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## **Mailing List Manager (MLM) Transformations**

### **Abstract**

The widespread adoption of Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) led Mailing List Managers (MLM) to rewrite the From: header field as a workaround.

This document describes cases where it is possible to revert MLM transformations and hence verify DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) signatures that were applied at submission time. For reliable results, some compliance is required of all agents involved, author domain signers, MLMs, forwarders, and final recipients.

MLM transformation reversion reduces the DMARC's effects on indirect mail flows.

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## 1. Introduction

Mailing List Managers (MLMs) can be configured to add a footer and a subject tag to the messages that they redistribute. Although that behavior slightly exceeds the very limited set of modifications and actions described by [Section 3.9.2](#) of [\[RFC5321\]](#), it is a welcome, time-honored tradition. According to their configuration, the modifications they carry out on messages may result in a set of stylized transformations that are programmatically revertible. Reversion allows to verify DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) signatures ([\[RFC6376\]](#)) that were applied before the transformation.

Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) ([\[I-D.ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis\]](#)) hinges on the alignment of the domain in the From: header field with a verified DKIM signature. For that reason, MLMs that transform messages have to rewrite From:. A deed which can be mitigated in some cases.

Mailbox providers can configure their mail submission agents (MSAs) in order to ease MLM transformation reversion. Or they can make it impossible. It is their policy and their will. MLM operators make a

similar decision. When they both agree on revertibility, a well equipped receiver can verify the original signatures. The outcome is twofold:

1. Author domains receive positive feedback about DKIM verification of mailing list traffic. That might eventually lead them to harden their DMARC policy.
2. Final recipient's mail delivery agents (MDAs), which know by the Authentication-Results: field whether a rewritten From: header was verified, can safely undo From: munging (after any external forwarding).

## 2. Terms Definitions

**Signers** and **verifiers** are defined in [RFC6376]. The use of the term **Mailing List Manager**, almost always abbreviated **MLM** follows [RFC6377]. A MLM is a kind of **Mediator** in [RFC5598] parlance.

**Message** is defined in [RFC5322]. It consists of a **header** made up of one or more **fields** and a **body**, possibly composed of various MIME **entities**, the latter being defined in [RFC2045] and companions.

The term **original** is used here to refer to the Author or parts of the Author's message as it was sent out by the Author's domain, where **Author** is defined in [RFC5598].

## 3. Reversible Transformations

Message modifications can affect the header and/or the body of a message. This document only considers the very limited set of transformation described in the following subsections. They turn out to be reversible.

### 3.1. Header Transformations

MLM often modify the Subject: field by inserting a tag at the beginning of its value. A tag consists of a short text delimited by square brackets. For example::

Subject: [added tag] Original value of subject

This transformation is easily reverted by removing the tag. For security reasons, subject tags must not exceed 20 characters.

A more recent modification carried out by MLMs is From: rewriting. It alters the value of From: in order to pass DMARC filters. MLMs save the original value of From: in a variety of places, including

Reply-To:, Cc:, X-Original-From:. When the original value is known, the transformation is revertible.

### 3.2. Body Transformations

Footer addition is often performed in one of three ways, according to the format of the original message.

#### Single-part plain text

When the original message is not structured, a footer can be appended at the end of the original text. See example in [Appendix A.1](#)

#### Multipart added

The footer stands in its own MIME entity, which is appended as the last part of an original multipart/mixed structure. See example in [Appendix A.2](#)

#### Multipart wrapped

The footer stands in the second entity of a new multipart/mixed MIME structure whose first entity consists of the original body. See example in [Appendix A.3](#)

The footer begins with a line consisting exclusively of underscore ("\_", ASCII 95) characters, at least four of them. For security reasons, the footer must belong to an entity of Content-Type: text/plain in all cases. In addition, footers cannot exceed 10 lines of text, each shorter than 80 characters.

