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R. Despres, Ed.  
RD-IPtech  
S. Matsushima  
SoftBank  
T. Murakami  
IP Infusion  
O. Troan  
Cisco  
March 14, 2011

IPv4 Residual Deployment across IPv6-Service networks (4rd)  
ISP-NAT's made optional  
draft-despres-intarea-4rd-01

## Abstract

This document specifies an automatic tunneling mechanism for providing IPv4 connectivity service to end users over a service provider's IPv6 network. During the long transition period from IPv4 to IPv6-only, a service provider's network will have to support IPv6, but will also have to maintain some IPv4 connectivity for a number of customers, for both outgoing and incoming connections, and for both exclusive and shared IPv4 addresses. The 4rd solution (IPv4 Residual Deployment) is designed as a lightweight solution for this.

In some scenarios, 4rd can dispense ISPs from supporting any NAT in their networks. In some others it can be used in parallel with NAT-based solutions such as DS-lite and/or NAT64/DNS4.

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IPv4 Residual Deployment(4rd)

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## 1. Introduction

During the transition period from IPv4 to IPv6 Internet Service Providers (ISP's), will deploy networks that are IPv6 only. Some of them will do so while they still have to offer IPv4 connectivity. The IPv4 service can be one or multiple IPv4 addresses per end-user, or it can be an IPv4 address shared among multiple end-users.

In this document, Internet Service Provider is used as a generic term. It includes DSL or Broadband service providers, mobile operators, and private operators of networks of any sizes.

4rd (IPv4 Residual Deployment) is a generic lightweight solution for providing IPv4 connectivity across an IPv6 only infrastructure. As such, it is the reverse of 6rd (IPv6 Rapid Deployment) whose purpose is to rapidly introduce native IPv6 connectivity across an IPv4 network. It applies the same principles of automatic tunneling, an stateless address mappings between IPv4 and IPv6.

On the tradeoff scale between efficiency of address sharing ratios and simplicity, 4rd is on the side of design and operational simplicity.

The 4rd mechanism tunnels IPv4 over IPv6 using an algorithmic mapping from IPv4 addresses or IPv4 addresses and ports to the IPv6 addresses used as tunnel endpoints. Depending on ISP constraints and policies, 4rd can be used either standalone, with NAT44's in CE's but no NAT in ISP networks, or can co-exist with other mechanisms in the network on NAT's like DS-lite [[I-D.ietf-softwire-dual-stack-lite](#)] or NAT64/DNS64 [[I-D.ietf-behave-v6v4-xlate-stateful](#)] [[I-D.ietf-behave-dns64](#)].

## 2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this

document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

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### [3.](#) Terminology

4rd domain (Domain): an IPv6 routing network operated by an ISP and comprising one or several 4rd BR's having the same set of parameters. It offers to its 4rd-capable CE's global IPv4 connectivity, both outgoing and incoming, and with exclusive or shared IPv4 addresses.

4rd Border Relay (BR): A 4rd-capable router managed by the service provider at the edge of a 4rd domain. A BR has an IPv6-enabled interface connected to the ISP network, and an IPv4 virtual interface acting as an endpoint for the automatic 4rd tunnel. This tunnel (IPv4 in IPv6) is between the BR and all CE's of the Domain.

4rd Customer Edge (CE): A node at the border between a customer network and the 4rd domain. This node has an IPv6 interface connected to the ISP network, and a virtual IPv4 interface acting as the endpoint of the automatic 4rd tunnel. This tunnel (IPv4 in IPv6) is between the CE and all other CE's and all BR's of the Domain. It may be a host, a router, or both.

CE IPv6 prefix: The IPv6 prefix assigned to a CE by other means than 4rd itself, and used by 4rd to derive a CE 4rd prefix.

