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Abstract

This document is intended to be a source of information about the Russian Federal standard for electronic encryption, decryption, and message authentication algorithms (GOST 28147-89), which is one of the Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (called

GOST algorithms). Recently, Russian cryptography is being used in Internet applications, and this document has been created as information for developers and users of GOST 28147-89 for encryption, decryption, message authentication.

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[1. Introduction](#)

[1.1. General information](#)

GOST 28147-89 is the unified cryptographic transformation algorithm for information processing systems of different purposes, defining the encryption/decryption rules and the message authentication code (MAC) generation rules.

This cryptographic transformation algorithm is intended for hardware or software implementation and corresponds to the cryptographic requirements. It puts no limitations on the encrypted information secrecy level.

[2. Applicability](#)

GOST 28147-89 defines encryption/decryption model and MAC generation for a given message (document) that is meant for transmission via insecure public telecommunication channels between data processing systems of different purposes.

GOST 28147-89 is required for use in the Russian Federation by all data processing systems providing public services.

3. Definitions and notations

3.1. Definitions

The following terms are used in the standard:

3.1.1 Running key: a pseudo-random bit sequence generated by a given algorithm for encrypting plain texts and decrypting encrypted texts.

3.1.2 Encryption: the process of transforming plain text to encrypted data using a cipher.

3.1.3 MAC: an information string of fixed length that is generated from a plain text and a key according to some rule and added to the encrypted data, for protection against data falsification.

3.1.4 Key: a defined secret state of some parameters of a cryptographic transformation algorithm, that provides a choice of one transformation out of all the possible transformations.

3.1.5 Cryptographic protection: data protection using the data cryptographic transformations.

3.1.6 Cryptographic transformation: data transformation using encryption and (or) MAC.

3.1.7 Decryption: the process of transforming encrypted data to plain text using a cipher.

3.1.8 Initialisation vector: initial values of plain parameters of a cryptographic transformation algorithm.

3.1.9 Encryption equation: a correlation showing the process of generating encrypted data out of plain text as a result of transformations defined by the cryptographic transformation algorithm.

3.1.10 Decryption equation: a correlation showing the process of generating plain text out of encrypted data as a result of transformations defined by the cryptographic transformation algorithm.

3.1.11 Cipher: a set of reversible transformations of the set of possible plain texts onto the set of encrypted data, made after certain rules and using keys.

3.2 Notation

In this document the following notations are used:

^ is a power operator

(+) is bitwise addition of the words of the same length modulo 2.

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[+] is addition of 32-bit vectors modulo 2^{32} .

[+]' is addition of the 32-bit vectors modulo $2^{32}-1$.

1..N is all values from 1 to N.

4 General Statements

4.1. The structure model of the cryptographic transformation algorithm (a cryptographic model) contains:

- a 256 bit key data store (KDS) consisting of eight 32-bit registers (X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7);
- four 32-bit registers (N1, N2, N3, N4);
- two 32-bit registers (N5, N6) containing constants C2, C1;
- two 32-bit adders modulo 2^{32} (CM1, CM3);
- a 32-bit adder of bitwise sums modulo 2 (CM2);
- a 32-bit adder modulo $(2^{32}-1)$ (CM4);
- an adder modulo 2 (CM5), with no limitation to its width;
- a substitution box (K);
- a register for a cyclic shift of 11 steps to the top digit (R).

4.2. A substitution box (S-box) K consists of eight substitution points K1, K2, K3, K4, K5, K6, K7, K8, with 64 bit memory. A 32-bit vector coming to the substitution box is divided into eight successive 4-bit vectors, and each of them is transformed into a 4-bit vector by a corresponding substitution point. A substitution point is a table consisting of 16 lines, each containing 4 bits. The incoming vector defines the line address in the table, and the contents of that line is the outgoing vector. Then these 4-bit outgoing vectors are successively combined into a 32-bit vector.

