

Network Working Group
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: April 8, 2018

S. Burleigh
D. Horres
JPL, Calif. Inst. Of Technology
K. Viswanathan
M. Benson
F. Templin
Boeing Research & Technology
October 05, 2017

Architecture for Delay-Tolerant Key Administration
draft-burleigh-dtnwg-dtka-00.txt

Abstract

Delay-Tolerant Key Administration (DTKA) is a system of public-key management protocols intended for use in Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN). This document outlines a DTKA proposal for space-based communications, which are characterized by long communication delays and planned communication contacts.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of [BCP 78](#) and [BCP 79](#).

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at <https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/>.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on April 8, 2018.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to [BCP 78](#) and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (<https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info>) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

| | | |
|----------------------|---|--------------------|
| 1. | Introduction | 2 |
| 1.1. | Motivation and Design Strategy | 3 |
| 1.2. | Scope | 3 |
| 1.3. | About This Document | 3 |
| 1.4. | Related Documents | 3 |
| 2. | Terminology | 5 |
| 3. | High Level Architecture | 5 |
| 3.1. | Application Domains | 6 |
| 3.2. | System Entities | 6 |
| 3.3. | System Interconnections | 7 |
| 3.4. | Architectural Assumption on Communication | 8 |
| 3.5. | System Security Configuration | 8 |
| 4. | Detailed Design | 9 |
| 4.1. | Message Formats | 9 |
| 4.2. | Node Registration | 11 |
| 4.3. | Key Revocation | 13 |
| 4.4. | Key Roll-over | 14 |
| 4.5. | Key Distribution | 15 |
| 4.6. | Secure Communications | 16 |
| 4.7. | Communication Stack View | 17 |
| 5. | IANA Considerations | 17 |
| 6. | Security Considerations | 17 |
| 7. | References | 17 |
| 7.1. | Normative References | 17 |
| 7.2. | Informative References | 18 |
| | Authors' Addresses | 18 |

[1. Introduction](#)

Delay-Tolerant Key Administration (DTKA) is a system of public-key management protocols intended for use in Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN) [[RFC4838](#)]. This document outlines a DTKA proposal for space-based communications, which are characterized by long communication delays and planned communication contacts. The proposal satisfies the requirements for DTN Security Key Management [[I-D.templin-dtnskmreq](#)].

1.1. Motivation and Design Strategy

In general, on-demand interactive communications, like client-server interactions, are not feasible in DTN's network model. Terrestrial public-key management protocols require on-demand interactions with remote computing nodes to distribute and validate public-keys. For example, terrestrial public-key management protocols require on-demand interactions with a remote trusted authority (Certificate Revocation List (CRL)) to determine if a given public-key certificate has been revoked or not. Therefore, such terrestrial public-key management protocols cannot be used in DTN.

Periodic and planned communications are an inherent property of space-based communication systems. Thus, the core principle of DTKA is to exploit this property of space-based communication systems in order to avoid the need for on-demand interactive communications for key management. Therefore, the design strategy for DTKA is to proactively distribute authenticated public-keys to all nodes in a given DTN instance in advance to ensure that keys will be available when needed even if there may be significant delays or disruptions. This design strategy is to be contrasted with protocols for terrestrial Public-Key Infrastructures, in which authenticated public-keys are exchanged interactively, just-in-time and on demand.

1.2. Scope

DTKA was originally designed for space-based DTN environments, but it could potentially be used in terrestrial DTN environments as well.

1.3. About This Document

This document describes the high-level architecture of DTKA and lists the architectural entities, their interactions, and system assumptions.

1.4. Related Documents

The following documents provide the necessary context for the high-level design described in this document.

[RFC 4838](#) [[RFC4838](#)] describes the architecture for DTN and is titled, "Delay-Tolerant Networking Architecture." That document provides a high-level overview of DTN architecture and the decisions that underpin the DTN architecture.

[RFC 5050](#) [[RFC5050](#)] describes the protocol and message formats for DTN and is titled, "Bundle Protocol Specification." That document provides the format of the network protocol message for DTN,

called a Bundle, along with descriptions of processes for generating, sending, forwarding, and receiving Bundles. It also specifies an encoding format called SDNV (Self-Delimiting Numeric Values) for use in DTN. Each bundle comprises a primary block, a payload block, and zero or more additional extension blocks. A node may receive and process a bundle even when the bundle contains one or more extension blocks that the node is not equipped to process.