CE IPv6 address:	In the context of 4rd, the IPv6 address used to reach a CE from other CE's and from BR's. A CE typically has another IPv6 address, assigned to it at its IPv6 interface without relationship with 6rd.
CE 4rd prefix:	The 4rd prefix of the CE. It is derived from the CE IPv6 prefix by a mapping rule according to <a href="#">Section 4.3</a> . Depending on its length, it is an IPv4 prefix, an IPv4 address, or a shared IPv4 address followed by a Port-set ID ( <a href="#">Section 4.3.2</a> ).
Port-set ID:	In a CE 4rd prefix longer than 32 bits, bits that follow the first 32. It algorithmically identifies a set of ports exclusively assigned to the CE. As specified in <a href="#">Section 4.3.3</a> , the set can comprise up to 4 disjoint port ranges.

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Domain IPv6 prefix:	An IPv6 prefix assigned by an ISP to a 4rd domain.
Domain 4rd prefix:	A 4rd prefix assigned by an ISP to the 4rd domain. In typical operator applications, it is an IPv4 prefix. In a residential site in which an already shared IPv4 address has to be shared even more among several hosts, it may have more than 32 bits.
CE index:	For a CE, the field that is common to its CE IPv6 prefix and its CE 4rd prefix. In the former, it follows the Domain IPv6 prefix. In the latter, it follows the Domain 4rd prefix.

## [4.](#) Protocol Specification

### [4.1.](#) General Principles

The principle of the 4rd protocol is that IPv4 packets, or in case of shared IPv4 addresses IPv4 datagrams, traverse a 4rd domain by means






Figure 1: From a CE IPv6 Prefix to a CE 4rd Prefix

A CE derives its CE 4rd prefix from the IPv6 prefix it has been delegated on the IPv6 network, using for this parameters of the applicable mapping rule. If the domain has several mapping rules, that which applies is that whose Domain IPv6 prefix is at the beginning of the CE IPv6 prefix. As shown in Figure 1, the CE 4rd prefix is made of the Domain 4rd prefix followed by the CE index, where the CE index is the remainder of the CE IPv6 prefix after the Domain IPv6 prefix (the length of the Domain IPv6 prefix is defined by the mapping rule).

#### [4.3.2.](#) From a CE 4rd Prefix to a Port-set ID

Depending on its length, a CE 4rd prefix is either an IPv4 prefix, a full IPv4 address, or a shared IPv4 address followed by a Port-set ID (Figure 2). If it includes a port set ID, this ID specifies which ports are assigned to the the CE for its exclusive use ([Section 4.3.3](#)).




Figure 2: Variants of CE 4rd prefixes

#### [4.3.3.](#) From a Port-Set ID to a Port Set

Each value of a Port-set ID specifies which ports can be used by any protocol whose header format starts with source and destination ports (UDP, TCP, SCTP, etc.). Design constraint of the algorithm are the following:

"Fairness with respect to special-value ports"

No port-set must contain any port from 0 to 4095. (These ports, which have more value than others in OS's, are normally not used in dynamic port assignments to applications).

"Fairness with respect to the number of ports"

For a Port-set-ID's having the same length, all sets must have the same number of ports.





set. How to chose among these functions and/or combine them is beyond the scope of this specification. Readers are referred to documents dealing with operational applicability in diverse environments, e.g. [[draft-sun-intarea-4rd-applicability](#)] prepared in parallel of this one.

#### 4.3.4. From an IPv4 Address or IPv4 address + Port to a CE IPv6 address




Figure 4: From 4rd Prefix to IPv6 address (shared IPv4 address case)

In order to find whether a CE IPv6 address can be derived from an IPv4 address, or an IPv6 address + a port, a mapping rule has to be found that matches the IPv4 information:


- o If a mapping rule has a length L of CE IPv4 prefixes which does not exceed 32 bits, there is a match if the IPv4 address starts with the Domain 4rd prefix. The CE 4rd prefix is then the first L bits of the IPv4 address.
- o If a mapping rule has a length L of CE IPv4 prefixes which exceeds 32 bits, the match can only be found with the IPv4 address and the port. For this, the port is examined to determine which port-range head it starts with: 1, 01,001, or 0001. The N bits that follow this head are taken as Port-set ID, where N is the length of Port set ID of the mapping rule. The CE 4rd prefix is then made of the IPv4 address followed by the Port-set ID.