Remark: the standard doesn't define any S-boxes. Some of them are defined in [\[RFC4357\]](#).

4.3. When adding and cyclically shifting binary vectors, the registers with larger numbers are considered the top digits.

4.4. When writing a key (W1, W2, ..., W256), $W_q = 0..1$, $q = 1..256$, in the KDS the value W1 is written into the 1-st bit of the register X0, the value W2 is written into the 2-nd bit of the register X0, ..., the value W32 is written into the 32-nd bit of the register X0; the value W33 is written into the 1-st bit of the register X1, the

value W34 is written into the 2-nd bit of the register X1, ..., the
value W64 is written into the 32-nd bit of the register X1; the

value W65 is written into the 1-st bit of the register X2 etc.; the value W256 is written into the 32-nd bit of the register X7.

4.5. When rewriting the information, the value of p-th bit of one register (adder) is written into the p-th bit of another register (adder).

4.6. The values of the constants C1, C2 in the registers N5 and N6 are in the Appendix 1.

4.7. The keys defining fillings of KDS and the substitution box K tables are secret elements and are provided in accordance with the established procedure.

The filling of the substitution box K is described in GOST 28147-89 as a long-term key element common for a whole computer network. Usually K is used as a parameter of algorithm, some possible sets of K are described in [[RFC4357](#)].

4.8 The cryptographic model contemplates four working modes:

- data encryption (decryption) in the electronic codebook (ECB) mode;
- data encryption (decryption) in the counter (CNT) mode;
- data encryption (decryption) in the cipher feedback (CFB) mode;
- the MAC generation mode.

[RFC4357] describes also the CBC mode of GOST 28147-89, but this mode is not a part of the standard.

5. The Electronic Codebook Mode

5.1. Encryption of plain text in the electronic codebook mode

5.1.1. The plain text to be encrypted is split into 64-bit blocks. Input of a binary data block $T_p = (a_1(0), a_2(0), \dots, a_{31}(0), a_{32}(0), b_1(0), b_2(0), \dots, b_{32}(0))$ into the registers N1 and N2 is done so that the value of $a_1(0)$ is put into the first bit of N1, the value of $a_2(0)$ is put into the second bit of N1 etc., and the value of $a_{32}(0)$ is put into the 32nd bit of N1. The value of $b_1(0)$ is put into the first bit of N2, the value of $b_2(0)$ is put into the 2nd bit of N2 etc., and the value of $b_{32}(0)$ is input into the 32nd bit of N2.

The result is the state $(a_{32}(0), a_{31}(0), \dots, a_2(0), a_1(0))$ of the register N1 and the state $(b_{32}(0), b_{31}(0), \dots, b_1(0))$ of the register N2.

5.1.2. The 256 bits of the key are entered into the KDS. The contents of eight 32-bit registers X0, X1, ..., X7 are:

$X_0 = W_{32}, W_{31}, \dots, W_2, W_1$
 $X_1 = W_{64}, W_{63}, \dots, W_{34}, W_{33}$
 \dots
 $X_7 = W_{256}, W_{255}, \dots, W_{226}, W_{225}$

5.1.3. The algorithm for enciphering 64-bit blocks of plain text in the electronic codebook mode consists of 32 rounds.

In the first round the initial value of register N1 is added modulo 2^{32} in the adder CM1 to the contents of the register X0. Note: the value of register N1 is unchanged.

The result of the addition is transformed in the substitution block K, and the resulting vector is put into the register R, where it is cyclically shifted by 11 steps towards the top digit. The result of this shift is added bitwise modulo 2 in the adder CM2 to the 32-bit contents of the register N2. The result produced in CM2 is then written into N1, and the old contents of N1 are written in N2. Thus the first round ends.

