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# Discovering Provisioning Domain Names and Data draft-bruneau-intarea-provisioning-domains-02

### Abstract

An increasing number of hosts and networks are connected to the Internet through multiple interfaces, some of which may provide multiple ways to access the internet by the mean of multiple IPv6 prefix configurations.

This document describes a way for hosts to retrieve additional information about their network access characteristics. The set of configuration items required to access the Internet is called a Provisioning Domain (PvD) and is identified by a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). This identifier, retrieved using a new Router Advertisement (RA) option, is associated with the set of information included within the RA and may later be used to retrieve additional information associated with the PvD by the mean of an HTTP request.

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## **<u>1</u>**. Introduction

It has become very common in modern networks that hosts have internet or more specific network access through different networking interfaces, tunnels, or next-hop routers. The concept of Provisioning Domain (PvD) was defined in [<u>RFC7556</u>] as a set of network configuration information which can be used by hosts in order to access the network.

This specification provides a way to identify explicit PvDs with Fully Qualified Domain Names called PvD IDs, which are included in a new Router Advertisement [RFC4861] option. This new option, when present, is used to associate the correlated set of configuration information with the identified PvD. It is worth noting that multiple PvDs with different PvD IDs could be provisioned on any host interface, as well as noting that the same PvD ID could be used on different interfaces in order to inform the host that both PvDs, on different interfaces, ultimately provide identical services.

This document also introduces a way for hosts to retrieve additional information related to a specific PvD by the mean of an HTTP-over-TLS query using an URI derived from the PvD ID. The retrieved JSON object contains additional network information that would typically be considered unfit, or too large, to be directly included in the Router Advertisements. This information can be used by the networking stack, the applications, or even be partially displayed to the users (e.g., by displaying a localized network service name).

# 2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

In addition, this document uses the following terminology:

- PvD: A Provisioning Domain, a set of network configuration information; for more information, see [<u>RFC7556</u>].
- PvD ID: A Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) used to identify a PvD.

Explicit PvD: A PvD uniquely identified with a PvD ID. for more information, see [<u>RFC7556</u>].

Implicit PvD: A PvD associated with a set of configuration information that, in the absence of a PvD ID, is associated with the advertising router.

#### 3. Provisioning Domain Identification using Router Advertisements

Each provisioning domain is identified by a PvD ID. The PvD ID is a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) which MUST belong to the network operator in order to avoid ambiguity. The same PvD ID MAY be used in several access networks when the set of configuration information is identical (e.g. in all home networks subscribed to the same service).

## 3.1. PvD ID Option for Router Advertisements

This document introduces a new Router Advertisement (RA) option called the PvD ID Router Advertisement Option, used to convey the FQDN identifying a given PvD.

Θ	1		2	3
01234	5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4	56789	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	901
+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-	+ - + - + - + - + - +	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-	. + - + - +
Туре	Length	H L	Reserved	
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	Sequence	I		
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	+-+-+-+-+-+-	+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-	. + - + - +
		Paddin	g	
+-+-+-+-+-+	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-	+ - + - + - + - + - +	-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-	. + - + - +

#### PvD ID Router Advertisements Option format

Type : (8 bits) To be defined by IANA.

- Length : (8 bits) The length of the option (including the Type and Length fields) in units of 8 octets.
- H-flag : (1 bit) Whether some PvD Additional Information is made available through HTTP over TLS, as described in <u>Section 4</u>.
- L-flag : (1 bit) Whether the router is also providing IPv4 access using DHCPv4 (see <u>Section 3.3.2</u>).

Reserved : (14 bits) Reserved for later use. It MUST be set to zero by the sender and ignored by the receiver.

Sequence : (16 bits) Sequence number for the PvD Additional Information, as described in <u>Section 4</u>.

- PvD ID FQDN : An ASCII string representation of the FQDN used as PvD ID. The string ends at the first byte set to zero, or the end of the option, whichever comes first.
- Padding : Zero or more padding octets such as to set the option length (Type and Length fields included) to eight times the value of the Length field. It MUST be set to zero by the sender and ignored by the receiver.

Routers MUST NOT include more than one PvD ID Router Advertisement Option in each RA. In case multiple PvD ID options are found in a given RA, hosts MUST ignore all but the first PvD ID option.

Note: The existence and/or size of the sequence number is subject to discussion. The validity of a PvD Additional Information object is included in the object itself, but this only allows for 'pull based' updates, whereas the RA options usually provide 'push based' updates.

