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Enterprise Multihoming using Provider-Assigned Addresses without Network
Prefix Translation: Requirements and Solution
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Abstract

Connecting an enterprise site to multiple ISPs using provider-assigned addresses is difficult without the use of some form of Network Address Translation (NAT). Much has been written on this topic over the last 10 to 15 years, but it still remains a problem without a clearly defined or widely implemented solution. Any multihoming solution without NAT requires hosts at the site to have addresses from each ISP and to select the egress ISP by selecting a source address for outgoing packets. It also requires routers at the site to take into account those source addresses when forwarding packets out towards the ISPs.

This document attempts to define a complete solution to this problem. It covers the behavior of routers to forward traffic taking into account source address, and it covers the behavior of host to select appropriate source addresses. It also covers any possible role that routers might play in providing information to hosts to help them select appropriate source addresses. In the process of exploring potential solutions, this documents also makes explicit requirements for how the solution would be expected to behave from the perspective of an enterprise site network administrator .

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[1.](#) Introduction

Site multihoming, the connection of a subscriber network to multiple upstream networks using redundant uplinks, is a common enterprise architecture for improving the reliability of its Internet connectivity. If the site uses provider-independent (PI) addresses, all traffic originating from the enterprise can use source addresses from the PI address space. Site multihoming with PI addresses is commonly used with both IPv4 and IPv6, and does not present any new technical challenges.

It may be desirable for an enterprise site to connect to multiple ISPs using provider-assigned (PA) addresses, instead of PI addresses. Multihoming with provider-assigned addresses is typically less expensive for the enterprise relative to using provider-independent

addresses. PA multihoming is also a practice that should be facilitated and encouraged because it does not add to the size of the Internet routing table, whereas PI multihoming does. Note that PA is also used to mean "provider-aggregatable". In this document we assume that provider-assigned addresses are always provider-aggregatable.

With PA multihoming, for each ISP connection, the site is assigned a prefix from within an address block allocated to that ISP by its National or Regional Internet Registry. In the simple case of two ISPs (ISP-A and ISP-B), the site will have two different prefixes assigned to it (prefix-A and prefix-B). This arrangement is problematic. First, packets with the "wrong" source address may be dropped by one of the ISPs. In order to limit denial of service attacks using spoofed source addresses, [BCP38](#) [[RFC2827](#)] recommends that ISPs filter traffic from customer sites to only allow traffic with a source address that has been assigned by that ISP. So a packet sent from a multihomed site on the uplink to ISP-B with a source address in prefix-A may be dropped by ISP-B.

However, even if ISP-B does not implement [BCP38](#) or ISP-B adds prefix-A to its list of allowed source addresses on the uplink from the multihomed site, two-way communication may still fail. If the packet with source address in prefix-A was sent to ISP-B because the uplink to ISP-A failed, then if ISP-B does not drop the packet and the packet reaches its destination somewhere on the Internet, the return packet will be sent back with a destination address in prefix-A. The return packet will be routed over the Internet to ISP-A, but it will not be delivered to the multihomed site because its link with ISP-A has failed. Two-way communication would require some arrangement for ISP-B to advertise prefix-A when the uplink to ISP-A fails.

Note that the same may be true with a provider that does not implement [BCP 38](#), if his upstream provider does, or has no corresponding route. The issue is not that the immediate provider implements ingress filtering; it is that someone upstream does, or lacks a route.

With IPv4, this problem is commonly solved by using [[RFC1918](#)] private address space within the multi-homed site and Network Address Translation (NAT) or Network Address/Port Translation (NAPT) on the uplinks to the ISPs. However, one of the goals of IPv6 is to eliminate the need for and the use of NAT or NAPT. Therefore, requiring the use of NAT or NAPT for an enterprise site to multihome with provider-assigned addresses is not an attractive solution.

[RFC6296] describes a translation solution specifically tailored to meet the requirements of multi-homing with provider-assigned IPv6 addresses. With the IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix Translation (NPTv6) solution, within the site an enterprise can use Unique Local Addresses [RFC4193] or the prefix assigned by one of the ISPs. As traffic leaves the site on an uplink to an ISP, the source address gets translated to an address within the prefix assigned by the ISP on that uplink in a predictable and reversible manner. [RFC6296] is currently classified as Experimental, and it has been implemented by several vendors. See [Section 5.2](#), for more discussion of NPTv6.

This document defines routing requirements for enterprise multihoming using provider-assigned IPv6 addresses. We have made no attempt to write these requirements in a manner that is agnostic to potential solutions. Instead, this document focuses on the following general class of solutions.

Each host at the enterprise has multiple addresses, at least one from each ISP-assigned prefix. Each host, as discussed in [Section 4.1](#) and [RFC6724], is responsible for choosing the source address applied to each packet it sends. A host SHOULD be able respond dynamically to the failure of an uplink to a given ISP by no longer sending packets with the source address corresponding to that ISP. Potential mechanisms for the communication of changes in the network to the host are Neighbor Discovery Router Advertisements, DHCPv6, and ICMPv6.

The routers in the enterprise network are responsible for ensuring that packets are delivered to the "correct" ISP uplink based on source address. This requires that at least some routers in the site network are able to take into account the source address of a packet when deciding how to route it. That is, some routers must be capable of some form of Source Address Dependent Routing (SADR), if only as described in [RFC3704]. At a minimum, the routers connected to the ISP uplinks (the site exit routers or SERs) must be capable of Source Address Dependent Routing. Expanding the connected domain of routers capable of SADR from the site exit routers deeper into the site network will generally result in more efficient routing of traffic with external destinations.

The document first looks in more detail at the enterprise networking environments in which this solution is expected to operate. It then discusses existing and proposed mechanisms for hosts to select the source address applied to packets. Finally, it looks at the requirements for routing that are needed to support these enterprise network scenarios and the mechanisms by which hosts are expected to select source addresses dynamically based on network state.

2. Enterprise Multihoming Requirements

2.1. Simple ISP Connectivity with Connected SERs

We start by looking at a scenario in which a site has connections to two ISPs, as shown in Figure 1. The site is assigned the prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/52 by ISP-A and prefix 2001:db8:0:b000::/52 by ISP-B. We consider three hosts in the site. H31 and H32 are on a LAN that has been assigned subnets 2001:db8:0:a010::/64 and 2001:db8:0:b010::/64. H31 has been assigned the addresses 2001:db8:0:a010::31 and 2001:db8:0:b010::31. H32 has been assigned 2001:db8:0:a010::32 and 2001:db8:0:b010::32. H41 is on a different subnet that has been assigned 2001:db8:0:a020::/64 and 2001:db8:0:b020::/64.




Figure 1: Simple ISP Connectivity With Connected SERs

We refer to a router that connects the site to an ISP as a site edge router(SER). Several other routers provide connectivity among the internal hosts (H31, H32, and H41), as well as connecting the internal hosts to the Internet through SERa and SERb. In this

example SERa and SERb share a direct connection to each other. In [Section 2.2](#), we consider a scenario where this is not the case.

For the moment, we assume that the hosts are able to make good choices about which source addresses through some mechanism that doesn't involve the routers in the site network. Here, we focus on primary task of the routed site network, which is to get packets efficiently to their destinations, while sending a packet to the ISP that assigned the prefix that matches the source address of the packet. In [Section 4](#), we examine what role the routed network may play in helping hosts make good choices about source addresses for packets.

With this solution, routers will need form of Source Address Dependent Routing, which will be new functionality. It would be useful if an enterprise site does not need to upgrade all routers to support the new SADR functionality in order to support PA multi-homing. We consider if this is possible and what are the tradeoffs of not having all routers in the site support SADR functionality.

In the topology in Figure 1, it is possible to support PA multihoming with only SERa and SERb being capable of SADR. The other routers can continue to forward based only on destination address, and exchange routes that only consider destination address. In this scenario, SERa and SERb communicate source-scoped routing information across their shared connection. When SERa receives a packet with a source address matching prefix 2001:db8:0:b000::/52, it forwards the packet to SERb, which forwards it on the uplink to ISP-B. The analogous behaviour holds for traffic that SERb receives with a source address matching prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/52.

In Figure 1, when only SERa and SERb are capable of source address dependent routing, PA multi-homing will work. However, the paths over which the packets are sent will generally not be the shortest paths. The forwarding paths will generally be more efficient as more routers are capable of SADR. For example, if R4, R2, and R6 are upgraded to support SADR, then can exchange source-scoped routes with SERa and SERb. They will then know to send traffic with a source address matching prefix 2001:db8:0:b000::/52 directly to SERb, without sending it to SERa first.