[RFC 6257](#) [[RFC6257](#)] is titled, "Bundle Security Protocol Specification." It specifies the message formats and processing rules for providing three types of security services to bundles, namely: confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. It does not specify mechanisms for key management. Rather, it assumes that cryptographic keys are somehow in place and then specifies how the keys shall be used to provide the security services. Additionally, it attempts to standardize a default cipher suite for DTN.

The revised Internet Draft [[I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec](#)] for DTN communication security is titled, "Bundle Security Protocol Specification (bpsec)." When compared with [RFC 6257](#), it is silent on concepts such as Security Regions, at-most-once-delivery option, and cipher suite specification. It deletes the Bundle Authentication Block and generalized the Payload Integrity and Payload Confidentiality Blocks to Block Integrity Block and Block Confidentiality Block. It provides more detailed specification for bundle canonicalization and rules for processing bundles received from other nodes. Like [RFC 6257](#), the draft does not describe any key management mechanisms for DTN but assumes that a suitable key management mechanism shall be in place.

5050bis [[I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis](#)] is an Internet Draft on standards track that intends to update [RFC 5050](#). It introduces a new concept called "node ID" as distinguished from the existing concept of "endpoint ID": a single DTN endpoint may contain one or more nodes. It also migrates some primary block fields into extension blocks, making the primary block immutable. In the Security Considerations section, 5050bis explicitly describes end-to-end security using Block-Integrity-Block (BIB) and Block-Confidentiality-Block (BCB). It does not specify link-by-link security considerations to be part of the bundle protocol level using the Bundle-Authenticity-Block (BAB), which was described in [RFC 6257](#). The convergence layers may provide link-by-link authentication instead of bundle protocol agent.

The Internet Draft for specifying requirements for DTN Key Management [[I-D.templin-dtnskmreq](#)] is titled, "DTN Security Key

Management - Requirements and Design." It sketches nine requirements and four design criteria for DTN Key Management system. The last two requirements are the need to support revocation in a delay tolerant manner. It also specifies the requirements for avoiding single points of failure and opportunities for the presence of multiple key management authorities.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. Lower case uses of these words are not to be interpreted as carrying [RFC2119](#) significance.

3. High Level Architecture




Figure 1: Abstract Data-Flow-Diagram for DTKA

The DTKA system includes Key Owners, Key Agents (which, in aggregate, constitute the Key Authority), and Key Users. For the sake of simplicity and to promote conceptual clarity, Figure 1 shows a single Key Agent. In order to avoid a single point-of-trust, DTKA provides mechanisms to distribute the Key Authority function among one or more DTKA Key Agents using an erasure-coding technique. This trust-distributing mechanism is discussed later in this document.

Each Key Owner has a unique DTN Node ID and chooses its own public-private key pair. In order to associate a public-key (Key) with its Node ID, a Key Owner sends an assertion of the form: (Node ID, Key) to the Key Authority. Key Owners need to authenticate their respective keys in one of two ways:

1. in the case of out-of-band bootstrapping, Key Authority shall rely on the physical security of the out-of-band channel to validate the integrity of the received message and the Key Owner needs to sign the assertion (Node ID, Key) using the private key corresponding to the Key in the assertion; or,

2. in the case of in-band authentication, the Key Owner needs to sign the assertion (Node ID, Key) using the private key corresponding to the previously authenticated and currently effective public-key for that NodeID.

Each Key User periodically receives a list of authenticated public-keys from the Key Authority and uses the authenticated public-keys as needed.

3.1. Application Domains

DTN can be used in various theatres such as space, airspace, on earth and at sea. There can be more than one installation of DTN in each of these theatres administered by different administrative entities, which may represent countries, companies and institutions. A particular installation of DTN with a single aggregate key authority is called an Application Domain.

3.2. System Entities

The architectural elements of DTKA, which shall henceforth be called DTKA Entities, are listed below.

DTKA Key Agent (DTKA-KA)

DTKA-KA is part of the root of trust for authenticated distribution of public-keys for a given application domain. All DTKA Entities must have physically authenticated public-keys of all DTKA Key Agents (DTKA-KAs), which together constitute the DTKA Key Authority for a given application domain.