## 4. Outline of a Reverting Verifier

The algorithm described here is implemented in a mail filter. It usually reads the input message twice -first pass, verify; last pass, write Authentication-Results and the rest of the message to follow. When enabling MLM transformation reversion, there can be a retry pass in between those two. The result is yielded during the SMTP dialogue with no noticeable delay. Implementing reversion changed the software from 22730 lines of C code to 26762. The bulk of such ~18% increase is due to the addition of encoding conversion functions. Changes involve both verifying and signing functions (see [Section 5.1](#) for the latter).

While reading the header in the first pass, the verifier looks for specific fields:

\*From:

\*Original-From:

\*X-Original-From:

\*Reply-To:

\*Cc:

These are candidates to the original mailbox.

The verifier also collects the Subject: and any field named Original-\* that the original signer might have set to ease the reversion. At the end of the header, candidate original mailboxes are sorted according to the display name, which MLMs try and keep unaltered. The best candidate is then added to the collected set of Original-\* fields. If the Subject: begins with a tag, its version without tag is added to that set as well, unless one is there already.

Next, before reading the body, the verifier looks for prospect signatures; that is, signatures whose "d=" domain is not aligned with SPF credentials ([[RFC7208](#)]), List-Post: ([[RFC4201](#)]), Sender:, or the rewritten From: (if deemed to have been rewritten). If any such signature exist, along with MLM or other signatures, then the verifier enables parsing the body to look for a footer.

Body parsing is done in parallel with body canonicalization during the first pass. For multipart, track top level entities. Set transformation type to "wrapped" if there are exactly two entities, "added" otherwise. For single-part, body parsing must avail of encoding conversions as needed. Assume identity encoding, 7bit or 8bit, unless otherwise directed by an Original-Content-Transfer-Encoding: field.

At the end of the first pass, the verifier knows how prospect signatures did. Let's recall that DKIM signature verification results from two independent operations, steps 3 and 4 in [Section 6.1.3](#) of [[RFC6376](#)]. The signature in the "b=" tag depends on the header, while the body hash in the "bh=" tag depends on the body:

\*If the signature "b=" did not verify and the set of Original-\* fields is not empty, then it is worth to try and re-canonicalize the header using the values in the set of Original-\* fields.

\*If the body hash "bh=" did not match and a footer was found, then it is worth to try and re-canonicalize the body excluding the footer.

None, one, or both of the above operations are performed in the retry pass.

On writing Authentication-Results, if a prospect signature verifies after replacing the From: field, the verifier writes a prominent,

well documented "reason" in the relevant resinfo stanza ([Section 2.2](#) of [[RFC7601](#)]). That way, reversion elements can be easily recognized and parsed by downstream agents.

## 5. Actors Roles and Compliance

### 5.1. Original Signer

Signers who wish their users to be able to participate to mailing lists can adopt rules apt to ease MLM transformations reversion. Doing so can slightly weaken DKIM'S stiffness, and expose to the risk of malicious MLMs. A sender that doesn't know which of its mail recipients are likely to be MLMs might abide by the following rules for all outgoing mail, in the expectation that few of its users correspondents are likely to be malicious. A sender that had some idea which recipients are MLMs could apply the rules only to mail to those recipients. Or a sender might apply the rules to all mail except that sent to recipients with poor reputations.

A special rule is the addition of an Original-From: header field with a value identical to the one signed in From:. Original-From: is defined by [[RFC5703](#)] in the context of Sieve Email Filtering. As Sieve operates at time of final delivery, DKIM verifiers which act at the time of message transit can reliably use it.

Original-From: is special because verifiers may infer that the field was added by the original signer rather than by MLMs. In that case, they can send DMARC feedback reports to the original signer even if From: was rewritten.

Other generic rules to ease reversion are as follows:

- \*DKIM signatures must deploy the "relaxed" canonicalization, at least for the header, since MLMs may reflow header fields.

- \*The quoted-printable encoding must not be used for the body of single-part text/plain messages, as it is impossible to guess original soft line breaks after re-encoding. Base64 is much more robust.

- \*Single-part text/plain messages encoded as base64 must follow a constant column width of 76 characters. The encoding must be advertised by adding a new header field as follows:

Original-Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

- \*If the original Subject: begins with a tag, its value must be copied to an Original-Subject: header field. The latter field is

also defined by [[RFC5703](#)], and the same usage considerations hold.