[2.2.](#) Simple ISP Connectivity Where SERs Are Not Directly Connected

In Figure 2, we modify the topology slightly by inserting R7, so that SERa and SERb are no longer directly connected. With this topology, it is not enough to just enable SADR routing on SERa and SERb to support PA multi-homing. There are two solutions to ways to enable PA multihoming in this topology.




Figure 2: Simple ISP Connectivity Where SERs Are Not Directly Connected

One option is to effectively modify the topology by creating a logical tunnel between SERa and SERb, using GRE for example. Although SERa and SERb are not directly connected physically in this topology, they can be directly connected logically by a tunnel.

The other option is to enable SADR functionality on R7. In this way, R7 will exchange source-scoped routes with SERa and SERb, making the three routers act as a single SADR domain. This illustrates the basic principle that the minimum requirement for the routed site network to support PA multi-homing is having all of the site exit routers be part of a connected SADR domain. Extending the connected SADR domain beyond that point can produce more efficient forwarding paths.

2.3. Enterprise Network Operator Expectations

Before considering a more complex scenario, let's look in more detail at the reasonably simple multihoming scenario in Figure 2 to understand what can reasonably be expected from this solution. As a

general guiding principle, we assume an enterprise network operator will expect a multihomed network to behave as close as to a single-homed network as possible. So a solution that meets those expectations where possible is a good thing.

For traffic between internal hosts and traffic from outside the site to internal hosts, an enterprise network operator would expect there to be no visible change in the path taken by this traffic, since this traffic does not need to be routed in a way that depends on source address. It is also reasonable to expect that internal hosts should be able to communicate with each other using either of their source addresses without restriction. For example, H31 should be able to communicate with H41 using a packet with S=2001:db8:0:a010::31, D=2001:db8:0:b010::41, regardless of the state of uplink to ISP-B.

These goals can be accomplished by having all of the routers in the network continue to originate normal unscoped destination routes for their connected networks. If we can arrange so that these unscoped destination routes get used for forwarding this traffic, then we will have accomplished the goal of keeping forwarding of traffic destined for internal hosts, unaffected by the multihoming solution.

For traffic destined for external hosts, it is reasonable to expect that traffic with an source address from the prefix assigned by ISP-A to follow the path to that the traffic would follow if there is no connection to ISP-B. This can be accomplished by having SERa originate a source-scoped route of the form (S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52, D=::/0) . If all of the routers in the site support SADR, then the path of traffic exiting via ISP-A can match that expectation. If some routers don't support SADR, then it is reasonable to expect that the path for traffic exiting via ISP-A may be different within the site. This is a tradeoff that the enterprise network operator may decide to make.

It is important to understand how this multihoming solution behaves when an uplink to one of the ISPs fails. To simplify this discussion, we assume that all routers in the site support SADR. We first start by looking at how the network operates when the uplinks to both ISP-A and ISP-B are functioning properly. SERa originates a source-scoped route of the form (S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52, D=::/0), and SERb is originates a source-scoped route of the form (S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52, D=::/0). These routes are distributed through the routers in the site, and they establish within the routers two set of forwarding paths for traffic leaving the site. One set of forwarding paths is for packets with source address in 2001:db8:0:a000::/52. The other set of forwarding paths is for packets with source address in 2001:db8:0:b000::/52. The normal destination routes which are not scoped to these two source prefixes

play no role in the forwarding. Whether a packet exits the site via SERa or via SERb is completely determined by the source address applied to the packet by the host. So for example, when host H31 sends a packet to host H101 with (S=2001:db8:0:a010::31, D=2001:db8:0:1234::101), the packet will only be sent out the link from SERa to ISP-A.

Now consider what happens when the uplink from SERa to ISP-A fails. The only way for the packets from H31 to reach H101 is for H31 to start using the source address for ISP-B. H31 needs to send the following packet: (S=2001:db8:0:b010::31, D=2001:db8:0:1234::101).

This behavior is very different from the behavior that occurs with site multihoming using PI addresses or with PA addresses using NAT. In these other multi-homing solutions, hosts do not need to react to network failures several hops away in order to regain Internet access. Instead, a host can be largely unaware of the failure of an uplink to an ISP. When multihoming with PA addresses and NAT, existing sessions generally need to be re-established after a failure since the external host will receive packets from the internal host with a new source address. However, new sessions can be established without any action on the part of the hosts.

Another example where the behavior of this multihoming solution differs significantly from that of multihoming with PI address or with PA addresses using NAT is in the ability of the enterprise network operator to route traffic over different ISPs based on destination address. We still consider the fairly simple network of Figure 2 and assume that uplinks to both ISPs are functioning. Assume that the site is multihomed using PA addresses and NAT, and that SERa and SERb each originate a normal destination route for D=::/0, with the route origination dependent on the state of the uplink to the respective ISP.

Now suppose it is observed that an important application running between internal hosts and external host H101 experience much better performance when the traffic passes through ISP-A (perhaps because ISP-A provides lower latency to H101.) When multihoming this site with PI addresses or with PA addresses and NAT, the enterprise network operator can configure SERa to originate into the site network a normal destination route for D=2001:db8:0:1234::/64 (the destination prefix to reach H101) that depends on the state of the uplink to ISP-A. When the link to ISP-A is functioning, the destination route D=2001:db8:0:1234::/64 will be originated by SERa, so traffic from all hosts will use ISP-A to reach H101 based on the longest destination prefix match in the route lookup.

Implementing the same routing policy is more difficult with the PA multihoming solution described in this document since it doesn't use NAT. By design, the only way to control where a packet exits this network is by setting the source address of the packet. Since the network cannot modify the source address without NAT, the host must set it. To implement this routing policy, each host needs to use the source address from the prefix assigned by ISP-A to send traffic destined for H101. Mechanisms have been proposed to allow hosts to choose the source address for packets in a fine grained manner. We will discuss these proposals in [Section 4](#). However, interacting with host operating systems in some manner to ensure a particular source address is chosen for a particular destination prefix is not what an enterprise network administrator would expect to have to do to implement this routing policy.

[2.4.](#) More complex ISP connectivity

The previous sections considered two variations of a simple multihoming scenario where the site is connected to two ISPs offering only Internet connectivity. It is likely that many actual enterprise multihoming scenarios will be similar to this simple example. However, there are more complex multihoming scenarios that we would like this solution to address as well.

It is fairly common for an ISP to offer a service in addition to Internet access over the same uplink. Two variation of this are reflected in Figure 3. In addition to Internet access, ISP-A offers a service which requires the site to access host H51 at 2001:db8:0:5555::51. The site has a single physical and logical connection with ISP-A, and ISP-A only allows access to H51 over that connection. So when H32 needs to access the service at H51 it needs to send packets with (S=2001:db8:0:a010::32, D=2001:db8:0:5555::51) and those packets need to be forward out the link from SERa to ISP-A.




Figure 3: Internet access and services offered by ISP-A and ISP-B

ISP-B illustrates a variation on this scenario. In addition to Internet access, ISP-B also offers a service which requires the site to access host H61. The site has two connections to two different parts of ISP-B (shown as SERb1 and SERb2 in Figure 3). ISP-B expects Internet traffic to use the uplink from SERb1, while it expects it expects traffic destined for the service at H61 to use the uplink from SERb2. For either uplink, ISP-B expects the ingress traffic to have a source address matching the prefix it assigned to the site, 2001:db8:0:b000::/52.

As discussed before, we rely completely on the internal host to set the source address of the packet properly. In the case of a packet sent by H31 to access the service in ISP-B at H61, we expect the packet to have the following addresses: (S=2001:db8:0:b010::31, D=2001:db8:0:6666::61). The routed network has two potential ways of distributing routes so that this packet exits the site on the uplink at SERb2.

We could just rely on normal destination routes, without using source-prefix scoped routes. If we have SERb2 originate a normal unscoped destination route for D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64, the packets from H31 to H61 will exit the site at SERb2 as desired. We should not have to worry about SERa needing to originate the same route, because ISP-B should choose a globally unique prefix for the service at H61.

The alternative is to have SERb2 originate a source-prefix-scoped destination route of the form (S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52, D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64). From a forwarding point of view, the use of the source-prefix-scoped destination route would result in traffic with source addresses corresponding only to ISP-B being sent to SERb2. Instead, the use of the unscoped destination route would result in traffic with source addresses corresponding to ISP-A and ISP-B being sent to SERb2, as long as the destination address matches the destination prefix. It seems like either forwarding behavior would be acceptable.

