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L. Cailleux
DGA MI
C. Bonatti
IECA
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**Securing Header Fields with S/MIME
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Abstract

This document describes how the S/MIME protocol can be extended in order to secure message header fields. This technology provides security services such as data integrity, non-repudiation and confidentiality. This extension is referred to as 'Secure Headers'.

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[1.](#) Introduction

S/MIME [[RFC5751](#)] standard defines a data encapsulation format for the achievement of end to end security services such as integrity, authentication, non-repudiation and confidentiality. By default, S/MIME secures message body parts, at the exclusion of the message header fields.

S/MIME provides an alternative solution to secure header fields. "The sending client MAY wrap a full MIME [[RFC2045](#)] message in a message/rfc822 wrapper in order to apply S/MIME security services to header fields". However, the S/MIME solution doesn't allow selection

of a subset of message header fields to secure. In addition, confidentiality service can not be implemented for message header fields. The solution described herein overcomes those limitations.

Several security standards exist such as DKIM [[RFC4871](#)], STARTTLS [[RFC3207](#)] and TLS with IMAP [[RFC2595](#)] but meet other needs (signing domain, secure channels). An internet draft referred to as PROTECTED HEADERS has been proposed, but doesn't address all the requirements. These different solutions are explained in the next chapters.

The goal of this document is to define end to end secure header fields mechanisms compliant with S/MIME standard. This technique is based on signed attribute fields of a CMS [[RFC5652](#)] signature.

2. Terminology and conventions used in this document

The key words "REQUIRED", "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [[RFC2119](#)].

MUA, MSA and MTA terms are defined in Email architecture document [[RFC5598](#)].

DCA term is defined in Domain Security specification [[RFC3183](#)].

End-to-end Internet Mail exchanges are performed between message originators and recipients.

Description of message header fields are described in [[RFC5322](#)]. A header field is composed of a name and a value.

3. Context

Over the Internet, email usage has grown and today represents a fundamental service. Meanwhile, continually increasing threat levels are motivating the implementation of security services.

Historically, SMTP [[RFC5321](#)] and IMF [[RFC5322](#)] don't provide, by default, security services. The S/MIME standard [[RFC5751](#)] was published in order to encompass these needs. S/MIME defines a data encapsulation format for the provision of end to end security services such as integrity, authentication, non-repudiation and

confidentiality. By default, S/MIME secures message body parts, at the exclusion of the message header fields. In order to protect message header fields (for instance, the "Subject", "To", "From" or customized fields), several solutions exist.

S/MIME defines an encapsulation mechanism, chapter 3.1: "The sending client may wrap a full MIME message in a message/rfc822 wrapper in order to apply S/MIME security services to these header fields. It is up to the receiving client to decide how to present this inner header along with the unprotected outer header". However, some use cases are not addressed, especially in the case of message encryption. What happens when header fields are encrypted? How does receiving client display these header fields? How can a subset of header fields be secured? S/MIME doesn't address these issues.

An alternative solution is described in [[RFC3850](#)]. "Receiving agents MUST check that the address in the From or Sender header of a mail message matches an Internet mail address, if present, in the signer's certificate, if mail addresses are present in the certificate". However, this solution only provides a matching mechanism between email addresses, and provides no protection to other header fields.

Other security standards (introduced below) exist such as DKIM, STARTTLS and TLS with IMAP but meet other needs (signing domain, secure channels...).

STARTTLS and TLS with IMAP provide secure channels between components of email system (MUA, MSA, MTA...) but end to end integrity cannot be guaranteed.

DKIM defines a domain-level authentication framework for email to permit verification of the source and contents of messages. It provides mechanisms to secure message header fields and message body but it doesn't guarantee non-repudiation and originator authentication. In addition, it doesn't provide confidentiality service.

An internet draft referred to as Protected Headers (PRHDRS) has been proposed. Mechanisms described in this draft are the following. "A digest value is computed over the canonicalized version of some selected header fields. This technique resembles header protection in

DKIM. Then the digest value is included in a signed attribute field of a CMS signature". This specification doesn't address all the requirements. If protected header field has been altered, the original value cannot be determined by the recipient. In addition, encryption service cannot be applied on protected header fields.

This document proposes a technology for securing message header fields. It's referred to as Secure Headers. It is based on S/MIME and CMS standards. It provides security services such as data integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation of sender. Secure Headers is backward compatible with other S/MIME clients. S/MIME clients who have not implemented Secure Headers technology need merely ignore specific signed attributes fields in a CMS signature (which is the default behavior).

4. Mechanisms to secure message header fields

Secure Headers technology involves the description of a security policy. This policy MUST describe a secure message profile and list the header fields to secure.

