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Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry
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Abstract

This document aims to enrich DOTS Signaling with various telemetry attributes allowing optimal DDoS/DoS attack mitigation. The nature of the DOTS architecture is to allow DOTS Agents to be integrated in highly diverse environments. Therefore, the DOTS architecture imposes a significant challenge in delivering optimal mitigation services. The DOTS Telemetry covered in this document aims to provide all needed attributes and feedback signaled from DOTS Agents such that optimal mitigation services can be delivered based on DOTS Signaling.

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DOTS Telemetry

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[1.](#) Introduction

The DOTS signaling architecture (see [[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture](#)]) is designed to allow anti-DoS services for a vast number of networking, security and operational scenarios aimed to operate in diverse environments. This is a multi-dimensional challenge DOTS needs to meet in order to provide all the signaling requirements as derived from each environment's unique characteristics. The DOTS Client can be integrated within various elements with large diversity on their security capabilities. In a simple use case, the DOTS Client can be integrated in entities with a very basic understanding of the current security conditions, for example a customer portal with a user that is just realizing that something is "going wrong" with his service but is not aware of the main cause of the service degradation. Here, the DOTS Client can basically signal the need for mitigation along with its identification attributes. In a more advanced use case, the DOTS Client can be integrated within DDoS/DoS attack mitigators (and their control and management environments) or network and security elements that have been actively engaged with ongoing attacks. The DOTS Client mitigation environment determines that it is no longer possible or practical for it to handle these attacks. This can be due to lack of resources or security capabilities, as derived from the complexities and the intensity of these attacks. In this circumstance the DOTS Client has invaluable knowledge about the actual attacks that need to be handled by the DOTS Server. By enabling the DOTS Client to share this comprehensive knowledge of an ongoing attack, the DOTS Server can dramatically increase its abilities to accomplish successful mitigation. While the attack is being handled by the DOTS Server associated mitigation resources, the DOTS Server has the knowledge about the ongoing attack mitigation. The DOTS Server can share this information with the DOTS Client so that the Client can better comprehend and evaluate the actual mitigation realized. Both DOTS Client and DOTS Server can benefit this information by presenting various information in relevant management, reporting and portal systems.

"DOTS Telemetry" is defined as the collection of attributes characterizing the actual attacks that have been detected and mitigated. The DOTS Telemetry is an optional set of attributes that can be signaled in the various DOTS protocol messages. The DOTS Telemetry can be optionally sent from the DOTS Client to Server and vice versa.

This document aims to define all the required DOTS Telemetry attributes in order to use DOTS Signal and Data Channels for DOTS Telemetry signaling. Due to the diversity of environments DOTS Agents are designed to be integrated within, the DOTS Telemetry attributes (all of them as a whole, or some of them) are not

mandatory fields in any type of DOTS protocol message. Nevertheless, when DOTS Telemetry attributes are available to the DOTS Agent it MAY signal the attributes in order to optimize the overall service provisioned using DOTS. Other basic minimum set of DOTS mandatory signaling attributes (like "targeted entity", Targeted IP address and so on), that are covered in other DOTS documents, are not reiterated in this document. No assumption is made regarding the DOTS Telemetry's actual collection methodology.

The document is divided into three logical parts: The first outlines the need for DOTS Telemetry. The second covers the actual telemetry attributes needed for providing comprehensive mitigation services. The third describes the telemetry attributes needed for each of the DOTS Signaling stages. Several typical use cases are also discussed in detail.

[1.1.](#) Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

[1.2.](#) Definition of Terms

This document uses the various terms defined in DOTS requirements document, see [[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements](#)].

[2.](#) Using the DOTS telemetry for a successful mitigation

The cyber security battle between the adversary and security countermeasures is an everlasting fight. The DoS/DDoS attacks have become more vicious and sophisticated in almost all aspects of their maneuvers and malevolent intentions. IT organizations and service providers are facing DoS/DDoS attacks that fall into two broad categories: Network/Transport layer attacks and Application layer attacks. Network/Transport layer attacks target the victim's infrastructure. These attacks are not necessarily aimed at taking down the actual delivered services, but rather to eliminate various network elements (routers, switches, FW, transit links, and so on) from serving legitimate user traffic. Here the main method of the attackers is to send a large volume or high PPS of traffic toward the victim's infrastructure. Attack volumes may vary from a few 100 Mbps/PPS to 100s of Gbps or even Tbps. Attacks are commonly carried out leveraging botnets and attack reflectors for amplification attacks, such as NTP, DNS, SNMP, SSDP, and so on. Application layer attacks target various applications. Typical examples include attacks against HTTP/HTTPS, DNS, SIP, SMTP, and so on. However, all valid applications with their ports open at network edges can be

attractive attack targets. Application layer attacks are considered more complex and hard to categorize, therefore harder to detect and mitigate efficiently.