However, from the point of view of the enterprise network administrator trying to configure, maintain, and trouble-shoot this multihoming solution, it seems much clearer to have SERb2 originate the source-prefix-scoped destination route correspond to the service offered by ISP-B. In this way, all of the traffic leaving the site is determined by the source-prefix-scoped routes, and all of the traffic within the site or arriving from external hosts is determined by the unscoped destination routes. Therefore, for this multihoming solution we choose to originate source-prefix-scoped routes for all traffic leaving the site.

2.5. ISPs and Provider-Assigned Prefixes

While we expect that most site multihoming involves connecting to only two ISPs, this solution allows for connections to an arbitrary number of ISPs to be supported. However, when evaluating scalable implementations of the solution, it would be reasonable to assume that the maximum number of ISPs that a site would connect to is five.

It is also useful to note that the prefixes assigned to the site by different ISPs will not overlap. This must be the case, since the provider-assigned addresses have to be globally unique.

2.6. Simplified Topologies

The topologies of many enterprise sites using this multihoming solution may in practice be simpler than the examples that we have used. The topology in Figure 1 could be further simplified by having all hosts directly connected to the LAN connecting the two site exit routers, SERa and SERb. The topology could also be simplified by having the uplinks to ISP-A and ISP-B both connected to the same site exit router. However, it is the aim of this draft to provide a solution that applies to a broad range of enterprise site network topologies, so this draft focuses on providing a solution to the more general case. The simplified cases will also be supported by this solution, and there may even be optimizations that can be made for simplified cases. This solution however needs to support more complex topologies.

We are starting with the basic assumption that enterprise site networks can be quite complex from a routing perspective. However, even a complex site network can be multihomed to different ISPs with PA addresses using IPv4 and NAT. It is not reasonable to expect an enterprise network operator to change the routing topology of the site in order to deploy IPv6.

3. Generating Source-Prefix-Scoped Forwarding Tables

So far we have described in general terms how the routers in this solution that are capable of Source Address Dependent Routing will forward traffic using both normal unscoped destination routes and source-prefix-scoped destination routes. Here we give a precise method for generating a source-prefix-scoped forwarding table on a router that supports SADR.

1. Compute the next-hops for the source-prefix-scoped destination prefixes using only routers in the connected SADR domain. These are the initial source-prefix-scoped forwarding table entries.
2. Compute the next-hops for the unscoped destination prefixes using all routers in the IGP. This is the unscoped forwarding table.
3. Augment each source-prefix-scoped forwarding table with unscoped forwarding table entries based on the following rule. If the destination prefix of the unscoped forwarding entry exactly matches the destination prefix of an existing source-prefix-scoped forwarding entry (including destination prefix length),

then do not add the unscoped forwarding entry. If the destination prefix does NOT match an existing entry, then add the entry to the source-prefix-scoped forwarding table.

The forward tables produced by this process are used in the following way to forward packets.

1. If the source address of the packet matches one of the source prefixes, then look up the destination address of the packet in the corresponding source-prefix-scoped forwarding table to determine the next-hop for the packet.
2. If the source address of the packet does NOT match one of the source prefixes, then look up the destination address of the packet in unscoped forwarding table to determine the next-hop for the packet.

The following example illustrates how this process is used to create a forwarding table for each provider-assigned source prefix. We consider the multihomed site network in Figure 3. Initially we assume that all of the routers in the site network support SADR. Figure 4 shows the routes that are originated by the routers in the site network.

Routes originated by SERa:

```
(S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52, D=2001:db8:0:5555/64)
(S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52, D=::/0)
(D=2001:db8:0:5555::/64)
(D=::/0)
```

Routes originated by SERb1:

```
(S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52, D=::/0)
(D=::/0)
```

Routes originated by SERb2:

```
(S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52, D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64)
(D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64)
```

Routes originated by R1:

```
(D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64)
(D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64)
```

Routes originated by R2:

```
(D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64)
(D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64)
```

Routes originated by R3:

```
(D=2001:db8:0:a020::/64)
(D=2001:db8:0:b020::/64)
```

Figure 4: Routes Originated by Routers in the Site Network

Each SER originates destination routes which are scoped to the source prefix assigned by the ISP that the SER connects to. Note that the SERs also originate the corresponding unscoped destination route. This is not needed when all of the routers in the site support SADR. However, it is required when some routers do not support SADR. This will be discussed in more detail later.

We focus on how R8 constructs its source-prefix-scoped forwarding tables from these route advertisements. R8 computes the next hops for destination routes which are scoped to the source prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/52. The results are shown in the first table in Figure 5. (In this example, the next hops are computed assuming that all links have the same metric.) Then, R8 computes the next hops for destination routes which are scoped to the source prefix 2001:db8:0:b000::/52. The results are shown in the second table in Figure 5. Finally, R8 computes the next hops for the unscoped destination prefixes. The results are shown in the third table in Figure 5.


```

forwarding entries scoped to
source prefix = 2001:db8:0:a000::/52
=====
D=2001:db8:0:5555/64      NH=R7
D=::/0                    NH=R7

forwarding entries scoped to
source prefix = 2001:db8:0:b000::/52
=====
D=2001:db8:0:6666/64      NH=SERb2
D=::/0                    NH=SERb1

unscoped forwarding entries
=====
D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64    NH=R2
D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64    NH=R2
D=2001:db8:0:a020::/64    NH=R5
D=2001:db8:0:b020::/64    NH=R5
D=2001:db8:0:5555::/64    NH=R7
D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64    NH=SERb2
D=::/0                    NH=SERb1

```

Figure 5: Forwarding Entries Computed at R8

The final step is for R8 to augment the source-prefix-scoped forwarding entries with unscoped forwarding entries. If an unscoped forwarding entry has the exact same destination prefix as an source-prefix-scoped forwarding entry (including destination prefix length), then the source-prefix-scoped forwarding entry wins.

As an example of how the source scoped forwarding entries are augmented with unscoped forwarding entries, we consider how the two entries in the first table in Figure 5 (the table for source prefix = 2001:db8:0:a000::/52) are augmented with entries from the third table in Figure 5 (the table of unscoped forwarding entries). The first four unscoped forwarding entries (D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64, D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64, D=2001:db8:0:a020::/64, and D=2001:db8:0:b020::/64) are not an exact match for any of the existing entries in the forwarding table for source prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/52. Therefore, these four entries are added to the final forwarding table for source prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/52. The result of adding these entries is reflected in first four entries the first table in Figure 6.

The next unscoped forwarding table entry is for D=2001:db8:0:5555::/64. This entry is an exact match for the existing entry in the forwarding table for source prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/52. Therefore, we do not replace the existing

entry with the entry from the unscoped forwarding table. This is reflected in the fifth entry in the first table in Figure 6. (Note that since both scoped and unscoped entries have R7 as the next hop, the result of applying this rule is not visible.)

The next unscoped forwarding table entry is for D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64. This entry is not an exact match for any existing entries in the forwarding table for source prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/52. Therefore, we add this entry. This is reflected in the sixth entry in the first table in Figure 6.

The next unscoped forwarding table entry is for D=::/0. This entry is an exact match for the existing entry in the forwarding table for source prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/52. Therefore, we do not overwrite the existing source-prefix-scoped entry, as can be seen in the last entry in the first table in Figure 6.


```

if source address matches 2001:db8:0:a000::/52
then use this forwarding table

```

```

=====

```

```

D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64    NH=R2
D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64    NH=R2
D=2001:db8:0:a020::/64    NH=R5
D=2001:db8:0:b020::/64    NH=R5
D=2001:db8:0:5555::/64    NH=R7
D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64    NH=SERb2
D=::/0                    NH=R7

```

```

else if source address matches 2001:db8:0:b000::/52
then use this forwarding table

```

```

=====

```

```

D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64    NH=R2
D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64    NH=R2
D=2001:db8:0:a020::/64    NH=R5
D=2001:db8:0:b020::/64    NH=R5
D=2001:db8:0:5555::/64    NH=R7
D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64    NH=SERb2
D=::/0                    NH=SERb1

```

```

else use this forwarding table

```

```

=====

```

```

D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64    NH=R2
D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64    NH=R2
D=2001:db8:0:a020::/64    NH=R5
D=2001:db8:0:b020::/64    NH=R5
D=2001:db8:0:5555::/64    NH=R7
D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64    NH=SERb2
D=::/0                    NH=SERb1

```

Figure 6: Complete Forwarding Tables Computed at R8

The forwarding tables produced by this process at R8 have the desired properties. A packet with a source address in 2001:db8:0:a000::/52 will be forwarded based on the first table in Figure 6. If the packet is destined for the Internet at large or the service at D=2001:db8:0:5555/64, it will be sent to R7 in the direction of SERa. If the packet is destined for an internal host, then the first four entries will send it to R2 or R5 as expected. Note that if this packet has a destination address corresponding to the service offered by ISP-B (D=2001:db8:0:5555::/64), then it will get forwarded to SERb2. It will be dropped by SERb2 or by ISP-B, since it the packet has a source address that was not assigned by ISP-B. However, this is expected behavior. In order to use the service offered by ISP-B, the host needs to originate the packet with a source address assigned by ISP-B.