The subsequent rounds are similar to the first one: in the second round the contents of X1 is read from the KDS, in the third round the contents of X2 are read from the KDS etc., in the 8th round the contents of X7 are read from the KDS. In the rounds 9 through 16 and 17 through 24 the contents of the KDS are read in the same order:

$X_0, X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4, X_5, X_6, X_7.$

In the last eight rounds from the 25th to the 32nd the contents of the KDS are read backwards:

$X_7, X_6, X_5, X_4, X_3, X_2, X_1, X_0.$

Thus, during the 32 rounds of encryption, the following order of choosing the registers' contents is implemented:

$X_0, X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4, X_5, X_6, X_7, X_0, X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4, X_5, X_6, X_7,$
 $X_0, X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4, X_5, X_6, X_7, X_7, X_6, X_5, X_4, X_3, X_2, X_1, X_0$

In the 32nd round the result in the adder CM2 is written into the register N2, and the old contents of register N1 are unchanged.

The contents of the registers N1 and N2 after the 32nd round are an encrypted data block corresponding to a block of plain text.

5.1.4. The equations for enciphering in the electronic codebook mode are:

```
|a(j) = (a(j-1) [+] X(j-1)(mod 8))*K*R (+) b (j-1)
|
|                                     j = 1..24;
|b(j) = a(j-1)

|a(j) = (a(j-1) [+] X(32-j))*K*R (+) b(j-1)
|
|                                     j = 25..31; a32 = a31;
|b(j) = a(j-1)

b(32) = (a(31) [+] X0)*K*R (+) b(31)                                     j=32,
```

where $a(0) = (a_{32}(0), a_{31}(0), \dots, a_1(0))$ is the initial contents of N_1 before the first round of encryption;

$b(0) = (b_{32}(0), b_{31}(0), \dots, b_1(0))$ is the initial contents of N_2 before the first round of encryption;

$a(j) = (a_{32}(j), a_{31}(j), \dots, a_1(j))$ is the contents of N_1 after the j -th round of encryption;

$b(j) = (b_{32}(j), b_{31}(j), \dots, b_1(j))$ is the contents of N_2 after the j^{th} round of encryption, $j = 1..32$.

R is the operation of cyclic shift towards the top digit by 11 steps, as follows:

```
R(r32, r31, r30, r29, r28, r27, r26, r25, r24, r23, r22, r21, r20,
..., r2, r1) =

(r21, r20, ..., r2, r1, r32, r31, r30, r29, r28, r27, r26, r25,
r24, r23, r22)
```

5.1.5. The 64-bit block of ciphertext T_c is taken out of the registers N_1, N_2 in the following order:

the first, second, ..., 32nd bit of the register N1, then the first, second, ..., 32nd bit of the register N2, i.e.,

$$T_c = a_1(32), a_2(32), \dots, a_{32}(32), b_1(32), b_2(32), \dots, b_{32}(32).$$

The remaining blocks of the plain text in electronic codebook mode are encrypted in the same fashion.

5.2. Decryption of the ciphertext in the electronic codebook mode

5.2.1 The same 256-bit key that was used for encryption is loaded into the KDS, the encrypted data to be deciphered is divided into 64-bit blocks. The loading of any binary information block

$$T_c = (a_1(32), a_2(32), \dots, a_{32}(32), b_1(32), b_2(32), \dots, b_{32}(32))$$

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into the registers N1 and N2 is done in such a way that the contents of $a_1(32)$ are written into the first bit of N1, the contents of $a_2(32)$ are written into the second bit of N1 and so on, the contents of $a_{32}(32)$ are written into the 32nd bit of N1; the contents of $b_1(32)$ are written into the first bit of N2 and so on, and the contents of $b_{32}(32)$ are written into the 32nd bit of N2.