DTKA Key Owner[Node ID] (DTKA-KO[Node ID])

DTKA-KO[Node ID] is a computing node that has possession of the private key corresponding to the public-key authenticated for a given Node Identity (Node ID) by the DTKA-KAs for the Key Owner's application domain.

DTKA Key User (DTKA-KU)

DTKA-KU is a computing node that receives authenticated public-keys from DTKA-KAs and distributes the same within a single computing machine through a suitable Interprocess Communication mechanism, which is outside the scope of this document.

DTKA Key Manager (DTKA-KM) and DTKA Key Manager Client (DTKA-KMC)

DTKA-KM is a DTKA Key User that receives authenticated public-keys from DTKA-KAs and distributes the same over a communication network to DTKA-KMCs, which are not DTKA Entities. DTKA-KMC can be a DTN node that can receive key distributions from DTKA KMs. The communication and security protocols for the interactions

between DTKA-KMs and DTKA-KMCs are outside the scope of this document.

3.3. System Interconnections




Figure 2: DTKA System Interconnections

Figure 2 depicts the system level interconnections that are assumed for the design of DTKA. An application domain can have one or more DTKA-KAs, all of which must be interconnected using a sub-second One-Way-Light-Time (OWLT) and rarely disrupted link. Such communication link can be realized using terrestrial Internet or specialized point-to-point space communication techniques. This link shall be used by the DTKA-KAs to synchronize between themselves. The DTKA-KAs shall

run a reliable Time Synchronization Mechanism (TSM), like the Network Time Protocol (NTP) service. TSM shall ensure that time is synchronized between the DTKA-KAs that realize the DTKA Key Authority for a given application domain.

A potentially delayed and frequently disrupted communication link is assumed to interconnect DTKA-KAs, DTKA-KOs and DTKA-KUs. This delayed-and-disrupted communication link is used by the DTKA-KAs to multicast authenticated public-key assertions to DTKA-KUs. The DTKA-KUs are assumed to have access to autonomous clocks. Autonomous clocks keep time without external correction signals and with an allowed drift in the order of a few seconds. But, delay-tolerant mechanisms for clock agreement such as issuance of UTC offsets in network management messages may be present.

3.4. Architectural Assumption on Communication

In the subsequent sections, it shall be seen that DTKA-KAs shall dispatch updates to the list of authenticated public-keys in the system using erasure coding techniques. It is evident that at least a sub-set of such communications updates must reach each DTKA-KU. Therefore, the DTN upon which the DTKA operates must satisfy the following communication assumption before DTKA can function along expected lines: all addressed receivers MUST receive sufficient number of bundles from the DTKA-KAs before the earliest effective time among the effective times of all public-key assertions in the payloads of the bundles. Note that the underlying DTN will not be aware of the effective times of the public-key assertions in the payloads of the bundles.

The above assumption can be restated using DTKA protocol terminologies, which shall be seen in the subsequent sections, as follows: All addressed receivers MUST receive enough of the code blocks for a given bulletin to enable reassembly of that bulletin before the earliest effective-time among all assertions in the bulletin.

3.5. System Security Configuration

The current public-keys of all designated DTKA-KAs for a given application domain must be securely configured into every DTKA-KA and DTKA-KU that needs to participate in that application domain; this is a pre-condition for initializing those DTKA-Entities. This process will ensure that the DTKA Agents are established as the root of trust for that application domain.

4. Detailed Design

4.1. Message Formats

Every DTKA-KA in an application domain will receive requests for associating public-keys with Node IDs from the respective DTKA-KOs. After authenticating the requests, every DTKA-KA reaches consensus with all other DTKA-KAs, which constitute the Key Authority in its application domain, on some subset of the authenticated requests. Thereafter, each DTKA-KA must multicast to all participating DTKA Entities the subset of authenticated list of address-and-key assertions on which consensus was reached. The message format for this multicast, which is called a Bulletin, supports message authentication and redundancy. The goal of message authentication is to prevent DTKA Entities' acceptance of malicious multicast messages issued by hostile nodes. The goal of message redundancy is to ensure that a minimal set of collaborating DTKA-KAs in the application domain will be able to successfully send assertions or revocations for address-and-key associations to all DTKA Entities -- the DTKA Entities need not know which DTKA-KAs are not collaborating.