In this example, a packet with a source address that doesn't match 2001:db8:0:a000::/52 or 2001:db8:0:b000::/52 must have originated from an external host. Such a packet will use the unscoped forwarding table (the last table in Figure 6). These packets will flow exactly as they would in absence of multihoming.

We can also modify this example to illustrate how it supports deployments where not all routers in the site support SADR. Continuing with the topology shown in Figure 3, suppose that R3 and R5 do not support SADR. Instead they are only capable of understanding unscoped route advertisements. The SADR routers in the network will still originate the routes shown in Figure 4. However, R3 and R5 will only understand the unscoped routes as shown in Figure 7.

Routes originated by SERa:

(D=2001:db8:0:5555::/64)

(D=::/0)

Routes originated by SERb1:

(D=::/0)

Routes originated by SERb2:

(D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64)

Routes originated by R1:

(D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64)

(D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64)

Routes originated by R2:

(D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64)

(D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64)

Routes originated by R3:

(D=2001:db8:0:a020::/64)

(D=2001:db8:0:b020::/64)

Figure 7: Routes Advertisements Understood by Routers that do not Support SADR

With these unscoped route advertisements, R5 will produce the forwarding table shown in Figure 8.

forwarding table

```
=====
D=2001:db8:0:a010::/64    NH=R8
D=2001:db8:0:b010::/64    NH=R8
D=2001:db8:0:a020::/64    NH=R3
D=2001:db8:0:b020::/64    NH=R3
D=2001:db8:0:5555::/64    NH=R8
D=2001:db8:0:6666::/64    NH=SERb2
D=::/0                    NH=R8
```

Figure 8: Forwarding Table For R5, Which Doesn't Understand Source-Prefix-Scoped Routes

Any traffic that needs to exit the site will eventually hit a SADR-capable router. Once that traffic enters the SADR-capable domain, then it will not leave that domain until it exits the site. This property is required in order to guarantee that there will not be routing loops involving SADR-capable and non-SADR-capable routers.

Note that the mechanism described here for converting source-prefix-scoped destination prefix routing advertisements into forwarding state is somewhat different from that proposed in [\[I-D.ietf-rtgwg-dst-src-routing\]](#). The method described in this document is intended to be easy to understand for network enterprise operators while at the same time being functionally correct. Another difference is that the method in this document assumes that source prefix will not overlap. Other differences between the two approaches still need to be understood and reconciled.

An interesting side-effect of deploying SADR is if all routers in a given network support SADR and have a scoped forwarding table, then the unscoped forwarding table can be eliminated which ensures that packets with legitimate source addresses only can leave the network (as there are no scoped forwarding tables for spoofed/bogon source addresses). It would prevent accidental leaks of ULA/reserved/link-local sources to the Internet as well as ensures that no spoofing is possible from the SADR-enabled network.

4. Mechanisms For Hosts To Choose Good Source Addresses In A Multihomed Site

Until this point, we have made the assumption that hosts are able to choose the correct source address using some unspecified mechanism. This has allowed us to just focus on what the routers in a multihomed site network need to do in order to forward packets to the correct ISP based on source address. Now we look at possible mechanisms for hosts to choose the correct source address. We also look at what

role, if any, the routers may play in providing information that helps hosts to choose source addresses.

Any host that needs to be able to send traffic using the uplinks to a given ISP is expected to be configured with an address from the prefix assigned by that ISP. The host will control which ISP is used for its traffic by selecting one of the addresses configured on the host as the source address for outgoing traffic. It is the responsibility of the site network to ensure that a packet with the source address from an ISP is not sent on an uplink to that ISP.

If all of the ISP uplinks are working, the choice of source address by the host may be driven by the desire to load share across ISP uplinks, or it may be driven by the desire to take advantage of certain properties of a particular uplink or ISP. If any of the ISP uplinks is not working, then the choice of source address by the host can determine if packets get dropped.

How a host should make good decisions about source address selection in a multihomed site is not a solved problem. We do not attempt to solve this problem in this document. Instead we discuss the current state of affairs with respect to standardized solutions and implementation of those solutions. We also look at proposed solutions for this problem.

An external host initiating communication with a host internal to a PA multihomed site will need to know multiple addresses for that host in order to communicate with it using different ISPs to the multihomed site. These addresses are typically learned through DNS. (For simplicity, we assume that the external host is single-homed.) The external host chooses the ISP that will be used at the remote multihomed site by setting the destination address on the packets it transmits. For a sessions originated from an external host to an internal host, the choice of source address used by the internal host is simple. The internal host has no choice but to use the destination address in the received packet as the source address of the transmitted packet.

For a session originated by a host internal to the multi-homed site, the decision of what source address to select is more complicated. We consider three main methods for hosts to get information about the network. The two proactive methods are Neighbor Discovery Router Advertisements and DHCPv6. The one reactive method we consider is ICMPv6. Note that we are explicitly excluding the possibility of having hosts participate in or even listen directly to routing protocol advertisements.

First we look at how a host is currently expected to select the source and destination address with which it sends a packet.

4.1. Source Address Selection Algorithm on Hosts

[RFC6724] defines the algorithms that hosts are expected to use to select source and destination addresses for packets. It defines an algorithm for selecting a source address and a separate algorithm for selecting a destination address. Both of these algorithms depend on a policy table. [RFC6724] defines a default policy which produces certain behavior.

The rules in the two algorithms in [RFC6724] depend on many different properties of addresses. While these are needed for understanding how a host should choose addresses in an arbitrary environment, most of the rules are not relevant for understanding how a host should choose among multiple source addresses in multihomed environment when sending a packet to a remote host. Returning to the example in Figure 3, we look at what the default algorithms in [RFC6724] say about the source address that internal host H31 should use to send traffic to external host H101, somewhere on the Internet. Let's look at what rules in [RFC6724] are actually used by H31 in this case.

There is no choice to be made with respect to destination address. H31 needs to send a packet with D=2001:db8:0:1234::101 in order to reach H101. So H31 have to choose between using S=2001:db8:0:a010::31 or S=2001:db8:0:b010::31 as the source address for this packet. We go through the rules for source address selection in [Section 5 of \[RFC6724\]](#). Rule 1 (Prefer same address) is not useful to break the tie between source addresses, because neither the candidate source addresses equals the destination address. Rule 2 (Prefer appropriate scope) is also not used in this scenario, because both source addresses and the destination address have global scope.

Rule 3 (Avoid deprecated addresses) applies to an address that has been autoconfigured by a host using stateless address autoconfiguration as defined in [RFC4862]. An address autoconfigured by a host has a preferred lifetime and a valid lifetime. The address is preferred until the preferred lifetime expires, after which it becomes deprecated. A deprecated address can still be used, but it is better to use a preferred address. When the valid lifetime expires, the address cannot be used at all. The preferred and valid lifetimes for an autoconfigured address are set based on the corresponding lifetimes in the Prefix Information Option in Neighbor Discovery Router Advertisements. So a possible tool to control source address selection in this scenario would be to a host to make an address deprecated by having routers on that link, R1 and R2 in

Figure 3, send Prefix Information Option messages with the preferred lifetime for the source prefix to be discouraged (or prohibited) set to zero. This is a rather blunt tool, because it discourages or prohibits the use of that source prefix for all destinations. However, it may be useful in some scenarios.

Rule 4 (Avoid home addresses) does not apply here because we are not considering Mobile IP.

Rule 5 (Prefer outgoing interface) is not useful in this scenario, because both source addresses are assigned to the same interface.

Rule 5.5 (Prefer addresses in a prefix advertised by the next-hop) is not useful in the scenario when both R1 and R2 will advertise both source prefixes. However potentially this rule may allow a host to select the correct source prefix by selecting a next-hop. The most obvious way would be to make R1 to advertise itself as a default router and send PIO for 2001:db8:0:a010::/64, while R2 is advertising itself as a default router and sending PIO for 2001:db8:0:b010::/64. We'll discuss later how Rule 5.5 can be used to influence a source address selection in single-router topologies (e.g. when H41 is sending traffic using R3 as a default gateway).

