

Workgroup: Internet Engineering Task Force
Internet-Draft:
draft-chen-bgp-ls-security-capability-00
Published: 7 November 2022
Intended Status: Informational
Expires: 11 May 2023
Authors: Chen, Ed. L. Su
 China Mobile China Mobile

the extensions of BGP-LS to carry security capabilities

Abstract

The goal is to collect the security capabilities of nodes, which will be one of the factors to form the routing topology, and use the routing programming capabilities to form a secure routing path.

The BGP-LS protocol is extended to carry the security capabilities of the node. The controller collects topology information, forms a topology path with security capabilities according to security requirements, and supports SRV6 path sending to execute node forwarding through programming.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at <https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/>.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 11 May 2023.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (<https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info>) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents

carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

- [1. Introduction](#)
- [2. BGP-LS node type carries security capability](#)
 - [2.1. Collection model of security capabilities](#)
 - [2.2. New Node Attribute TLVs](#)
 - [2.3. Usage of new attribute](#)
- [3. BGP-LS Link type carries security capability](#)
 - [3.1. Collection model of security capabilities](#)
 - [3.2. New Link Attribute TLVs](#)
 - [3.3. Useage of new attribute](#)
- [4. BGP-LS Prefix type carries security capability](#)
 - [4.1. Collection model of security capabilities](#)
 - [4.2. New Link Attribute TLVs](#)
 - [4.3. Usage of new attribute](#)
- [5. IANA Considerations](#)
- [6. Security Considerations](#)
- [Authors' Addresses](#)

1. Introduction

The most important reason for using BGP-LS as the extended basic protocol is that BGP-LS shields the differences of other routing protocols, and the underlying routing protocol types do not need to be considered when transmitting security capabilities.

RFC7752 standardized North-Bound Distribution of Link-State and Traffic Engineering (TE) Information Using BGP, describes a mechanism by which link-state and TE information can be collected from networks and shared with external components using the BGP routing protocol, using a new BGP Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI) encoding format.

BGP-LS is a new way to collect network topology. The topology information discovered by the IGP protocol is summarized by the BGP protocol and sent to the upper controller. With the powerful routing and routing capabilities of the BGP protocol, there are three types of BGP-LS routes, which are used to carry node, link and route prefix information respectively. The three routes cooperate with each other to complete the transmission of topology information. The node routing function is to record the node information of the topology, the link routing function is to record the link information between two devices, and the address prefix routing

function is to record the network segment information that the node can reach.

The state information NLRI collected by BGP-LS is described in TLV (type/length/value triplet) format. Each link state described by NLRI can identify a node, link or prefix. Therefore, three types of NLRI are newly set in the standard, of which type 3 and 4 are used to distinguish the prefix of IPv4 and IPv6. There are only two types of NLRI attributes in the original BGP protocol: MP_REACH_NLRI, attribute type 14; MP_UNREACH_NLRI, attribute type 15.

2. BGP-LS node type carries security capability

2.1. Collection model of security capabilities




Figure1: Router and attached security products are used as node units

2.2. New Node Attribute TLVs

The Local Node Descriptors TLV contains Node Descriptors for the node anchoring the local end of the link. This is a mandatory TLV in all three types of NRIs (node, link, and prefix).




Figure 2: Local Node Descriptors TLV Format

Node attribute TLVs are the TLVs that may be encoded in the BGP-LS attribute with a Node NLRI. The following Node Attribute TLVs are defined:

TLV Code Point	Description	Length
263	Multi-Topology Identifier	variable
1024	Node Flag Bits	1
1025	Opaque Node Attribute	variable
1026	Node Name	variable
1027	IS-IS Area Identifier	variable
1028	IPv4 Router-ID of Local Node	4
1029	IPv6 Router-ID of Local Node	16

Table 3: Node Attribute TLVs

The security capability is transferred by adding the security capability attribute to the attributes of the local node.

TLV Code Point	Description	Length
1030	Node Security Capability	variable

Table 4: New Node Attribute TLV

security capability information through the BGP-LS link state data packet.

