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DTN Bundle Protocol Security (BPsec) COSE Context  
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## Abstract

This document defines a security context suitable for using CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) algorithms within Bundle Protocol Security (BPsec) integrity and confidentiality blocks. A profile for COSE, focused on asymmetric-keyed algorithms, and for PKIX certificates are also defined for BPsec interoperation.

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DTN BPSec COSE

September 2022

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## [1.](#) Introduction

The Bundle Protocol Security (BPsec) Specification [[RFC9172](#)] defines structure and encoding for Block Integrity Block (BIB) and Block Confidentiality Block (BCB) types but does not specify any security contexts to be used by either of the security block types. The CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) specification [[RFC8152](#)] defines a structure, encoding, and algorithms to use for cryptographic signing and encryption.

This document describes how to use the algorithms and encodings of COSE within BPsec blocks to apply those algorithms to Bundle security in [Section 2](#). A bare minimum of interoperability algorithms and algorithm parameters is specified by this document in [Section 3](#). The focus of the recommended algorithms is to allow BPsec to be used in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) as described in [Section 1.2](#).

Examples of specific uses are provided in [Appendix A](#) to aid in implementation support of the interoperability algorithms.

### [1.1.](#) Scope

This document describes a profile of COSE which is tailored for use in BPsec and a method of including full COSE messages within BPsec security blocks. This document does not address:

- \* Policies or mechanisms for issuing Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) certificates; provisioning, deploying, or accessing certificates and private keys; deploying or accessing certificate

revocation lists (CRLs); or configuring security parameters on an individual entity or across a network.

- \* Uses of COSE beyond the profile defined in this document.
- \* How those COSE algorithms are intended to be used within a larger security context. Many header parameters used by COSE (e.g., key identifiers) depend on the network environment and security policy related to that environment.

## [1.2.](#) PKIX Environments and CA Policy

This specification gives requirements about how to use PKIX certificates issued by a Certificate Authority (CA), but does not define any mechanisms for how those certificates come to be.

To support the PKIX uses defined in this document, the CA(s) issuing certificates for BP nodes are aware of the end use of the certificate, have a mechanism for verifying ownership of a Node ID, and are issuing certificates directly for that Node ID. BPsec security acceptors authenticate the Node ID of security sources when verifying integrity (see [Section 2.6.1](#)) using a public key provided by a PKIX certificate (see [Section 2.6.1](#)) following the certificate profile of [Section 4](#).

## [1.3.](#) Use of CDDL

This document defines CBOR structure using the Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) of [[RFC8610](#)]. The entire CDDL structure can be extracted from the XML version of this document using the XPath expression:

```
'//sourcecode[@type="cddl"]'
```

The following initial fragment defines the top-level symbols of this document's CDDL, including the ASB data structure with its parameter/result sockets.

```
start = bpsec-cose-asb / AAD-list /
```

primary-block / extension-block /  
MAC\_structure / Sig\_structure / Enc\_structure / COSE\_KeySet

#### [1.4.](#) Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](#) [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

#### [2.](#) BPSec Security Context

This document specifies a single security context for use in both BPSec integrity and confidentiality blocks. This is done to save code points allocated to this specification and to simplify the encoding of COSE-in-BPSec; the BPSec block type uniquely defines the acceptable parameters and COSE messages which can be present.

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The COSE security context SHALL have the Security Context ID specified in [Section 7.1](#).

Both types of security block can use the same parameters, defined in [Section 2.2](#), to carry public key-related information and each type of security block allows specific COSE message results, defined in [Section 2.3](#).

```
; Specialize the ASB for this context
bpsec-cose-asb = bpsec-context-use<
  -1, ; Context ID TBD-COSE
  $bpsec-cose-param,
  $bpsec-cose-result
>
$ext-data-asb /= bpsec-cose-asb
```

Figure 1: COSE context declaration CDDL

#### [2.1.](#) Security Scope

The scope here refers to the set of information used by the security context to cryptographically bind with the plaintext data being

integrity-protected or confidentiality-protected. This information is generically referred to as additional authenticated data (AAD), which is also the term used by COSE to describe the same data.

The sources for AAD within the COSE context are described below, controlled by the AAD Scope Flags parameter of [Section 2.2.3](#), and implemented as defined in [Section 2.5.1](#). The purpose of this parameter is identical to the AAD Scope parameter and Integrity Scope parameter of [[RFC9173](#)].

**Bundle Primary Block:** The primary block identifies a bundle and, once created, the contents of this block are immutable. Changes to the primary block associated with the security target indicate that the target is no longer in its original bundle. Including the primary block as part of AAD ensures that security target appears in the same bundle that the security source intended.

**Target Block Metadata:** When the target block is a canonical block (i.e., not the primary block) it contains its block-type-specific data (BTSD), which is the subject of the security operation, but also metadata identifying the block. This metadata explicitly excludes the CRC type and value fields because the CRC is derived from the BTSD. Including this metadata as part of AAD ensures that the target data appears in the same block that the security source intended.

**Security Block Metadata:** The BPSec block containing the security result for which the AAD is assembled also has metadata identifying the block. This metadata explicitly excludes the CRC type and value fields because the security block does not have a full BTSD available at the time the AAD is needed. Including this metadata as part of AAD ensures that the security result appears in the same block that the security source intended.

## [2.2.](#) Parameters

Each COSE context parameter value SHALL consist of the COSE structure indicated by Table 1 in its decoded (CBOR item) form. Each security block MAY contain any number of each parameter type. When a parameter is not present, the security acceptor SHALL use the Default Value of Table 1.

Parameter ID	Parameter Structure	Reference	Default Value
1	COSE_Key	<a href="#">[RFC8152]</a>	none
2	COSE_KeySet	<a href="#">[RFC8152]</a>	none
3	additional-protected	<a href="#">Section 2.2.2</a> of this document	' ' (empty byte string)
4	additional-unprotected	<a href="#">Section 2.2.2</a> of this document	{ } (empty map)
5	AAD-scope	<a href="#">Section 2.2.3</a> of this document	0b111 (all AAD contexts)

Table 1: COSE Context Parameters

### [2.2.1.](#) Raw Public Key Containers

Implementations capable of handling asymmetric-keyed algorithms SHOULD support raw public key handling in COSE\_Key and COSE\_KeySet parameters.

No more than one total COSE\_Key or COSE\_KeySet parameter SHALL be present in a single security block. Security acceptors are still required to aggregate multiple parameters, if present, in [Section 3.3](#).

Key container parameters SHALL NOT contain any private key material. The security parameters are all stored in the bundle as plaintext and are visible to any bundle handlers.

```
$bpsec-cose-param /= [1, COSE_Key]
$bpsec-cose-param /= [2, COSE_KeySet]
```

Figure 2: Key Containers CDDL

### [2.2.2.](#) Additional Header Maps

The two parameters Additional Protected and Additional Unprotected allow de-duplicating header items which are common to all COSE results. Both additional header values contain a CBOR map which is to be merged with each of the result's unprotected headers. Although the additional header items are all treated as unprotected from the perspective of the COSE message, the additional protected map is included within the external\_aad (see [Section 2.5.1](#)). The expected use of additional header map is to contain a certificate (chain) or identifier (see [Section 3.3](#)) which applies to all results in the same security block.

Following the same pattern as COSE, when both additional header maps are present in a single security block they SHALL not contain any duplicated labels. Security acceptors SHALL treat a pair of additional header maps containing duplicated labels as invalid.

No more than one of each Additional Protected and Additional Unprotected parameter SHALL be present in a single security block. Security acceptors SHALL treat a security block with multiple instances of either additional header type as invalid. There is no well-defined behavior for a security acceptor to handle multiple Additional Protected parameters.