Rule 6 (Prefer matching label) refers to the Label value determined for each source and destination prefix as a result of applying the policy table to the prefix. With the default policy table defined in [Section 2.1 of \[RFC6724\]](#), Label(2001:db8:0:a010::31) = 5, Label(2001:db8:0:b010::31) = 5, and Label(2001:db8:0:1234::101) = 5. So with the default policy, Rule 6 does not break the tie. However, the algorithms in [\[RFC6724\]](#) are defined in such a way that non-default address selection policy tables can be used. [\[RFC7078\]](#) defines a way to distribute a non-default address selection policy table to hosts using DHCPv6. So even though the application of rule 6 to this scenario using the default policy table is not useful, rule 6 may still be a useful tool.

Rule 7 (Prefer temporary addresses) has to do with the technique described in [\[RFC4941\]](#) to periodically randomize the interface portion of an IPv6 address that has been generated using stateless address autoconfiguration. In general, if H31 were using this technique, it would use it for both source addresses, for example creating temporary addresses 2001:db8:0:a010:2839:9938:ab58:830f and 2001:db8:0:b010:4838:f483:8384:3208, in addition to 2001:db8:0:a010::31 and 2001:db8:0:b010::31. So this rule would prefer the two temporary addresses, but it would not break the tie between the two source prefixes from ISP-A and ISP-B.

Rule 8 (Use longest matching prefix) dictates that between two candidate source addresses the one which has longest common prefix length with the destination address. For example, if H31 were selecting the source address for sending packets to H101, this rule would not be a tie breaker as for both candidate source addresses 2001:db8:0:a101::31 and 2001:db8:0:b101::31 the common prefix length with the destination is 48. However if H31 were selecting the source address for sending packets H41 address 2001:db8:0:a020::41, then this rule would result in using 2001:db8:0:a101::31 as a source (2001:db8:0:a101::31 and 2001:db8:0:a020::41 share the common prefix 2001:db8:0:a000::/58, while for 2001:db8:0:b101::31 and 2001:db8:0:a020::41 the common prefix is 2001:db8:0:a000::/51). Therefore rule 8 might be useful for selecting the correct source address in some but not all scenarios (for example if ISP-B services belong to 2001:db8:0:b000::/59 then H31 would always use 2001:db8:0:b010::31 to access those destinations).

So we can see that of the 8 source selection address rules from [\[RFC6724\]](#), five actually apply to our basic site multihoming scenario. The rules that are relevant to this scenario are summarized below.

- o Rule 3: Avoid deprecated addresses.
- o Rule 5.5: Prefer addresses in a prefix advertised by the next-hop.
- o Rule 6: Prefer matching label.
- o Rule 8: Prefer longest matching prefix.

The two methods that we discuss for controlling the source address selection through the four relevant rules above are SLAAC Router Advertisement messages and DHCPv6.

We also consider a possible role for ICMPv6 for getting traffic-driven feedback from the network. With the source address selection algorithm discussed above, the goal is to choose the correct source address on the first try, before any traffic is sent. However, another strategy is to choose a source address, send the packet, get feedback from the network about whether or not the source address is correct, and try another source address if it is not.

We consider four scenarios where a host needs to select the correct source address. The first is when both uplinks are working. The second is when one uplink has failed. The third one is a situation when one failed uplink has recovered. The last one is failure of both (all) uplinks.

4.2. Selecting Source Address When Both Uplinks Are Working

Again we return to the topology in Figure 3. Suppose that the site administrator wants to implement a policy by which all hosts need to use ISP-A to reach H01 at D=2001:db8:0:1234::101. So for example, H31 needs to select S=2001:db8:0:a010::31.

4.2.1. Distributing Address Selection Policy Table with DHCPv6

This policy can be implemented by using DHCPv6 to distribute an address selection policy table that assigns the same label to destination address that match 2001:db8:0:1234::/64 as it does to source addresses that match 2001:db8:0:a000::/52. The following two entries accomplish this.

Prefix	Precedence	Label
2001:db8:0:1234::/64	50	33
2001:db8:0:a000::/52	50	33

Figure 9: Policy table entries to implement a routing policy

This requires that the hosts implement [\[RFC6724\]](#), the basic source and destination address framework, along with [\[RFC7078\]](#), the DHCPv6 extension for distributing a non-default policy table. Note that it does NOT require that the hosts use DHCPv6 for address assignment. The hosts could still use stateless address autoconfiguration for address configuration, while using DHCPv6 only for policy table distribution (see [\[RFC3736\]](#)). However this method has a number of disadvantages:

- o DHCPv6 support is not a mandatory requirement for IPv6 hosts, so this method might not work for all devices.
- o Network administrators are required to explicitly configure the desired network access policies on DHCPv6 servers.

4.2.2. Controlling Source Address Selection With Router Advertisements

Neighbor Discovery currently has two mechanisms to communicate prefix information to hosts. The base specification for Neighbor Discovery (see [\[RFC4861\]](#)) defines the Prefix Information Option (PIO) in the Router Advertisement (RA) message. When a host receives a PIO with the A-flag set, it can use the prefix in the PIO as source prefix from which it assigns itself an IP address using stateless address autoconfiguration (SLAAC) procedures described in [\[RFC4862\]](#). In the example of Figure 3, if the site network is using SLAAC, we would expect both R1 and R2 to send RA messages with PIOs for both source prefixes 2001:db8:0:a010::/64 and 2001:db8:0:b010::/64 with the

A-flag set. H31 would then use the SLAAC procedure to configure itself with the 2001:db8:0:a010::31 and 2001:db8:0:b010::31.

Whereas a host learns about source prefixes from PIO messages, hosts can learn about a destination prefix from a Router Advertisement containing Route Information Option (RIO), as specified in [\[RFC4191\]](#). The destination prefixes in RIOs are intended to allow a host to choose the router that it uses as its first hop to reach a particular destination prefix.

As currently standardized, neither PIO nor RIO options contained in Neighbor Discovery Router Advertisements can communicate the information needed to implement the desired routing policy. PIO's communicate source prefixes, and RIO communicate destination prefixes. However, there is currently no standardized way to directly associate a particular destination prefix with a particular source prefix.

[I-D.pfister-6man-sadr-ra] proposes a Source Address Dependent Route Information option for Neighbor Discovery Router Advertisements which would associate a source prefix and with a destination prefix. The details of [\[I-D.pfister-6man-sadr-ra\]](#) might need tweaking to address this use case. However, in order to be able to use Neighbor Discovery Router Advertisements to implement this routing policy, an extension that allows a R1 and R2 to explicitly communicate to H31 an association between S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52 D=2001:db8:0:1234::/64 would be needed.

However the Rule 5.5 of the source address selection (discussed above) together with default router preference (specified in [\[RFC4191\]](#)) and RIO can be used to influence a source address selection on a host as described below. Let's look at source address selection on the host H41. It receives RAs from R3 with PIOs for 2001:db8:0:a020::/64 and 2001:db8:0:b020::/64. At that point all traffic would use the same next-hop (R3 link-local address) so Rule 5.5 does not apply. Now let's assume that R3 supports SADR and has two scoped forwarding tables, one scoped to S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52 and another scoped to S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52. If R3 generates two different link-local addresses for its interface facing H41 (one for each scoped forwarding table, LLA_A and LLA_B) and starts sending two different RAs: one is sent from LLA_A and includes PIO for 2001:db8:0:a020::/64, another is sent from LLA_B and includes PIO for 2001:db8:0:b020::/64. Now it is possible to influence H41 source address selection for destinations which follow the default route by setting default router preference in RAs. If it is desired that H41 reaches H101 (or any destinations in the Internet) via ISP-A, then RAs sent from LLA_A should have default router preference set to 01 (high priority), while RAs sent from LLA_B should have preference set

to 11 (low). Then LLA_A would be chosen as a next-hop for H101 and therefore (as per rule 5.5) 2001:db8:0:a020::41 would be selected as the source address. If, at the same time, it is desired that H61 is accessible via ISP-B then R3 should include a RIO for 2001:db8:0:6666::/64 to its RA sent from LLA_B. H41 would chose LLA_B as a next-hop for all traffic to H61 and then as per Rule 5.5, 2001:db8:0:b020::41 would be selected as a source address.

If in the above mentioned scenario it is desirable that all Internet traffic leaves the network via ISP-A and the link to ISP-B is used for accessing ISP-B services only (not as ISP-A link backup), then RAs sent by R3 from LLA_B should have Router Lifetime set to 0 and should include RIOs for ISP-B address space. It would instruct H41 to use LLA_A for all Internet traffic but use LLA_B as a next-hop while sending traffic to ISP-B addresses.

The proposed solution relies on SADR support by first-hop routers as well as SERs.

