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**Problem Statement for MIPv6 Interactions with GPRS/UMTS
Packet Filtering
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Abstract

This document provides an analysis of certain inter-working problems between IPv6 nodes running Mobile IPv6, at least one of which is connected to a Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) specified General Packet Radio Service/Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (GPRS/UMTS) network. The inter-working problems

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are caused by some specific packet filtering operations at the edge of the GPRS/UMTS network which are applied to control access to the GPRS/UMTS services and network resources. However, we believe that other scenarios may exist in which similar packet filtering operations may be applied and that similar problems would arise in these more general scenarios.

The GPRS Gateway Support Node (GGSN) checks the source address or the destination address in the basic IPv6 header of incoming or outgoing IP datagrams against a set of packet filtering information established during the GPRS/UMTS session set-up. The packet filtering information remains stable during the sessions and independent of Mobile IP. When MIPv6 is activated by either end of the IPv6 mobile nodes, the packet filtering will fail to perform properly and subsequently block the traffic due to the mismatch between the packet filters and the current source address or destination address in the basic IPv6 header of the IP datagrams to and from the IPv6 mobile nodes.

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1. Introduction

Mobile IPv6 [1] allows a mobile node to maintain its IP connectivity regardless of its network attachment point. Packets sent to the mobile node may still use its home address, or the care-of address

of

the mobile node as the destination address. The mobile node may continue to communicate with its existing communication peers (stationary or mobile) by using its topologically correct IP addresses. An important and highly desirable feature of mobile IP based mobility is that the control is transparent to transport and higher-layer protocols and applications, i.e. the higher layer protocols and applications function as if the mobile node is "stationary".

Packet filtering in GPRS/UMTS [2] is used for differentiating GPRS/UMTS connections and Quality of Service (QoS), and protecting the network resources and services against Theft of Service attacks. It is achieved by checking the header information of the incoming

and

outgoing IP datagrams against a set of packet filtering information. The packet filtering information is defined or authorised by the application layer entities during the set-up of the GPRS/UMTS and IP Multimedia Subsystem sessions operating independently of Mobile IP. This pre-defined packet filtering information is used by the GGSN to check the header of incoming or outgoing IP datagrams so as to select the appropriate GPRS/UMTS sessions with QoS or control the access to network resources and IMS services based on the operator defined local policies. For example, the Service Based Local Policy control (SBLP) [5][6] in UMTS IP Multimedia Subsystems (IMS)[4] enables the GGSN to check the destination address for outgoing IP datagrams according to policy information authorised by the Policy Decision Function during the IMS session establishment.

When Mobile IPv6 is activated, an IPv6 node sends IP datagrams using Care-of Address as either the destination address or source address while its home address is carried in the extension headers. The change of source address or destination address in the basic IPv6 header from the mobile node's home address to its care-of address

or

from one care-of address to another during a session leads to a mismatch with the header information such as the source address or destination address in the set of parameters for packet filtering information and, as a result, the discard of incoming or outgoing IP datagrams by the GGSN.

In the following sections, the basic packet filtering operations in

failure GPRS/UMTS are described and followed by the analysis of the
of those operations when Mobile IPv6 is activated.

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1.1 Scope of this Document

This document provides information about the potential problems for mobile terminals to use Mobile IPv6 when at least one of them is connected to the GPRS/UMTS networks. It analyses the scenarios when Mobile IPv6 is applied and how the problems occur.

Similar problems may also exist in CDMA2000 as defined by 3GPP2 and other Internet technologies such as firewalls. But the discussions in this document are intended to apply to 3GPP compliant GPRS/UMTS networks.

1.2 Abbreviations

| | |
|-------|--|
| 3GPP | Third Generation Partnership Project |
| 3GPP2 | Third Generation Partnership Project Two |
| GGSN | Gateway GPRS Support Node (default router for 3GPP User Equipment) |
| GPRS | General Packet Radio Service |
| IMS | IP Multimedia (Core Network) Subsystem, 3GPP Release 5 IPv6-only part of the network |
| NSIS | Next Steps In Signalling |
| PDP | Packet Data Protocol |
| RSVP | Resource Reservation Protocol |
| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
| SBLP | Service Based Local Policy |
| TFT | Traffic Flow Template |
| UE | User Equipment, for example a UMTS mobile handset |
| UMTS | Universal Mobile Telecommunications System |

2. Terminology

GPRS services those services provided or accessed by the GPRS/UMTS networks. They can be a single media service with one traffic flow or a multimedia service with several traffic flows.

IMS Services those services provided by the IP Multimedia (Core Network) Subsystems (IMS). They are distinguished from the general GPRS Services as defined above in that the latter are not provided by the IMS.

