Passive IP Addresses
draft-baker-opsec-passive-ip-address-01

Abstract

   This note suggests an approach to minimizing the attack surface of
   the network elements - routers, switches, and middleware - of a
   network.

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1. Introduction

   This note suggests an approach to minimizing the attack surface of
   the network elements - routers, switches, and middleware - of a
   network.

1.1. Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.2. Problem Statement

   The problem, at least in its first instance, is a side effect of
   diagnostics used in the Internet. Tools such as mtr, traceroute, and
   pingplotter operate by sending streams of packets to a remote address
   with varying hop limit values in IPv6 [RFC2460] or Time to Live in
   IPv4 [RFC0791], and receiving ICMP [RFC0792] or ICMPv6 [RFC4443]
   messages that indicate which interfaces the packet stream traversed
   in the forward direction. Path MTU [RFC1191] [RFC1981] discovery
   depends on ICMP/ICMPv6 Packet Too Big. Various ICMP/ICMPv6
   "unreachable" messages respond when routing fails, which are intended
   to trigger applications to try other peer addresses
   [I-D.ietf-v6ops-happy-eyeballs], and so on. The IP addresses of
   these responders can be looked up in Reverse DNS [RFC1033][RFC1912]
   to build a name that indicates the operator, POP, and equipment in
   question, which is useful in identifying potential problems in the
   path.

   Unfortunately, those addresses can also be used in another way. A
   motivated adversary can subject routers to TCP RST attacks, load-
   based DDOS, and other attacks.

   An alternate way to reduce this potential attack vector is to not use
   addresses that are valid beyond the link it is attached towards. A
   sollution describing considerations around this is given in
   [draft-ietf-opsec-lla-only] while passive IPv6 addresses will provide
   network path visibility withought increasing large extend of
   vulnerability for the devices using down the traffic path.

1.3. Examples of attacks

   To pick one example, attacks are being reported in which residential
   broadband customer's CPE Router is targeted with large volume SNMP
   GET Requests. The address of the router is not generally known; in
   IPv4, that may be a result of NAPT use, with the address being
   harvested from exchanges. It may be obtained from a traceroute to a

server behind the router, or it may be determined by analysis of SMTP
envelopes.

Another example is attacks on BGP peering. BGP neighbors often peer
between the loopback addresses of neighboring routers, to make the
TCP session stable in the presence of link outages, but may peer
using interface addresses. If a router is configured to use
interface addresses in ICMP/ICMPv6 messages and to peer using those
same addresses, the ICMP response exposes information that can be
used in a RST attack on routing. It also facilitates any other kind
of attack on the router, such as the previously noted SNMP attack
(even if the router knows to refuse the message, it consumes CPU).
If global addresses are not used - routers use link-local or private
addresses - that makes it harder for an attacker to attack the
router, but it means that traceroute and other uses are compromised,
which is an attack on network forensics. If link-local addresses are
used on the interfaces and ICMP is configured to use the loopback
address, the router is again exposed to RST attacks.

2. **Proposal**

The simplest solution seems to be to enable the router to hide in
plain sight - to use an address as the source address in ICMP and
other messages that is identifiable using Reverse DNS (and therefore,
through the name, useful for network diagnostics and communication
between operators), but does not facilitate attacks.

The fundamental theory behind this proposal is the Principle of Least
Privilege, which in this application is that an entity in the
Internet must be able to access only the information and resources
that are necessary for its legitimate purpose. In this case, it is
reasonable, for various reasons, to enable a random user to identify
the path his or her traffic is using or to identify a system in his
path when reporting operational issues to an administration. It is
not reasonable, or at least not required, that the user be able to
specifically interact with any of those systems in the general case.

We propose that the source IP address in an ICMP/ICMPv6 message, or
indeed any message sent to a host that has no inherent need to
contact the specific system, be useful for Reverse DNS, but not for
touching the system. Ideally, it is not routable to the system in
the first place; The passive character of this type of addres address
comes to play if a packet with this address as destination address on
a targetted device and is delivered to the interface, it is summarily
dropped. Such an address is referred to as a "passive address", and
if it comes from a specific prefix, the prefix is referred to as a
"passive prefix". Addresses that are routable and not dropped on

receipt will, for the purposes of this specification, be called
"active" IP addresses.

A passive address is sementically non-disguisable from any other type
of address and has no requirement for any new type of address-family.
Any IPv4 or IPv6 address can become a passive address by a
configuration knob when specifying the interface IP address for the
Interface or device.

2.1. Making the address useless

Every interface in the Internet has an address, with the exception of
IPv4 unnumbered interfaces; even those have addresses that they use,
which are the actual address of some other interface on the same
system. Increasingly, this is in fact a list of addresses, some of
which are IPv4 and some of which are IPv6.