To compound the problem, attackers also leverage multi-vectorized attacks. These merciless attacks are assembled from dynamic attack vectors (Network/Application) and tactics. Here, multiple attack vectors formed by multiple attack types and volumes are launched simultaneously towards the victim. Multi-vector attacks are harder to detect and defend. Multiple and simultaneous mitigation techniques are needed to defeat such attack campaigns. It is also common for attackers to change attack vectors only moments after a successful mitigation, burdening their opponents with changing their defense methods.

The ultimate conclusion derived from these real-life scenarios is that modern attacks detection and mitigation are most certainly complicated and highly convoluted tasks. They demand a comprehensive knowledge of the attack attributes, the targeted normal behavior/traffic patterns, as well as the attacker's on-going and past actions. Even more challenging, retrieving all the analytics needed for detecting these attacks is not simple to obtain with the

industry's current capabilities.

With all this in mind, when signaling a mitigation request, it is most certainly beneficial for the DOTS Client to signal to the DOTS Server any knowledge regarding ongoing attacks. This can happen in cases where DOTS Clients are asking the DOTS Server for support in defending against attacks that they have already detected and/or mitigated. These actions taken by DOTS Agent are referred to as "signaling the DOTS Telemetry". If attacks are already detected and categorized, the DOTS Server, and his associated mitigation services, can proactively benefit this information and optimize the overall service delivered. It is important to note that DOTS Client and Server detection and mitigation approaches can be different, and can potentially outcome different results and attack classifications. Therefore, the DDOS mitigation service must treat the ongoing attack details from the Client as hints, and cannot completely rely or trust the attack details conveyed by the DOTS client. Nevertheless, the DOTS Telemetry should support the identification of such misalignment conditions.

A basic requirement of security operation teams is to be aware and get visibility into the attacks they need to handle. The DOTS Server security operation teams benefit from the DOTS Telemetry, especially from the reports of ongoing attacks. They use the DOTS Telemetry to be prepared for attack mitigation and to assign the correct resources (operation staff, networking and mitigation) for the specific

service. Similarly, security operation personnel at the DOTS Client side ask for feedback about their requests for protection. Therefore, it is valuable for the DOTS Server to share DOTS Telemetry with the DOTS Client. Thus mutual sharing of information is crucial for "closing the mitigation loop" between the Client and Server. For the Server side teams, it is important to realize that "the same attacks that I am seeing are those that my client is asking me to mitigate?." For the Client side, it is important to realize that the Clients receive the required service. For example: understanding that "I asked for mitigation of two attacks and my Server detects and mitigates only one...". Cases of inconsistency in attack classification between DOTS Client and Server can be high-lighted, and maybe handled, using the DOTS Telemetry various attributes.

In addition, management and orchestration systems, at both Client and

Server side, can potentially use DOTS Telemetry as a feedback to automate various control and management activities derived from ongoing information signaled.

Should the DOTS Server's mitigation resources have the capabilities to facilitate the DOTS Telemetry, the Server adopts its protection strategy and activates the required countermeasures immediately. The overall results of this adoption are optimized attack mitigation decisions and actions.

The DOTS Telemetry can also be used to tune the mitigators with the correct state of the attack. During the last few years, DDoS/DoS attack detection technologies have evolved from threshold-based detection (that is, cases when all or specific parts of traffic cross a pre-defined threshold for a certain period of time is considered as an attack) to an "anomaly detection" approach. In anomaly detection, the main idea is to maintain rigorous learning of "normal" behavior and where an "anomaly" (or an attack) is identified and categorized based on the knowledge about the normal behavior and a deviation from this normal behavior. Machine learning approaches are used such that the actual "traffic thresholds" are "automatically calculated" by learning the protected entity normal traffic behavior during peace time. The normal traffic characterization learned is referred to as the "normal traffic baseline". An attack is detected when the victim's actual traffic is deviating from this normal baseline.

In addition, the subsequent activities toward mitigating the attack are much more challenging. The ability to distinguish legitimate traffic from attacker traffic on a per packet basis is complex. This complexity originates in the fact that the packet itself may look "legitimate" and no attack signature can be identified. The anomaly can be identified only after detailed statistical analysis. DDoS/DoS attack mitigators use the normal baseline during the actual

mitigation of an attack to identify and categorize the expected appearance of a specific traffic pattern. Particularly the mitigators use the normal baseline to recognize the "level of normality" needs to be achieved during the various mitigation process.