5.2.2. The decryption procedure uses the same algorithm as the encryption of plain text, with one exception: the contents of the registers X_0, X_1, \dots, X_7 are read from the KDS in the decryption rounds in the following order:

$X_0, X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4, X_5, X_6, X_7, X_7, X_6, X_5, X_4, X_3, X_2, X_1, X_0,$

$X_7, X_6, X_5, X_4, X_3, X_2, X_1, X_0, X_7, X_6, X_5, X_4, X_3, X_2, X_1, X_0.$

5.2.3. The decryption equations are:

$$\begin{aligned} |a(32-j) &= (a(32-j+1) [+] X(j-1)) * K * R (+) b(32-j+1) \\ | & & j = 1..8; \\ |b(32-1) &= a(32-j+1) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} |a(32-j) &= (a(32-j+1) [+] X(j-1)(\text{mod } 8)) * K * R (+) b(32-j+1) \\ | & & j = 9..31; \\ |b(32-1) &= a(32-j+1) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} |a(0) &= a(1) \\ | & & j=32. \\ |b(0) &= (a(1) [+] X_0) * K * R (+) b_1 \end{aligned}$$

5.2.4 The fillings of the adders N1 and N2 after 32 working rounds are a plain text block.

$T_p = (a_1(0), a_2(0), \dots, a_{32}(0), b_1(0), b_2(0), \dots, b_{32}(0))$

corresponding to the encrypted data block, and the value of $a_1(0)$ of the block T_p corresponds to the contents of the first bit of N1, the value of $a_2(0)$ corresponds to the contents of the second bit of N1 etc., the value of $b_1(0)$ corresponds to the contents of the first bit of N2, the value of $b_2(0)$ corresponds to the contents of the second bit of N2 etc., the value of $b_{32}(0)$ corresponds to the contents of 32nd bot of N2.

The remaining blocks of encrypted data are decrypted similarly.

5.3. The encryption algorithm in the electronic codebook mode of a 64-bit block T_p is denoted by A , that is

$A(T_p)$ is $A(a(0), b(0)) = (a(32), b(32)) = T_c.$

6. The counter encryption mode

6.1. Encryption of plain text in the counter encryption mode

6.1.1 The plain text divided into 64-bit blocks $Tp(1)$, $Tp(2)$, ..., $Tp(M-1)$, $Tp(M)$ is encrypted in the counter encryption mode by bitwise addition modulo 2 in the adder CM5 with the running key Gc produced in 64 bit blocks, that is:

$$Gc = (Gc(1), Gc(2), \dots, Gc(M-1), Gc(M))$$

where M is defined by the size of the plain text being encrypted. $Gc(i)$ is the i -th 64-bit block where $i=1..M$, the number of bit in a block $Tp(M)$ can be less than 64, in this case the unused part of the running key block $Gc(M)$ is discarded.

6.1.2 256 bit of the key are put into the KDS. The registers $N1$ and $N2$ accept a 64-bit binary sequence (an initialisation vector) $S = (S1, S2, \dots, S64)$ that is the initial filling of these registers for subsequent generation of M blocks of the running key. The initialisation vector is put into the registers $N1$ and $N2$ so as the value of $S1$ is written into the first bit of $N1$, the value of $S2$ is written into the second bit of $N1$ etc., the value of $S32$ is written into the 32nd bit of $N1$; the value of $S33$ is written into the first bit of $N2$, the value of $S34$ is written into the 33th bit of $N2$, etc., the value of $S64$ is written into the 32nd bit of $N2$.

6.1.3 The initial filling of the registers $N1$ and $N2$ (the initialisation vector S) is encrypted in the electronic codebook mode in accordance with the requirements from [section 5.1](#). The result of that encryption $A(S) = (Y0, Z0)$ is rewritten into the 32-bit registers $N3$ and $N4$ so as the contents of $N1$ are written into $N3$, and the contents of $N2$ are written into $N4$.

6.1.4 The filling of the register $N4$ is added modulo $(2^{32}-1)$ in the adder CM4 to the 32-bit constant $C1$ from the register $N6$, the result is written into $N4$. The filling of the register $N3$ is added modulo 2^{32} in the adder CM3 with the 32-bit constant $C2$ from the register $N5$, the result is written into $N3$.

