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Abstract

This document describes the motivation and the problem statement for Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF).

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[1.](#) Introduction

This document describes the motivation and the problem space for the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) effort.

The growing challenges and complexity in maintaining a secure infrastructure, complying with regulatory requirements, and controlling costs are enticing enterprises into consuming network security functions hosted by service providers. The hosted security service is especially attractive to small and medium size enterprises who suffer from a lack of security experts to continuously monitor, acquire new skills and propose immediate mitigations to ever increasing sets of security attacks.

According to [[Gartner-2013](#)], the demand for hosted (or cloud-based) security services is growing. Small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) are increasingly adopting cloud-based security services to replace on-premises security tools, while larger enterprises are deploying a mix of traditional and cloud-based security services.

To meet the demand, more and more service providers are providing hosted security solutions to deliver cost-effective managed security services to enterprise customers. The hosted security services are

primarily targeted at enterprises (especially small/medium ones), but could also be provided to any kind of mass-market customer.

As the result, the Network security functions (NSFs) are provided and consumed in increasingly diverse environments. Users of NSFs could consume network security services hosted by one or more providers, which may be their own enterprise, service providers, or a combination of both.

This document does not elaborate on specific use case. The reader should refer to [[I2NSF-ACCESS](#)], [[I2NSF-DC](#)] and [I2NSF-Mobile] for a more in-depth discussion on the I2NSF use cases.

2. Terminologies

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

This document makes use of the following terms and acronyms:

DC: Data Center

Network Security Function (NSF): functions to ensure the communications in and out of network as well as to deter and detect the unwanted communication from negatively impacting the network and its attached entities.

Hosted security function: Refers to a security function that it is hosted by another network.

Flow-based Network Security Function: A function that inspects network flows according to a policy intended for enforcing security properties. Flow-based security also means that packets are inspected in the order they are received, and without modification to the packet due to the inspection process (MAC rewrites, TTL decrement action; even NAT would be outside the inspection process).

3. Problem Space

The following sub-sections describe the problems and challenges facing customers and security service providers (called service provider, for short) when security functions are no longer physically hosted at customer premises.

The "Customer-Provider" relationship may be between any two parties: different firms or different domains of the same firm. Contractual agreements may be required in such contexts to formally document the customer's security requirements and the provider's guarantees to fulfill those requirements. Such agreements may detail protection levels, escalation procedure, alarms reporting, etc. There is currently no standard mechanism to capture those requirements.

Note a service provider may be a customer of another service provider.

3.1. Challenges Facing Security Service Providers

3.1.1. Diverse types of Security Functions

There are many types of NSFs. NSFs by different vendors can have different features and have different interfaces. NSFs can be deployed in multiple locations in a given network, and perhaps have different roles.

Below are a few examples of security functions and locations or contexts in which they are often deployed:

External Intrusion & Attack Protection:

e.g., Firewall/ACL; Authentication; IPS; IDS; Endpoint Protection; etc.;

Security Functions in a DMZ:

e.g., Firewall/ACL; IDS/IPS, authentication and authorization services, NAT, forward proxies, application FWs, AAA; etc.

Internal Security Analysis & report:

e.g., Security Log; Event Correlation; Forensic Analysis;
etc;

Internal Data and Content Protection:

e.g., Encryption; Authorization; Public/Private key
management for internal database, etc.

Given the diversity of security functions, contexts in which they can be deployed, and constant evolution of these functions, standardizing all aspects of security functions is challenging, most probably not feasible, and not necessary. For example, from an I2NSF perspective, there is no need to standardize on how a firewall filters are created or applied. What is needed is having an interface to control and monitor the security policies to be provisioned on NSFs.

3.1.2. No Standard Characterization of NSFs

To offer effective security services, service providers need to activate various security functions on devices manufactured by multiple vendors. Even within one product category (e.g., firewall), security functions provided by different vendors can have different features and capabilities: filters that can be designed and activated by a firewall may or may not support IPv6, depending on the firewall technology, for example.

Service Provider management system (or controller) needs ways to retrieve the capabilities of service functions by different vendors so that it could build an effective security solution.

These capabilities can be documented in a static manner or via an interface for security functions vendors to register to service provider security management system. This dynamic capability registration is useful for automation because security functions may be subject to software and hardware updates. These updates may have implications on the policies enforced by the NSFs.

Today, there is no standard method for vendors to describe the capabilities of their security functions. Without a common technical framework to describe the capabilities of security functions, service providers can't automate the process of selecting NSFs by different vendors to accommodate customer's requirements.

3.1.3. More Distributed NSFs and vNSFs

The security functions that are invoked to enforce a security policy can be located in different equipment and network locations.

