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SM2 Digital Signature Algorithm for DNSSEC

Abstract

This document describes how to specify SM2 Digital Signature Algorithm keys and signatures in DNS Security (DNSSEC). It lists the curve and uses SM3 as hash algorithm for signatures.

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1. Introduction

DNSSEC is broadly defined in RFCs 4033, 4034, and 4035 ([RFC4033],

[<u>RFC4034</u>], and [<u>RFC4035</u>]). It uses cryptographic keys and digital signatures to provide authentication of DNS data. Currently, there are several signature algorithms, such as RSA with SHA-256, ECDSA with curve P-256 and SHA-256, etc.

This document defines the DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records (RRs) of a new signing algorithms: SM2 uses elliptic curves over 256-bit prime fields with SM3 hash algorithm. (A description of SM2 and SM3 can be found in ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 [ISO/IEC10118-3:2018] and ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 [ISO/IEC14888-3:2018].) This document also defines the DS RR for the SM3 one-way hash algorithm. In the signing algorithm defined in this document, the size of the key for the elliptic curve is matched with the size of the output of the hash algorithm. Both are 256 bits.

Like all ECC-based algorithms, signing with SM2 is significantly faster than RSA based algorithms, while the validating is slower.

Due to the similarity between SM2 and ECDSA with curve P-256, some of the material in this document is copied liberally from <u>RFC 6605</u> [<u>RFC6605</u>].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in <u>RFC 2119</u> [<u>RFC2119</u>].

2. SM3 DS Records

SM3 is included in ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 and is similar to SHA-256 in many ways. The implementation of SM3 in DNSSEC follows the implementation of SHA-256 as specified in <u>RFC 4509[RFC4509]</u> except that the underlying algorithm is SM3, the digest value is 32 bytes long, and the digest type code is 17 [to be determined].

3. SM2 Parameters

Verifying SM2 signatures requires agreement between the signer and the verifier of the parameters used. SM2 digital signature algorithm has been added to ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018. And the parameters of the curve used in this document are as follows:

 p
 =
 FFFFFFE
 FFFFFFF
 FFFFFFF
 FFFFFFF
 0000000
 FFFFFFF
 FFFFFFF

 a
 =
 FFFFFFE
 FFFFFFF
 FFFFFFF
 FFFFFFF
 0000000
 FFFFFFF
 FFFFFFF

 a
 =
 FFFFFFE
 FFFFFFF
 FFFFFFF
 FFFFFFF
 0000000
 FFFFFFF
 FFFFFFF

 b
 =
 28E9FA9E
 9D9F5E34
 4D5A9E4B
 CF6509A7
 F39789F5
 15A88F92
 DDBCBD41
 4D940E93

 xG
 =
 32C4AE2C
 1F198119
 5F990446
 6A39C994
 8FE30BBF
 F2660BE1
 715A4589
 334C74C7

 yG
 =
 BC3736A2
 F4F6779C
 59BDCEE3
 6B692153
 D0A9877C
 C62A4740
 02DF32E5
 2139F0A0

 n
 =
 FFFFFFE
 FFFFFFF
 FFFFFFF
 7203DF6B
 21C6052B
 53BBF409
 39D54123

4. DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for SM2

SM2 public keys consist of a single value, called "P". In DNSSEC keys, P is a simple bit string that represents the uncompressed form of a curve point, "x | y".

The SM2 signature is the combination of two non-negative integers, called "r" and "s". The two integers, each of which is formatted as a simple octet string, are combined into a single longer octet string for DNSSEC as the concatenation "r | s". (Conversion of the integers to bit strings is the same as ECDSA signature.) Each integer MUST be encoded as 32 octets.

Although SM2 uses elliptic curves, the process of digest and signature generation is different from ECDSA.

The algorithm number associated with the DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records is fully defined in the IANA Considerations section. It is:

DNSKEY and RRSIG RRs signifying SM2 with SM3 use the algorithm number 17 [to be determined].

Conformant implementations that create records to be put into the DNS MAY implement signing and verification for the above algorithm. Conformant DNSSEC verifiers MAY implement verification for the above algorithm.

5. Support for NSEC3 Denial of Existence

This document does not define algorithm aliases mentioned in <u>RFC 5155</u> [<u>RFC5155</u>].

A DNSSEC validator that implements the signing algorithms defined in this document MUST be able to validate negative answers in the form of both NSEC and NSEC3 with hash algorithm 1, as defined in <u>RFC 5155</u>. An authoritative server that does not implement NSEC3 MAY still serve zones that use the signing algorithms defined in this document with NSEC denial of existence.

6. Example

The following is an example of SM2 keys and signatures in DNS format.

6.1. SM2 Example

Private-key-format: v1.3
Algorithm: 17[to be determined] (SM2SM3)
PrivateKey: V24tjJgXxp2ykscKRZdT+iuR5J1xRQN+FKoQACmo9fA=

example.net. 3600 IN DNSKEY 257 3 17 (
 jZbZMBImG9dtGWSVEwnv2l320VKcX7MMJv+83/+A41ia
 Zu00ajXMcuyJbTr8Ud+kae6UlfqrnsG6tgADIPHxXA==)

example.net. 3600 IN DS 27215 17 6 (86671f82dd872e4ee73647a95dff7fd0af599ff8a43f fa26c9a2593091653c0e)

www.example.net. 3600 IN A 192.0.2.1

www.example.net. 3600 IN RRSIG A 17 6 3600 (
 20220428075649 20220331075649 27215 example.net.
 tz295lkfu2InRnLdLhKWDm354I6ZGSmYe0SDswKiQMU7
 /Va0QrH7bD7ZnHB4wWsEjfy1XscwM4P86sVxkMJE7w==)

7. IANA Considerations

This document updates the IANA registry for digest types in DS records, currently called "Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR) Type Digest Algorithms". The following entry has been added:

Value	6 [to be determined]
Digest Type	SM3
Status	OPTIONAL

This document updates the IANA registry "Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Algorithm Numbers". The following two entries have been added to the registry:

Number	17
Description	SM2 signing algorithm with SM3 hashing algorithm
Mnemonic	SM2SM3
Zone Signing	Y
Trans. Sec.	*
Reference	This document

* There has been no determination of standardization of the use of this algorithm with Transaction Security.

8. Security Considerations

The cryptographic work factor of SM2 is generally considered to be equivalent to half the size of the key, which is 128 bits. Such an assessment could, of course, change in the future if new attacks that work better than the ones known today are found.

SM2 digital signature algorithm has come into use for less than a score of years. So SM2SM3 algorithm is mainly used for research and experiment purpose currently.

The security considerations listed in <u>RFC 4509</u> apply here as well.

9. Normative References

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