4.2.3. Controlling Source Address Selection With ICMPv6

We now discuss how one might use ICMPv6 to implement the routing policy to send traffic destined for H101 out the uplink to ISP-A, even when uplinks to both ISPs are working. If H31 started sending traffic to H101 with S=2001:db8:0:b010::31 and D=2001:db8:0:1234::101, it would be routed through SER-b1 and out the uplink to ISP-B. SERb1 could recognize that this is traffic is not following the desired routing policy and react by sending an ICMPv6 message back to H31.

In this example, we could arrange things so that SERb1 drops the packet with S=2001:db8:0:b010::31 and D=2001:db8:0:1234::101, and then sends to H31 an ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable message with Code 5 (Source address failed ingress/egress policy). When H31 receives this packet, it would then be expected to try another source address to reach the destination. In this example, H31 would then send a packet with S=2001:db8:0:a010::31 and D=2001:db8:0:1234::101, which will reach SERa and be forwarded out the uplink to ISP-A.

However, we would also want it to be the case that SERb1 does not enforce this routing policy when the uplink from SERa to ISP-A has failed. This could be accomplished by having SERa originate a source-prefix-scoped route for (S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52, D=2001:db8:0:1234::/64) and have SERb1 monitor the presence of that route. If that route is not present (because SERa has stopped originating it), then SERb1 will not enforce the routing policy, and it will forward packets with S=2001:db8:0:b010::31 and D=2001:db8:0:1234::101 out its uplink to ISP-B.

We can also use this source-prefix-scoped route originated by SERa to communicate the desired routing policy to SERb1. We can define an EXCLUSIVE flag to be advertised together with the IGP route for (S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52, D=2001:db8:0:1234::/64). This would allow SERa to communicate to SERb that SERb should reject traffic for D=2001:db8:0:1234::/64 and respond with an ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable Code 5 message, as long as the route for (S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52, D=2001:db8:0:1234::/64) is present.

Finally, if we are willing to extend ICMPv6 to support this solution, then we could create a mechanism for SERb1 to tell the host what source address it should be using to successfully forward packets that meet the policy. In its current form, when SERb1 sends an ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable Code 5 message, it is basically saying, "This source address is wrong. Try another source address." It would be better if the ICMPv6 message could say, "This source address is wrong. Instead use a source address in S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52."

However using ICMPv6 for signalling source address information back to hosts introduces new challenges. Most routers currently have software or hardware limits on generating ICMP messages. A site administrator deploying a solution that relies on the SERs generating ICMP messages could try to improve the performance of SERs for generating ICMP messages. However, in a large network, it is still likely that ICMP message generation limits will be reached. As a result hosts would not receive ICMPv6 back which in turns leads to traffic blackholing and poor user experience. To improve the scalability of ICMPv6-based signalling hosts SHOULD cache the preferred source address (or prefix) for the given destination. In addition, the same source prefix SHOULD be used for other destinations in the same /64 as the original destination address. The source prefix SHOULD have a specific lifetime. Expiration of the lifetime SHOULD trigger the source address selection algorithm again.

Using ICMPv6 Code 5 message for influencing source address selection allows an attacker to exhaust the list of candidate source addresses on the host by sending spoofed ICMPv6 Code 5 for all prefixes known on the network (therefore preventing a victim from establishing a communication with the destination host). To protect from such attack hosts SHOULD verify that the original packet header included into ICMPv6 error message was actually sent by the host.

4.2.4. Summary of Methods For Controlling Source Address Selection To Implement Routing Policy

So to summarize this section, we have looked at three methods for implementing a simple routing policy where all traffic for a given destination on the Internet needs to use a particular ISP, even when the uplinks to both ISPs are working.

The default source address selection policy cannot distinguish between the source addresses needed to enforce this policy, so a non-default policy table using associating source and destination prefixes using Label values would need to be installed on each host. A mechanism exists for DHCPv6 to distribute a non-default policy table but such solution would heavily rely on DHCPv6 support by host operating system. Moreover there is no mechanism to translate desired routing/traffic engineering policies into policy tables on DHCPv6 servers. Therefore using DHCPv6 for controlling address selection policy table is not recommended and SHOULD NOT be used.

At the same time Router Advertisements provide a reliable mechanism to influence source address selection process via PIO, RIO and default router preferences. As all those options have been standardized by IETF and are supported by various operating systems, no changes are required on hosts. First-hop routers in the enterprise network need to be able of sending different RAs for different SLAAC prefixes (either based on scoped forwarding tables or based on pre-configured policies).

SERs can enforce the routing policy by sending ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable messages with Code 5 (Source address failed ingress/egress policy) for traffic that is being sent with the wrong source address. The policy distribution can be automated by defining an EXCLUSIVE flag for the source-prefix-scoped route which can be set on the SER that originates the route. As ICMPv6 message generation can be rate-limited on routers, it SHOULD NOT be used as the only mechanism to influence source address selection on hosts. While hosts SHOULD select the correct source address for a given destination the network SHOULD signal any source address issues back to hosts using ICMPv6 error messages.

4.3. Selecting Source Address When One Uplink Has Failed

Now we discuss if DHCPv6, Neighbor Discovery Router Advertisements, and ICMPv6 can help a host choose the right source address when an uplink to one of the ISPs has failed. Again we look at the scenario in Figure 3. This time we look at traffic from H31 destined for external host H501 at D=2001:db8:0:5678::501. We initially assume

that the uplink from SERa to ISP-A is working and that the uplink from SERb1 to ISP-B is working.

We assume there is no particular routing policy desired, so H31 is free to send packets with S=2001:db8:0:a010::31 or S=2001:db8:0:b010::31 and have them delivered to H501. For this example, we assume that H31 has chosen S=2001:db8:0:b010::31 so that the packets exit via SERb to ISP-B. Now we see what happens when the link from SERb1 to ISP-B fails. How should H31 learn that it needs to start sending the packet to H501 with S=2001:db8:0:a010::31 in order to start using the uplink to ISP-A? We need to do this in a way that doesn't prevent H31 from still sending packets with S=2001:db8:0:b010::31 in order to reach H61 at D=2001:db8:0:6666::61.

4.3.1. Controlling Source Address Selection With DHCPv6

For this example we assume that the site network in Figure 3 has a centralized DHCP server and all routers act as DHCP relay agents. We assume that both of the addresses assigned to H31 were assigned via DHCP.

We could try to have the DHCP server monitor the state of the uplink from SERb1 to ISP-B in some manner and then tell H31 that it can no longer use S=2001:db8:0:b010::31 by setting its valid lifetime to zero. The DHCP server could initiate this process by sending a Reconfigure Message to H31 as described in [Section 19 of \[RFC3315\]](#). Or the DHCP server can assign addresses with short lifetimes in order to force clients to renew them often.

This approach would prevent H31 from using S=2001:db8:0:b010::31 to reach the a host on the Internet. However, it would also prevent H31 from using S=2001:db8:0:b010::31 to reach H61 at D=2001:db8:0:6666::61, which is not desirable.

Another potential approach is to have the DHCP server monitor the uplink from SERb1 to ISP-B and control the choice of source address on H31 by updating its address selection policy table via the mechanism in [\[RFC7078\]](#). The DHCP server could initiate this process by sending a Reconfigure Message to H31. Note that [\[RFC3315\]](#) requires that Reconfigure Message use DHCP authentication. DHCP authentication could be avoided by using short address lifetimes to force clients to send Renew messages to the server often. If the host is not obtaining its IP addresses from the DHCP server, then it would need to use the Information Refresh Time option defined in [\[RFC4242\]](#).

If the following policy table can be installed on H31 after the failure of the uplink from SERb1, then the desired routing behavior

should be achieved based on source and destination prefix being matched with label values.

Prefix	Precedence	Label
::/0	50	44
2001:db8:0:a000::/52	50	44
2001:db8:0:6666::/64	50	55
2001:db8:0:b000::/52	50	55

Figure 10: Policy Table Needed On Failure Of Uplink From SERb1

The described solution has a number of significant drawbacks, some of them already discussed in [Section 4.2.1](#).

- o DHCPv6 support is not required for an IPv6 host and there are operating systems which do not support DHCPv6. Besides that, it does not appear that [\[RFC7078\]](#) has been widely implemented on host operating systems.
- o [\[RFC7078\]](#) does not clearly specify this kind of a dynamic use case where address selection policy needs to be updated quickly in response to the failure of a link. In a large network it would present scalability issues as many hosts need to be reconfigured in very short period of time.
- o No mechanism exists for making DHCPv6 servers aware of network topology/routing changes in the network. In general DHCPv6 servers monitoring network-related events sounds like a bad idea as completely new functionality beyond the scope of DHCPv6 role is required.