A bulletin is a collection of association blocks such that each association block represents a single association of a Node ID with a public-key as depicted in Figure 3. Each block issues either an assert or revoke or roll-over instruction to the receiving DTKA Entities, which use the key information message to execute the instruction locally. The block labelled "Bulletin Hash" contains the cryptographic hash computed over all association blocks in that bulletin.

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Bulletin | Key information message (KIM):      |   |   |   |
| Hash     | {[Node ID, Effective Time, Public Key], KIM |...| KIM |
|          |   assert/revoke/roll-over)}              |   |   |   |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
```

Figure 3: Bulletin

After forming a bulletin, a $(Q+k)$ -erasure code algorithm is used to create an erasure code for the bulletin. Thus, receipt of any Q distinct code blocks will be sufficient to decode the bulletin. To ensure that the incapacity or compromise -- or veto (disagreement on bulletin content) -- of any single DTKA-KA will not result in malfunction of the key authority mechanism, each DTKA-KA is assigned primary responsibility for transmission of some limited subset of the bulletin's code blocks and backup responsibility for some other limited subset. The assigned code block subsets for the various DTKA-KAs are selected in such a way that every code block is to be

transmitted by two different DTKA-KAs. The combination of these two transmission redundancy mechanisms (parity code blocks and duplicate transmissions), together with reliable bundle transmission at the convergence layer under bundle multicast, minimizes the likelihood of any client node being unable to reconstruct the bulletin from the code blocks it receives.

During system initialization, the code-block assignments for each DTKA-KA need to be configured into every DTKA Entity. The code-block assignment for the example considered in this section is shown below in the table, in which an x-mark depicts the assignment of a code block to a DTKA-KA. It can be seen in the table that, in this example, code-blocks from at least five ($t=5$) DTKA-KAs must be received before the bulletin blocks can be decoded. Also, when all DTKA-KAs multicast their pre-defined code blocks, $n * m$ ($8 * 3 = 24$) code blocks are sent to all DTKA Entities. To further defend against a compromised DTKA-KA node introducing error into the key distribution system:

- o All nodes are informed of the code block subsets for which all DTKA-KA nodes are responsible. Any received code block that was transmitted by a DTKA-KA node which was not responsible for transmission of that code block is discarded by the receiving node.
- o Each bulletin issued by the aggregate KA is signed in a private key that is held in common by all DTKA-KA nodes. This signature functionally identifies the bulletin. Every transmitted code block is accompanied by the signature of the bulletin whose encoding DTKA-KA generated this code block. All - and only - code blocks tagged with a common signature are reassembled into the bulletin identified by that signature.
- o If the signature of a bulletin reassembled from a set of received code blocks is not verified then, for each of the DTKA-KA nodes that transmitted one or more of the constituent code blocks, all code blocks transmitted by that node are excluded from the reassembled bulletin and verification of the bulletin's signature is attempted again. Upon success, the node whose transmitted code blocks had been excluded from the reassembled bulletin may be presumed to be compromised.

| Code Block Numbers (0 to (Q + k - 1)) | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|--|
| | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| KA 1 | x | x | x | | | | | | |
| KA 2 | | x | x | x | | | | | |
| KA 3 | | | x | x | x | | | | |
| KA 4 | | | | x | x | x | | | |
| KA 5 | | | | | x | x | x | | |
| KA 6 | | | | | | x | x | x | |
| KA 7 | x | | | | | | x | x | |
| KA 8 | x | x | | | | | | x | |

Table 1: Example: Code Blocks Assignments for Key Authorities

The message format for transmitting the assigned code-blocks by each DTKA-KA is shown in Figure 4. Note that each such message is the payload of a Bundle and that the authenticity of that payload is nominally protected by a Block Integrity Block containing a digital signature computed in the private key of the issuing Key Agent; the message itself contains no self-authentication material. Reading the figure left to right, the first item is the bulletin hash as defined in Figure 3, the second item identifies the pre-defined code blocks for that DTKA-KA as conceptualized in Table 1, and the last item is the value of the identified code blocks. The identity of the DTKA-KA (KAX) that generated the code blocks is given by the source node ID of the DTN bundle in which the message arrived. KAX is used to validate the signature in the bundle's Block Integrity Block before the message is delivered to DTKA.