3. Packet Filtering in 3GPP Networks

The following sections list some packet filtering operations in

GPRS/

UMTS. It is not intended to exhaust all the possible application scenarios for packet filtering operations in 3G networks such as those used by firewalls.

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3.1 Mobile Terminal Defined Packet Filtering for GPRS Services

The GPRS Services are defined to be those services that are not run on the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) [4]. IMS is defined by 3GPP to provide SIP Based IP multimedia services. To support GPRS services with more than one traffic flow with differentiated QoS, GPRS/UMTS networks support multiple simultaneous sessions as typically represented by multiple secondary PDP (Packet Data Protocol) Contexts[2] in association with one Primary PDP Context for each of its IP address. Each GPRS/UMTS session may be assigned specific QoS with the necessary network resources (including radio resources).

An

incoming IP datagram from the external public data network such as Internet will be checked by the GGSN, to decide if there is an existing GPRS/UMTS session to deliver the datagram through the network to the mobile terminal. The basic IPv6 header as well as some higher layer information such as the ports is checked against a Traffic Flow Template (TFT) [3] that contains the packet filtering information such as the IPv4/IPv6 Source Addresses, Protocol Identifier, Source/Destination Ports, etc.

upon

The TFT is generated by the mobile node and recorded by the GGSN

activated

a successful establishment of a GPRS/UMTS session for the mobile node. The TFT only applies when secondary PDP contexts are

context

in which case only one PDP context among both the primary PDP

and secondary PDP context(s) is allowed not to have a TFT associated with it.

contains

The GGSN will use at least one of those packet filter parameters defined in the TFT, primarily the Source Address, to check if an appropriate GPRS/UMTS session has been set up for incoming traffic. The GGSN searches for a GPRS/UMTS session with the TFT that

the parameter values matching those carried in the datagram. For example, the Source IP Address field of each existing TFT will be compared with the source address carried in the basic IPv6 header of an IPv6 datagram. If no matching TFT is found, the datagram may be discarded.

3.2 Mobile Terminal Defined Packet Filtering for IMS Services

For a UE running IMS Services, the GGSN ignores any UE supplied TFT. The filters in that TFT are not installed in the packet processing table at the GGSN. The packet filtering for IMS services is based on the Service Based Local Policy as discussed in the next section.

3.3 Network Service Defined Packet Filtering for IMS Services

In IMS, Service Based Local Policy (SBLP) [5][6] is enforced by the GGSN to authorise and control the access to the IMS services and the GPRS/UMTS network resources based on operator defined local policies. The SBLP can be applied to both the traffic leaving the GPRS/UMTS

networks (uplink) and the traffic entering the GPRS/UMTS network (downlink).

An IMS service request, a GPRS/UMTS session set-up request and the subsequent data packets originated by the mobile terminal will be checked by the GGSN against a set of policy control information parameters such as Destination Address, Destination Port Number, Transport Protocol ID, etc. The policy control information is issued as an authorisation from the IMS application layer (the IMS/Policy Decision Function -PDF). An IP datagram carrying an IMS service request or user data will be blocked by the GGSN if mismatch is

found

between the authorised policy information and those carried by the

IP

datagram. For example, an IMS service request or a VoIP packet will be blocked by the GGSN if the destination address carried by the IP datagram does not match that authorised by the Policy Decision Function. This is designed for protecting GPRS/UMTS and IMS against ToS attacks.

4. Problem statement

The problem is stated in terms of an IPv6 node, A, communicating with a second IPv6 node, B. B is connected to the GPRS/UMTS network. The Internet or IP networks are between A's local network and B's GPRS/UMTS network.

We consider in turn the cases in which the GPRS node, B, is acting either as a Correspondent Node or as a Mobile Node. For each case, we consider sub-cases related to terminal defined filters (i.e. TFTs) and network defined filters (i.e. SBLP).

Agent

Further, for each sub-case, we further consider the use of Home tunnelling and Route Optimisation by the Mobile Node.

4.1 GPRS node, B, acting as Correspondent Node

This is the case where A is a Mobile Node that is having multimedia sessions with a Correspondent Node, B. B is connected to a GPRS/UMTS network. The sessions are set up when A is connected to its home network link.

4.1.1 Mobile Terminal defined Packet Filtering for GPRS Services

Upon a successful establishment of multimedia sessions between A and B, each session is associated with a TFT packet filter(s) defined

by

B which have A's home address as the source address for IP datagrams sent from A to B. The GGSN uses these packet filters to decide which PDP Context to use to deliver an incoming IP datagram to B.

4.1.1.1 Home Agent Tunnelling

The IP datagrams sent from A to B use the (reverse) tunnel from A's current CoA to its HA. IP datagrams exit the tunnel at A's home

agent

and transmit to B using A's home address as the source address.