The filling of $N3$ is copied into $N1$, and the filling of $N4$ is copied into $N2$, while the fillings of $N3$ and $N4$ are kept.

The filling of $N1$ and $N2$ is encrypted in the electronic codebook mode according to the requirements of the [section 5.1](#). The resulting encrypted filling of $N1$ and $N2$ is the first 64-bit block of the running key $Gc(1)$, this block is bitwise added modulo 2 in the adder CM5 with the first 64-bit block of the plain text:

$$Tp(1) = (t1(1), t2(1), \dots, t63(1), t64(1)).$$

The result of this addition is a 64-bit block of the encrypted data

$$Tc(1) = (\tau_1(1), \tau_2(1), \dots, \tau_{63}(1), \tau_{64}(1)).$$

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The value of $\tau_1(1)$ of the block $T_c(1)$ is the result of addition modulo 2 in the CM5 the value $t_1(1)$ of the block $T_p(1)$ to the value of the first bit of N_1 , the value of $\tau_2(1)$ of the block $T_c(1)$ is the result of addition modulo 2 in the CM5 the value of $t_2(1)$ from the block $T_p(1)$ to the value of the second bit of N_1 etc., the value of $\tau_{64}(1)$ of the block $T_c(1)$ is the result of addition modulo 2 in the CM5 of the value $t_{64}(1)$ of the block $T_p(1)$ to the value of the 32nd bit of N_2 .

6.1.5 To get the next 64-bit block of the running key $G_c(2)$ the filling of N_4 is added modulo $(2^{32}-1)$ in the adder CM4 with the constant C_1 from N_6 , the filling of N_3 is added modulo 2^{32} in the adder CM3 with the constant C_2 from N_5 . The new filling of N_3 is copied into N_1 , the new filling of N_4 is copied into N_2 , while the fillings of N_3 and N_4 are kept.

The filling of N_1 and N_2 is encrypted in the electronic codebook mode according to the requirements of the [section 5.1](#). The resulting encrypted filling of N_1 and N_2 is the second 64-bit block of the running key $G_c(2)$, this block is bitwise added modulo 2 in the adder CM5 with the first 64-bit block of the plain text $T_p(2)$. The remaining running key blocks $G_c(3)$, $G_c(4)$, ..., $G_c(M)$ are generated and the plain text blocks $T_p(3)$, $T_p(4)$, ..., $T_p(M)$ are encrypted similarly. If the length of the last M -th block of the plain text is less than 64 bit then only the corresponding number of bit from the last M -th block of the running key is uses, remaining bit are discarded.

6.1.6 The initialisation vector S and the blocks of encrypted data $T_c(1)$, $T_c(2)$, ..., $T_c(M)$ are transmitted to the telecommunication channel or to the computer memory.

6.1.7 The encryption equation is:

$$\begin{aligned} T_c(i) &= A(Y[i-1] [+] C_2, Z[i-1]) [+] C_1) (+) T_p(i) \\ &= G_c(i) (+) T_p(i) \quad i=1..M \end{aligned}$$

where:

$Y[i]$ is the contents of the register N_3 after encrypting the i -th block of the plain text $T_p(i)$;

$Z(i)$ is the contents of the register N_4 after encrypting the i -th block of the plain text $T_p(i)$;

$$(Y[0], Z[0]) = A(S).$$

6.2. Decryption of ciphertext in the counter encryption mode

6.2.1 256 bit of the key that was used for encrypting the data $Tp(1)$, $Tp(2)$, ..., $Tp(M)$ are put into the KDS. The initialisation vector S is put into the registers $N1$ and $N2$ and, like in the sections [6.1.2](#) - [6.1.5](#) M blocks of the running key $Gc(1)$, $Gc(2)$, ..., $Gc(M)$ are generated. The encrypted data blocks $Tc(1)$, $Tc(2)$, ..., $Tc(M)$ are added bitwise modulo 2 in the adder $CM5$ with the blocks of the running key, and this results in the blocks of plain text $Tp(1)$, $Tp(2)$, ..., $Tp(M)$, and $Tp(M)$ may contain less than 64 bit.