The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) Network Function Virtualization (NFV) initiative creates new management challenges for security policies to be enforced by distributed, virtual, network security functions (vNSF).

vNSF has higher risk of failure, migrating, and state changes as their hosting VMs being created, moved, or decommissioned.

3.1.4. More Demand to Control NSFs Dynamically

In the advent of SDN [[SDN-Security](#)], more clients, applications or application controllers need to dynamically update their communication policies that are enforced by NSFs. The Security Service Providers have to be able to provide an interface for clients to dynamically control the NSFs.

3.1.5. Diverse Interfaces to Control and Monitor NSFs

To provide effective and competitive solutions and services, Security Service Providers may need to utilize multiple security functions from various vendors to enforce the security policies desired by their customers.

Yet because no widely accepted industry standard security interfaces exist today, management of NSFs (device and policy provisioning, monitoring, etc.) tends to be bespoke, essentially as offered by product vendors. As a result, automation of such

services, if it exists at all, is also bespoke. It worth noting that even with the traditional way of deploying security features, there is still a gap to coordinate among implementations from distinct vendors. This is mainly the reason why mono-vendor security functions are enabled in a given network segment.

3.1.6. Lack of mechanism to monitor the behavior of NSFs

Obviously, enabling a security function (e.g., firewall [I-D.ietf-opsawg-firewalls]) does not mean that a network is protected. As such, it is necessary to have a mechanism to monitor the execution status of NSFs.

3.2. Challenges Facing Customers

When customers invoke hosted security services, their security policies may be enforced by a collection of security functions hosted in different domains. Customers may not have security skills. As such, they may not be able to express sufficiently precise requirements or security policies. Usually these customers express expectations (that can be viewed as loose security requirements). Customers may also express guidelines such as which critical communications are to be preserved during critical events, which hosts are to service even during severe security attacks, etc.

3.2.1. Need to integrate on-premises NSFs with Remote NSFs

Many medium and large enterprises have deployed various on-premises security functions which they want to continue to use. They are looking for combining local security functions with remote hosted security functions to achieve more efficient and immediate counter-measures to both Internet-originated attacks and enterprise network-originated attacks.

Some enterprises may only need the hosted security services for their remote branch offices where minimal security infrastructures/capabilities exist. The security solution can consist of NSFs on customer networks and NSFs on service provider networks.

3.2.2. Today's Policy Expressions are Vendors Specific

Customers may consume NSFs by multiple service providers. Customers need to express their security requirements, guidelines, and expectations to the service providers, which in turn will be translated into security policies and associated configuration sets to the set of security functions. But no standard technical characterization and/or APIs exist, even for most common security services. Most security services are accessible only through disparate, proprietary interfaces (e.g., portals, APIs), in whatever format vendors choose to offer.

Without standard interfaces it is complex for customers to update security policies and integrate with services provided by the security service providers. This complexity is induced by the diversity of the configuration models, policy models, supported management interfaces, etc.

The current practices that rely on the use of scripts that generates automatically scripts have to be adjusted each time an implementation from a different vendor is enabled in a provider side.

Customers may also require means to easily update/modify their security requirements with immediate effect in the underlying involved NSFs.

While security agreements are in place, security functions may be solicited without requiring an explicit invocation means. Nevertheless, some explicit invocation means may be required to interact with a service function.

Here is an example of how standard interfaces could help achieve faster implementation time cycles. Let us consider a customer who would like to dynamically allow an encrypted flow with specific port, src/dst addresses or protocol type through the firewall/IPS to enable an encrypted video conferencing call only during the time of the call. With no commonly accepted interface in place, the customer would have to learn about the particular provider's

firewall/IPS interface, and send the request in the provider's required format. If a firewall/IPS interface standard exists, the customer would be able to send the request, without having to do much preliminary legwork. Such a standard helps providers too since they could now offer the same firewall/IPS interface to represent firewall/IPS services, which may be offered by different vendors' products. They have now abstracted the firewall/IPS services. Lastly, it helps the firewall/IPS vendors since they could now work on common specifications.

3.2.3. Difficulty to Monitor the Execution of Desired Policies

How a policy is translated into technology-specific actions is hidden from the customers. However, customers still need ways to monitor the delivered security service that is the result of the execution of their desired security requirements, guidelines and expectations.

Today, there is no standard way for customers to get security service assurance (including running "what-if" scenarios to assess the efficiency of the delivered security service) of their specified security policies properly enforced by the security functions in the provider domain.

3.3. Difficulty to Validate Policies across Multiple Domains

One key aspect of a hosted security service with security functions located at different premises is to have a standard interface to express, monitor and verify security policies that combine several distributed security functions. This becomes more crucial when NSFs are instantiated in Virtual Machines because NSFs can be more distributed and sometimes multiple NSFs are combined together to perform one task.