[4.3.2](#). Controlling Source Address Selection With Router Advertisements

The same mechanism as discussed in [Section 4.2.2](#) can be used to control the source address selection in the case of an uplink failure. If a particular prefix should not be used as a source for any destinations, then the router needs to send RA with Preferred Lifetime field for that prefix set to 0.

Let's consider a scenario when all uplinks are operational and H41 receives two different RAs from R3: one from LLA_A with PIO for 2001:db8:0:a020::/64, default router preference set to 11 (low) and another one from LLA_B with PIO for 2001:db8:0:a020::/64, default router preference set to 01 (high) and RIO for 2001:db8:0:6666::/64. As a result H41 is using 2001:db8:0:b020::41 as a source address for all Internet traffic and those packets are sent by SERs to ISP-B. If SERb1 uplink to ISP-B failed, the desired behavior is that H41 stops

using 2001:db8:0:b020::41 as a source address for all destinations but H61. To achieve that R3 should react to SERb1 uplink failure (which could be detected as the scoped route (S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52, D=::/0) disappearance) by withdrawing itself as a default router. R3 sends a new RA from LLA_B with Router Lifetime value set to 0 (which means that it should not be used as default router). That RA still contains PIO for 2001:db8:0:b020::/64 (for SLAAC purposes) and RIO for 2001:db8:0:6666::/64 so H41 can reach H61 using LLA_B as a next-hop and 2001:db8:0:b020::41 as a source address. For all traffic following the default route, LLA_A will be used as a next-hop and 2001:db8:0:a020::41 as a source address.

If all uplinks to ISP-B have failed and therefore source addresses from ISP-B address space should not be used at all, the forwarding table scoped S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52 contains no entries. Hosts can be instructed to stop using source addresses from that block by sending RAs containing PIO with Preferred Lifetime set to 0.

4.3.3. Controlling Source Address Selection With ICMPv6

Now we look at how ICMPv6 messages can provide information back to H31. We assume again that at the time of the failure H31 is sending packets to H501 using (S=2001:db8:0:b010::31, D=2001:db8:0:5678::501). When the uplink from SERb1 to ISP-B fails, SERb1 would stop originating its source-prefix-scoped route for the default destination (S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52, D=::/0) as well as its unscoped default destination route. With these routes no longer in the IGP, traffic with (S=2001:db8:0:b010::31, D=2001:db8:0:5678::501) would end up at SERa based on the unscoped default destination route being originated by SERa. Since that traffic has the wrong source address to be forwarded to ISP-A, SERa would drop it and send a Destination Unreachable message with Code 5 (Source address failed ingress/egress policy) back to H31. H31 would then know to use another source address for that destination and would try with (S=2001:db8:0:a010::31, D=2001:db8:0:5678::501). This would be forwarded to SERa based on the source-prefix-scoped default destination route still being originated by SERa, and SERa would forward it to ISP-A. As discussed above, if we are willing to extend ICMPv6, SERa can even tell H31 what source address it should use to reach that destination. The expected host behaviour has been discussed in [Section 4.2.3](#). Potential issue with using ICMPv6 for signalling source address issues back to hosts is that uplink to an ISP-B failure immediately invalidates source addresses from 2001:db8:0:b000::/52 for all hosts which triggers a large number of ICMPv6 being sent back to hosts - the same scalability/rate limiting issues discussed in [Section 4.2.3](#) would apply.

4.3.4. Summary Of Methods For Controlling Source Address Selection On The Failure Of An Uplink

It appears that DHCPv6 is not particularly well suited to quickly changing the source address used by a host in the event of the failure of an uplink, which eliminates DHCPv6 from the list of potential solutions. On the other hand Router Advertisements provides a reliable mechanism to dynamically provide hosts with a list of valid prefixes to use as source addresses as well as prevent particular prefixes to be used. While no additional new features are required to be implemented on hosts, routers need to be able to send RAs based on the state of scoped forwarding tables entries and to react to network topology changes by sending RAs with particular parameters set.

The use of ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable messages generated by the SER (or any SADR-capable) routers seem like they have the potential to provide a support mechanism together with RAs to signal source address selection errors back to hosts, however scalability issues may arise in large networks in case of sudden topology change. Therefore it is highly desirable that hosts are able to select the correct source address in case of uplinks failure with ICMPv6 being an additional mechanism to signal unexpected failures back to hosts.

The current behavior of different host operating system when receiving ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable message with code 5 (Source address failed ingress/egress policy) is not clear to the authors. Information from implementers, users, and testing would be quite helpful in evaluating this approach.

4.4. Selecting Source Address Upon Failed Uplink Recovery

The next logical step is to look at the scenario when a failed uplink on SERb1 to ISP-B is coming back up, so hosts can start using source addresses belonging to 2001:db8:0:b000::/52 again.

4.4.1. Controlling Source Address Selection With DHCPv6

The mechanism to use DHCPv6 to instruct the hosts (H31 in our example) to start using prefixes from ISP-B space (e.g. S=2001:db8:0:b010::31 for H31) to reach hosts on the Internet is quite similar to one discussed in [Section 4.3.1](#) and shares the same drawbacks.

4.4.2. Controlling Source Address Selection With Router Advertisements

Let's look at the scenario discussed in [Section 4.3.2](#). If the uplink(s) failure caused the complete withdrawal of prefixes from 2001:db8:0:b000::/52 address space by setting Preferred Lifetime value to 0, then the recovery of the link should just trigger new RA being sent with non-zero Preferred Lifetime. In another scenario discussed in [Section 4.3.2](#), the SERb1 uplink to ISP-B failure leads to disappearance of the (S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52, D=::/0) entry from the forwarding table scoped to S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52 and, in turn, caused R3 to send RAs from LLA_B with Router Lifetime set to 0. The recovery of the SERb1 uplink to ISP-B leads to (S=2001:db8:0:b000::/52, D=::/0) scoped forwarding entry re-appearance and instructs R3 that it should advertise itself as a default router for ISP-B address space domain (send RAs from LLA_B with non-zero Router Lifetime).

4.4.3. Controlling Source Address Selection With ICMP

It looks like ICMPv6 provides a rather limited functionality to signal back to hosts that particular source addresses have become valid again. Unless the changes in the uplink state a particular (S,D) pair, hosts can keep using the same source address even after an ISP uplink has come back up. For example, after the uplink from SERb1 to ISP-B had failed, H31 received ICMPv6 Code 5 message (as described in [Section 4.3.3](#)) and allegedly started using (S=2001:db8:0:a010::31, D=2001:db8:0:5678::501) to reach H501. Now when the SERb1 uplink comes back up, the packets with that (S,D) pair are still routed to SERa1 and sent to the Internet. Therefore H31 is not informed that it should stop using 2001:db8:0:a010::31 and start using 2001:db8:0:b010::31 again. Unless SERa has a policy configured to drop packets (S=2001:db8:0:a010::31, D=2001:db8:0:5678::501) and send ICMPv6 back if SERb1 uplink to ISP-B is up, H31 will be unaware of the network topology change and keep using S=2001:db8:0:a010::31 for Internet destinations, including H51.

One of the possible option may be using a scoped route with EXCLUSIVE flag as described in [Section 4.2.3](#). SERa1 uplink recovery would cause (S=2001:db8:0:a000::/52, D=2001:db8:0:1234::/64) route to reappear in the routing table. In the absence of that route packets to H101 which were sent to ISP-B (as ISP-A uplink was down) with source addresses from 2001:db8:0:b000::/52. When the route reappears SERb1 would reject those packets and sends ICMPv6 back as discussed in [Section 4.2.3](#). Practically it might lead to scalability issues which have been already discussed in [Section 4.2.3](#) and [Section 4.4.3](#).

4.4.4. Summary Of Methods For Controlling Source Address Selection Upon Failed Uplink Recovery

Once again DHCPv6 does not look like reasonable choice to manipulate source address selection process on a host in the case of network topology changes. Using Router Advertisement provides the flexible mechanism to dynamically react to network topology changes (if routers are able to use routing changes as a trigger for sending out RAs with specific parameters). ICMPv6 could be considered as a supporting mechanism to signal incorrect source address back to hosts but should not be considered as the only mechanism to control the address selection in multihomed environments.

4.5. Selecting Source Address When All Uplinks Failed

One particular tricky case is a scenario when all uplinks have failed. In that case there is no valid source address to be used for any external destinations while it might be desirable to have intra-site connectivity.