Upon

arriving at the GGSN, the IP datagrams' source address matches the IPv6 source address (A's home address) recorded in one of the TFT filters and, if other filtering parameters are matched as well, the IP datagrams will be delivered to B through the PDP Context corresponding to the TFT. No specific issues are identified for this case.

4.1.1.2 Route Optimisation

When A moves away from its home network link and connects to a foreign network link and attempts the Mobile IPv6 binding update procedures, it starts sending IP datagrams to B directly using its CoA address as the Source Address and carrying its Home Address in the Home Address destination option extension header.

not

When such an IP datagram sent from A arrives at the GGSN, it does


IPv6

match the TFT packet filters containing A's home address as the source address. As result, two possible decisions can be made by the GGSN; If there happens to be a different PDP Context with a TFT

which

does match A's CoA or a PDP Context without an associated TFT, the GGSN will decide to use it to deliver the IP datagram to B. But in this case it may not receive the correct Quality of Service treatment. Additionally, the PDP Context with the Quality of Service appropriate for delivering the IP datagram is left unused.

Figure 1 shows an example of two GPRS sessions that are distinguished by GGSN using TFT packet filters, TFT1 and TFT2, respectively.






Figure 1. Route Optimization with TFT-based Packet Filtering in GGSN

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Alternatively the GGSN will discard the IP datagram if all sessions have TFTs and none of them match the incoming packet.

The first IP datagram sent out by A will carry the Care-of Test Init message of the Return Routability Procedure. If this message is dropped, then Route Optimisation will not complete, and IP datagrams from A to B will continue to be routed via the Home Agent instead (see [Section 4.1.1.1](#)).

If, instead, this message is delivered to B by the GGSN, the Return Routability procedure may complete and subsequent datagrams will be routed in the same way as the Care-of Test Init. The session with optimised route from A to B will therefore continue.

The major problem is then that the IP datagrams will not receive the correct Quality of Service treatment. Since UMTS Quality of Service can involve small constant bit-rate bandwidth reservations, this can cause a complete loss of service, if the incorrect QoS treatment involves a path with too low a bandwidth or no bandwidth guarantee

at

all.

In addition, extra complexity or even difficulties will be incurred in the system with respect to PDP Contexts and network resources, especially, the radio resources, that remain unused but are being paid for by the user.

4.1.2 Network Service defined Packet Filtering for IMS Services

4.1.2.1 Home Agent tunnelling

We have not identified any issues with this case, for the same reason as discussed in [Section 4.1.1.1](#).

4.1.2.2 Route Optimisation

When IMS multimedia sessions are set up between A and B, the SBLP Policy Control authorises IP datagrams to be sent from B to A's home address using assigned GPRS/UMTS network resources and the associated

QoS. When A moves away from its home network link and connects to foreign network link, Mobile IPv6 Route Optimisation may be used to allow B to continue sending IP datagrams to A by using A's CoA.

Upon arrival at the GGSN, they will not match the SBLP filter for the session which is authorised only for destination equal to A's home address. SBLP filters are associated with the particular UMTS QoS reservation (PDP Context) for the session. If B continues to use

4.2 GPRS node, B, acting as Mobile Node

This is the case where the GPRS node, B, is acting as MIPv6 Mobile Node and has a live session such as VoIP with a Correspondent Node, A. The MN, B, connects to the GPRS network after leaving either a GPRS network or non-GPRS network. Therefore, the current GPRS network is NOT taken to be B's home network but a foreign network.

4.2.1 Mobile Terminal defined Packet Filtering for GPRS Services

4.2.1.1 Home Agent Tunnelling

When B moves away from its home network link and connects to GPRS network link, a PDP Context is set up and associated with a TFT filter containing A's address as the Source Address for IP datagrams sent from A to B.

Figure 3 shows an example of two PDP Contexts representing two GPRS sessions, 1 and 2, that are distinguished by GGSN using TFT filters, TFT1 and TFT2, for incoming IP datagrams to be delivered to B.




Figure 3. HA Tunnelling with TFT-based Packet Filtering in GGSN

The IP datagrams sent from A to B may use Home Agent Tunnelling from B's Home Agent to its current CoA. The IP datagrams tunnelled from B's Home Agent to B's CoA have the Home Agent address as the source address in the outer header, while the TFT filter associated with

the

existing session has A's address as the Source Address. When the IP datagrams arrive at the GGSN, the source address in the outer header does not match the Source Address in the TFT template associated

with

the session. As a result, the IP datagrams may be discarded by the GGSN or provided with incorrect QoS treatment.