Without standard interfaces and security policy data models, the enforcement of a customer-driven security policy remains challenging because of the inherent complexity brought by the

combined invocation of several, yet vendor-specific security functions, but also because of the accompanying complexity of configuration procedures and operational tasks in a multi-vendor, heterogeneous environment.

Ensuring the consistent enforcement of the policies at various domains is challenging. Standard data models are likely to contribute to softening that issue.

3.4. Lack of Standard Interface to Inject Feedback to NSF

Today, many security functions, such as IPS and Antivirus, depend heavily on the associated profiles. They can perform more effective protection if they have the up-to-date profiles. As more sophisticated threats arise, enterprises, vendors, and service providers have to rely on each other to achieve optimal protection. [CA] is one of those initiatives that aim at combining efforts conducted by multiple organizations.

Today there is no standard interface to exchange security profiles between organizations.

4. Scope of the proposed work

The primary goal of I2NSF is to define an information model, a set of software interfaces and data models for controlling and monitoring aspects of NSFs (both physical and virtual). Other aspects of NSFs such as device or network provisioning and configuration are out of scope. Controlling and monitoring of NSFs should include the use of policies to specify, query, monitor, and control the NSFs by one or more management entities. Since different security vendors support different features and functions on their devices, I2NSF will focus on flow-based NSFs that provide treatment to packets/flows, such as IPS/IDS, Web filtering, flow filtering, deep packet inspection, or pattern matching and remediation.

There are two layers of interfaces envisioned in the I2NSF approach:

- I2NSF Capability Layer
- I2NSF Service Layer

The I2NSF capability layer specifies how to control and monitor NSFs at an interface level. (I2NSF will NOT work on any other aspects of NSFs including standardizing NSFs or devices. Nor will I2NSF at this stage specify how to derive control and monitoring capabilities from higher level security policies for the Capability layer). I2NSF will only standardize the security policies related to the control and monitoring of the NSFs. A sample capability layer construct for controlling NSFs is "subject-object-function-action".

The I2NSF Service Layer defines how clients' security policies may be expressed and monitored. The Service Layer is out of scope for this phase of I2NSF's work. However, I2NSF will provide a forum for information drafts on data models, APIs, etc. that demonstrate how service layer policies may be translated to Capability Layer functions.

The concrete work at the I2NSF Capability Layer includes development of

- An information model that defines concepts required for standardizing the control and monitoring of NSFs,
- A set of YANG data models, derived from the above information model,
- The capability registry (IANA) that enables the characteristics and behavior of NSFs to be specified using a vendor-neutral vocabulary without requiring the NSFs themselves to be standardized; the registry enables various mechanisms, including policy rules, to be used to match monitor and control functions to the needs of an application and/or environment, and
- The proper secure communication channels to carry the controlling and monitoring information between the NSFs and their management entity (or entities).

Standard interfaces for monitoring and controlling the behavior of NSFs are essential building blocks for Security Service Providers to automate the use of different NSFs from multiple vendors by

their Security management entities. This layer will leverage the existing protocols and data models defined by I2RS, Netconf, and NETMOD.

I2NSF may be invoked by any (authorized) client-e.g., upstream applications (controllers), orchestration systems, security portals, etc.

5. Other Potential Uses of I2NSF

The I2NSF framework allows the clients to view, request, and/or verify the security functions/policies offered by providers at different premises. This framework can make it possible for a cluster of devices requiring the similar security policies to have consistent policies across multiple sites.

Network service providers can provide "Hosted Security Functions" services. Network providers can also act as security function brokers to facilitate if not optimize the enforcement of customer-driven security policies. They can expose a service catalog and standard mechanisms by which enterprises (or applications) can query, request, or/and verify the needed security functions or policies.

With the standard interfaces for clients to request the required security functions and policies, network operators can leverage their current service to enterprises (e.g. VPN, private IP services) and access to a vast population of end users to offer a set of consolidated Security solutions and policies. Network operators can be instrumental in defining a common interface and framework as part of an IETF-conducted specification effort.

6. Related Industry Initiatives

6.1. Related IETF WGs

IETF NETCONF: I2NSF should consider using the NETCONF protocol exchange security policy provisioning information between participating devices/security functions and the computation logic (a.k.a., a security Policy Decision Point (PDP)) that resides in

the control plane and which makes the decisions to dynamically allocate resources and enforce customer-driven security policies.

NETMOD ACL Model: [[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model](#)] describes the very basic attributes for access control. I2NSF will extend the ACL data model to be more comprehensive, for example, extend to multiple actions and policies, and describes various services associated with the security functions under consideration.

In addition, I2NSF has to specify ways to monitor/report of Packet Based Security Functions.