#### 3.2. Router Behavior

A router MAY insert at most one PvD ID Option in its RAs. The included PvD ID is associated with all the other options included in the same RA (e.g., Prefix Information [<u>RFC4861</u>], Recursive DNS Server [<u>RFC6106</u>], Routing Information [<u>RFC4191</u>] options).

In order to provide multiple independent PvDs, a router MUST send multiple RAs using different source link-local addresses (LLA) (as proposed in [<u>I-D.bowbakova-rtgwg-enterprise-pa-multihoming</u>]), each of which MAY include a PvD ID option. In such cases, routers MAY originate the different RAs using the same datalink layer address.

If the router is actually a VRRP instance [<u>RFC5798</u>], then the procedure is identical except that the virtual datalink layer address is used as well as the virtual IPv6 addresses.

### <u>3.3</u>. Host Behavior

RAs are used to configure IPv6 hosts. When a host receives an RA message including a PvD ID Option, it MUST associate all the configuration objects which are updated by the received RA (e.g., Prefix Information [RFC4861], Recursive DNS Server [RFC6106], Routing Information [RFC4191] options) with the PvD identified by the PvD ID Option, even if some objects are already ssociated with a different explicit or implicit PvD.

If the received RA does not include a PvD ID Option, the host MUST associate the configuration objects which are updated by the received RA with an implicit PvD, even if some objects were already associated

with a different explicit or implicit PvD. This implicit PvD is identified by the link-local address of the router sending the RA and the interface on which the RA was received.

This document does not update the way Router Advertisement options are processed. But in addition to the option processing defined in other documents, hosts implementing this specification MUST associate each created or updated object (e.g. address, default route, more specific route, DNS server list) with the PvD associated with the received RA.

Note: There is a discussion whether there can be multiple implicit PvDs on a single interface (i.e. whether the router link-local address should be used to identify the implicit PvDs).

While resolving names, executing the default address selection algorithm [<u>RFC6724</u>] or executing the default router selection algorithm ([<u>RFC2461</u>], [<u>RFC4191</u>] and [<u>RFC8028</u>]), hosts MAY consider only the configuration associated with an arbitrary set of PvDs.

For example, a host MAY associate a given process with a specific PvD, or a specific set of PvDs, while associating another process with another PvD. A PvD-aware application might also be able to select, on a per-connection basis, which PvDs should be used for a given connection. In particular, constrained devices such as small battery operated devices (e.g. IoT), or devices with limited CPU or memory resources may purposefully use a single PvD while ignoring some received RAs containing different PvD IDs.

The way an application expresses its desire to use a given PvD, or a set of PvDs, or the way this selection is enforced, is out of the scope of this document. Useful insights about these considerations can be found in [I-D.kline-mif-mpvd-api-reqs].

#### <u>**3.3.1</u></u>. DHCPv6 configuration association</u>**

When a host retrieves configuration elements using DHCPv6, they MUST be associated with the explicit or implicit PvD of the RA received on the same interface, using the same link-local address, and with the O-flag set [<u>RFC4861</u>]. If no such PvD is found, or whenever multiple different PvDs are found, the host behavior is unspecified.

This process requires hosts to keep track of received RAs, associated PvD IDs, and routers link-local addresses.

# 3.3.2. DHCPv4 configuration association

When a host retrieves configuration elements from DHCPv4, they MUST be associated with the explicit PvD received on the same interface, whose PVD ID Options L-flag is set and, in the case of a non pointto-point link, using the same link-layer address. If no such PvD is found, or whenever multiple different PvDs are found, the configuration elements coming from DHCPv4 MUST be associated with an IPv4-only implicit PvD identified by the interface on which the DHCPv4 transaction happened.

#### 3.3.3. Interconnection Sharing by the Host

The situation when a host becomes also a router by acting as a router or ND proxy on a different interface (such as WiFi) to share the connectivity of another interface (such as cellular), also known as "tethering" is TBD but it is expected that the one or several PvD associated to the shared interface will also be advertised to the clients.

#### **<u>4</u>**. Provisioning Domain Additional Information

Once a new PvD ID is discovered, it may be used to retrieve additional information about the characteristics of the provided connectivity. This set of information is called PvD Additional Information, and is encoded as a JSON object [<u>RFC7159</u>].

The purpose of this additional set of information is to securely provide additional information to hosts about the connectivity that is provided using a given interface and source address pair. It typically includes data that would be considered too large, or not critical enough, to be provided within an RA option. The information contained in this object MAY be used by the operating system, network libraries, applications, or users, in order to decide which set of PvDs should be used for which connection, as described in Section 3.3.