6.2.2 The decryption equation is:

$$\begin{aligned} Tp(i) &= A(Y[i-1] [+], C2, Z[i-1] [+], C1) (+) Tc(i) \\ &= Gc(i) (+) Tc(i) \quad i = 1..M \end{aligned}$$

7. The cipher feedback mode

7.1. Encryption of plain text in the cipher feedback mode

7.1.1 The plain text is divided into 64-bit blocks $Tp(1)$, $Tp(2)$, ..., $Tp(M)$ and encrypted in the cipher feedback mode by bitwise addition modulo 2 in the adder $CM5$ with the running key Gc generated in 64-bit blocks, i.e. $Gc(i) = (Gc(1), Gc(2), \dots, Gc(M))$, where M is defined by

the length of the plain text, $Gc(i)$ is the i -th 64-bit block, $i=1, M$. The number of bits in the block $Tp(M)$ may be less than 64.

7.1.2 256 bit of key are put into the KDS. The 64-bit initialisation vector $S = (S1, S2, \dots, S64)$ is put into $N1$ and $N2$ as described in the [section 6.1.2](#).

7.1.3 The initial filling of $N1$ and $N2$ is encrypted in the electronic codebook mode in accordance with the requirements in [section 6.1](#). The resulting encrypted filling $N1$ and $N2$ is the first 64-bit block of the running key $Gc(1) = A(S)$, then this block is added bitwise modulo 2 with the first 64-bit block of plain text $Tp(1) = (t1(1), t2(1), \dots, t64(1))$.

The result is 64-bit block of encrypted data

$$Tc(1) = (\tau1(1), \tau2(1), \dots, \tau64(1)).$$

7.1.4 The block of encrypted data $Tc(1)$ is simultaneously the initial state of $N1$ and $N2$ for generating the second block of the running key $Gc(2)$ and is written on feedback in these registers. Here the value of $\tau1(1)$ is written into the first bit of $N1$, the value of $\tau2(1)$ is written into the second bit of $N1$, etc., the value of $\tau32(1)$ is written into the 32nd bit of $N1$; the value of $\tau33(1)$ is written into the first bit of $N2$, the value of $\tau34(1)$ is written into the second bit of $N2$ etc., the value of $\tau64(1)$ is written into the 32nd

bit of N2.

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The filling of N1, N2 is encrypted in the electronic codebook mode in accordance with the requirements in the [section 6.1](#). The encrypted filling N1, N2 makes the second 64-bit block of the running key Gc(2), this block is added bitwise modulo 2 in the adder CM5 to the second block of the plain text Tp(2).

The generation of subsequent blocks of the running key Gc(i) and the encryption of the corresponding blocks of the plain text Tp(i) (i = 3..M) is performed similarly. If the length of the last M-th block of the plain text is less than 64 bit, only the corresponding number of bits of the M-th block of the running key Gc(M) is used, remaining bits are discarded.

7.1.5. The encryption equations in the cipher feedback mode are:

$$\begin{aligned} |Tc(1) &= A(S) \quad (+) \quad Tp(1) = Gc(1) \quad (+) \quad Tp(1) \\ | \\ |Tc(i) &= A(Tc(i-1)) \quad (+) \quad Tp(i) = Gc(i) + Tp(i), \quad i = 2..M. \end{aligned}$$

7.1.6 The initialisation vector S and the blocks of encrypted data Tc(1), Tc(2), ..., Tc(M) are transmitted into the telecommunication channel or to the computer memory.

[7.2.](#) Decryption of ciphertext in the cipher feedback mode

7.2.1 256 bits of the key used for the encryption of Tp(1), Tp(2), ..., Tp(M) are put into the KDS. The initialisation vector S is put into N1 and N2 similarly to 6.1.2.

