharness.cfg
--- a/testharness.cfg
+++ b/testharness.cfg
@@ -13,3 +13,8 @@
 endpoint = https://openpgp.example/test/
 username = testuser
 password = MJVMZlHR75mILg
+
+[barcorp]
+endpoint = https://barcorp.example/
+username = examplecorptest
+password = correct-horse-battery-staple
```

--8df--

--6ae--

--c72

content-type: application/pgp-signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

wnUEARYKAB0FA12twZwWIQTrhbtf0zp14V6UTmPyMVUMT0fjjgAKCRDyMVUMT0fj  
jnUTAP9YDBbjItEr14L3f/hpRDdkieX96wHRZ0ZlP4VlsPbmrgEA/zNQ5GZx0W70  
EyF6maqK0Dedw/FXsbL32iFiXMGaTgY=

=EuL1

-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--c72--

## **10. IANA Considerations**

FIXME: register content-type parameter for legacy-display part

MAYBE: provide a list of user-facing headers, or a new "user-facing" column in some table of known RFC5322 headers?

MAYBE: provide a comparable indicator for which headers are "structural" ?

## **11. Security Considerations**

This document describes a technique that can be used to defend against two security vulnerabilities in traditional end-to-end encrypted e-mail.

### **11.1. Subject Leak**

While e-mail structure considers the Subject header to be part of the message metadata, nearly all users consider the Subject header to be part of the message content.

As such, a user sending end-to-end encrypted e-mail may inadvertently leak sensitive material in the Subject line.

If the user's MUA uses Protected Headers and obscures the Subject header as described in [Section 4.2](#) then they can avoid this breach of confidentiality.

### **11.2. Signature Replay**

A message without Protected Headers may be subject to a signature replay attack, which attempts to violate the recipient's expectations about message authenticity and integrity. Such an attack works by taking a message delivered in one context (e.g., to someone else, at a different time, with a different subject, in reply to a different message), and replaying it with different message headers.

A MUA that generates all its signed messages with Protected Headers gives recipients the opportunity to avoid falling victim to this attack.

Guidance for how a message recipient can use Protected Headers to defend against a signature replay attack are out of scope for this document.

### **11.3. Participant Modification**

A trivial (if detectable) attack by an active network adversary is to insert an additional e-mail address in a To or Cc or Reply-To or From header. This is a staging attack against message confidentiality - it relies on followup action by the recipient.

For an encrypted message that is part of an ongoing discussion where users are accustomed to doing "reply all", such an insertion would cause the replying MUA to encrypt the replying message to the additional party, giving them access to the conversation. If the replying MUA quotes and attributes cleartext from the original message within the reply, then the attacker learns the contents of the encrypted message.

As certificate discovery becomes more automated and less noticeable to the end user, this is an increasing risk.

An MUA that rejects Exposed Headers in favor of Protected Headers should be able to avoid this attack when replying to a signed message.

## **12. Privacy Considerations**

This document only explicitly contemplates confidentiality protection for the Subject header, but not for other headers which may leak associational metadata. For example, From and To and Cc and Reply-To and Date and Message-Id and References and In-Reply-To are not explicitly necessary for messages in transit, since the SMTP envelope carries all necessary routing information, but an encrypted [[RFC5322](#)] message as described in this document will contain all this associational metadata in the clear.

Although this document does not provide guidance for protecting the privacy of this metadata directly, it offers a platform upon which thoughtful implementations may experiment with obscuring additional e-mail headers.

## **13. Document Considerations**

[ RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication ]

This document is currently edited as markdown. Minor editorial changes can be suggested via merge requests at <https://github.com/autocrypt/protected-headers> or by e-mail to the authors. Please direct all significant commentary to the public IETF LAMPS mailing list: [spasm@ietf.org](mailto:spasm@ietf.org)

### **13.1. Document History**

Significant changes between version -01 and -02:

\*Added S/MIME test vectors in addition to PGP/MIME

\*Legacy Display parts should now be text/plain and not text/rfc822-headers

\*Cryptographic Payload must have protected-headers parameter set to v1

\*Test vector sample Message-Ids have been normalized

\*Added encrypted-only (unsigned) test vectors, at the suggestion of Russ Housley

Changes between version -00 and -01:

\*Credit Randall for "correct horse battery staple".

\*Adjust test vectors to ensure no line in the generated .txt format exceeds 72 chars.

\*Minor formatting cleanup to appease idnits.

\*Update references to more recent documents (RFC 2822 -> 5322, -00 to -01 of draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection-requirements).

### **14. Acknowledgements**

The set of constructs and algorithms in this document has a previous working title of "Memory Hole", but that title is no longer used as different implementations gained experience in working with it.

These ideas were tested and fine-tuned in part by the loose collaboration of MUA developers known as [[Autocrypt](#)].

Additional feedback and useful guidance was contributed by attendees of the OpenPGP e-mail summit ([[OpenPGP-Email-Summit-2019](#)]).

The following people have contributed implementation experience, documentation, critique, and other feedback:

\*Holger Krekel

\*Patrick Brunschwig

\*Vincent Breitmoser

\*Edwin Taylor

\*Alexey Melnikov

\*Russ Housley

The password example used in [Section 9](#) comes from [[xkcd936](#)].

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