4.5.1. Controlling Source Address Selection With DHCPv6

From DHCPv6 perspective uplinks failure should be treated as two independent failures and processed as described in [Section 4.3.1](#). At this stage it is quite obvious that it would result in quite complicated policy table which needs to be explicitly configured by administrators and therefore seems to be impractical.

4.5.2. Controlling Source Address Selection With Router Advertisements

As discussed in [Section 4.3.2](#) an uplink failure causes the scoped default entry to disappear from the scoped forwarding table and triggers RAs with zero Router Lifetime. Complete disappearance of all scoped entries for a given source prefix would cause the prefix being withdrawn from hosts by setting Preferred Lifetime value to zero in PIO. If all uplinks (SERa, SERb1 and SERb2) failed, hosts either lost their default routers and/or have no global IPv6 addresses to use as a source. (Note that 'uplink failure' might mean 'IPv6 connectivity failure with IPv4 still being reachable', in which case hosts might fall back to IPv4 if there is IPv4 connectivity to destinations). As a results intra-site connectivity is broken. One of the possible way to solve it is to use ULAs.

All hosts have ULA addresses assigned in addition to GUAs and used for intra-site communication even if there is no GUA assigned to a host. To avoid accidental leaking of packets with ULA sources SADR-capable routers SHOULD have a scoped forwarding table for ULA source for internal routes but MUST NOT have an entry for D::

table. In the absence of (S=ULA_Prefix; D=::/0) first-hop routers will send dedicated RAs from a unique link-local source LLA_ULA with PIO from ULA address space, RIO for the ULA prefix and Router Lifetime set to zero. The behaviour is consistent with the situation when SERb1 lost the uplink to ISP-B (so there is no Internet connectivity from 2001:db8:0:b000::/52 sources) but those sources can be used to reach some specific destinations. In the case of ULA there is no Internet connectivity from ULA sources but they can be used to reach another ULA destinations. Note that ULA usage could be particularly useful if all ISPs assign prefixes via DHCP-PD. In the absence of ULAs uplinks failure hosts would lose all their GUAs upon prefix lifetime expiration which again makes intra-site communication impossible.

4.5.3. Controlling Source Address Selection With ICMPv6

In case of all uplinks failure all SERs will drop outgoing IPv6 traffic and respond with ICMPv6 error message. In the large network when many hosts are trying to reach Internet destinations it means that SERs need to generate an ICMPv6 error to every packet they receive from hosts which presents the same scalability issues discussed in [Section 4.3.3](#)

4.5.4. Summary Of Methods For Controlling Source Address Selection When All Uplinks Failed

Again, combining SADR with Router Advertisements seems to be the most flexible and scalable way to control the source address selection on hosts.

4.6. Summary Of Methods For Controlling Source Address Selection

To summarize the scenarios and options discussed above:

While DHCPv6 allows administrators to manipulate source address selection policy tables, this method has a number of significant disadvantages which eliminates DHCPv6 from a list of potential solutions:

1. It required hosts to support DHCPv6 and its extension ([RFC7078](#));
2. DHCPv6 server need to monitor network state and detect routing changes.
3. Network topology/routing policy changes could trigger simultaneous re-configuration of large number of hosts which present serious scalability issues.

The use of Router Advertisements to influence the source address selection on hosts seem to be the most reliable, flexible and scalable solution. It has the following benefits:

1. no new (non-standard) functionality needs to be implemented on hosts (except for [\[RFC4191\]](#) support);
2. no changes in RA format;
3. Routers can react to routing table changes by sending RAs which would minimize the failover time in the case of network topology changes;
4. information required for source address selection is broadcast to all affected hosts in case of topology change event which improves the scalability of the solution (comparing to DHCPv6 reconfiguration or ICMPv6 error messages).

To fully benefit from the RA-based solution, first-hop routers need to implement SADR and be able to send dedicated RAs per scoped forwarding table as discussed above, reacting to network changes with sending new RAs. It should be noted that the proposed solution would work even if first-hop routers are not SADR-capable but still able to send individual RAs for each ISP prefix and react to topology changes as discussed above

The RA-based solution relies heavily on hosts correctly implementing default address selection algorithm as defined in [\[RFC6724\]](#) and in particular, Rule 5.5. There are some evidences that not all host OSes have that rule implemented currently (it should be noted that [\[I-D.ietf-6man-multi-homed-host\]](#) states that Rule 5.5 SHOULD be implemented.

ICMPv6 Code 5 error message SHOULD be used to complement RA-based solution to signal incorrect source address selection back to hosts, but it SHOULD NOT be considered as the stand-alone solution. To prevent scenarios when hosts in multihomed environments incorrectly identify onlink/offlink destinations, hosts should treat ICMPv6 Redirects as discussed in [\[I-D.ietf-6man-multi-homed-host\]](#).

[4.7.](#) Other Configuration Parameters

[4.7.1.](#) DNS Configuration

In multihomed environment each ISP might provide their own list of DNS servers. E.g. in the topology show on Figure 3, ISP-A might provide recursive DNS server H51 2001:db8:0:5555::51, while ISP-B might provide H61 2001:db8:0:6666::61 as a recursive DNS server. If

the multihomed enterprise network is not running their own recursive resolver then hosts need to be configured with DNS server IPv6 addresses. [RFC6106] defines IPv6 Router Advertisement options to allow IPv6 routers to advertise a list of DNS recursive server addresses and a DNS Search List to IPv6 hosts. Using RDNSS together with 'scoped' RAs as described above would allow a first-hop router (R3 in the Figure 3) to send DNS server addresses and search lists provided by each ISPs.

As discussed in [Section 4.5.2](#), failure of all ISP uplinks would cause deprecation of all addresses assigned to a host from ISPs address space. Most likely intra-site IPv6 connectivity would be still desirable so [Section 4.5.2](#) proposes a usage of ULAs to enable intra-site communication. In such scenario the enterprise network should run its own recursive DNS server(s) and provide its ULA addresses to hosts via RDNSS mechanism in RAs send for ULA-scoped forwarding table as described in [Section 4.5.2](#).

It should be noted that [RFC6106] explicitly prohibits using DNS information if the RA router Lifetime expired: "An RDNSS address or a DNSSL domain name MUST be used only as long as both the RA router Lifetime (advertised by a Router Advertisement message) and the corresponding option Lifetime have not expired.". Therefore hosts might ignore RDNSS information provided in ULA-scoped RAs as those RAs would have router lifetime set to 0. However the updated version of [RFC6106](#) ([[I-D.ietf-6man-rdnss-rfc6106bis](#)]) has that requirement removed.

5. Other Solutions

5.1. Shim6

The Shim6 working group specified the Shim6 protocol [[RFC5533](#)] which allows a host at a multihomed site to communicate with an external host and exchange information about possible source and destination address pairs that they can use to communicate. It also specified the REAP protocol [[RFC5534](#)] to detect failures in the path between working address pairs and find new working address pairs. A fundamental requirement for Shim6 is that both internal and external hosts need to support Shim6. That is, both the host internal to the multihomed site and the host external to the multihomed site need to support Shim6 in order for there to be any benefit for the internal host to run Shim6. The Shim6 protocol specification was published in 2009, but it has not been implemented on widely used operating systems.

We do not consider Shim6 to be a viable solution. It suffers from the fact that it requires widespread deployment of Shim6 on hosts all

over the Internet before the host at a PA multihomed site sees significant benefit. However, there appears to be no motivation for the vast majority of hosts on the Internet (which are not at PA multihomed sites) to deploy Shim6. This may help explain why Shim6 has not been widely implemented.

5.2. IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix Translation

IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix Translation (NPTv6) [[RFC6296](#)] is not the focus of this document. This document describes a solution where a host in a multihomed site determines which ISP a packet will be sent to based on the source address it applies to the packet. This solution has many moving parts. It requires some routers in the enterprise site to support some form of Source Address Dependent Routing (SADR). It requires a host to be able to learn when the uplink to an ISP fails so that it can stop using the source address corresponding to that ISP. Ongoing work to create mechanisms to accomplish this are discussed in this document, but they are still a work in progress.

This document attempts to create a PA multihoming solution that is as easy as possible for an enterprise to deploy. However, the success of this solution will depend greatly on whether or not the mechanisms for hosts to select source addresses based on the state of ISP uplinks gets implemented across a wide range of operating systems as the default mode of operation. Until that occurs, NPTv6 should still be considered a viable option to enable PA multihoming for enterprises.

6. IANA Considerations

This memo asks the IANA for no new parameters.

7. Security Considerations

7.1. Privacy Considerations

8. Acknowledgements

The original outline was suggested by Ole Troan.

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[Appendix A](#). Change Log

Initial Version: July 2016

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