Secure headers are based on signed attributes field as defined in CMS. The details are as follows. The message header fields to be secured are integrated in a structure (secure header structure) which is encapsulated in signed attributes structure of SignerInfo object. See [Appendix A](#) for an example. For each header field present in the secure signature, a status can be set. Then, as described in chapter 5.4 of CMS, the message digest calculation process computes a message digest on the content together with the signed attributes. Details of the signature generation process are described in chapter 4.5.1 of this document.

Verification of secure header fields is based on signature verification process described in CMS. At the end of this process, a comparison between secure header fields (in signature) and message header fields is performed. If they match, the signature is valid. Otherwise, the signature is invalid. Details of the signature verification process are described in chapter 4.5.2 of this document.

Non-conforming S/MIME clients will ignore the signed attribute contains a secure headers structure, and only perform the

verification process described in CMS. This guarantees backward compatibility.

Secure headers provide security services such as data integrity, non-repudiation and confidentiality.

For different reasons (e.g., usability, limits of IMAP [[RFC3501](#)]), encryption and decryption processes are performed by a third party. The third party that performs these processes is referred to in Domain Security specification as a "Domain Confidentiality Authority" (DCA). Details of the encryption and decryption processes are described in chapters 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 of this document.

The architecture of Secure Headers is presented below. The MUA performs the signature generation process (C) and signature verification process (F). The DCA performs the message encryption process (D) and message decryption process (E). The encryption and decryption processes are optional.




Figure 1: Architecture of Secure Headers

[4.1. ASN.1 syntax of secure header fields](#)

ASN.1 notation [[X.680](#)] of secure header structure is the follow:

```

SecureHeaderFields ::= SET {
    canonAlgorithm Algorithm,
    secHeaderFields HeaderFields}

id-aa-secureHeaderFieldsIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-
aa(2) secure-headers (to be defined)}

Algorithm ::= ENUMERATED {
    canonAlgorithmSimple(0),

```

```
    canonAlgorithmRelaxed(1)}
```

```
HeaderFields ::= SET SIZE (1..max-header-fields) OF HeaderField
max-header-fields INTEGER ::= MAX
```

```
HeaderField ::= SEQUENCE {
    field-Name HeaderFieldName,
    field-Value HeaderFieldValue,
    field-Status HeaderFieldStatus OPTIONAL
}
```

```
HeaderFieldName ::= IA5String
HeaderFieldValue ::= IA5String
```

```
HeaderFieldStatus ::= INTEGER
{
    duplicated(0), deleted(1), modified(2)
}
```

4.2. Secure header fields length and format

This specification requires MUA security capabilities in order to process well formed headers, as specified in IMF. Notice that it includes long header fields and folded header fields.

4.3. Canonization algorithm

During a message transfer through a messaging system, some components might modify headers (i.e., space adding or deletion, lowercase/uppercase rewriting...). This might lead to header fields comparison mismatch. This emphasizes the need of a conversion process in order to transform data to their canonical form. This process is named canonization process.

Two canonization algorithms are considered here, according to DKIM specification, chapter 3.4. The simple algorithm doesn't allow any modification whereas the relaxed algorithm accepts slight modifications like spaces replacement or line reformatting. Given the scope of this document, canonization mechanisms only involve header fields.

4.4. Header fields statuses

Header fields statuses are required to provide a confidentiality service toward message headers. Since this mechanism is OPTIONAL, the status field is also OPTIONAL. The three following statuses MUST be used:

- Duplicated (default). When this status is present or if no status is specified, the signature process MUST embed the header field in the signature.

- Deleted. When this status is present, the signature process MUST embed the header field in the signature. Then, the encryption process MUST delete this field from the message. This guarantees header confidentiality during the message transfer. Mandatory header fields, as specified in IMF MUST be kept in the message.

- Modified. When this status is present, the signature process MUST embed the header field in the signature. Then, the encryption process MUST modify the value of the header field in the message. This guarantees header confidentiality during the message transfer. Furthermore, modified values MAY inform a receiver's non-compliant MUA that secure headers are being used. The new value for each field is configured by the sender (i.e., this header is secured, use a compliant client). Mandatory header fields, as specified in IMF MUST be kept well formed after the modification process. For example, Date field MUST be compliant with the IMF specification.

4.5. Signature Process

4.5.1. Signature Generation Process

During the signature generation process, the sender's MUA MUST embed the SecureHeaderFields structure in the signed attributes, as described in CMS. SecureHeaderFields structure MUST include a canonization algorithm.

The sender's MUA MUST have a list of header fields to secure, statuses and a canonization algorithm, as defined by the security policy.

Header fields (names and values) embedded in signed attributes MUST be the same as the ones included in the initial message.