\*Content-Type: and Content-Transfer-Encoding: are fields related to the data form. Mailers often rewrite them, so they should not be signed. If signed, their Original- counterpart should be set too.

\*When signing Cc: or Reply-To:, add their Original- counterparts to the header, as MLMs are likely to change them.

\*Original-\*: fields with an empty value stand for non-existing counterparts.

\*Original-\* fields need not be signed. If original signatures can be recovered, that suffices; otherwise, the unverified signature is irrelevant.

## 5.2. MLM

Participating MLMs must not operate transformations other than those listed in [Section 3](#). Since DKIM is MIME-agnostic, attention must be paid to preserve the exact preamble and epilogue of the original MIME structure.

MLMs must apply their own DKIM signature. The presence of signatures by multiple domains can be used by verifiers to infer that a message underwent MLM transformations.

MLMs must not set the Original-From: field, which is reserved to original signers. It is recommended that MLMs add a mailbox entry to Reply-To: or Cc: in order to ease off-list replies as well as to allow transformation reversion, but only in case the Original-From: is missing.

MLMs may set Original-\* fields other than Original-From:, but only if the original message contains no Original-\* field at all. That is, when the author's domain is not aware of the possibility to ease MLM transformation reversion.

MLMs which collect posts from other MLMs must avoid to add their own footer and subject tag. Transformation reversion cannot be stacked. A second-level MLM can modify or replace the content of previous transformations. Attention must be paid to not exceed tag and footer length limits.

## 5.3. Verifier

Attempts to verify original signatures can be done as outlined in [Section 4](#). The reversion must not replace the messages signed and

distributed by MLMs, with one exception detailed in the next paragraph. Only the result of the verification is written out.

If an original signature with rewritten From: is recovered, the verifier must make sure that an Original-From: field with the verified mailbox is written out. An MDA downstream may combine the Authentication-Results: and Original-From: fields to restore the original value of From:. This is the only recommended modification to the distributed message. It must be done after any dot-forward processing, so that external verifiers receive the message as distributed by the MLM, and can revert transformations by themselves.

If the Original-From: is set, the corresponding DMARC record may be looked up and its "rua=" and "ruf=" tags considered for feedback reports. If DMARC policies are considered, it is the the From: field which rules, not the Original-From: nor any other mailbox value, unless verified.

## 6. Security Considerations

Rewriting the From: header field is an unwelcome modification to messages. It fosters the belief that the display name of a mailbox is more trustworthy than the angle address. A belief further consented by the tendency to not even display the latter. Bad actors take advantage of this belief by displaying the names of trusted institution paired with trash email addresses hidden between angle brackets. That trick defeats DMARC's purpose.

It is out of this document's scope to suggest how mail user agents (MUAs) could counter phishing by highlighting security indicators (for the extent that indicators can actually help preventing phishing attacks). Let's just note that MUAs have to cope with MLM and phishing alike, which makes it hard to devise a pattern to tell apart one from the other without getting involved with the reputation of the specific domains.

By safely restoring munged From: to the original value, that contrast is eliminated. Then, perhaps, deceptive mailboxes might become amenable to some kind of efficient indication.

Of course, MLM role can be played by miscreants as well. However, replaying a signed message, even with revertible transformations, has more limits than forging scam messages anew. Therefore, the risk introduced by easing transformation reversion is considerably lower than that of not signing, or of keeping DMARC policy at "none".

Compared with the use of "l=" tag ([Section 8.2](#) of [[RFC6376](#)]), the fact that footers are written in plain text removes the main security objection about footer additions. Namely, footers cannot



completely replace the original content in the end recipient's eyes by exploiting lax HTML parsing in the MUA.

Still, a footer can contain dangerous URLs and deceiving text. That possibility has to be countered by usual mail filtering and savvy behavior.

## 7. IANA Considerations

IANA maintains the "Message Header" registry with several subregistries. IANA is asked to make the assignments set out in the following section.