I2RS: the WG currently discusses the specification of an interface between the forwarding and the control planes, to facilitate the dynamic enforcement of traffic forwarding policies based upon IGP/BGP route computation results. I2NSF is looking specifically into expressing security policies in two layers. I2NSF should leverage the protocols and data models developed by I2RS.

I2NSF aims to develop the additional information models and data models for distributed security functions, like the firewall and IPS/IDS. The policy structure specified by [[I-D.hares-i2rs-bnp-info-model](#)] can be used by I2NSF to be extended to include recursive actions to other security functions.

The IETF SFC WG specifies service function chaining techniques while treating service functions as a black box; VNFpool is about the reliability and availability of the virtualized network functions. But neither addresses how service functions are invoked, or configured.

Both SFC and VNFpool do not cover in-depth specification (e.g. rules for the requested FW) to invoke security functions. In SFC and VNFpool, a firewall function is a black box that is treated in the same way as a video optimization function. SFC and VNFpool do not cover the negotiation part, e.g. Client needs Rules x/y/z for FW, but the Provider can only offer x/z.

The IETF SACM (Security Assessment and Continuous Monitoring) WG specifies mechanisms to assess endpoint security. The endpoints can be routers, switches, clustered DB, or an installed piece of

software. SACM is about "How to encode that policy in a manner where assessment can be automated". For example:

- a Solaris 10 SPARC or Windows 7 system used in an environment that requires adherence to a policy of Mission Critical Classified.
- rules like "The maximum password age must be 30 days" and "The minimum password age must be 1 day"

[I2NSF-GAP] has a more extensive study comparing I2NSF with various existing efforts in similar/adjacent areas.

6.2. Relationship with ETSI NFV ISG

ETSI's NFV ISG defines the architecture to pool together many virtual network functions to be managed and consumed collectively.

I2NSF is one of the enabling tools for NFV, specifically the VNF as a Service (VNFaaS) specified by ETSI NFV Group Specification Use Cases [[gs_NFV](#)].

ETSI's NFV ISG effort is actively contributed by service providers. It defines a detailed service model for VNFaaS as well as requirements that should be taken into account by the I2NSF initiative.

6.3. OpenStack Firewall/Security as a Service

Open source projects like OpenStack and CloudStack have begun to tackle the issues of interfaces to security functions but much work remains.

OpenStack completed the Firewall as a Service project and specified the set of APIs for Firewall services [[API](#)]

OpenStack has defined the APIs for managing Security Groups [SG]

The attributes defined by OpenStack Firewall/Security as a Service are at this point are basic. However, they can serve as the basis of the information model that the I2NSF IETF initiative aims to specify.

6.4. Security as a Service by Cloud Security Alliance

https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/secaas/#_get-involved

SaaS by CSA is at the initial stage of defining the scope of work.

7. Security Policies Negotiation

The protocol needed for this security function/policies negotiation may be somewhat correlated to the dynamic service parameter negotiation procedure [RFC7297]. The CPP template documented in RFC7297, even though currently covering only Connectivity (but includes security clauses such as isolation requirements, non-via nodes, etc.), could be extended as a basis for the negotiation procedure. Likewise, the companion CPNP could be a candidate to proceed with the negotiation procedure.

The "security as a service" would be a typical example of the kind of (CPP-based) negotiation procedures that could take place between a corporate customer and a service provider. However, more security specific parameters have to be considered by this proposed work.

8. Manageability Considerations

Management of NSFs usually include configuration of devices, signaling and policy provisioning. I2NSF will only focus on the policy provisioning part.

9. Security Considerations

Having a secure access to control and monitor NSFs is crucial for hosted security service. Therefore, proper secure communication channels have to be carefully specified for carrying the controlling and monitoring information between the NSFs and their management entity (or entities).

10. IANA Considerations

This document requires no IANA actions. RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication.

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12.1. Appendix: Relationship with Open Source Communities

One of the goals of the I2NSF initiative is to form a collaborative loop from IETF to Industry Open Source Communities.

Open-source initiatives are not to be considered as an alternative to formal standardization processes. On the contrary, they are complementary, with the former acting as an enabler and accelerator of the latter. Open-source provides an ideal mechanism to quick prototyping and validating contending proposals, and demonstrating the feasibility of disruptive ideas that could otherwise not be considered. In this respect, open-source facilitates the engagement in the standardization process of small (and typically more dynamic) players such as start-ups and research groups, which would see better opportunities of being heard and a clearer rewards to their efforts. An open-source approach is extremely useful as well for the production of open reference implementations of the standards at the same (or even faster) pace they are defined. The availability of such reference implementations translate into much simpler interoperability and conformance assessments for both providers and users, and can become the basis for incremental differentiation of a common solution, thus allowing a cooperative competition ("coopetition") model.