| Bulletin Hash | Code Block Numbers | Code Blocks |
|---------------|--------------------|-------------|
| | | |

Figure 4: Message Format for Code Blocks

4.2. Node Registration

In order to register a new DTKA-KO in the system, DTKA requires the DTKA-KO with a Node ID (DTKA-KO[Node ID]) to generate a public-private key pair and preserve the secrecy of its private key. The DTKA-KO[Node ID] needs to generate an association message of the form (Node ID, effective-time, public-key), where effective-time specifies the start time after which the public-key is valid. That is, each bundle sent by this node is to be authenticated using the node's most recently effective public key whose effective time is less than the

bundle's creation time. The DTKA-KO[Node ID] must send the association message, along with a signature on the message using its private key, to the DTKA-KA as depicted in Figure 5. Since DTKA-KA would not have seen the association of the public-key to that key owner previously, it cannot trust that the message indeed originated from DTKA-KO[Node ID]. Therefore, for registration purposes, this initial message from the DTKA-KO[Node ID] to the DTKA-KA MUST be protected by transmitting it over an independently (e.g., physically) authenticated channel. The independently authenticated channel can be realized by physically securing the access to the DTKA-KA server, using a physical communication medium, such as a USB dongle, and manually verifying the authenticity of the communication from the DTKA-KO. The manual verification is a one-time process for a given Key Owner. When an application domain has more than one DTKA-KA (KAx), the message from DTKA-KO[Node ID] must be sent to each DTKA-KA (KAx) in a similarly secure manner.

Although the messages to DTKA-KA (KAx) are independently authenticated, the DTKA-KO[Node ID] must sign the association message using its private key. The signature is not intended to cryptographically authenticate the message but only to prove to the DTKA-KA that the DTKA-KO[Node ID] is indeed in possession of the private key. This self-signed message by the DTKA-KO is useful to ensure that the physical courier, which is used to realize the physically authenticated channel, has not tampered the message sent by the DTKA-KO to the DTKA-KA. Additionally, the self-signed message is useful to audit the operations of the DTKA-KA.




Figure 5: Interaction Diagram 1: Node Registration

As an alternative to the use of a physically authenticated channel, the registration association message might be sent by a trusted third-party node whose authenticated public key is known to all KAs, so that the message may be authenticated by verifying the digital signature (formed using the trusted third-party node's current private key) in the BIB of the bundle containing the message.

The DTKA-KA will insert the received association message into its next bulletin (refer to Figure 3), for multicast, as an assertion. The bulletin will be multicast to all DTKA Entities using the protocol described in [Section 4.5](#).

4.3. Key Revocation

Manual decisions trigger the key revocation procedure. Every DTKA-KA in the application domain is assumed to have a human operator who can trigger the revocation process. When a key is to be revoked, the human operator will need to authenticate to the respective DTKA-KA (KAX) server, identify the public-key and Node ID to be revoked, and instruct that DTKA-KA (KAX) revocation software to schedule a revocation message. The revocation software in DTKA-KA (KAX) will: (a) insert the revocation message in its next bulletin as described in Figure 3; and, (b) send a revocation notice to the other DTKA-KA (KAY) instances using the protocol described in Figure 6. After authenticating the revocation instruction and arriving at a consensus for a given bulletin, of which the revocation information is a part,

each DTKA-KA will multicast the revocation in their next bulletin code block as described in Figure 3.




Figure 6: Interaction Diagram 1.1: Key Revocation

4.4. Key Roll-over

When a DTKA-KO[Node ID] has been registered by the DTKA-KA using the protocol described in Figure 5, the DTKA-KO[Node ID] can periodically roll-over to a new public-private key pair by following the key roll-over protocol described in Figure 7. The protocol for key roll-over is similar to the one for key registration except that: (a) the protocol can be executed using DTN bundles issued by the KO itself without requiring any independently secured out-of-band communication channels; and, (b) the old (current) public-key is used to authenticate the association of the new public-key with the Node ID for that DTKA KO. The DTKA-KO [Node ID] must send this message to every key agent in its application domain. Upon accepting the roll-over message from the DTKA-KO[Node ID], each key agent will schedule the roll-over instruction for identified Node ID and public-key in its next bulletin as described in [Section 4.1](#). A DTKA-KO can schedule any number of future roll-overs but the number of such roll-over schedules may need to be limited to avoid Denial of Service attacks by registered nodes -- but this topic is beyond the scope of this document.