7.2.2 The initial filling of N1, N2 (the initialisation vector S) is encrypted in the electronic codebook mode in accordance with the [subsection 6.1](#). The encrypted filling of N1, N2 is the first block of the running key Gc(1) = A(S), this block is added bitwise modulo 2 in the adder CM5 with the encrypted data block Tc(1). This results in the first block of plain text Tp(1).

7.2.3 The block of encrypted data Tc(1) makes the initial filling of N1, N2 for generating the second block of the running key Gc(2). The block Tc(1) is written in N1 and N2 in accordance with the requirements in the [subsection 6.1](#), the resulted block Gc(2) is added bitwise modulo 2 in the adder CM5 to the second block of the encrypted data Tc(2). This results in the block of plain text Tp(2).

Similarly, the blocks of encrypted data Tc(2), Tc(3), ..., Tc(M-1) are written in N1, N2 successively, and the blocks of the running key Gc(3), Gc(4), ..., Gc(M) are generated out of them in the electronic codebook mode. The blocks of the running key are added bitwise modulo 2 in the adder CM5 to the blocks of the encrypted data Tc(3), Tc(4), ..., Tc(M), this results in the blocks of plain text Tp(3), Tp(4), ..., Tp(M), here the number of bits in the last block of the plain text Tp(M) can be less than 64 bit.

7.2.4. The decryption equations in the cipher feedback mode are:

$$\begin{aligned} | & T_p(1) = A(S) (+) T_c(1) = G_c(1) (+) T_c(1) \\ | & \\ | & T_p(i) = A(T_c(i-1)) (+) T_c(i) = G_c(i) (+) T_c(i), \quad i=2..M \end{aligned}$$

8. Message authentication code (MAC) generation mode

8.1. To provide the protection from falsification of plain text consisting of M 64-bit blocks $T_p(1), T_p(2), \dots, T_p(M)$, $M \geq 2$, an additional 1-bit block is generated (the message authentication code $I(1)$). The process of MAC generation is the same for all the encryption/decryption modes.

8.2. The first block of plain text

$$T_p(1) = (t_1(1), t_1(2), \dots, t_{64}(1)) = (a_1(1)[0], a_2(1)[0], \dots, a_{32}(1)[0], b_1(1)[0], b_2(1)[0], \dots, b_{32}(1)[0])$$

is written to the registers $N1$ and $N2$, the value of $t_1(1) = a_1(1)[0]$ is written into the first bit of $N1$, the value of $t_2(1) = a_2(1)[0]$ is written into the second bit of $N1$, etc., the value of $t_{32}(1) = a_{32}(1)[0]$ is written into the 32nd bit of $N1$; the value of $t_{33}(1) = b_1(1)[0]$ is written into the first bit of $N2$ etc., the value of $t_{64}(1) = b_{32}(1)[0]$ is written into the 32nd bit of $N2$.

8.3. The filling of $N1$ and $N2$ is transformed in accordance with the first 16 rounds of the encryption algorithm in the electronic codebook mode (see the [subsection 6.1](#)). In the KDS there's the same key that is used for encrypting the blocks of plain text $T_p(1), T_p(2), \dots, T_p(M)$ in the corresponding blocks of encrypted data $T_c(1), T_c(2), \dots, T_c(M)$.

The filling of $N1$ and $N2$ after the 16 working rounds, looking like $(a_1(1)[16], a_2(1)[16], \dots, a_{32}(1)[16], b_1(1)[16], b_2(1)[16], \dots, b_{32}(1)[16])$, is added in CM5 modulo 2 to the second block $T_p(2) = (t_1(2), t_2(2), \dots, t_{64}(2))$.