### 7.1. Permanent Message Header Field Names

IANA is asked to create new entries in the "Permanent Message Header Field Names" registry as follows.

Header Field Name	Template	Protocol	Status	Reference
Original-Content-Transfer-Encoding		mail	standard	this I-D
Original-Reply-To		mail	standard	this I-D
Original-Cc		mail	standard	this I-D

Table 1

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## Appendix A. Examples

In the examples that follow, the first character of each wrapped line of DKIM-Signature: fields should be a TAB. For editorial reasons, it is rendered as four spaces. While visually there is little difference, those signatures won't verify unless replacing them with a TAB.

To verify the examples, public keys can be set as follows:

```
s._domainkey.example.com IN TXT ( "v=DKIM1; g=*; k=rsa; "  
"p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCqlye7m5zLLXoIpBp20005LNMqK"  
"u0zKowoH0pyRpv10Vq0aNCk5uZ+wY00JwrKbt5u1G1ghuXsFkFkl0h00LBurz7ivyZH"  
"3LohSWOZ8okgR+8kuGu9GHtQ+MqgRd16t1CF8PlWS2kGaBQKua1zk+ZCDwFy82Uo5G2"  
"1nu/+Nn2sUwIDAQAB" )
```

```
s._domainkey.lists.example IN TXT ( "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; "  
"p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDgnLb2TZ6KECBMBo9ZLqDFt4ZBz"  
"NHFrGbj/LVJVfU8IQP8uH4G8Pj0mEHRo1qpf0vuFI2HVpe/3Nhzkt4Ay/1ZIIsxY754"  
"f2thlhBvKh4AAgZFmzRvA3aZs6Tb/ERmD+a51liEMFaT0mY4mWeLi9wOM51usQ9Q65i"  
"8IP/vjHM3rQIDAQAB" )
```

### **A.1. Single-part plain text**

Base64 encoding has to be decoded in order to locate the footer. The original encoding was text/plain, this can be inferred by the verifier from the absence of an Original-Content-Transfer-Encoding: field. The original body hash will match after decoding and removing the footer. Note that an "l=" tag couldn't have done the trick in this case.



Received: from lists.example by subscriber.example.org with ESMTP  
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=lists.example; s=s;  
t=1603974193; bh=sEPYS1Jlh90leqy5+63oPn1iU+9P684R92cZHXa9ENw=;  
h=Date:From:To:Subject;  
b=fTSAMcaEatofQCuAeUhlTXmVl5j9bPbwWgc84NWtoSt5zT+SSNp37DTzhYIGHozEk  
bpldArGQ+GygJE1b2witi6NctBd10/xsUwDcJQxDXkF63QlCcalbKWypHZ0hRqncUQ  
zgUzdcuYgqTYMJ0NoTP8fqu0HdgmjD2LJXjV3pVI=

Old-Authentication-Results: lists.example;

dkim=pass header.d=example.com

Received: from mail.example.com by lists.example with ESMTP

DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=example.com; s=s;  
t=1603973996; bh=eWqyE53pjRVCFGyHY1zGQTkCEvucN1vNN4cTcWk90WU=;  
h=Date:From:To:Subject;  
b=LGP1M3IX6XORfLs8HRLCF0cymzsPn+8+ljqQlmeNlCC/2Cl1+aBDCIEnzWI0pceCb  
zg32vFfEeryvRDHB1L1K4rrKCEznv00J3p1xkUPEWpSpzxUGw+PK9KA9ePZ5qdz7cI  
/hXf7zjebznNdDQJnxajf7QHnx1tXmxijSj1jiGQ=

Old-Authentication-Results: example.com; auth=pass (details omitted)

Original-From: Author <user@example.com>

Received: from mua.example.com by mail.example.com with ESMTPA

Message-ID: <123456@author.example>

Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2020 13:12:55 +0100

From: Author via MLM <MLM@lists.example>

MIME-Version: 1.0

To: MLM@lists.example

Subject: [example] Check simple MLM message

Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=original-boundary

Original preamble must be preserved!