Normal baseline calculation is performed based on continuous learning of the normal behavior of the protected entities. The minimum

learning period varies from hours to days and even weeks, depending on the protected application behavior. The baseline cannot be learned during active attacks because attack conditions do not characterize the protected entities' normal behavior.

If the DOTS Client has calculated the normal baseline of its protected entities, signaling this attribute to the DOTS Server along with the attack traffic levels is significantly valuable. The DOTS Server benefits from this telemetry by tuning its mitigation resources with the DOTS Client's normal baseline. The mitigators use the baseline to familiarize themselves with the attack victim's normal behavior and target the baseline as the level of normality they need to achieve. Consequently, the overall mitigation performances obtained are dramatically improved in terms of time to mitigate, accuracy, false-negative, false-positive, and other measures. Mitigation of attacks without having certain knowledge of normal traffic can be inaccurate at best. This is especially true for DOTS environments where it is assumed that there is no universal DDoS attack scale threshold triggering an attack across administrative domains (see [[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture](#)]). In addition, the highly diverse types of use-cases where DOTS Clients are integrated also emphasize the need for knowledge of Client behavior. Consequently, common global thresholds for attacks detection practically cannot be realized. Each client can have his own levels of traffic and normal behavior. Without facilitate baseline signaling, it can be very difficult for Server to detect and mitigate the attacks accurately. It is important to emphasize that it is practically impossible for the Server's mitigators to calculate the normal baseline, in cases they do not have any knowledge of the traffic beforehand. In addition, baseline learning requires a period of time that cannot be afforded during active attack.

As mentioned above, the task of isolating legitimate from attacker traffic is extremely difficult to achieve. A common mechanism that DDoS/DoS mitigators use to achieve such a distinction is to authenticate source IP addresses that send traffic towards protected entities. The source IP address can be authenticated as legitimate or as a malicious BOT. Traffic from a BOT can be discarded or can be rate-limited. Authentication can be performed using various techniques; actively sending various challenges towards source IP

puzzle and others are examples of challenge-response tests used by mitigators to determine whether the user is legitimate or a BOT. Most certainly, building a list of authenticated source IP addresses is a task that consumes resources and takes a long period of time to construct. If the DOTS Client has already built a list of authenticated IP addresses, the DOTS Server can use this list to safely serve these IP addresses without any further need to re-authenticate them. It is important to mention that "authenticated IPs" are different from IP addresses in a "white list". This is mainly because the authenticated IPs addresses are not predefined and are not known upfront to the DOTS Agents. In addition, a source IP address is treated as an authenticated IP address for a limited period of time.

During a high volume attack, DOTS Client pipes can be totally saturated. The Client asks the Server to handle the attack upstream so that DOTS Client pipes return to a reasonable load level. At this point, it is essential to ensure that the DOTS Server does not overwhelm the DOTS Client pipes by sending back "clean traffic", or what it believes is "clean". This can happen when the Server has not managed to detect and mitigate all the attacks launched towards the Client. In this case, it can be valuable to Clients to signal to Server the "Total pipe capacity", which is the level of traffic the Clients can absorb from the upstream Server. Dynamic updating of the condition of pipes between DOTS Agents while they are under a DDoS attack is essentially. For example, for cases of multiple DOTS Clients share the same physical connectivity pipes. It is important to note, that the term "pipe" noted here does not necessary represent physical pipe, but rather represents the current level of traffic Client can observe from Server. The Server should activate other mechanisms to ensure it does not saturate the Client's pipes unintentionally. The Rate Limiter can be a reasonable candidate to achieve this objective; the Client can ask for the type of traffic (such as ICMP, UDP, TCP port 80) it prefers to limit.

To summarize, timely and effective signaling of up-to-date DOTS telemetry to all elements involved in the mitigation process is essential and absolutely improves the overall service effectiveness. Bi-directional feedback between DOTS elements is required for the increased awareness of each party, supporting superior and highly efficient attack mitigation service.