3.2. New Link Attribute TLVs




Figure 6: The Link NLRI Format

TLV Code Point	Description	IS-IS TLV /Sub-TLV
1028	IPv4 Router-ID of Local Node	134/---
1029	IPv6 Router-ID of Local Node	140/---
1030	IPv4 Router-ID of Remote Node	134/---
1031	IPv6 Router-ID of Remote Node	140/---
1088	Administrative group (color)	22/3
1089	Maximum link bandwidth	22/9
1090	Max. reservable link bandwidth	22/10
1091	Unreserved bandwidth	22/11
1092	TE Default Metric	22/18
1093	Link Protection Type	22/20
1094	MPLS Protocol Mask	---
1095	IGP Metric	---
1096	Shared Risk Link Group	---
1097	Opaque Link Attribute	---
1098	Link Name	---

Table 7: Link Attribute TLVs

The new attribute describes the link security capability and transmits the link security capability information through this attribute.

TLV Code Point	Description	IS-IS TLV /Sub-TLV
1099	Link security info	---

Table 8: New Link Attribute TLVs

3.3. Usage of new attribute




Figure 9: Association security capability interaction

The Association security capability depends on the security capability enabled by the node. As a node directly connected to the controller, node B first interacts with the enabled security capability information of the opposite end in a two-way manner, and then the opposite end initiates the transmission of the association security capability information.

The decision of association security capability can be divided into two situations: one is under the same security domain, and the other is under different security domains. 1. The decision rules for link security capabilities under different security domains are as follows: SCing represents the enabled security capabilities of a node. Example: SCing A=[1,0,0,1,0,.....]，SCing B=[1,1,0,1,0,.....]，SCing Association<A,B> = SCing A && SCing B

When the link passes through more than two nodes, it is necessary to logically and operate the security capabilities of all nodes in the path to obtain the link security capabilities.

1. The decision rules of association security capability in the same security domain are as follows: SCing indicates the security capability of a node that has been enabled. Example: SCing A=[1,0,0,1,0,.....]，SCing B=[1,1,0,1,0,.....]，SCing Association<A,B> = SCing A || SCing B

When the link passes through more than two nodes, it is necessary to logically or operate the security capabilities of all nodes in the path to obtain the link security capabilities.

4. BGP-LS Prefix type carries security capability

4.1. Collection model of security capabilities




Figure 10: Security capability is transferred between ASs through Prefix

The router and its attached security products are the basic units. When collecting the status information, only some nodes can directly transmit the node status information to the controller through the BGP-LS protocol. Other nodes that do not directly transmit the node information need to transmit the node information to the directly connected node to achieve the transmission of security capability information. In the figure, nodes A and E are direct connected nodes, which are connected to their respective controllers. Nodes A and E are responsible for collecting the security capabilities of other nodes in their respective fields.

4.2. New Link Attribute TLVs

The IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix NLRIs (NLRI Type = 3 and Type = 4) use the same format, as shown in the following figure.




Figure 11: The IPv4/IPv6 Topology Prefix NLRI Format

TLV Code Point	Description	Length
1152	IGP Flags	1
1153	IGP Route Tag	4*n
1154	IGP Extended Route Tag	8*n
1155	Prefix Metric	4
1156	OSPF Forwarding Address	4
1157	Opaque Prefix Attribute	variable

Table 12: Prefix Attribute TLVs

An AS has at least one super direct connection node, which has the security capability information of all nodes under the AS. By adding new attributes to Prefix, the security capabilities of the entire AS can be transferred.

TLV Code Point	Description	Length
1158	AS security capabilities	variable

AS Security capabilities means the security capability information of all nodes under the AS, that is, the security capability information of all nodes is spliced, such as {[IP address (A)+node security capability], [IP address (B)+node security capability]}.

4.3. Usage of new attribute

5. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

6. Security Considerations

TBD

Authors' Addresses

Meiling Chen (editor)
China Mobile
BeiJing
China

Email: chenmeiling@chinamobile.com

Li Su
China Mobile
BeiJing
China

Email: suli@chinamobile.com