Security sources SHOULD NOT include an additional header parameter which represents an empty map. Security acceptors SHALL handle empty header map parameters, specifically the Additional Protected parameter because it is part of the external\_aad.

Security acceptors SHALL treat the aggregate of both additional header maps as being present in the unprotected header map of the highest-layers of the COSE message of each result. For single-layer messages (i.e., COSE\_Encrypt0, COSE\_MAC0, and COSE\_Sign1) the

additional headers apply to the message itself (layer 1) and for



other messages the additional headers apply to the final recipients. If the same header label is present in a additional header map and a COSE layer's headers the item in the result header SHALL take precedence (i.e., the additional header items are added only if they are not already present in a layer's header).

Additional header maps SHALL NOT contain any private key material. The security parameters are all stored in the bundle as plaintext and are visible to any bundle handlers.

```
$bpsec-cose-param /= [3, additional-protected]  
additional-protected = empty_or_serialized_map
```

```
$bpsec-cose-param /= [4, additional-unprotected]  
additional-unprotected = header_map
```

Figure 3: Additional Headers CDDL

### 2.2.3. AAD Scope

The AAD Scope parameter controls what data is included in the AAD for both integrity and confidentiality operations. The AAD Scope parameter SHALL be encoded as a uint value with bit flags defined in Table 2. All reserved bits SHALL be set to zero (which will be elided by CBOR encoding) by security sources. All reserved bits SHALL be ignored by security acceptors. The default value for this parameter has all flags set, meaning the AAD includes all available context. The flags of this parameter value are identical to the AAD Scope flags of [Section 4.3.4 of \[RFC9173\]](#) and Integrity Scope flags of [Section 3.3.3 of \[RFC9173\]](#).

A CDDL representation of this definition is included in Figure 4 for reference.

Name	Code	Description
has-primary-ctx	0b001	If bit is set, indicates that the primary block is included in AAD scope.
has-target-ctx	0b010	If bit is set, indicates that the target block metadata is included in AAD scope.
has-security-ctx	0b100	If bit is set, indicates that the security block metadata is included in AAD scope.
Reserved	others	

Table 2: AAD Scope Flags

```

$bpsec-cose-param /= [5, AAD-scope]
AAD-scope = uint .bits AAD-scope-flags
AAD-scope-flags = &(amp;
    has-primary-ctx: 0,
    has-target-ctx: 1,
    has-security-ctx: 2,
)

```

Figure 4: AAD Scope CDDL

### 2.3. Results

Although each COSE context result is a COSE message, the types of message allowed depend upon the security block type in which the result is present: only MAC or signature messages are allowed in a BIB and only encryption messages are allowed in a BCB.

The code points for Result ID values are identical to the existing COSE message-marking tags in [Section 2 of \[RFC8152\]](#). This avoids the need for value-mapping between code points of the two registries.

When embedding COSE messages, the message CBOR structure SHALL be encoded as a byte string used as the result value. This allows a security acceptor to skip over unwanted results without needing to decode the result structure. When embedding COSE messages, the CBOR-tagged form SHALL NOT be used. The Result ID values already provide

the same information as the COSE tags (using the same code points).

These generic requirements are formalized in the CDDL fragment of Figure 5.

```
$bpsec-cose-result /= [16, bstr .cbor COSE_Encrypt0]
$bpsec-cose-result /= [17, bstr .cbor COSE_Mac0]
$bpsec-cose-result /= [18, bstr .cbor COSE_Sign1]
$bpsec-cose-result /= [96, bstr .cbor COSE_Encrypt]
$bpsec-cose-result /= [97, bstr .cbor COSE_Mac]
$bpsec-cose-result /= [98, bstr .cbor COSE_Sign]
```

Figure 5: COSE context results CDDL

### 2.3.1. Integrity Messages

When used within a Block Integrity Block, the COSE context SHALL allow only the Result IDs from Table 3. Each integrity result value SHALL consist of the COSE message indicated by Table 3 in its non-tagged encoded form.

Result ID	Result Structure	Reference
97	encoded COSE_Mac	[RFC8152]
17	encoded COSE_Mac0	[RFC8152]
98	encoded COSE_Sign	[RFC8152]
18	encoded COSE_Sign1	[RFC8152]

Table 3: COSE Integrity Results

Each integrity result SHALL use the "detached" payload form with null payload value. The integrity result for COSE\_Mac and COSE\_Mac0 messages are computed by the procedure in [Section 6.3 of \[RFC8152\]](#). The integrity result for COSE\_Sign and COSE\_Sign1 messages are computed by the procedure in [Section 4.4 of \[RFC8152\]](#).

The COSE "protected attributes from the application" used for a signature or MAC result SHALL be the encoded data defined in [Section 2.5.1](#). The COSE payload used for a signature or MAC result SHALL be either the BTSD of the target, if the target is not the primary block, or an empty byte string if the target is the primary block.

[2.3.2](#). Confidentiality Messages

When used within a Block Confidentiality Block, COSE context SHALL allow only the Result IDs from Table 4. Each confidentiality result value SHALL consist of the COSE message indicated by Table 4 in its non-tagged encoded form.

Result ID	Result Structure	Reference
96	encoded COSE_Encrypt	<a href="#">[RFC8152]</a>
16	encoded COSE_Encrypt0	<a href="#">[RFC8152]</a>

Table 4: COSE Confidentiality Results

Only algorithms which support Authenticated Encryption with Authenticated Data (AEAD) SHALL be usable in the first (content) layer of a confidentiality result. Because COSE encryption with AEAD appends the authentication tag with the ciphertext, the size of the BTSD will grow after an encryption operation. Security acceptors MUST NOT assume that the size of the plaintext is the same as the size of the ciphertext.

Each confidentiality result SHALL use the "detached" payload form with null payload value. The confidentiality result for COSE\_Encrypt and COSE\_Encrypt0 messages are computed by the procedure in [Section 5.3 of \[RFC8152\]](#).

The COSE "protected attributes from the application" used for an encryption result SHALL be the encoded data defined in [Section 2.5.1](#).

The COSE payload used for an encryption result SHALL be the BTSD of the target. Because confidentiality of the primary block is disallowed by BPsec, there is no logic here for handling a BCB with a target on the primary block.

## [2.4.](#) Key Considerations

This specification does not impose any additional key requirements beyond those already specified for each COSE algorithm required in [Section 3](#).

## [2.5.](#) Canonicalization Algorithms

Generating or processing COSE messages for the COSE context follows the profile defined in [Section 3](#) with the "protected attributes from the application" (i.e., the external\_aad item) generated as defined in [Section 2.5.1](#).

### [2.5.1.](#) Generating AAD

The encoding of this AAD is identical to the AAD of [Section 4.7.2 of \[RFC9173\]](#) and the front items of IPPT of [Section 3.7 of \[RFC9173\]](#).

The AAD used for both integrity and confidentiality messages SHALL be the deterministically encoded form of a CBOR sequence containing the following:

1. The first item SHALL be the AAD Scope value itself, which is a uint.
2. The next item SHALL be the CBOR array (unencoded) form of the primary block of the bundle if the AAD Scope has the has-primary-ctx flag set.
3. The next items SHALL be the first three fields of the target block (i.e., the block type code, block number, and control

flags) if the AAD Scope has the has-target-ctx flag set.

4. The next items SHALL be the first three fields of the security block containing the result (i.e., the block type code, block number, and control flags) if the AAD Scope has the has-security-ctx flag set.
5. The last item SHALL be the Additional Protected header map, which is a bstr, and has a default value of the empty bstr.