If different headers share the same name, all instances MUST be included in the SecureHeaderFields structure.

If multiple signatures are used, as explained in CMS and MULTISIGN [[RFC4853](#)] specifications, SecureHeaderFields structure MUST be the same in each SignerInfos object.

If a header field is present and its value is empty, HeaderFieldValue MUST have a zero-length field-value.

Considering secure headers mechanisms, the signature generation process MUST perform the following steps:

- 1) Select the relevant header fields to secure. This subset of headers is defined according the security policy.
- 2) Apply the canonization algorithm for each selected header field.
- 3) Complete the following fields in SecureHeaderFields structure according to the initial message: HeaderFieldName, HeaderFieldValue, HeaderFieldStatus (OPTIONAL).
- 4) Complete the algorithm field according to the canonization algorithm configured.
- 5) Embed the SecureHeaderFields structure in the signed attributes of the SignerInfos object.
- 6) Compute the signature generation process as described in CMS, chapter 5.5

4.5.2. Signature verification process

During the signature verification process, the receiver's MUA compares header fields embedded in the SecureHeaderFields structure with those present in the message. For this purpose, it uses the canonization algorithm identified in the signed attributes. If a

mismatch appears during the comparison process, the receiver's MUA MUST invalidate the signature. The MUA MUST display information on the validity of each header field. It MUST also display the values embedded in the signature.

The receiver's MUA MUST know the list of mandatory header fields in order to verify their presence in the message. If a header field defined in a message is in the secure header list, it MUST be included in the SecureHeaderFields structure. Otherwise, the receiver's MUA MUST warn the user that a non-secure header is present.

Considering secure headers mechanisms, the signature verification process MUST perform the following steps:

- 1) Execute the signature verification process as described in CMS, chapter 5.6. If the signature appears to be invalid, the process ends. Otherwise, the process continues.

- 2) Read the type of canonization algorithm specified in SecureHeaderFields structure.

- 3) For each field present in the signature, find the matching header in the message. If there is no matching header, the verification process MUST warn the user, specifying the missing header name. The signature is tagged as invalid.

- 4) Compute the canonization algorithm for each header field value in the message. If the simple algorithm is used, the steps described in DKIM, chapter 3.4.1, are performed. If the relaxed algorithm is used, the steps described in DKIM, chapter 3.4.2, are performed.

- 5) For each field, compare the value stored in the SecureHeaderFields structure with the value returned by the canonization algorithm. If values don't match, the verification process MUST warn the user. This warning MUST mention mismatching fields. The signature is tagged as invalid. If all the comparisons succeed, the verification process MUST also notify the user (i.e., using an appropriate icon).

6) Verify that no secure header has been added to the message header, given the initial fields. If an extra header field has been added, the verification process MUST warn the user. This warning MUST mention extra fields. The signature is tagged as invalid.

7) Verify that every mandatory headers in the security policy and present in the message are also embedded in the SecureHeaderField structure. If such headers are missing, the verification process MUST warn the user and indicate the names of the missing headers.

The MUA MUST display features for each secure header field (name, value and status) and canonization algorithm used.

4.6. Encryption and Decryption Processes

Encryption and decryption operations are not performed by MUAs. This is mainly justified by IMAP limitations. The solution developed here relies on concepts explained in Domain Security specification, chapter 4. A fundamental component of the architecture is the Domain Confidentiality Authority (DCA). Its purpose is to encrypt and decrypt messages instead of - respectively - senders and receivers.

4.6.1. Encryption Process

All the computations presented in this chapter MUST be performed only if the following conditions are verified:

- The content to be encrypted MUST consist of a signature object or a multipart object, where one part is a detached signature, as shown in S/MIME specification, chapter 3.4.

- A SecureHeaderFields structure MUST be included in the signedAttrs field of the SignerInfo object of the signature.

All the mechanisms described below MUST start at the beginning of the encryption process, as explained in CMS. They are performed by the sender's DCA. The following steps MUST be performed for each field included in the SecureHeaderFields structure:

1. Extraction of the field status;

1.1 If the status is Duplicated, the field is left at its existing value.

1.2 If the status is Deleted, the header field (name and value) is removed from the message. Mandatory header fields specified in [\[RFC5322\]](#) MUST be kept.

1.3 If the status is Modified, the header value is replaced by a new value, as configured in the DCA.

4.6.2. Decryption Process

All the computations presented in this chapter MUST be performed only if the following conditions are verified:

- The decrypted content MUST consist of a signature object or a multipart object, where one part is a detached signature, as shown in S/MIME specification, chapter 3.4.

- A SecureHeaderFields structure MUST be included in the SignerInfo object of the signature.