4.2.1.2 Route Optimisation

For the Return Routability Procedure to complete, there needs to be a route from HA to B to deliver the Home Test messages. If no matching TFT is found by the GGSN for the tunnelled Home Test Messages and the GGSN chooses to drop the message, the Return Routability procedure will fail and, as a result, the Route Optimisation will not take place.

then

If tunnelled packets are routed at all from the Home Agent to B, the Return Routability procedure can complete successfully.

the

Packets from A are then sent directly to B's Care-of Address. These will be correctly filtered by the TFTs and then delivered through

corresponding PDP Context to B.

4.2.2 Network Service defined packet filtering for IMS Services

4.2.2.1 Home Agent Tunnelling

with

When B moves away from its home network link and connects to a GPRS network, it requests and acquires an IMS session with terminal A

Destination

authorised SBLP information containing A's address as the Address for IP datagrams sent from B to A.

carry

When Home Agent Tunnelling operation mode is used, B uses a (reverse) tunnel from its CoA to its Home Agent to send IP datagrams to A. In the reverse tunnel, the IP datagrams tunnelled from B

its Home Agent address as the destination.

Figure 4 shows an example of two IMS sessions, each of which is associated with a SBLP filter, SBLP1 and SBLP2, for IP datagrams to

be sent to the authorised destination, i.e. A's address.

When the IP datagrams in an IP-in-IP tunnel arrive at the GGSN, GGSN will find no authorised SBLP matching the destination indicated by the outer header of the tunnelled IP datagrams, and it will block and drop them.




Figure 4. HA Tunneling with SBLP-based Packet Filtering in GGSN

4.2.2.2 Route Optimisation

When Route Optimisation is used, IP datagrams from A to B (and B to A) use B's Care-of Address as destination (resp. source) and therefore will not match any of the established SBLP filters. This is because the pre-established SBLP filters authorise IP datagrams sent to B's Home Address to enter the GPRS/UMTS network. These will be either blocked or carried with inappropriate QoS treatment.

The Figure 5 shows an example of filtering IP datagrams sent from A directly to B using route optimisation passing an SBLP filter SBLP1 or SBLP2. Both authorise the use of IMS sessions and associated network resources to deliver IP datagrams to B's home address.

Depending on the policy applied to packets which do not match the SBLP filters, the Return Routability procedure may not complete.

This

is because the SBLP filters, SBLP1 and SBLP2, authorise IP datagrams sent to B's Home Address for accessing GPRS network resources and IMS services. The 'Care of Test' message in response to the 'Care

of

Test Init' message from B uses B's Care-of Address as the destination address.




Figure 5. Route Optimization with SBLP-based Packet Filtering in GGSN

4.3 Summary

GPRS Services will be disrupted when a GPRS mobile terminal have multiple secondary PDP Contexts to communicate with a mobile node which changes its network attachment point and starts using Mobile IPv6 route optimisation. This will also happen when the GPRS mobile terminal that is having more than one GPRS session with a mobile node leaves its home network, enters GPRS network and starts using mobile IPv6 home agent tunnelling or route optimisation.

IMS services will be disrupted when a mobile node that is having an IMS session with a GPRS mobile terminal changes its network attachment point and starts using mobile IPv6 route optimisation. This will also happen when the GPRS mobile terminal that is having an IMS session with a mobile node leaves its home network, enters the GPRS/UMTS network and starts using mobile IPv6 home agent tunnelling or route optimisation.

5. Problem generalisation

Although the description above is presented in terms of GPRS-specific mechanisms for installing packet filters in the network. More general situations may exist in which such filters are installed. This may

give rise to similar problems [[9](#)].

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In the analysis above, we classify the filters as mobile terminal defined and network service defined. This represents the source of the information within the filters.

An example of a 'terminal defined' filter in the network is a filter installed as a result of RSVP (or in future NSIS protocols). Such filters determine the QoS treatment that will be applied to packets according to the user's request and are therefore very similar to Traffic Flow Templates.

An example of a 'network service defined ' filter would be one installed through policy mechanisms. In this case it is in order to apply appropriate network policy that packets filtered.

6. Security Considerations

6.1 User security considerations

No user security issues have been identified.

6.2 Network security considerations

In the case of network service defined filters (e.g. Service Based Local Policy), the purpose of the filters is to ensure that appropriate network policy for controlling access to network resources and services is applied to the packets.

The problems described in this paper do not themselves represent security issues for the network (for example users circumventing the network's policy). Indeed, the problems arise largely because the policies cause packets to be dropped, or treated according to a different policy which explicitly allows those packets to pass.

However, care must be taken in considering solutions to these problems which cause modification of the network's policies. Such modification will necessarily be caused by the mobility event at one or other user. These events can easily be faked by users.

For example, IP address spoofing could be used to convince the network that a user has moved when in fact they have not. Collaborating users could convince the network that a user has

moved,

when in fact the new address belongs to a different host.

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