[3.](#) DOTS Telemetry attributes

This section outlines the set of DOTS Telemetry attributes. The ultimate objective of these attributes is to allow for the complete knowledge of attacks and the various particulars that can best

characterize attacks. This section presents the attributes required for each stage of the DOTS Signaling protocol (see [\[I-D.reddy-dots-signal-channel\]](#) and [\[I-D.nishizuka-dots-inter-domain-mechanism\]](#)). Other way of using telemetry attributes is allowing DOTS Server to receive relevant DOTS Telemetry before the actual attacks are launched using the DOTS Data Channel [\[I-D.reddy-dots-signal-channel\]](#).

The description and motivation behind each attribute were presented in previous sections in this document. The data model and the actual integration within the DOTS Protocol are out of scope of this document. It is expected that the following attributes will be covered in any of the DOTS Protocol and DOTS Data Model standards. As explained in previous sections, the DOTS Telemetry attributes are optionally signaled and therefore SHOULD NOT be treated as mandatory fields in any DOTS protocol messages.

[3.1.](#) Pre-mitigation DOTS Telemetry attributes

The Pre-mitigation telemetry attributes MAY be signaled from the DOTS Client to the DOTS Server as part of the initiation of a DOTS service request or during peace time using the DOTS Data Channel. Can be signaled during a "Mitigation Request" (see also [\[I-D.nishizuka-dots-inter-domain-mechanism\]](#)) session, or as part of the "POST request" DOTS Signal (see also [\[I-D.reddy-dots-signal-channel\]](#)). The following attributes are required:

[3.1.1.](#) "Normal Baselines" of legitimate traffic

Average, x percentile and peak values of "Total traffic normal baselines". PPS and BPS of the traffic are required.

[[EDITOR'S NOTE: We request feedback from the working group about possible types of baselines to be signaled.]]

[3.1.2.](#) "Total Attack Traffic volume"

Current and peak values of "Total attack traffic". PPS and BPS of attack traffic are required.

[3.1.3.](#) "Attack Details"

Various information and details that describe the on-going attacks that need to be mitigated by the DOTS Server. The Attack Details need to cover well-known and common attacks (such as a SYN Flood)

along with new emerging or vendor-specific attacks. The following is a suggestion for the required fields in the Attack Details (this

definition follows the CEF Common Event Formula event definition, see also [\[CEF\]](#) for more description):

Vendor |Version| Attack ID| Attack Name| Attack Severity| Extension

Where Extension is a placeholder for additional fields. Examples for such fields are: Attack Classification, for example UDP port 80, Layer 7 attack signature - Regex with Layer 7 attack signatures. These can be defined as relevant key value pairs. Common and well-known attack IDs SHOULD be standardized, and the vendor-specific IDs SHOULD be specifically defined by each vendor.

The DOTS server should only treat the attack details as hints, and not as a strict attribute to comply to. Please see requirement OP-004 in [\[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements\]](#).

[[EDITOR'S NOTE: We request feedback from the working group about possible alternatives for presenting "Attack Details" and various characteristics of attacks.]]

[3.1.4.](#) "Total pipe capacity"

The limit of traffic volume, in BPS and PPS. The DOTS Server SHALL eliminate sending this back as clean traffic. This attribute represents the DOTS Client's pipe limits.

[3.1.5.](#) List of already "Authenticated source IPs"

List of source IP addresses that the DOTS Client has already identified as authenticated IP addresses.

[[EDITOR'S NOTE: We request feedback from the working group about the way to support this kind of IP address list under various NAT strategies deployed in the Client's network. The same support is required for "white lists" and "black lists" referred to in several DOTS drafts, see [\[I-D.reddy-dots-data-channel\]](#).]]

[3.2.](#) Client to Server Mitigation Status DOTS Telemetry attributes

The Mitigation Status telemetry attributes MAY be signaled from the DOTS Client to the DOTS Server as part of the periodic mitigation status update as realized by the Server. This can be signaled during "Mitigation Efficacy Update" (see also [\[I-D.nishizuka-dots-inter-domain-mechanism\]](#) session, or as part of the - "PUT request" DOTS signal (see also [\[I-D.reddy-dots-signal-channel\]](#))).

The following attributes are required:

[3.2.1.](#) Current "Total traffic volumes"

Current values of the total traffic, in BPS and PPS, that arrive at the DOTS Client sites. In addition, the Peak and x percentile of traffic, in BPS and PPS, MAY also be signaled.

[3.2.2.](#) Current "Total Attack Traffic"

The total attack traffic volume, bps and pps, that the DOTS Client still sees during the active mitigation service. In addition, the Peak and x percentile of traffic, in BPS and PPS, MAY also be signaled.