A CDDL representation of this data is shown below in Figure 6.

```
; Encoded as a CBOR sequence
AAD-list = [
  AAD-structure,
  ; copy of additional-protected (or default empty bstr)
  additional-protected
]

; Identical to the definition of RFC 9173
AAD-structure = (
  AAD-scope,
  ? primary-block, ; present if has-primary-ctx flag set
  ? block-metadata, ; present if has-target-ctx flag set
  ? block-metadata, ; present if has-security-ctx flag set
)
; Selected fields of a canonical block
block-metadata = (
  block-type-code: uint,
  block-number: uint,
```

block-control-flags,  
)

Figure 6: COSE context AAD CDDL

### [2.5.2.](#) Payload Data

When correlating between BPsec target BTSD and COSE plaintext or payload, any byte string SHALL be handled in its decoded (CBOR item) form. This means any CBOR header or tag in a source encoding are ignored for the purposes of security processing. This also means that if the source byte string was encoded in a non-conforming way, for example in indefinite-length form or with a non-minimum-size length, the security processing always treats it in a deterministically encoded CBOR form.

### [2.6.](#) Processing

This section describes block-level requirements for handling COSE security data.

All security results generated for BIB or BCB blocks SHALL conform to the COSE profile of [Section 3](#) with header augmentation as defined in [Section 2.2.2](#).

#### [2.6.1.](#) Node Authentication

This section explains how the certificate profile of [Section 4](#) is used by a security acceptor to both validate an end-entity certificate and to use that certificate to authenticate the security source for an integrity result. For a confidentiality result, some of the requirements in this section are implicit in an implementation using a private key associated with a certificate used by a result recipient. It is an implementation matter to ensure that a BP agent is configured to generate or receive results associated with valid certificates.

A security source MAY prohibit generating a result (either integrity or confidentiality) for an end-entity certificate which is not considered valid according to [Section 2.6.1.2](#). Generating a result which is likely to be discarded is wasteful of bundle size and transport resources.

#### [2.6.1.1](#). Certificate Identification

Because of the standard policy of using separate certificates for transport, signing, and encryption (see [Section 4.1](#)) a single Node ID is likely to be associated with multiple certificates, and any or all of those certificates MAY be present within an "x5bag" in an Additional Protected parameter (see [Section 2.2.2](#)). When present, a security acceptor SHALL use an "x5chain" or "x5t" to identify an end-entity certificate to use for result processing. Security acceptors SHALL NOT assume that a validated certificate containing a NODE-ID matching a security source is enough to associate a certificate with a COSE message or recipient (see [Section 3.3](#)).

#### [2.6.1.2](#). Certificate Validation

For each end-entity certificate contained in or identified by by a COSE result, the security acceptor SHALL perform the certification path validation of [Section 6 of \[RFC5280\]](#) up to one of the acceptor's trusted CA certificates. When evaluating a certificate Validity period, the security acceptor SHALL use the bundle Creation Timestamp time (if not unknown) as the reference instead of the current time. If enabled by local policy, the entity SHALL perform an OCSP check of each certificate providing OCSP authority information in accordance with [\[RFC6960\]](#). If certificate validation fails or if security policy disallows a certificate for any reason, the acceptor SHALL treat the associated security result as failed. Leaving out part of the certification chain can cause the entity to fail to validate a certificate if the left-out certificates are unknown to the entity (see [Section 6.2](#)).

For each end-entity certificate contained in or identified by a COSE context result, the security acceptor SHALL apply security policy to the Key Usage extension (if present) and Extended Key Usage extension (if present) in accordance with [Section 4.2.1.12 of \[RFC5280\]](#) and the



profile in [Section 4](#).

#### [2.6.1.3](#). Node ID Authentication

If required by security policy, for each end-entity certificate referenced by a COSE context integrity result the security acceptor SHALL validate the certificate NODE-ID in accordance with [Section 6 of \[RFC6125\]](#) using the NODE-ID reference identifier from the Security Source of the containing security block. If the NODE-ID validation result is Failure or if the result is Absent and security policy requires an authenticated Node ID, the security acceptor SHALL treat the result as failed.

#### [2.6.2](#). Policy Recommendations

A RECOMMENDED security policy is to enable the use of OCSP checking when internet connectivity is present. A RECOMMENDED security policy is that if an Extended Key Usage is present that it needs to contain id-kp-bundleSecurity of [[IANA-SMI](#)] to be usable as an end-entity certificate for COSE security results. A RECOMMENDED security policy is to require a validated Node ID (of [Section 2.6.1.3](#)) and to ignore any other identifiers in the end-entity certificate.

This policy relies on and informs the certificate requirements in [Section 3.3.1](#) and [Section 4](#). This policy assumes that a DTN-aware CA (see [Section 1.2](#)) will only issue a certificate for a Node ID when it has verified that the private key holder actually controls the DTN node; this is needed to avoid the threat identified in [Section 6.4](#). This policy requires that a certificate contain a NODE-ID and allows the certificate to also contain network-level identifiers. A tailored policy on a more controlled network could relax the requirement on Node ID validation and/or Extended Key Usage presence.

### [3](#). COSE Profile

This section contains requirements which apply to the use of COSE within the BPSec security context defined in this document. Other variations of COSE within BPSec can be used but are not expected to be interoperable or usable by all security acceptors.

### [3.1.](#) COSE Messages

When generating a BPSec result, security sources SHALL use only COSE labels with a uint value. When processing a BPSec result, security acceptors MAY handle COSE labels with with a tstr value.

When used in a BPSec result, each COSE message SHALL contain an explicit algorithm identifier in the lower (content) layers. When available and not implied by the bundle source, a COSE message SHALL contain a key identifier in the highest (recipient) layer. See [Section 3.3](#) for specifics about asymmetric key identifiers. When a key identifier is not available, BPSec acceptors SHALL use the Security Source (if available) and the Bundle Source to imply which keys can be used for security operations. Using implied keys has an interoperability risk, see [Section 6.5](#) for details. A BPSec security operation always occurs within the context of the immutable primary block with its parameters (specifically the Source Node ID) and the security block with its optional Security Source.

The algorithms required by this profile focuses on networks using shared symmetric-keys, with recommended algorithms for Elliptic Curve (EC) keypairs and RSA keypairs. The focus of this profile is to enable interoperation between security sources and acceptors on an open network, where more explicit COSE parameters make it easier for BPSec acceptors to avoid assumptions and avoid out-of-band parameters. The requirements of this profile still allow the use of potentially not-easily-interoperable algorithms and message/recipient configurations for use by private networks, where message size is more important than explicit COSE parameters.

### [3.2.](#) Interoperability Algorithms

The set of integrity algorithms needed for interoperability is listed here. The full set of COSE algorithms available is managed at [\[IANA-COSE\]](#).

Implementations conforming to this specification SHALL support the symmetric keyed and key-encryption algorithms of Table 5.

Implementations capable of doing so SHOULD support the asymmetric keyed and key-encryption algorithms of Table 5.

| The layer-1 required list is identical to the [\[RFC9173\]](#) context  
| list.

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BPsec Block	COSE Layer	Name	Code	Implementation Requirements
Integrity	1	HMAC 256/256	5	Required
Integrity	1	ES256	-7	Recommended
Integrity	1	EdDSA	-8	Recommended
Integrity	1	PS256	-37	Recommended
Confidentiality	1	A256GCM	3	Required
Confidentiality	2	A256KW	-5	Required
Confidentiality	2	ECDH-ES + A256KW	-31	Recommended
Confidentiality	2	ECDH-SS + A256KW	-34	Recommended
Confidentiality	2	RSAES-OAEP w/ SHA-256	-41	Recommended

Table 5: Interoperability Algorithms

The following are recommended key and recipient uses within COSE/BPsec:

**Symmetric Key Integrity:** When generating a BIB result from a symmetric key, implementations SHALL use a COSE\_Mac0 using the private key directly. When a COSE\_Mac0 is used with a direct key, the headers SHALL include a key identifier ("kid" header).