--original-boundary

Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii

Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

This is a plain text message submitted to a mailing list.

The mailing list is expected to add a footer and a subject tag.

Best

Author

--original-boundary

Content-Type: image/png

Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAAYAAAAGCAYAAADGzO9IAAAABHNCSVQICAgIfAhkiAAAAAlwSFlz  
AAAHKgAABYoB49HU1wAAABl0RVh0U29mdHdhcmUAd3d3Lmlua3NjYXB1Lm9yZ5vuPB0AAAB+SURB  
VAiZNCgxDYUgAEXRhXTMYWLFVlDT0AUj0IEzWDqEC1igCQ0LSLi/+ueotUZKieu6u0+bdV2ptaLz  
PDHGSG0b+74jieM40Pd91Fr5K6UAMC3LImutxhgaY8g5p3meNcUYFULQ+756nkchBMUYpd470We8  
93jvyTnTe+cHXqRZbKSV4EoAAAAASUVORK5CYII=

--original-boundary  
Content-Type: text/plain

---

this message was modified by MLM example  
adding this footer and the subject tag  
(note that != cannot work in this case)

--original-boundary--

### **A.3. Multipart wrapped**

When the original body is multipart/alternative, MLMs have to wrap the whole body into the first entity of a multipart/mixed structure. Indeed, appending an entity to a multipart/alternative would result in it either hiding or being hidden by the existing ones.

Received: from lists.example by subscriber.example.org with ESMTP  
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=lists.example; s=s;  
t=1603962061; bh=n4/RahgnfVg7htgJtCr7TwEW4eKA105oiNaQFA5HU+A=;  
h=Date:From:To:Subject;  
b=RJlq/Fu40AC1hdJfljd+KPU69Vq2M7capbGQyEMhDWvaN7xDPJdXotwnTwiz91iZY  
5W3ITY7YXKHsWweLxu1Rph3ST3bbYQ1cifztpmtu4VPifBkm9MAe70MDLHhk5ua9YL  
VzJ0sXieiIw5a8Jh0sr6F/05/K05kNiEXvuLgKd8=  
Old-Authentication-Results: lists.example;  
dkim=pass header.d=example.com  
Received: from mail.example.com by lists.example with ESMTP  
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=example.com; s=s;  
t=1603961679; bh=XiCPb0V1vcu2Q2TyEU0uT4SMun2AjYj/Va6KRPa1lv0=;  
h=Date:From:To:Subject;  
b=gVM5grV2dbtinFMLcExv+gMATILzY+c8RY7QPVBJSFohH5HMgOLwrgSH8uw0cZxq0  
FoxTbCbnukonqo97l8nY0faHi0Dp0LAMqn9e4ijwXw9IwwhFuUiCwICRaLEzrNUVBN  
TwtzkQKnHpEXnPGBD7Q9f924mBe+eZsDyRc41ZvQ=  
Old-Authentication-Results: example.com; auth=pass (details omitted)  
Original-From: Author <user@example.com>  
Received: from mua.example.com by mail.example.com with ESMTPA  
Message-ID: <123456@author.example>  
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2020 13:12:55 +0100  
From: Author via MLM <MLM@lists.example>  
MIME-Version: 1.0  
To: MLM@lists.example  
Subject: [example] Check simple MLM message  
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=MLM-boundary

This is the MLM preamble, not signed by Author.

--MLM-boundary  
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=original-boundary

Original preamble must be preserved!

--original-boundary  
Content-Type: text/plain;

This is a plain text message submitted to a mailing list.  
The mailing list is expected to add a footer and a subject tag.

Best  
Author

--original-boundary  
Content-Type: text/html;

<p>This is a plain text message submitted to a mailing list.  
The mailing list is expected to add a footer and a subject tag.

<p>Best<br>

Author<br>

--original-boundary--

Original epilogue

--MLM-boundary

Content-Type: text/plain

---

this message was modified by MLM example  
adding this footer and the subject tag  
(note that l= is not set)

--MLM-boundary--

MLM epilogue

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