If a match has been found, the CE IPv6 prefix is then made of the

Domain IPv6 prefix followed by bits of the CE 4rd prefix that follow the Domain 4rd prefix, followed by the Domain IPv6 prefix of the mapping rule if there is one, and followed by 0's up to 128 bits to make a complete IPv6 address [RFC4291]. Figure 4 illustrates this process in the case of a shared IPv4 address.

#### 4.4. Encapsulation and Fragmentation Considerations

For 4rd domain traversal, IPv4 packets are encapsulated in IPv6 packets whose Next header is set to 4 (i.e. IPv4). If fragmentation of IPv6 packets is needed, it is performed according to [RFC2460], and as illustrated in Figure 5. Absent more specific information, the path MTU of a 4rd Domain has to be set to 1280 [RFC2460].



```

|   IPv6   ||frag n|
+-----++-----+

```

Figure 5: Fragmentation of long IPv4 packets for Domain Traversal

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In domains where IPv4 addresses are not shared, IPv6 destinations are derived from IPv4 addresses alone. Thus, each IPv4 packet can be encapsulated and decapsulated independently of each other. 4rd processing is completely stateless.

On the other hand, in domains where IPv4 addresses are shared, BR's and CE's can have to encapsulate IPv4 packets whose IPv6 destinations depend on destination ports. Precautions are needed, due to the fact that the destination port of a fragmented datagram is available only in its first fragment. A sufficient precaution consists in reassembling each datagram received in multiple packets, and to treat it as though it would have been received in single packet. This function is such that 4rd is in this case stateful at the IP layer. (This is common with DS-lite and NAT64/DNS64 which, in addition, are stateful at the transport layer.) At Domain entrance, this ensures that all pieces of all received IPv4 datagrams go to the right IPv6 destinations.

Another peculiarity of shared IPv4 addresses is that, without precaution, a destination could simultaneously receive from different sources fragmented datagrams that have the same Datagram ID (the Identification field of [[RFC0791](#)]). This would disturb the reassembly process. To eliminate this risk, BR's and CE's SHOULD, in datagrams they receive from shared-IPv4-address CE's, replace received Datagram ID's by new ones. New values SHOULD be generated as though these datagrams would have been created locally (and with due respect of [[RFC0791](#)]). Note that replacing a Datagram ID in an IPv4 header implies an update of its Header-checksum field, by adding to it the one's complement difference between the old and the new values.

#### [4.5.](#) BR and CE behaviors

#### [4.5.1.](#) Domains having only One Mapping rule

##### (a) BR reception of an IPv4 packet

Step 1 If the length of CE 4rd prefixes does not exceed 32 bits, the BR proceeds to step 2. Otherwise, and unless the packet contains a complete IPv4 datagram, IPv4 datagram reassembly is performed. If a complete datagram is available, the BR proceeds to step 2 as though the datagram had been received in a single packet.

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Step 2 The BR checks that the IPv4 source doesn't start with the Domain 4rd prefix, and that a CE IPv6 address is successfully derived from the IPv4 destination. In case of success, the packet is encapsulated and forwarded to this CE IPv6 address via the IPv6 interface.

##### (b) BR reception of an IPv6 packet

The BR checks that a CE IPv6 address is successfully derived from the source of the IPv4 encapsulated packet, and that the source address of the encapsulating packet is equal to it. In case of success: (1) if the length of CE 4rd prefixes exceeds 32 bits, the Datagram ID of the packet is replaced by a locally generated one; (2) the IPv4 packet is forwarded via the IPv4 interface.

##### (c) CE reception of an IPv4 packet

Step 1 If the CE 4rd prefix of the CE does not exceed 32 bits and the IPv4 destination address starts with the Domain 4rd prefix, the CE proceeds to step 2. Otherwise, and unless the packet contains a complete IPv4 datagram, IPv4 datagram reassembly is performed. If a complete datagram is available, the BR proceeds to step 2 as though the datagram had been received in a single packet.

Step 2 The CE tries to derive a CE IPv6 address from the IPv4 destination. It then encapsulates the IPv4 packet into an IPv6 packet whose destination is this CE IPv6 address, if one is obtained, or the BR IPv6 address otherwise.