**EC Keypair Integrity:** When generating a BIB result from an EC keypair, implementations SHALL use a COSE\_Sign1 using the private key directly. When a COSE\_Sign1 is used with an EC keypair, the

headers SHALL include a public key identifier (see [Section 3.3](#)).

RSA Keypair Integrity: When generating a BIB result from an RSA

keypair, implementations SHALL use a COSE\_Sign1 using the private key directly. When a COSE\_Sign1 is used with an RSA keypair, the headers SHALL include a public key identifier (see [Section 3.3](#)). When a COSE signature is generated with an RSA keypair, the signature uses a PSS salt in accordance with [Section 2 of \[RFC8230\]](#).

Symmetric Key Confidentiality: When generating a BCB result from an symmetric key, implementations SHALL use a COSE\_Encrypt message with a recipient containing an indirect (wrapped or derived) content encryption key (CEK). When generating a BCB result from a symmetric key, implementations SHOULD NOT use COSE\_Encrypt0 or COSE\_Encrypt with direct CEK. Doing so risks key overuse and the vulnerabilities associated with large amount of ciphertext from the same key. When a COSE\_Encrypt is used with an overall key-encryption key (KEK), the recipient layer SHALL include a key identifier for the KEK.

EC Keypair Confidentiality: When generating a BCB result from an EC keypair, implementations SHALL use a COSE\_Encrypt message with a recipient containing an indirect (wrapped or derived) CEK. When a COSE\_Encrypt is used with an EC keypair, the recipient layer SHALL include a public key identifier (see [Section 3.3](#)). When a COSE\_Encrypt is used with an EC keypair, the security source SHALL either generate an ephemeral EC keypair or choose a unique PartyU Nonce for each security operation. When processing a COSE\_Encrypt with an EC keypair, the security acceptor SHALL process all KDF and HMAC context data from the recipient headers in accordance with [Section 11.2 of \[RFC8152\]](#) even though the source is not required to provide any of those parameters.

RSA Keypair Confidentiality: When generating a BCB result from an RSA keypair, implementations SHALL use a COSE\_Encrypt message with

a recipient containing a key-wrapped CEK. When a COSE\_Encrypt is used with an RSA keypair, the recipient layer SHALL include a public key identifier (see [Section 3.3](#)).

### [3.3](#). Asymmetric Key Types and Identifiers

This section applies when a BIB uses a public key for verification or key-wrap, or when a BCB uses a public key for encryption or key-wrap. When using asymmetric keyed algorithms, the security source SHALL include a public key container or public key identifier as a recipient header. The public key identifier SHALL be either a "kid" of [[RFC8152](#)], an "x5t" or "x5chain" of [[I-D.ietf-cose-x509](#)], or an equivalent identifier.

When a BIB result contains a "kid" identifier, the security source MAY include an appropriate COSE public key "COSE\_Key" in a key container security parameter (see [Section 2.2.1](#)). When BIB result contains a "x5t" identifier, the security source MAY include an appropriate PKIX certificate container ("x5chain" or "x5bag" of [[I-D.ietf-cose-x509](#)]) in a direct COSE header or an additional header security parameter (see [Section 2.2.2](#)). When a BIB result contains an "x5chain", the security source SHOULD NOT also include an "x5t" as the first certificate in the chain is implicitly the applicable end-entity certificate. For a BIB, if all potential security acceptors are known to possess related public key and/or certificate data then the public key or additional header parameters can be omitted. Risks of not including related data are described in [Section 6.5](#) and [Section 6.6](#).

When present, public keys and certificates SHOULD be included as additional header parameters rather than within result COSE messages. This provides size efficiency when multiple security results are present because they will all be from the same security source and likely share the same public key material. Security acceptors SHALL still process public keys or certificates present in a result message or recipient as applying to that individual COSE level.

Security acceptors SHALL aggregate all COSE\_Key objects from all parameters within a single BIB or BCB, independent of encoded type or order of parameters. Because each context contains a single set of

security parameters which apply to all results in the same context, security acceptors SHALL treat all public keys as being related to the security source itself and potentially applying to every result.

### [3.3.1](#). Policy Recommendations

The RECOMMENDED priority policy for including PKIX material for BIB results is as follows:

1. When receivers are not known to possess certificate chains, a full chain is included (as an "x5chain").
2. When receivers are known to possess root and intermediate CAs, just the end-entity certificate is included (again as an "x5chain").
3. When receivers are known to possess associated chains including end-entity certificates, a certificate thumbnail (as an "x5t").
4. Some arbitrary identifier is used to correlate to an end-entity certificate (as a "kid").

5. The BIB Security Source is used to imply an associated end-entity certificate which identifies that Node ID.

When PKIX certificates are used by security acceptors and the end-entity certificate is not explicitly trusted (i.e. pinned), the security acceptor SHALL perform the certification path validation of [Section 2.6.1.2](#) up to one or more trusted CA certificates. Leaving out part of the certification chain can cause the security acceptor to fail to validate a BIB if the left-out certificates are unknown to the acceptor (see [Section 6.6](#)).

Any end-entity certificate associated with a BPSec security source SHALL adhere to the profile of [Section 4](#).

## [4](#). PKIX Certificate Profile

This section contains requirements on certificates used for the COSE context, while [Section 3.3](#) contains requirements for how such certificates are transported or identified.

All end-entity certificates used for BPSec SHALL conform to [\[RFC5280\]](#), or any updates or successors to that profile.

This profile requires Version 3 certificates due to the extensions used by this profile. Security acceptors SHALL reject as invalid Version 1 and Version 2 end-entity certificates.

Security acceptors SHALL accept certificates that contain an empty Subject field or contain a Subject without a Common Name. Identity information in end-entity certificates is contained entirely in the subjectAltName extension as a NODE-ID, as defined in [Section 4.4.1 of \[RFC9174\]](#).

All end-entity and CA certificates used for BPSec SHOULD contain both a Subject Key Identifier extension in accordance with [Section 4.2.1.2 of \[RFC5280\]](#) and an Authority Key Identifier extension in accordance with [Section 4.2.1.1 of \[RFC5280\]](#). Security acceptors SHOULD NOT rely on either a Subject Key Identifier and an Authority Key Identifier being present in any received certificate. Including key identifiers simplifies the work of an entity needing to assemble a certification chain.

A BPSec end-entity certificate SHALL contain a NODE-ID which authenticates the Node ID of the security source (for integrity) or the security acceptor (for confidentiality). The identifier type NODE-ID is defined in [Section 4.4.1 of \[RFC9174\]](#).

When allowed by CA policy, a BPSec end-entity certificate SHOULD contain a PKIX Extended Key Usage extension in accordance with [Section 4.2.1.12 of \[RFC5280\]](#). When the PKIX Extended Key Usage extension is present, it SHALL contain a key purpose id-kp-bundleSecurity of [\[IANA-SMI\]](#). The id-kp-bundleSecurity purpose MAY be combined with other purposes in the same certificate.

When allowed by CA policy, a BPSec end-entity certificate SHALL contain a PKIX Key Usage extension in accordance with [Section 4.2.1.3 of \[RFC5280\]](#). The PKIX Key Usage bits which are consistent with COSE security are: digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyEncipherment, and keyAgreement. The specific algorithms used by COSE messages in

security results determine which of those key uses are exercised. See [Section 4.1](#) for discussion of key use policies across multiple certificates.