#### 4.1. Retrieving the PvD Additional Information

When the H-flag of the PvD ID Option is set, hosts MAY attempt to retrieve the PvD Additional Information associated with a given PvD by performing an HTTP over TLS [<u>RFC2818</u>] GET query to https://<PvD-ID >/.well-known/pvd [<u>RFC5785</u>]. Inversely, hosts MUST NOT do so whenever the H-flag is not set.

Note: Should the PvD AI retrieval be a MAY or a SHOULD ? Could the object contain critical data, or should it only contain informational data ?

Note that the DNS name resolution of <PvD-ID> as well as the actual query MUST be performed using the PvD associated with the PvD ID. In other words, the name resolution, source address selection, as well as the next-hop router selection MUST be performed while using exclusively the set of configuration information attached with the PvD, as defined in <u>Section 3.3</u>. In some cases, it may therefore be necessary to wait for an address to be available for use (e.g., once the Duplicate Address Detection or DHCPv6 processes are complete) before initiating the HTTP over TLS query.

If the HTTP status of the answer is greater than or equal to 400 the host MUST abandon and consider that there is no additional PvD information. If the HTTP status of the answer is between 300 included and 399 included it MUST follow the redirection(s). If the HTTP status of the answer is between 200 included and 299 included the host MAY get a file containing a single JSON object. When a JSON object could not be retrieved, an error message SHOULD be logged and/ or displayed in a rate-limited fashion.

After retrieval of the PvD Additional Information, hosts MUST watch the PvD ID Sequence field for change. In case a different value than the one in the RA Sequence field is observed, or whenever the validity time included in the PVD Additional Information JSON object is expired, hosts MUST either perform a new query and retrieve a new version of the object, or deprecate the object and stop using it.

Hosts retrieving a new PvD Additional Information object MUST check for the presence and validity of the mandatory fields <u>Section 4.3</u>. A retrieved object including an outdated expiration time or missing a mandatory element MUST be ignored. In order to avoid traffic spikes toward the server hosting the PvD Additional Information when an object expires, a host which last retrieved an object at a time A, including a validity time B, SHOULD renew the object at a uniformly random time in the interval [(B-A)/2,A].

The PvD Additional Information object includes a set of IPv6 prefixes which MUST be checked against all the Prefix Information Options advertised in the Router Advertisement. If any of the prefixes included in the Prefix Information Options is not included in at least one of the listed prefixes, the PvD associated with the tested prefix MUST be considered unsafe and MUST NOT be used. While this does not prevent a malicious network provider, it does complicate some attack scenarios, and may help detecting misconfiguration.

The server providing the JSON files SHOULD also check whether the client address is part of the prefixes listed into the additional information and SHOULD return a 403 response code if there is no

match. The server MAY also use the client address to select the right JSON object to be returned.

### **4.2**. Providing the PvD Additional Information

Whenever the H-flag is set in the PvD RA Option, a valid PvD Additional Information object MUST be made available to all hosts receiving the RA. In particular, when a captive portal is present, hosts MUST still be allowed to access the object, even before logging into the captive portal.

Routers MAY increment the PVD ID Sequence number in order to inform host that a new PvD Additional Information object is available and should be retrieved.

### **4.3**. PvD Additional Information Format

The PvD Additional Information is a JSON object.

The following array presents the mandatory keys which MUST be included in the object:

	+   Description +	Туре	++   Example   ++
-	Human-readable   service name		"Awesome Wifi"   
expires   	Date after which   this object is   not valid	[ <u>RFC3339</u> ]   	"2017-07-23T06:00:00Z"   
prefixes     +	Array of IPv6   prefixes valid   for this PVD	1	["2001:db8:1::/48",     "2001:db8:4::/48"]   

A retrieved object which does not include a valid string associated with the "name" key at the root of the object, or a valid date associated with the "expiration" key, also at the root of the object, MUST be ignored. In such cases, an error message SHOULD be logged and/or displayed in a rate-limited fashion.

The following table presents some optional keys which MAY be included in the object.

+	Description	+	++
JSON key		Type	Example
localizedName           	<pre>  Localized user-   visible service name,   language can be   selected based on the   HTTP Accept-Language   header in the   request.</pre>	string 	"Wifi Genial"                       
noInternet	<pre>  No Internet, set when</pre>	boolean	true
	the PvD only provides		
	restricted access to		
	a set of services.		
characteristics	Connectivity	JSON	See Section
	characteristics	object	4.3.1
,   metered   	metered, when the   access volume is   limited.	boolean   	false         

It is worth noting that the JSON format allows for extensions. Whenever an unknown key is encountered, it MUST be ignored along with its associated elements.

# **<u>4.3.1</u>**. Connectivity Characteristics Information

The following set of keys can be used to signal certain characteristics of the connection towards the PvD.