(d) CE reception of an IPv6 packet (reassembled if applicable)

The CE checks that a CE IPv6 address is successfully derived from the source of the IPv4 encapsulated packet, AND that it is equal to the source address of the encapsulating packet. In case of success: (1) if the length of CE 4rd prefixes exceeds 32 bits, the Datagram ID of the packet is replaced by a locally generated one; (2) the IPv4 packet is forwarded via the IPv4 interface.

#### [4.5.2.](#) Domains having Multiple Mapping Rules

Some ISP will want to use 4rd in networks having several Domain 4rd prefixes, an/or several Domain IPv6 prefixes, and/or assigning CE 4rd prefixes of different lengths. For this several mapping rules are needed.

A first possibility consists in establishing several 4rd domains, each on having a single mapping rule. In this case, paths between CE's belonging to different 4rd domains go from one domain to the other in IPv4, and cross two BR's.

A second possibility permits direct IPv6 paths between CE's by supporting several mapping rules in a single domain, as described in this section. At time of writing, whether this will be in the 4rd specification a MAY, a SHOULD, or a MUST, remains an open question.

(a) BR reception of an IPv4 packet

Step 1 If a mapping rule whose length of CE 4rd prefixes does not exceed 32 bits applies to the IPv4 destination, the BR proceeds to step 2. Otherwise, and unless the packet contains a complete IPv4 datagram, IPv4 datagram reassembly is performed. If a complete datagram is available, the BR then proceeds to step 2 as though the

datagram had been received in a single packet.

- Step 2 The BR checks that the IPv4 source doesn't start with the Domain 4rd prefix of any rule. In case of success, the packet is encapsulated and forwarded to this CE IPv6 address via the IPv6 interface.

(b) BR reception of an IPv6 packet (reassembled if applicable)

The BR checks that a CE IPv6 address is successfully derived from the source of the IPv4 encapsulated packet, and that the source address of the encapsulating packet is equal to it. In case of success, the BR tries to derive a CE IPv6 address from the destination of the encapsulated packet. In case of success: (1) if the source CE 4rd prefix exceeds 32 bits, the Datagram ID of the packet is replaced by a locally generated one; (2) the encapsulating packet is retransmitted via the IPv6 interface with this CE IPv6 address as destination (and the BR IPv6 address as source address); in case of failure, the IPv4 packet is decapsulated and forwarded via the IPv4 interface.

(c) CE reception of an IPv4 packet

- Step 1 If the CE 4rd prefix of the CE does not exceed 32 bits, and a mapping rule whose length of CE 4rd prefixes does not exceed 32 bits applies to the IPv4 destination, the CE proceeds to step 2. Otherwise, and unless the packet contains a complete IPv4 datagram, IPv4 datagram reassembly is performed. If a complete datagram is

available, the BR then proceeds to step 2 as though the datagram had been received in a single packet.

- Step 2 The CE tries to derive a CE IPv6 address from the IPv4 destination. It then encapsulates the IPv4 packet into an IPv6 packet whose destination is this CE IPv6 address, if one is obtained, or the BR IPv6 address otherwise.

(d) CE reception of an IPv6 packet (reassembled if applicable)

The CE checks that a CE IPv6 address is successfully

derived from the source of the IPv4 encapsulated packet, and that it is equal to the source address of the encapsulating packet. In case of success: (1) if the source CE 4rd prefix exceeds 32 bits, the Datagram ID of the packet is replaced by a locally generated one; (2) the IPv4 packet is decapsulated and forwarded via the IPv4 interface.

NOTE: With consistency check made between encapsulated and encapsulating sources in BR's and CE's when they received tunneled packets, no CE can forward an invalid IPv4 source address, or address plus port, and have it forwarded at by the egress BR or CE. Yet, if before tunneling a packet, a CE makes an additional check that the IPv4 source is consistent with the CE IPv6 address, it can discard invalid packets earlier than by leaving it to the egress BR or CE. At time of writing, whether this test can remain a MAY, or might require a SHOULD or a MUST remains an open question.