Figure 7: Interaction Diagram 1.2: Key Rollover

4.5. Key Distribution

Each DTKA-KA collects multiple assertion, revocation, and roll-over messages from different parties by following the protocols described in [Section 4.2](#), [Section 4.3](#), and [Section 4.4](#). Then, each DTKA-KA forms and multicasts the code blocks for its bulletin to all DTKA Key Users as explained in [Section 4.1](#). The DTKA-KUs verify the authenticity of each code block from all the DTKA-KAs before using the code blocks to decode the bulletin, which will contains key assertion, revocation, and roll-over instructions. The DTKA-KUs perform these instructions in their respective local key database. This interaction between the DTKA-KAs and the DTKA-KUs of an application domain is shown in Figure 8.




Figure 8: Interaction Diagram 2: Bulk Key Distribution

4.6. Secure Communications

After receiving key assertion and roll-over information, every DTKA-KU shall have authenticated public-keys for different Node IDs in its local database. These authenticated public-keys can be used to authenticate messages received from the DTKA-KO[Node ID] and to send confidential messages to the DTKA-KO[Node ID] after the specified effective-time for each Node ID and public-key pair. This interaction is specified in Figure 9.




Figure 9: Interaction Diagram 3: Secure communication

4.7. Communication Stack View

DTKA is designed to be a special DTN application that shall perform key management operations using the services of the Bundle Protocol and BPsec. DTKA will use BP, which in turn will use BPsec to authenticate the messages containing the public-keys that are subsequently to be used by BPsec for securing future communications as shown in Figure 10.




Figure 10: Interaction Diagram 3: Secure communication

5. IANA Considerations

This document potentially contains IANA considerations depending on the design choices adopted for future work. But, in its present form, there are no immediate IANA considerations.

6. Security Considerations

Security issues and considerations are discussed through out this document.

7. References

7.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis]
 Burleigh, S., Fall, K., and E. Birrane, "Bundle Protocol",
[draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-08](#) (work in progress), August 2017.

[I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec]

Birrane, E. and K. McKeever, "Bundle Protocol Security Specification", [draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-05](#) (work in progress), July 2017.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 2119](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>>.

7.2. Informative References

[I-D.templin-dtnskmreq]

Templin, F. and S. Burleigh, "DTN Security Key Management - Requirements and Design", [draft-templin-dtnskmreq-00](#) (work in progress), February 2015.

[RFC4838] Cerf, V., Burleigh, S., Hooke, A., Torgerson, L., Durst, R., Scott, K., Fall, K., and H. Weiss, "Delay-Tolerant Networking Architecture", [RFC 4838](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC4838, April 2007, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4838>>.

[RFC5050] Scott, K. and S. Burleigh, "Bundle Protocol Specification", [RFC 5050](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC5050, November 2007, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5050>>.

[RFC6257] Symington, S., Farrell, S., Weiss, H., and P. Lovell, "Bundle Security Protocol Specification", [RFC 6257](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC6257, May 2011, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6257>>.

Authors' Addresses

Scott Burleigh
JPL, Calif. Inst. Of Technology
4800 Oak Grove Dr.
Pasadena, CA 91109-8099
USA

Email: Scott.Burleigh@jpl.nasa.gov

David Horres
JPL, Calif. Inst. Of Technology
4800 Oak Grove Dr.
Pasadena, CA 91109-8099
USA

Email: David.C.Horres@jpl.nasa.gov

Kapali Viswanathan
Boeing Research & Technology
Boeing International Corporation India Private Limited
A Block, 4th Floor, Lake View Building
Bagmane Tech Park, C.V. Raman Nagar
Bangalore, KA 560093
IN

Email: kapaleeswaran.viswanathan@boeing.com

Michael W. Benson
Boeing Research & Technology
The Boeing Company
499 Boeing Boulevard
Huntsville, AL 35824
USA

Email: michael.w.benson@boeing.com

Fred L. Templin
Boeing Research & Technology
P.O. Box 3707
Seattle, WA 98124
USA

Email: fltemplin@acm.org