[3.2.3.](#) "Mitigation Efficacy Factor"

A factor defining the overall Mitigation Efficacy from the Client perspective. By way of suggestion, the Mitigation Efficacy Factor can be defined as the current clean traffic ratio to the normal baseline. Network and Application Performance Monitoring attributes can also be considered here.

[3.2.4.](#) "Attack Details"

The overall attack details as observed from the DOTS Client perspective. The same data models that will be defined for the Pre-mitigation DOTS Telemetry can also be applicable here.

[3.3.](#) Server to Client Mitigation Status DOTS Telemetry attributes

The Mitigation Status telemetry attributes MAY be signaled from the DOTS Server to the DOTS Client as part of the periodic mitigation status update. This can be signaled during "Mitigation Status" (see

also [[I-D.nishizuka-dots-inter-domain-mechanism](#)] session, or as part of the "GET request" DOTS Signal (see also [[I-D.reddy-dots-signal-channel](#)]).

The following attributes are required:

[3.3.1.](#) Current "Mitigation Countermeasure status"

As defined in [[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements](#)], the actual mitigation activities can include several countermeasure mechanisms. The DOTS Server SHOULD signal the current operational status to each relevant countermeasure. For example: Layer 4 mitigation active/inactive, Layer 7 mitigation active/inactive, and so on. In addition to the status of each countermeasure, the DOTS Server SHOULD also signal: A list of attacks detected by each countermeasure, and the statistics

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for each countermeasure: Number of bytes/packets for each attack handled, clean traffic volumes, dropped traffic.

It is important to maintain the AttackID among all DOTS communications. The DOTS Client can further use this information for reporting and service fulfillment purposes.

[4.](#) DOTS Telemetry Use-cases

DOTS Telemetry can certainly improve numerous DOTS Signaling use cases. Nevertheless, DOTS Telemetry can be most beneficial when dealing with relatively complex use cases where the DOTS Client is integrated into environments with advanced detection and mitigation abilities. In this section, typical use-cases are presented. However, this list of use cases does not eliminate many other scenarios, where the DOTS Telemetry is the pivot in bringing in valuable use cases. It is expected that the DOTS Telemetry notions will be added to the DOTS use cases [[I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases](#)] document.

[4.1.](#) Hybrid anti-DoS services use-case

In this common use case, a large enterprise deploys DDoS/DoS mitigators as "in-line" devices on all the enterprise Internet peers. The enterprise's security and operations teams are aware that in

cases of a large volume of attacks their Internet links can get saturated. Therefore, having "in-line" mitigation devices deployed will not help them in maintaining the service level that their organization must maintain. In addition, they understand that they are not capable of operating all the required actions to mitigate multi-vector attacks. For these solid reasons, the enterprise IT decides to purchase MSP (Managed Security Services) for "on demand" DDoS/DoS mitigation services from a MSP Cloud provider. As part of the anti-DoS service delivery, the enterprise and the MSP Cloud provider have agreed to the required SLA. Also, they deploy a DOTS Client at the enterprise premises and the DOTS Server at the MSP cloud. During peace time, the enterprise mitigators build the enterprise protected service's normal baseline. In cases of attacks that can be mitigated "on-prem", the enterprise is able to deal with the attack with its own resources. Should the attack become a large volume attack and or also become multi-vector, the Internet links of the organization, or even the mitigator links, get saturated. The DOTS Client signals the need for aid in mitigating the on-going attacks from the MSP's DOTS Server. In order to fulfil his SLA, the MSP uses the DOTS Telemetry it received from the Client to assign the adequate mitigation resources, tune the mitigators with the normal baseline, assign the appropriate personnel to handle the enterprise attacks, and so forth. The enterprise's security and operations team

uses the DOTS Telemetry they received from their DOTS Client to get visibility into the actual mitigation performed "on the cloud" and makes sure the service is fulfilled as expected.

[4.2.](#) MSP to MSP anti-DoS services use-case

This use case can be treated as a continuation of the previous use case. The MSP Cloud provider operation team realizes that they have some serious difficulties at their data centers and they are no longer capable of serving the enterprise attacks. A back-to-back DOTS Gateway is implemented at the MSP Cloud to allow redirection of the attack to another MSP Cloud provider for the purpose of attack mitigation. The same processes for using DOTS Telemetry are taken here to ensure continuous service delivery. The same is true for visibility into the actual service provided to the enterprise and to the primary MSP Cloud provider.

[5.](#) Acknowledgements

Thanks to Yotam Ben-Ezra and Dennis Usle from Radware for their contribution, careful reading and feedback.

6. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

7. Security Considerations

To Be Added.

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