## 5. 4rd Configuration

A CE can acquire 4rd parameters of its 4rd domain in various ways: manual configuration by an administrator, software download by the ISP, a new DHCPv6 option, etc. This document describes how to configure the necessary parameters via a single DHCPv6 option. A CE that allows IPv6 configuration by DHCPv6 SHOULD implement this option. Other configuration and management methods, MAY use the format described by this option for consistency and convenience of implementation on CEs that support multiple configuration methods.

The format of Figure 6 is proposed for the DCHPv6 option. It is chosen to permit multiple mapping rules:

```
<-2-><-2-><----- n octets ----->
+---+---+---+...---+--- ... --+---+---+---+--- ... --+
| . | n | parameter 1 |          | Parameter j |          |
+---+---+---+...---+--- ... --+---+---+---+--- ... --+
```





PARAMETER-CODES (in Hexadecimal)

0x10 : BR IPv6 address

0x11 : Length of CE-IPv6-prefixes

0x2m : Domain IPv6 prefix, with m useful bits in last octet

0x3m : Domain 4rd prefix, with m useful bits in last octet

0x4m : Domain IPv6 suffix, with m useful bits in last octet

Figure 6: 4rd DHCPv6 option

In the parameter list the BR IPv6 address is first, followed by parameters of each rule. For each rule, the order is <Domain IPv6 prefix, Domain IPv4 prefix, Length of CE IPv6 prefixes, Domain IPv6 suffix (optional)>.

## 6. Security considerations

### Spoofing attacks

With consistency checks between IPv4 and IPv6 sources that are performed on IPv4/IPv6 packets received by BR's and CE's ([Section 4.5](#)), 4rd does not introduce any opportunity for spoofing attack that would not pre-exist in IPv6.

### Denial-of-service attacks

In 4rd domains where IPv4 addresses are shared, the fact that IPv4 datagram reassembly may be necessary introduces an opportunity for DOS attacks ([Section 4.4](#)). This is inherent to address sharing, and is common with other address sharing approaches such as DS-lite and NAT64/DNS64.

The best protection against such attacks is to accelerate IPv6 enablement in both clients and servers so that, where 4rd is supported, it is less and less used.

## Routing-loop attacks

Routing-loop attacks that may exist in some automatic-tunneling scenarios are documented in [[I-D.ietf-v6ops-tunnel-loops](#)]. They cannot exist with 4rd because each BRs checks that the IPv6 source address of a received IPv6 packet is a CE address ([Section 4.5.1](#) (b) and [Section 4.5.2](#) (b) />).

## Attacks facilitated by restricted port sets

From hosts that are not subject to ingress filtering of [[RFC2827](#)], some attacks are possible by intervening with faked packets during ongoing transport connections ([[RFC4953](#)], [[RFC5961](#)], [[RFC6056](#)]). These attacks, that have mitigations of their own are easier with hosts that only use restricted port sets (they depend on guessing which ports are currently used by target hosts). To avoid using restricted port sets, the easiest approach consists in increasing the proportion of connections that are IPv6, i.e. using unrestricted port sets.

## [7.](#) IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to assign a DHCPv6 option number for 4rd ([Section 5](#)).

## [8.](#) Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank Mark Townsley for his active encouragements to pursue the 4rd approach since it was first introduced in [[I-D.despres-softwire-sam](#)]. Questions raised by Wojciech Dec have been useful to clarify explanations. Olivier Vautrin, who independently proposed a similar approach with the same acronym deserves special recognition. Particular gratitude is due to decision makers of the Japan ISP's that have announced actual 4rd deployment projects ([www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/v6ops/current/msg05247](http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/v6ops/current/msg05247)).

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#### Authors' Addresses

Remi Despres (editor)  
RD-IPtech  
3 rue du President Wilson  
Levallois,  
France

Email: [remi.despres@free.fr](mailto:remi.despres@free.fr)

Satoru Matsushima

SoftBank  
1-9-1 Higashi-Shinbashi, Munato-ku  
Tokyo  
Japan

Email: satoru.matsushima@tm.softbank.co.jp

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Tetsuya Murakami  
IP Infusion  
1188 East Arques Avenue  
Sunnyvale  
USA

Email: tetsuya@ipinfusion.com

Ole Troan  
Cisco  
Bergen, Norway  
France

Email: ot@cisco.com

