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Abstract

It is becoming more commonplace to install front end proxy devices in front of DNS servers to provide (for example) load balancing or to perform transport layer conversions.

This document defines a meta resource record that allows a DNS server to receive information about the client's original transport protocol parameters when supplied by trusted proxies.

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[1.](#) Introduction

It is becoming more commonplace to install front end proxy devices in front of DNS servers [[RFC1035](#)] to provide load balancing or to perform transport layer conversions (e.g. to add DNS over TLS [[RFC7858](#)] to a DNS server that lacks native support).

This has the unfortunate side effect of hiding the clients' source IP addresses from the server, making it harder to employ server-side technologies that rely on knowing those addresses (e.g. ACLs, DNS Response Rate Limiting, etc).

This document defines a DNS meta resource record (RR) that allows a DNS server to receive information about the client's original transport protocol parameters when supplied by trusted proxies.

Whilst in some circumstances it would be possible to re-use the Client Subnet EDNS Option [[RFC7871](#)] to carry a subset of this information, a new RR is defined to allow both this feature and the

Client Subnet Option to co-exist in the same packet.

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[2.](#) Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](#) [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The word "proxy" in this document means a network component that sits on the inbound query path in front of a recursive or authoritative DNS server, receiving DNS queries from clients and dispatching them to local servers. This is to distinguish these from a "forwarder" since that term is usually understood to describe a network component that sits on the outbound query path of a client.

[3.](#) Description

The XPF RR contains the entire 5-tuple of (protocol, source address, destination address, source port and destination port) of the packet received from the client by the proxy.

The presence of the source address supports use of ACLs based on the client's IP address.

The source port allows for ACLs to support Carrier Grade NAT whereby different end-users might share a single IP address.

The destination address supports scenarios where the server behaviour depends upon the packet destination (e.g. BIND view's "match-destinations" option)

The protocol and destination port fields allow server behaviour to vary depending on whether DNS over TLS [[RFC7858](#)] or DNS over DTLS [[RFC8094](#)] are in use.

[3.1.](#) Proxy Processing

Proxies MUST append this RR to the Additional Section of each request packet received (and update the ARCOUNT field accordingly) before sending it to the intended DNS server.

If this RR is already present in an incoming request it MUST be stripped from the request unless the request was received from an upstream proxy that is itself white-listed by the receiving proxy (i.e. if the proxies are configured in a multi-tier architecture), in which case the original value the RRs MUST be preserved.

Where multiple XPF RRs to appear in a request their ordering MUST also be preserved.

<< TODO: what about truncation on the client -> server path? >>

[3.2.](#) Server Processing

When this RR is received from a white-listed client the DNS server SHOULD use the transport information contained therein in preference to the packet's own transport information for any data processing logic (e.g. ACLs) that would otherwise depend on the latter.

If this RR is received from a non-white-listed client the server MUST return a REFUSED response.

If a server finds this RR anywhere other than in the Additional Section of a request it MUST return a REFUSED response.

If the value of the RR's IP version field is not understood by the server it MUST return a REFUSED response.

If the length of the IP addresses contained in the RR are not consistent with that expected for the given IP version then the server MUST return a FORMERR response.

Servers MUST NOT send this RR in DNS responses.

[3.3.](#) Wire Format

The XPF RR is formatted like any standard RR, but none of the fields except RDLENGTH and RDATA have any meaning in this specification. All multi-octet fields are transmitted in network order (i.e. big-endian).

The required values of the RR header fields are as follows:

NAME: MUST contain a single 0 octet (i.e. the root domain).


TYPE: MUST contain TBD1 (XPF).

CLASS: MUST contain 1 (IN).

TTL: MUST contain 0 (zero).

RDLENGTH: specifies the length in octets of the RDATA field.

The RDATA of the XPF RR is as follows:



Unused: Currently reserved. These bits MUST be zero unless redefined in a subsequent specification.

IP Version: The IP protocol version number used by the client, as defined in the IANA IP Version Number Registry [[IANA-IP](#)].

Implementations MUST support IPv4 (4) and IPv6 (6).

Protocol: The Layer 4 protocol number (e.g. UDP or TCP) as defined in the IANA Protocol Number Registry [[IANA-PROTO](#)].

Source Address: The source IP address of the client.

Destination Address: The destination IP address of the request, i.e. the IP address of the proxy on which the request was received.

Source Port: The source port used by the client.

Destination Port: The destination port of the request.

The length of the Source Address and Destination Address fields will be variable depending on the IP Version in use.

[3.4.](#) Presentation Format

Since this is a "meta" RR that cannot appear in master format zone files no presentation format is defined.

[3.5.](#) Signed DNS Requests

Any XPF RRs found in a packet MUST be ignored for the purposes of verifying any signatures used for Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS [[RFC2845](#)] or DNS Request and Transaction Signatures (SIG(0)) [[RFC2931](#)].

Similarly, if either TSIG or SIG(0) are configured between the proxy and server then any XPF RRs MUST be ignored when the proxy calculates the packet signature.

[4.](#) Security Considerations

If the white-list of trusted proxies is implemented as a list of IP addresses, the server administrator MUST have the ability to

selectively disable this feature for any transport where there is a possibility of the proxy's source address being spoofed.

This does not mean to imply that use over UDP is impossible - if for example the network architecture keeps all proxy-to-server traffic on a dedicated network and clients have no direct access to the servers then the proxies' source addresses can be considered unspoofable.

5. Privacy Considerations

Used incorrectly, this RR could expose internal network information, however it is not intended for use on proxy / forwarder devices that sit on the client-side of a DNS request.

This specification is only intended for use on server-side proxy devices that are under the same administrative control as the DNS servers themselves. As such there is no change in the scope within which any private information might be shared.

Use other than as described above would be contrary to the principles of [[RFC6973](#)].

6. IANA Considerations

<< a copy of the [RFC 6895](#) IANA RR TYPE application template will appear here >>

7. Acknowledgements

Mark Andrews, Robert Edmonds, Duane Wessels

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