A BPSec end-entity certificate MAY contain an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) URI within an Authority Information Access extension in accordance with [Section 4.2.2.1 of \[RFC5280\]](#). Security acceptors are not expected to have continuous internet connectivity sufficient to perform OCSP verification.

#### [4.1](#). Multiple-Certificate Uses

A RECOMMENDED security policy is to limit asymmetric keys (and thus public key certificates) to single uses among the following:

Bundle transport: With key uses as defined in the convergence layer specification(s).

Block signing: With key use digitalSignature and/or nonRepudiation.

Block encryption: With key use keyEncipherment and/or keyAgreement.

This policy is the same one recommended by [Section 6 of \[RFC8551\]](#) for email security and by Section 5.2 of [\[NIST-SP800-57\]](#) more generally. Effectively this means that a BP node uses separate certificates for transport (e.g., as a TCPCL entity), BIB signing (as a security source), and BCB encryption (as a security acceptor).

#### [5](#). Implementation Status

This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

[NOTE to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication, as well as the reference to [\[RFC7942\]](#), [\[github-dtn-bpsec-cose\]](#), [\[github-dtn-demo-agent\]](#), and [\[github-dtn-wireshark\]](#).]

This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [\[RFC7942\]](#). The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to



RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations can exist.

An example implementation of COSE over Blocks has been created as a GitHub project [[github-dtn-bpsec-cose](#)] and is intended to use as a proof-of-concept and as a possible source of interoperability testing. This example implementation only handles CBOR encoding/decoding and cryptographic functions, it does not construct actual BIB or BCB and does not integrate with a BP Agent.

## 6. Security Considerations

This section separates security considerations into threat categories based on guidance of [BCP 72](#) [[RFC3552](#)].

All of the security considerations of the underlying BPsec [[RFC9172](#)] apply to these new security contexts.

### 6.1. Threat: BPsec Block Replay

The bundle's primary block contains fields which uniquely identify a bundle: the Source Node ID, Creation Timestamp, and fragment parameters (see [Section 4.3.1 of \[RFC9171\]](#)). These same fields are used to correlate Administrative Records with the bundles for which the records were generated. Including the primary block in the AAD Scope for integrity and confidentiality (see [Section 2.2.3](#)) binds the verification of the secured block to its parent bundle and disallows replay of any block with its BIB or BCB.

This profile of COSE limits the encryption algorithms to only AEAD in order to include the context of the encrypted data as AAD. If an agent mistakenly allows the use of non-AEAD encryption when decrypting and verifying a BCB, the possibility of block replay attack is present.

## [6.2.](#) Threat: Untrusted End-Entity Certificate

The profile in [Section 2.6.1](#) uses end-entity certificates chained up to a trusted root CA. A security source can include a certificate set which does not contain the full chain, possibly excluding intermediate or root CAs. In an environment where security acceptors are known to already contain needed root and intermediate CAs there is no need to include those CAs, but this has a risk of an acceptor not actually having one of the needed CAs.

## [6.3.](#) Threat: Certificate Validation Vulnerabilities

Even when a security acceptor is operating properly an attacker can attempt to exploit vulnerabilities within certificate check algorithms or configuration to authenticate using an invalid certificate. An invalid certificate exploit could lead to higher-level security issues and/or denial of service to the Node ID being impersonated.

There are many reasons, described in [\[RFC5280\]](#) and [\[RFC6125\]](#), why a certificate can fail to validate, including using the certificate outside of its valid time interval, using purposes for which it was not authorized, or using it after it has been revoked by its CA. Validating a certificate is a complex task and can require network connectivity outside of the primary BP convergence layer network path(s) if a mechanism such as OCSP [\[RFC6960\]](#) is used by the CA. The configuration and use of particular certificate validation methods are outside of the scope of this document.

## [6.4.](#) Threat: BP Node Impersonation

When certificates are referenced by BIB results it is possible that the certificate does not contain a NODE-ID or does contain one but has a mismatch with the actual security source (see [Section 1.2](#)). Having a CA-validated certificate does not alone guarantee the identity of the security source from which the certificate is provided; additional validation procedures in [Section 2.6.1](#) bind the Node ID based on the contents of the certificate.

## [6.5.](#) Threat: Unidentifiable Key

The profile in [Section 3.2](#) recommends key identifiers when possible and the parameters in [Section 2.2](#) allow encoding public keys where available. If the application using a COSE Integrity or COSE Confidentiality context leaves out key identification data (in a COSE recipient structure), the security acceptor for those BPSec blocks only has the primary block available to use when verifying or decrypting the target block. This leads to a situation, identified

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in BPSec Security Considerations, where a signature is verified to be valid but not from the expected Security Source.

Because the key identifier headers are unprotected (see [Section 3.3](#)), there is still the possibility that an active attacker removes or alters key identifier(s) in the result. This can cause the security acceptor to not be able to properly verify a valid signature or not use the correct private key to decrypt valid ciphertext.

#### [6.6.](#) Threat: Non-Trusted Public Key

The profile in [Section 3.2](#) allows the use of PKIX which typically involves end-entity certificates chained up to a trusted root CA. This allows a BIB to contain end-entity certificates not previously known to a security acceptor but still trust the certificate by verifying it up to a trusted CA. In an environment where security acceptors are known to already contain needed root and intermediate CAs there is no need to include those CAs in a proper chain within the security parameters, but this has a risk of an acceptor not actually having one of the needed CAs.

Because the security parameters are not included as AAD, there is still the possibility that an active attacker removes or alters certification chain data in the parameters. This can cause the security acceptor to be able to verify a valid signature but not trust the public key used to perform the verification.

#### [6.7.](#) Threat: Passive Leak of Key Material

It is important that the key requirements of [Section 2.2](#) apply only to public keys and PKIX certificates. Including non-public key material in ASB parameters will expose that material in the bundle data and over the bundle convergence layer during transport.

#### [6.8.](#) Threat: Algorithm Vulnerabilities

Because this use of COSE leaves the specific algorithms chosen for BIB and BCB use up to the applications securing bundle data, it is important to use only COSE algorithms which are marked as recommended in the IANA registry [[IANA-COSE](#)].

## [7.](#) IANA Considerations

Registration procedures referred to in this section are defined in [\[RFC8126\]](#).

### [7.1.](#) BPsec Security Contexts

Within the "Bundle Protocol" registry [[IANA-BUNDLE](#)], the following entry has been added to the "BPsec Security Context Identifiers" sub-registry.

Value	Description	Reference
TBD-COSE	COSE	This specification.

Table 6

## [8.](#) References

### [8.1.](#) Normative References

[IANA-BUNDLE]

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<<https://www.iana.org/assignments/bundle/>>.

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<<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/>>.

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<<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/>>.

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[RFC9173] Birrane, E., III, White, A., and S. Heiner, "Default Security Contexts for Bundle Protocol Security (BPsec)", [RFC 9173](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC9173, January 2022, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9173>>.

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Sipos, B., "DTN Bundle Protocol Security COSE Security Context", <<https://github.com/BrianSipos/dtn-bpsec-cose/>>.

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Sipos, B., "Demo Convergence Layer Agent", <<https://github.com/BrianSipos/dtn-demo-agent/>>.

[github-dtn-wireshark]  
Sipos, B., "Wireshark Plugin Dissectors for DTN", <<https://github.com/BrianSipos/dtn-demo-agent/>>.

## [Appendix A](#). Examples

These examples are intended to have the correct structure of COSE security blocks but in some cases use simplified algorithm parameters or smaller key sizes than are required by the actual COSE profile defined in this documents. Each example indicates how it differs from the actual profile if there is a meaningful difference.

All of these examples operate within the context of the bundle primary block of Figure 7 with a security target block of Figure 8. All example figures use the extended diagnostic notation [[RFC8610](#)].