They should reflect characteristics of the overall access technology which is not limited to the link the host is connected to, but rather a combination of the link technology, CPE upstream connectivity, and further quality of service considerations.

+   JSON key	+   Description +	+   Type +	++   Example
<pre>+   maxThroughput         minLatency           rl  </pre>	+   Maximum   achievable   throughput   Minimum   achievable   latency   Maximum   achievable	up(int)}) in kb/s     object({down(int),	
 +	reliability	every 1000 packets	

# 4.3.2. Private Extensions

JSON keys starting with "x-" are reserved for private use and can be utilized to provide information that is specific to vendor, user or enterprise. It is RECOMMENDED to use one of the patterns "x-FQDN-KEY" or "x-PEN-KEY" where FQDN is a fully qualified domain name or PEN is a private enterprise number [PEN] under control of the author of the extension to avoid collisions.

# 4.3.3. Example

Here are two examples based on the keys defined in this section.

```
{
  "name": "Foo Wireless",
  "localizedName": "Foo-France Wifi",
  "expires": "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z",
  "prefixes" : ["2001:db8:1::/48", "2001:db8:4::/48"],
  "characteristics": {
  "maxThroughput": { "down":200000, "up": 50000 },
  "minLatency": { "down": 0.1, "up": 1 }
 }
}
{
  "name": "Bar 4G",
  "localizedName": "Bar US 4G",
  "expires": "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z",
  "prefixes": ["2001:db8:1::/48", "2001:db8:4::/48"],
  "metered": true,
  "characteristics": {
    "maxThroughput": { "down":80000, "up": 20000 }
 }
}
```

## 5. Security Considerations

Although some solutions such as IPsec or SEND [<u>RFC3971</u>] can be used in order to secure the IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol, actual deployments largely rely on link layer or physical layer security mechanisms (e.g. 802.1x [<u>IEEE8021X</u>]) in conjunction with RA Guard [<u>RFC6105</u>].

This specification does not improve the Neighbor Discovery Protocol security model, but extends the purely link-local configuration retrieval mechanisms with HTTP-over-TLS communications.

During the exchange, the server authenticity is verified by the mean of a certificate, validated based on the FQDN found in the Router Advertisement (e.g. using a list of pre-installed CA certificates, or DNSSec [RFC4035] with DNS Based Authentication of Named Entities [RFC6698]). This authentication creates a secure binding between the information provided by the trusted Router Advertisement, and the HTTP server. But this does not mean the Advertising Router and the PvD server belong to the same entity.

The IPv6 prefixes list included in the PvD Additional Information JSON object is used to validate that the prefixes included in the Router Advertisements are really part of the PvD. An adversarial router willing to fake the use of a given explicit PvD, without any access to the actual PvD, would need to perform NAT66 in order to circumvent this check.

It is also RECOMMENDED that the PvD server checks the source addresses of incoming connexions (see <u>Section 4.1</u>). This check ensures that the internet access provided by any router advertising a given PvD eventually reaches the internet using the actual PvD (Tunneling can still be used).

For privacy reasons, it is desirable that the PvD Additional Information object may only be retrieved by the hosts using the given PvD. Host identity SHOULD be validated based on the client address that is used during the HTTP query.

### **<u>6</u>**. Privacy Considerations

TBD

# 7. IANA Considerations

IANA is kindly requested to allocate a new IPv6 Neighbor Discovery option number for the PvD ID Router Advertisement option.

The URI used to retrieve the PvD Additional Information JSON object is the well known URI (see [<u>RFC5785</u>]) with the URI suffix "pvd".

TBD: JSON keys will need a new registry.

## 8. Acknowledgements

Many thanks to M. Stenberg and S. Barth for their earlier work: [<u>I-D.stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns</u>].

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IEEE, "IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port based Network Access Control, IEEE Std", .

[github] Cisco, "IPv6-mPvD github repository", <<u>https://github.com/</u> IPv6-mPvD>.

#### <u>Appendix A</u>. Changelog

Note to RFC Editors: Remove this section before publication.

## A.1. Version 00

Initial version of the draft. Edited by Basile Bruneau + Eric Vyncke and based on Basile's work.

#### A.2. Version 01

Major rewrite intended to focus on the the retained solution based on corridors, online, and WG discussions. Edited by Pierre Pfister. The following list only includes major changes.

PvD ID is an FQDN retrieved using a single RA option. This option contains a sequence number for push-based updates, a new H-flag, and a L-flag in order to link the PvD with the IPv4 DHCP server.

A lifetime is included in the PvD ID option.

Detailed Hosts and Routers specifications.

