### pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Trustwords concept
#### draft-birk-pep-trustwords-00

Abstract

   In public-key cryptography comparing the public keys' fingerprints of
   the communication partners involved is vital to ensure that there is
   no man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack on the communication channel.
   Fingerprints normally consist of a chain of hexadecimal chars.
   However, comparing hexadecimal strings is often impractical for
   regular users and prone to misunderstandings.

   To mitigate these challenges, this memo proposes the comparision of
   trustwords as opposed to hexadecimal strings.  Trustwords are common
   words in a natural language (e.g., English) to which the hexidecimal
   strings are mapped to.  This makes the verification process more
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## 1.  Introduction

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the communication partners involved is vital to ensure that there is
no man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack on the communication channel.
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To mitigate these challenges, this memo proposes the comparision of
trustwords as opposed to hexadecimal strings.  Trustwords are common
words in a natural language (e.g., English) to which the hexidecimal
strings are mapped to.  This makes the verification process more
natural.

Trustwords are used to achieve easy contact verification in pEp's
proposition of Privacy by Default [pEp] for end-to-end encryption
situations after the peers have exchanged public keys
opportunistically.

Trustwords may also be used for purposes other than contact
verification.

## [2](#). Terms

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

## [3](#). The Concept of Trustword Mapping

## [4](#). Example

A fingerprint typically looks like:

F482 E952 2F48 618B 01BC 31DC 5428 D7FA ACDC 3F13

Its mapping to trustwords looks like:

dog house brother town fat bath school banana kite task

[[Actual mapping for English should be used here and perhaps an example for another language.]]

Instead of the former hexadecimal string, users can compare ten common words of their language.

## [5](#). Previous work

The basic concept of trustwork mapping has been already documented in the past, e.g. for use in One-Time Passwords (OTP) [[RFC2289](#)] or the PGP Word List ("Pretty Good Privacy word list" [[PGPwordlist](#)], also called a biometric word list, to compare fingerprints.

## [6](#). Number of Trustwords for a language

Previsous proposals have the shortcoming of a limited number of trustwords and they are usually only available in English.  If the number of trustwords is low, a lot of trustworks need to be compared, which make a comparision somewhat cumbersome for users, i.e. leads to degraded usability.  To reduce the number of trustwords to compare, 16-bit scalars are mapped to natural language words.  Therefore, the size (by number of key--value pairs) of any key--value pair structure MUST be 65536, the keys being the enumeration of the Trustwords (starting at 0) and the values being individual natural language words in the respective language.

However, the number of unique values to be used in a language may be less than 65536.  This can be addressed e.g. by using the same value (trustword) for more than one key.  However, the entropy of the representation is slightly reduced.

Example.  A Trustwords list of just 42000 words still allows for an entropy of $log\_2(42000) \sim= 15.36$ bits in 16-bit mappings.

It is for further study, what minimal number of words (or entropy) should be required.

## 7.  The nature of the words

Every Trustwords list SHOULD be cleared from swearwords in order to not offense users.  This is a task to be carried out by speakers of the respective natural lnaguage.

## 8.  IANA Considerations

Each natural language requires a different set of trustwords.  To allow implementors for identical trustword lists, a IANA registry is to be established.  The IANA registration policy according to [RFC8126] will likely be "Expert Review" and "Specification Required".

An IANA registration will contain:

o  language code accoring to ISO 639-3

o  version number

o  list of up to 65536 trustwords

The details of the IANA registry and requirements for the expert to assess the specification are for further study.

## 9.  Security Considerations

There are no special security considerations.

## 10.  Acknowledgements

This work was initially created by pEp Foundation, and then reviewed and extended with funding by the Internet Society's Beyond the Net Programme on standardizing pEp. [bnet]

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