[  
7, / BP version /

```

0, / flags /
0, / CRC type /
[1, "//dst/svc"], / destination /
[1, "//src/"], / source /
[1, "//src/"], / report-to /
[0, 40], / timestamp /
1000000 / lifetime /
]

```

Figure 7: Primary block CBOR diagnostic

```

[
1, / type code: payload /
1, / block num /
0, / flags /
0, / CRC type /
<<"hello">> / block-type-specific-data /
]

```

Figure 8: Target block CBOR diagnostic

All of the block integrity block examples operate within the context of the "frame" block of Figure 9, and block confidentiality block examples within the frame block of Figure 10.

```

[
11, / type code: BIB /
3, / block num /
0, / flags /
0, / CRC type /
'' / BTSD to be replaced /
]

```

Figure 9: Block integrity block frame CBOR diagnostic

```

[
12, / type code: BCB /
3, / block num /
0, / flags /
0, / CRC type /
'' / BTSD to be replaced /
]

```



Figure 10: Block confidentiality block CBOR diagnostic

All of the examples also operate within a security block containing the AAD Scope parameter with only "has-primary-ctx" and "has-target-ctx" flags set. This results in a consistent AAD-list as shown in Figure 11, which is encoded as the byte string for COSE external\_aad in all of the examples.

```
3, / scope /
[ 7, 0, 0, [ 1, "//dst/svc" ], [ 1, "//src/" ], [ 1, "//src/" ],
  [ 0, 40 ], 1000000 ], / primary-ctx /
1, 1, 0, / target-ctx /
'' / additional-protected /
```

Figure 11: Example scope AAD-list CBOR-sequence diagnostic

The only differences between these examples which use EC or RSA keypairs and a use of a PKIX public key certificate are: the parameters would have an x5chain parameter instead of a COSE\_Key type, and the recipient would contain an "x5t" value instead of a "kid" value. Neither of these is a change to a protected header so, given the same private key, there would be no change to the signature or wrapped-key data.

Because each of the encryption examples use the same CEK within the same AAD, the target ciphertext is also identical. The target block after application of the encryption is shown in Figure 12.

```
[
  1, / type code: payload /
  1, / block num /
  0, / flags /
  0, / CRC type /
  h'1fd25f64a2eea12d4bb6c02d25bf33cec45f3e4f96b1' / ciphertext /
]
```

Figure 12: Encrypted Target block CBOR diagnostic

### [A.1.](#) Symmetric Key COSE\_Mac0

This is an example of a MAC with recipient having a 256-bit symmetric key identified by a "kid".

```
[
  {
    / kty / 1: 4, / symmetric /
    / kid / 2: 'ExampleMAC',
    / k / -1: h'13bf9cead057c0aca2c9e52471ca4b19ddfaf4c0784e3f3e8e39
99dbae4ce45c'
  }
]
```

Figure 13: Symmetric Key

The external\_aad is the encoded data from Figure 11. The payload is the encoded target BTSD from Figure 8.

```
[
  "MAC0", / context /
  h'a10105', / protected /
  h'03880700008201692f2f6473742f7376638201662f2f7372632f8201662f2f73
72632f820018281a000f424001010040', / external_aad /
  h'6568656c6c6f' / payload /
]
```

Figure 14: MAC\_structure CBOR diagnostic

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```

[1], / targets /
-1, / security context TBD-COSE /
1, / flags: params-present /
[1, "//src/"], / security source /
[ / parameters /
  [
    5, / AAD-scope /
    0b011 / has-primary-ctx | has-target-ctx /
  ]
],
[
  [ / target block #1 /
    [ / result /
      17, / COSE_Mac0 tag /
      <<[
        <<{ / protected /
          / alg / 1:5 / HMAC 256//256 /
        }>>,
        { / unprotected /
          / kid / 4:'ExampleMAC'
        },
        null, / payload detached /
        h'48d325a89fe966b982d0a603b75b352b1cbe50903ad025b9126431dfdb
bb0389' / tag /
      ]>>
    ]
  ]
]

```

Figure 15: Abstract Security Block CBOR diagnostic

The final bundle is encoded as the byte string:

```

h'9f880700008201692f2f6473742f7376638201662f2f7372632f8201662f2f7372
632f820018281a000f4240850b030000584c810100018201662f2f7372632f818205
038181821158358443a10105a1044a4578616d706c654b6579f6582048d325a89fe9
66b982d0a603b75b352b1cbe50903ad025b9126431dfdbbb03898501010000466568
656c6c6fff'

```

## [A.2.](#) EC Keypair COSE\_Sign1

This is an example of a signature with a recipient having a P-256 curve EC keypair identified by a "kid". The associated public key is

included as a security parameter.

```
[
  { / signing private key /
    / kty / 1: 2, / EC2 /
    / kid / 2: 'ExampleEC2',
    / crv / -1: 1, / P-256 /
    / x / -2: h'44c1fa63b84f172b50541339c50beb0e630241ecb4eebbddb8b5
e4fe0a1787a8',
    / y / -3: h'059451c7630d95d0b550acbd02e979b3f4f74e645b74715fafbc
1639960a0c7a',
    / d / -4: h'dd6e7d8c4c0e0c0bd3ae1b4a2fa86b9a09b7efee4a233772cf51
89786ea63842'
  }
]
```

Figure 16: Example Keys

The `external_aad` is the encoded data from Figure 11. The payload is the encoded target BTSD from Figure 8.

```
[
  "Signature1", / context /
  h'a10126', / protected /
  h'03880700008201692f2f6473742f7376638201662f2f7372632f8201662f2f73
72632f820018281a000f424001010040', / external_aad /
  h'6568656c6c6f' / payload /
]
```

Figure 17: Sig\_structure CBOR diagnostic

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```
[1], / targets /
-1, / security context TBD-COSE /
1, / flags: params-present /
[1, "//src/"], / security source /
[ / parameters /
  [
    5, / AAD-scope /
    0b011 / has-primary-ctx | has-target-ctx /
  ]
],
[
  [ / target block #1 /
    [ / result /
      18, / COSE_Sign1 tag /
      <<[
        <<{ / protected /
          / alg / 1:-7 / ES256 /
        }>>,
        { / unprotected /
          / kid / 4:'ExampleEC2'
        },
        null, / payload detached /
        h'b8eb3feb581fde875f277ed757512f1a4b107fcd46373ebc53d2af5549
8bb07e335a06ef035f16622ca143a6cc1e390441714155e1571e18a3c767bf5128c1
b0' / signature /
      ]>>
    ]
  ]
]
```

Figure 18: Abstract Security Block CBOR diagnostic

The final bundle is encoded as the byte string:

```
h'9f880700008201692f2f6473742f7376638201662f2f7372632f8201662f2f7372632f820018281a000f4240850b030000586c810100018201662f2f7372632f818205038181821258558443a10126a1044a4578616d706c65454332f65840b8eb3feb581fde875f277ed757512f1a4b107fcd46373ebc53d2af55498bb07e335a06ef035f16622ca143a6cc1e390441714155e1571e18a3c767bf5128c1b08501010000466568656c6c6fff'
```

### [A.3.](#) RSA Keypair COSE\_Sign1

This is an example of a signature with a recipient having a 1024-bit RSA keypair identified by a "kid". The associated public key is included as a security parameter.