Additional Information is retrieved using HTTP-over-TLS when the PvD ID Option H-flag is set. Retrieving the object is optional.

The PvD Additional Information object includes a validity date.

DNS-based approach is removed as well as the DNS-based encoding of the PvD Additional Information.

Major cut in the list of proposed JSON keys. This document may be extended later if need be.

Monetary discussion is moved to the appendix.

Clarification about the 'prefixes' contained in the additional information.

Clarification about the processing of DHCPv6.

### A.3. Version 02

The FQDN is now encoded with ASCII format (instead of DNS binary) in the RA option.

The PvD ID option lifetime is removed from the object.

Use well known URI "https://<PvD-ID>/.well-known/pvd"

Reference **RFC3339** for JSON timestamp format.

The PvD ID Sequence field has been extended to 16 bits.

Modified host behavior for DHCPv4 and DHCPv6.

Removed IKEv2 section.

Removed mention of <u>RFC7710</u> Captive Portal option. A new I.D. will be proposed to address the captive portal use case.

## Appendix B. Connection monetary cost

NOTE: This section is included as a request for comment on the potential use and syntax.

The billing of a connection can be done in a lot of different ways. The user can have a global traffic threshold per month, after which his throughput is limited, or after which he/she pays each megabyte. He/she can also have an unlimited access to some websites, or an unlimited access during the weekends.

An option is to split the bill in elementary billings, which have conditions (a start date, an end date, a destination IP address...). The global billing is an ordered list of elementary billings. To know the cost of a transmission, the host goes through the list, and the first elementary billing whose the conditions are fulfilled gives the cost. If no elementary billing conditions match the request, the host MUST make no assumption about the cost.

## **B.1**. Conditions

Here are the potential conditions for an elementary billing. All conditions MUST be fulfill.

+	++		++
Key	Description	Туре	JSON Example
beginDate   	Date before     which the     billing is     not valid	ISO 8601	"1977-04-22T06:00:00Z"         
endDate     	Date after     which the     billing is     not valid	ISO 8601	"1977-04-22T06:00:00Z"       
domains   	FQDNs whose     the billing     is limited	array(string)	["deezer.com","spotify.     com"]
prefixes4       	IPv4     prefixes     whose the     billing is     limited	array(string)	["78.40.123.182/32","78     .40.123.183/32"]   
prefixes6       	IPv6     prefixes     whose the     billing is     limited	array(string)	["2a00:1450:4007:80e::2     00e/64"]         

## B.2. Price

Here are the different possibilities for the cost of an elementary billing. A missing key means "all/unlimited/unrestricted". If the elementary billing selected has a trafficRemaining of 0 kb, then it means that the user has no access to the network. Actually, if the last elementary billing has a trafficRemaining parameter, it means that when the user will reach the threshold, he/she will not have access to the network anymore.

+	Description	   Туре	++   JSON Example
pricePerGb   	The price per Gigabit	float (currency per Gb)	2
currency	The currency used	ISO 4217	"EUR"
throughputMax   	The maximum achievable throughput	float (kb/s)	100000   
trafficRemaining   +	The traffic remaining	float (kB)	12000000   

# **B.3**. Examples

Example for a user with 20 GB per month for 40 EUR, then reach a threshold, and with unlimited data during weekends and to example.com:

```
Γ
  {
   "domains": ["example.com"]
  },
  {
    "prefixes4": ["78.40.123.182/32", "78.40.123.183/32"]
 },
  {
    "beginDate": "2016-07-16T00:00:00Z",
    "endDate": "2016-07-17T23:59:59Z",
 },
  {
    "beginDate": "2016-06-20T00:00:00Z",
    "endDate": "2016-07-19T23:59:59Z",
    "trafficRemaining": 12000000
  },
  {
    "throughputMax": 100000
  }
1
```

If the host tries to download data from example.com, the conditions of the first elementary billing are fulfilled, so the host takes this elementary billing, finds no cost indication in it and so deduces that it is totally free. If the host tries to exchange data with foobar.com and the date is 2016-07-14T19:00:00Z, the conditions of the first, second and third elementary billing are not fulfilled.

```
But the conditions of the fourth are. So the host takes this
   elementary billing and sees that there is a threshold, 12 GB are
   remaining.
   Another example for a user abroad, who has 3 GB per year abroad, and
   then pay each MB:
   Γ
     {
       "beginDate": "2016-02-10T00:00:00Z",
       "endDate": "2017-02-09T23:59:59Z",
       "trafficRemaining": 3000000
    },
     {
       "pricePerGb": 30,
       "currency": "EUR"
    }
   ]
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