All the mechanisms described below MUST start at the end of the decryption process, as explained in CMS. They are executed by the receiver's DCA. The following steps MUST be performed for each field included in the SecureHeaderFields structure:

1. If the status is Duplicated, the field is left at its existing value.

2. If the status is Deleted, the DCA MUST write a header field (name and value) in the message. This header MUST be compliant with the information embedded in the signature.

3. If the status is Modified, the DCA MUST rewrite a header field in the message. This header MUST be compliant with the SecureHeaderFields structure.

5. Case of triple wrapping

Secure Headers mechanisms MAY be used with triple wrapping, as described in ESS [[RFC2634](#)]. In this case, a SecureHeaderFields structure MAY be present in the inner signature, in the outer signature, or both. In the last case, the two structure SecureHeaderFields MAY differ. One MAY consider the encapsulation of a header field in the inner signature in order to satisfy confidentiality needs. On the contrary, an outer signature encapsulation MAY help for delivery purpose. Header fields processing, given the signature type (inner or outer), is out of the scope of this document.

6. Security Considerations

This specification describes an extension of the S/MIME standard. It provides message headers integrity, non-repudiation and confidentiality. The signature and encryption processes are complementary. However, according to the security policy, only the signature mechanism MAY be prescribed. In this case, the signature process is implemented between MUAs. The encryption process requires signed messages with Secure Headers extension. If required, the encryption process is implemented by DCAs.

This specification doesn't address end-to-end confidentiality for message header fields. Sent and received messages by MUAs MAY appear in plaintext. In order to avoid interception, the use of TLS is recommended between MUAs and DCAs (uplink and downlink). Another solution might be the use of S/MIME between MUAs and DCAs in the same domain.

7. References

7.1. Normative References

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Appendix A. Formal syntax of Secure Header

ASN.1 notation [[X.680](#)] of secure header structure is the follow:

```
SecureHeaderFields ::= SET {  
    canonAlgorithm Algorithm,  
    secHeaderFields HeaderFields}
```

```
id-aa-secureHeaderFieldsIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1)  
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-  
aa(2) secure-headers (to be defined)}
```

```
Algorithm ::= ENUMERATED {  
    canonAlgorithmSimple(0),  
    canonAlgorithmRelaxed(1)}
```

```
HeaderFields ::= SET SIZE (1..max-header-fields) OF HeaderField  
max-header-fields INTEGER ::= MAX
```

```
HeaderField ::= SEQUENCE {  
    field-Name HeaderFieldName,  
    field-Value HeaderFieldValue,  
    field-Status HeaderFieldStatus OPTIONAL  
}
```

```
HeaderFieldName ::= IA5String  
HeaderFieldValue ::= IA5String
```

```
HeaderFieldStatus ::= INTEGER  
{  
    duplicated(0), deleted(1), modified(2)  
}
```

Appendix B. Secure Header Fields example

In the following example, header fields subject, from, to and x-ximf-primary-precedence are secured and integrated in a SecureHeaders structure.

Extract of message header fields

```
From: John Doe <jdoe@example.com>
To: Mary Smith <mary@example.com>
Subject: This is a test
X-ximf-primary-precedence: priority
```

SecureHeaders structure extracted from signature:

```
2286 163:      SEQUENCE {
2289  11:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 80'
2302 147:      SET {
2305 144:      SET {
2308  4:      ENUMERATED 1
2314 135:      SET {
2317  40:      SEQUENCE {
2319  25:      IA5String 'x-ximf-primary-precedence'
2346  8:      IA5String 'priority'
2356  1:      INTEGER 0
          :      }
2359  25:      SEQUENCE {
2361  2:      IA5String 'to'
2365 16:      IA5String 'mary@example.com'
2383  1:      INTEGER 0
          :      }
2386  34:      SEQUENCE {
2388  4:      IA5String 'from'
2394 23:      IA5String 'jdoe <jdoe@example.com>'
2419  1:      INTEGER 0
          :      }
2422  28:      SEQUENCE {
2424  7:      IA5String 'subject'
2433 14:      IA5String 'This is a test'
2449  1:      INTEGER 0
          :      }
          :      }
          }
```



```
      :           }  
      :         }  
      :
```

Example is displayed as an output of Peter Gutmann's "dumpsn1" program.

OID used in this example is non official.

Appendix C. Acknowledgements

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Author's addresses

Laurent CAILLEUX
DGA Maitrise de l'information
BP 7
35998 Rennes Armees
France
Email: laurent.cailleux@dga.defense.gouv.fr

Chris Bonatti
IECA, Inc.
3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
Fairfax, VA 22031
USA
Email: bonattic@ieca.com