This key strength is not supposed to be a secure configuration, only intended to explain the procedure. This signature uses a random salt, so the full signature output is not deterministic.

```
[
  { / signing private key /
    / kty / 1: 3, / RSA /
    / kid / 2: 'ExampleRSA',
    / n / -1: h'b0b5fd85f52c91844007443c9f9371980025f76d51fc9c67681231da610cb291ba637ce813bffd2e9c653258607389ec97dad3db295fded67744ed620707db36804e74e56a494030a73608fc8d92f2f0578d2d85cc201ef0ff22d7835d2d147d3b90a6884276235a01c2be99dfc597f79554362fc1eb03639cac5ccaddb2925',
    / e / -2: h'010001',
    / d / -3: h'9b5d26ad6445ef1aab80b809e4f329684e9912d556c4166f041d1b1fb93c04b4037ffd0dbe6f8a8a86e70bab6e0f6344983a9ada27ed9ff7de816fdeb5e7be48e607ce5fda4581ca6338a9e019fb3689b28934192b6a190cdda910abb5a86a2f7b6f9cd5011049d8de52ddfef73aa06df401c55623ec196720f54920deb4f01',
    / p / -4: h'db22d94e7784a27b568cbf985307ea8d6430ff6b88c18a7086fd4f57a326572f2250c39e48a6f8e2201661c2dfe12c7386835b649714d050aa36123ec3d00e75',
```

```

    / q / -5: h'ce7016adc5f326b7520397c5978ee2f50e69279983d54c5d76f0
5bcd61de0879d7056c923540dff9cbae95dcc0e5e86b52b3c902dc9669c8021c6955
7effb9f1',
    / dP / -6: h'6a6fcacceaa106a3b2e16bf18e57b7ad9a2488a4758ed68a8af6
86a194f0d585b7477760c738d6665aee0302bcf4237ad0530d83b4b86b887f5a4bdc
7eea427e1',
    / dQ / -7: h'28a4cae245b1dcb285142e027a1768b9c4af915b59285a93a04
22c60e05edd9e57663afd023d169bd0ad3bd62da8563d231840802ebbf271ad70b89
05ba3af91',
    / qInv / -8: h'07b5a61733896270a6bd2bb1654194c54e2bc0e061b543a4e
d9fa73c4bc79c87148aa92a451c4ab8262b6377a9c7b97f869160ca6f5d853ee4b65
f4f92865ca3'
  }
]

```

Figure 19: Example Keys

The external\_aad is the encoded data from Figure 11. The payload is the encoded target BTSD from Figure 8.

```

[
  "Signature1", / context /
  h'a1013824', / protected /
  h'03880700008201692f2f6473742f7376638201662f2f7372632f8201662f2f73
72632f820018281a000f424001010040', / external_aad /
  h'6568656c6c6f' / payload /
]

```

Figure 20: Sig\_structure CBOR diagnostic

```

[1], / targets /
-1, / security context TBD-COSE /
1, / flags: params-present /
[1, "//src/"], / security source /
[ / parameters /

```

```

[
  5, / AAD-scope /
  0b011 / has-primary-ctx | has-target-ctx /
]
],
[
  [ / target block #1 /
    [ / result /
      18, / COSE_Sign1 tag /
      <<[
        <<{ / protected /
          / alg / 1:-37 / PS256 /
        }>>,
        { / unprotected /
          / kid / 4:'ExampleRSA'
        },
        null, / payload detached /
        h'57a263315f4641e40b7481fdf6140d10a9d51cdbf29b33a4c31e8477a9
cad07cedf2df4b0016f44af69599ed8031e26deae2c26bc9407c31e550437cb9c569
f6af80feb14ef54ad740bf02b3f68047961dbe7ea5b13ac2610ff2706abf83f50f59
51e21c2610b79b1719ff99da66ccabeb5600132625267ea75772d450b7eb
cb' / signature /
      ]>>
    ]
  ]
]

```

Figure 21: Abstract Security Block CBOR diagnostic

The final bundle is encoded as the byte string:

```

h'9f880700008201692f2f6473742f7376638201662f2f7372632f8201662f2f7372
632f820018281a000f4240850b03000058ad810100018201662f2f7372632f818205
038181821258968444a1013824a1044a4578616d706c65525341f6588057a263315f
4641e40b7481fdf6140d10a9d51cdbf29b33a4c31e8477a9cad07cedf2df4b0016f4
4af69599ed8031e26deae2c26bc9407c31e550437cb9c569f6af80feb14ef54ad740
bf02b3f68047961dbe7ea5b13ac2610ff2706abf83f50f5951e21c2610b79b1719ff
99da66ccabeb5600132625267ea75772d450b7ebcb8501010000466568656c6c6f
ff'

```



#### A.4. Symmetric KEK COSE\_Encrypt

This is an example of an encryption with a random CEK and an explicit key-encryption key (KEK) identified by a "kid". The keys used are shown in Figure 22.

```
[
  {
    / kty / 1: 4, / symmetric /
    / kid / 2: 'ExampleKEK',
    / k / -1: h'0e8a982b921d1086241798032fedc1f883eab72e4e43bb2d11cf
ae38ad7a972e'
  },
  {
    / kty / 1: 4, / symmetric /
    / kid / 2: 'ExampleCEK',
    / k / -1: h'13bf9cead057c0aca2c9e52471ca4b19ddfaf4c0784e3f3e8e39
99dbae4ce45c'
  }
]
```

Figure 22: Example Keys

The external\_aad is the encoded data from Figure 11.

```
[
  "Encrypt", / context /
  h'a10103', / protected /
  h'03880700008201692f2f6473742f7376638201662f2f7372632f8201662f2f73
72632f820018281a000f424001010040', / external_aad /
]
```

Figure 23: Enc\_structure CBOR diagnostic

The ASB item for this encryption operation is shown in Figure 24 and corresponds with the updated target block (containing the ciphertext) of Figure 12.

```

-1, / security context TBD-COSE /
1, / flags: params-present /
[1, "//src/"], / security source /
[ / parameters /
  [
    5, / AAD-scope /
    0b011 / has-primary-ctx | has-target-ctx /
  ]
],
[
  [ / target block #1 /
    [ / result /
      96, / COSE_Encrypt tag /
      <<[
        <<{ / protected /
          / alg / 1:3 / A256GCM /
        }>>,
        { / unprotected /
          / iv / 5: h'6f3093eba5d85143c3dc484a'
        },
        null, / payload detached /
        [
          [ / recipient /
            h'', / protected /
            { / unprotected /
              / alg / 1:-5, / A256KW /
              / kid / 4:'ExampleKEK'
            },
            h'917f2045e1169502756252bf119a94cdac6a9d8944245b5a9a26d4
03a6331159e3d691a708e9984d' / key-wrapped /
          ]
        ]
      ]>>
    ]
  ]
]

```

Figure 24: Abstract Security Block CBOR diagnostic

The final bundle is encoded as the byte string:

```

h'9f880700008201692f2f6473742f7376638201662f2f7372632f8201662f2f7372
632f820018281a000f4240850c0300005869810100018201662f2f7372632f818205
03818182186058518443a10103a1054c6f3093eba5d85143c3dc484af6818340a201
24044a4578616d706c654b454b5828917f2045e1169502756252bf119a94cdac6a9d
8944245b5a9a26d403a6331159e3d691a708e9984d8501010000561fd25f64a2ee52
8b86b0c2f3785b531e634d6ef31c74ff'