The result of this addition

$$\begin{aligned} & (a_1(1)[16](+)t_1(2), a_2(1)[16](+)t_2(2), \dots, a_{32}(1)[16](+)t_{32}(2), \\ & b_1(1)[16](+)t_{33}(2), b_2(1)[16](+)t_{34}(2), \dots, b_{32}(1)[16](+)t_{64}(2)) \\ & = \\ & (a_1(2)[0], a_2(2)[0], \dots, a_{32}(2)[0], b_1(2)[0], b_2(2)[0], \dots, \\ & b_{32}(2)[0]) \end{aligned}$$

is written into $N1$ and $N2$ and is transformed in accordance with the first 16 rounds of the encryption algorithm in the electronic codebook mode.

The resulting filling of N1 and N2 is added in the CM5 modulo 2 with the third block $Tp(3)$ etc., the last block $Tp(M) = (t1(M), t2(M), \dots, t64(M))$, padded if necessary to a complete 64-bit block by zeros, is added in CM5 modulo 2 with the filling N1, N2 ($a1(M-1)[16], a2(M-1)[16], \dots, a32(M-1)[16], b1(M-1)[16], b2(M-1)[16], \dots, b32(M-1)[16]$).

The result of the addition

$$(a1(M-1)[16](+)t1(M), a2(M-1)[16](+)t2(M), \dots, a32(M-1)[16](+)t32(M), b1(M-1)[16](+)t33(M), b2(M-1)[16](+)t34(M), \dots, b32(M-1)[16](+)t64(M))$$

=

$$(a1(M)[0], a2(M)[0] \dots, a32(M)[0], b1(M)[0], b2(M)[0], \dots, b32(M)[0])$$

is written into N1, N2 and encrypted in the electronic codebook mode after the first 16 rounds of the algorithm's work. Out of the resulting filling of the registers N1 and N2

$$(a1(M)[16], a2(M)[16] \dots, a32(M)[16], b1(M)[16], b2(M)[16], \dots, b32(M)[16])$$

an l-bit string $I(l)$ (the MAC) is chosen:

$$I(l) = [a(32-l+1)(M)[16], a(32-l+2)(M)[16], \dots, a32(M)[16]].$$

The MAC $I(l)$ is transmitted through the telecommunication channel or to the computer memory attached to the end of the encrypted data, i.e. $Tc(1), Tc(2), \dots, Tc(M), I(l)$.

8.4. The encrypted data $Tc(1), Tc(2), \dots, Tc(M)$, when arriving, are decrypted, out of the resulting plain text blocks $Tp(1), Tp(2), \dots, Tp(M)$, the MAC $I'(l)$ is generated as described in the [subsection 5.3](#) and compared with the MAC $I(l)$ received together with the encrypted data from the telecommunication channel or from the computer memory. If the MACs are not equal, the resulting plain text blocks $Tp(1), Tp(2), \dots, Tp(M)$ are considered false.

The MAC $I(l)$ ($I'(l)$) can be generated either before encryption (after decryption, respectively) of the whole message, or simultaneously with the encryption (decryption) in blocks. The first plain text blocks, used in the MAC generation, can contain service information (the address section, a time mark, the initialisation vector etc.,) and they may be unencrypted.

The parameter l value (the bit length of the MAC) is defined by the actual cryptographic requirements, while considering that the possibility of imposing false data is 2^{l-1} .

9. Security considerations

This entire document is about security considerations.

V.Dolmatov

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10. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

11. Normative references

[GOST28147] "Cryptographic Protection for Data Processing System",
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GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94 Algorithms

Appendix 1. Values of the constants C1, C2

The constant C1 is:

The bit of N6	32	31	30	29	28	27	26	25	24	23	22	21	20	19	18
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The bit value	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
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The bit of N6	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
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The bit value	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
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The constant C2 is:

The bit of N6	32	31	30	29	28	27	26	25	24	23	22	21	20	19	18
---------------	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

The bit value	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
---------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

The bit of N6	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
---------------	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

The bit value	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
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