We propose that any address allocated to an interface on
infrastructure equipment be given two binary attributes:

UseInICMP: If the address has this attribute TRUE, the corresponding
   address may be used as the source address of ICMP or ICMPv6
   messages and other messages sent to hosts that have no need to
   actually touch the system. It is otherwise FALSE.

Respond: If the address has this attribute TRUE, the device will
   process and respond to packets it receives that have this as a
   destination address; it is an active address. If the attribute is
   FALSE, the address is a passive address.

If UseInICMP is set TRUE on a Global Unicast Address or Unique Local
Address, the address will be available for use in ICMP messages. If
"Respond" is set TRUE, traffic sent to the address will be served in
the usual way. This describes the present Internet usage. If
Respond is set FALSE, traffic sent to the address will be summarily
discarded, in effect presenting a "local firewall" blockage related
to the address.

An address that has UseInICMP set FALSE will not be used as the
source address of an ICMP message. That address will be
indiscoverable via ICMP messages. If Respond is TRUE and the address
becomes known by other means, such as DNS, traffic sent to the
address will be served in the usual way. If Respond is set FALSE,
traffic sent to the address will be summarily discarded, in effect
presenting a "local firewall" blockage related to the address.

The scenario in view here is that

o   an address that is used to access the system would have UseInICMP
    FALSE (the address is not leaked in such messages) and Respond
    TRUE (messages sent to the address MAY be operated on by the
    system).

o   an address that is used in ICMP and similar messages would have
    UseInICMP TRUE (the address MAY be leaked in such messages) and
    Respond FALSE (messages sent to the address will be dropped on
    receipt).

2.2. ICMP/ICMPv6 handling

Per [RFC4443], an ICMP Response such as Time Exceeded or Parameter
Problem is sent from "the" source address of the interface that
detected the issue. This specification narrows that: it SHOULD use
one of the source addresses that have the attribute UseInICMP set to
TRUE. If no address has that attribute TRUE, it SHOULD NOT send the
message.

2.3. Removing the address from routing

If the passive address is taken from any prefix that is not
advertised in routing, it will be difficult for an adversary to route
to the address, which simplifies the treatment of certain forms of
attacks. It is not impossible; a system on the same LAN could send a
crafted packet that would arrive anyway. However, especially in
inter-domain routing, it is often quite reasonable to believe that
addresses exist that need not be advertised to a neighboring network.

One example of such an address, in IPv6, might be a Unique Local IPv6
Unicast Address [RFC4193], or a global unicast address or prefix.
There are obvious operational issues in the use of a global prefix;
it is easy to accidentally advertise it. In an IPv4 network, the
counterpart might be to use an [RFC1918] address, or to use another
prefix that one chooses to not advertise.

Link Local addresses SHOULD NOT be used in this context; while they
are obviously unroutable except on the local LAN, they are not useful
in Reverse DNS.

One problem with this relates to Ingress Filtering [RFC2827]. If the
prefix used for passive addresses is not advertised to the
neighboring network and the neighboring network is using unicast
reverse path filtering, it will filter these responses. For this
reason, a network doing this SHOULD advise neighboring networks of
passive prefixes for the purpose of inclusion in ingress filters.

2.4. DNS and Reverse DNS

[RFC1912] recommends that "For every IP address, there should be a matching PTR record in the in-addr.arpa domain." In IPv6, there is an important special case, in that link-local addresses are not reflected there, and are used in routing protocols for local communication among IPv6 routers. Like other addresses, passive IP addresses SHOULD have a corresponding Reverse DNS entry; these names help with traceroute and in fault diagnosis. While active addresses may be expected to have A or AAAA records in the administration's own DNS, there is little point for doing so for passive addresses, as they are unresponsive and very likely unreachable.

However, the names given to passive addresses SHOULD NOT be directly similar to the names given active IP addresses. For example, it may be useful to name the interfaces on a certain router so as to identify the router - "ethernet7.card3.router5.lax.example.com". If the correlation to the name of the loopback interface ("router5.lax.example.com") is obviously derivative, the security value is largely forfeit, although it might require human interaction. Such names should differ enough that they are not readily intuited, such as "rack12.lax.example.com".

3. IANA Considerations

This memo asks the IANA for no new parameters.

Note to RFC Editor: This section will have served its purpose if it correctly tells IANA that no new assignments or registries are required, or if those assignments or registries are created during the RFC publication process. From the author's perspective, it may therefore be removed upon publication as an RFC at the RFC Editor's discretion.

4. Security Considerations

This entire note could be described as addressing a set of security considerations. It is not a complete solution to attacks on infrastructure - if loopback addresses, which are used for network management and other purposes are generally known, the infrastructure can still be attacked. However, it is an important reduction of the attack surface. It creates no attack surface that did not already exist.

4.1. Privacy Considerations

This proposal also introduces no new privacy issues.

5. Acknowledgements

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6. Change Log

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7. References

7.1. Normative References

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