```

[A.5.](#) EC Keypair COSE\_Encrypt

This is an example of an encryption with an P-256 curve ephemeral sender keypair and a static recipient keypair identified by a "kid". The keys used are shown in Figure 25.

```
[
  { / sender ephemeral private key /
    / kty / 1: 2, / EC2 /
    / crv / -1: 1, / P-256 /
    / x / -2: h'fedaba748882050d1bef8ba992911898f554450952070aeb4788
ca57d1df6bcc',
    / y / -3: h'ceaa8e7ff4751a4f81c70e98f1713378b0bd82a1414a2f493c1c
9c0670f28d62',
    / d / -4: h'a2e4ed4f2e21842999b0e9ebdaad7465efd5c29bd5761f5c2088
0f9d9c3b122a'
  },
  { / recipient private key /
    / kty / 1: 2, / EC2 /
    / kid / 2: 'ExampleEC2',
    / crv / -1: 1, / P-256 /
    / x / -2: h'44c1fa63b84f172b50541339c50beb0e630241ecb4eebbddb8b5
e4fe0a1787a8',
    / y / -3: h'059451c7630d95d0b550acbd02e979b3f4f74e645b74715fafbc
1639960a0c7a',
    / d / -4: h'dd6e7d8c4c0e0c0bd3ae1b4a2fa86b9a09b7efee4a233772cf51
89786ea63842'
  },
  {
    / kty / 1: 4, / symmetric /
    / kid / 2: 'ExampleCEK',
    / k / -1: h'13bf9cead057c0aca2c9e52471ca4b19ddfaf4c0784e3f3e8e39
99dbae4ce45c'
  }
]
```

Figure 25: Example Keys

The external\_aad is the encoded data from Figure 11.

```
[
  "Encrypt", / context /
  h'a10103', / protected /
  h'03880700008201692f2f6473742f7376638201662f2f7372632f8201662f2f73
72632f820018281a000f424001010040', / external_aad /
]
```

Figure 26: Enc\_structure CBOR diagnostic

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The ASB item for this encryption operation is shown in Figure 27 and corresponds with the updated target block (containing the ciphertext) of Figure 12.

```
[1], / targets /
-1, / security context TBD-COSE /
1, / flags: params-present /
[1, "//src/"], / security source /
[ / parameters /
  [
    5, / AAD-scope /
    0b011 / has-primary-ctx | has-target-ctx /
  ]
],
[
  [ / target block #1 /
    [ / result /
      96, / COSE_Encrypt tag /
      <<[
        <<{ / protected /
          / alg / 1:3 / A256GCM /
        }>>,
        { / unprotected /
          / iv / 5: h'6f3093eba5d85143c3dc484a'
        },
        null, / payload detached /
      ]
      [ / recipient /
        h'', / protected /
        { / unprotected /
          / alg / 1:-31, / ECDH-ES + A256KW /
          / kid / 4:'ExampleEC2',
          / ephemeral key / -1:{
            1:2,
            -1:1,
            -2:h'fedaba748882050d1bef8ba992911898f554450952070ae
```



```
[
  { / recipient private key /
    / kty / 1: 3, / RSA /
    / kid / 2: 'ExampleRSA',
    / n / -1: h'b0b5fd85f52c91844007443c9f9371980025f76d51fc9c676812
31da610cb291ba637ce813bffdb2e9c653258607389ec97dad3db295fded67744ed6
20707db36804e74e56a494030a73608fc8d92f2f0578d2d85cc201ef0ff22d7835d2
d147d3b90a6884276235a01c2be99dfc597f79554362fc1eb03639cac5ccaddb29
25',
    / e / -2: h'010001',
    / d / -3: h'9b5d26ad6445ef1aab80b809e4f329684e9912d556c4166f041d
1b1fb93c04b4037ffd0dbe6f8a8a86e70bab6e0f6344983a9ada27ed9ff7de816fde
eb5e7be48e607ce5fda4581ca6338a9e019fb3689b28934192b6a190cdda910abb5a
86a2f7b6f9cd5011049d8de52ddfef73aa06df401c55623ec196720f54920deb4f
01',
    / p / -4: h'db22d94e7784a27b568cbf985307ea8d6430ff6b88c18a7086fd
4f57a326572f2250c39e48a6f8e2201661c2dfe12c7386835b649714d050aa36123e
c3d00e75',
```

```

    / q / -5: h'ce7016adc5f326b7520397c5978ee2f50e69279983d54c5d76f0
5bcd61de0879d7056c923540dff9cbae95dcc0e5e86b52b3c902dc9669c8021c6955
7effb9f1',
    / dP / -6: h'6a6fcacceaa106a3b2e16bf18e57b7ad9a2488a4758ed68a8af6
86a194f0d585b7477760c738d6665aee0302bcf4237ad0530d83b4b86b887f5a4bdc
7eea427e1',
    / dQ / -7: h'28a4cae245b1dcb285142e027a1768b9c4af915b59285a93a04
22c60e05edd9e57663afd023d169bd0ad3bd62da8563d231840802ebbf271ad70b89
05ba3af91',
    / qInv / -8: h'07b5a61733896270a6bd2bb1654194c54e2bc0e061b543a4e
d9fa73c4bc79c87148aa92a451c4ab8262b6377a9c7b97f869160ca6f5d853ee4b65
f4f92865ca3'
  },
  {
    / kty / 1: 4, / symmetric /
    / kid / 2: 'ExampleCEK',
    / k / -1: h'13bf9cead057c0aca2c9e52471ca4b19ddfaf4c0784e3f3e8e39
99dbae4ce45c'
  }
]

```

Figure 28: Example Keys

The external\_aad is the encoded data from Figure 11.

```

[
  "Encrypt", / context /
  h'a10103', / protected /
  h'03880700008201692f2f6473742f7376638201662f2f7372632f8201662f2f73
72632f820018281a000f424001010040', / external_aad /
]

```

Figure 29: Enc\_structure CBOR diagnostic

The ASB item for this encryption operation is shown in Figure 30 and corresponds with the updated target block (containing the ciphertext)



of Figure 12.

```
[1], / targets /  
-1, / security context TBD-COSE /  
1, / flags: params-present /  
[1, "//src/"], / security source /
```

```

[ / parameters /
  [
    5, / AAD-scope /
    0b011 / has-primary-ctx | has-target-ctx /
  ]
],
[
  [ / target block #1 /
    [ / result /
      96, / COSE_Encrypt tag /
      <<[
        <<{ / protected /
          / alg / 1:3 / A256GCM /
        }>>,
        { / unprotected /
          / iv / 5: h'6f3093eba5d85143c3dc484a'
        },
        null, / payload detached /
      [
        [ / recipient /
          h'', / protected /
          { / unprotected /
            / alg / 1:-41, / RSAES-OAEP w SHA-256 /
            / kid / 4:'ExampleRSA'
          },
          h'98123325e3f124321a109a374e8a43a33252f79c67a3ec9e3158f6
7a0664671d444a80b7f6c05fa4f91635e1a372481db3f7b0b60e0eb9c4b479340f72
71f14925a32604f9e4b3e944f5a0422ac21745148363bc49e85361ab9344a9b63ea8
0a127f74eda2fb0d992780fba4d48a5bc520609ba6fd5c668d6614bfa4623a31
1e' / key-wrapped /
        ]
      ]
    ]>>
  ]
]
]

```

Figure 30: Abstract Security Block CBOR diagnostic

The final bundle is encoded as the byte string:

```
h'9f880700008201692f2f6473742f7376638201662f2f7372632f8201662f2f7372632f820018281a000f4240850c03000058c2810100018201662f2f7372632f81820503818182186058aa8443a10103a1054c6f3093eba5d85143c3dc484af6818340a2013828044a4578616d706c65525341588098123325e3f124321a109a374e8a43a33252f79c67a3ec9e3158f67a0664671d444a80b7f6c05fa4f91635e1a372481db3f7b0b60e0eb9c4b479340f7271f14925a32604f9e4b3e944f5a0422ac21745148363bc49e85361ab9344a9b63ea80a127f74eda2fb0d992780fba4d48a5bc520609ba6fd5c668d6614bfa4623a311e8501010000561fd25f64a2ee528b86b0c2f3785b531e634d6ef31c74ff'
```

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