

Network Working Group
Internet-Draft
Expires: January 20, 2007

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July 19, 2006

A Simple Privacy Extension for Mobile IPv6
draft-dupont-mip6-privacyext-04.txt

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Abstract

This draft presents a simple privacy extension for Mobile IPv6 that prevents eavesdroppers from identifying the packets sent or received from a particular mobile node. This extension also allows a mobile node to hide its identity from correspondent nodes when the mobile node initiates the communication.

Internet-Draft

MIPv6 Privacy Ext

July 2006

1. Introduction

In Mobile IPv6 [[RFC3775](#)], the home address of a mobile node is included in the packets that it sends and receives.

As a result any node in the network can identify packets that belong to a particular mobile node (and use them to perform some kind of traffic analysis) and track its movements (i.e., its care-of address) and usage. We propose a solution to prevent such tracking while still using route optimization.

In particular our proposal solves the two following problems:

- Privacy of mobile client from its correspondent node and from any eavesdroppers in the network: the mobile node connects to a remote node (a server for example) and wants to hide its identity (i.e., its home address) from this node and from any eavesdropper in the network while still being able to move.
- Privacy of mobile server from eavesdroppers: the remote node initiates the communication and the mobile node is able to hide its identity (and therefore its locations) from any eavesdropper in the network (but not from the remote node).

We do not solve the problem of privacy of a mobile server from its correspondent nodes. In this case a mobile node still needs to reveal its care-of address to its correspondent nodes to ensure optimal routing. If this level of privacy is desired, one possible solution is bi-directional encrypted tunneling via the home agent. Full privacy is then provided at the cost of routing performance. It should be noted that [[RFC4140](#)] in revealing the regional care-of address (RCoA) instead of the care-of address might be an other alternative.

In this draft we only look at privacy issues in Mobile IPv6 and assume that a mobile node's identity is not revealed by other protocols such as AAA, IKE,...and by the applications (i.e. applications must not include any IP address in their payloads.)

2. Problem statement

In Mobile IPv6, the home address of a mobile node is included in

clear text in the packets it sends and receives. In fact, packets sent by a mobile node includes a home address option that contains its home address. Packets sent by a correspondent node to a given mobile node contains a routing header that includes the mobile home address. As a result, any eavesdropper within the network can easily

identify packets that belong to a particular mobile node (and use them to perform some kind of traffic analysis) and track mobile movements and usage.

3. Possible solutions

Several solutions are possible, all with their limitations:

- IPv6 privacy extension: a solution could be to use the privacy extension described in [[RFC3041](#)] to configure the home address and the care-of addresses. While this solution represents a marked improvement over the default address configuration methods [[RFC2462](#)], and should be used for the home and care-of addresses, we contend that this is not sufficient. [[RFC3041](#)] causes nodes to generate global-scope addresses from interface identifiers that change over time, even in cases where the interface contains an embedded IEEE identifier. As a result if [[RFC3041](#)] is used to generate the home address, this address will change periodically but the network prefix (64 highest bits) will remain unchanged. This network prefix can still reveal much information about the mobile node's identity to an eavesdropper. This mechanism described in [[RFC3041](#)] must be used for the home address and care-of addresses in Mobile IPv6 but one should not rely on it to get full privacy protection.
- Home address option encryption: an other solution could be to encrypt the home address option. This solution is not satisfactory because
 - (1) it would require to modify IPsec implementation (security associations should then be indexed with the care-of address and therefore would need to be updated at each movement of the mobile node) and
 - (2) it would make the usage of firewalls difficult (currently firewalls look at the home address option to perform some filtering).

Furthermore this solution does not solve the problem of incoming packets that contain a routing header which reveals the home address.

- IPsec bi-directional Tunnel (mobile VPN): A solution could be to open a bi-directional IPsec tunnel between the mobile node and its home agent [[RFC3024](#)]. This solution has the following disadvantages:
 - (1) addition of extra bandwidth (packets need to be encapsulated) and processing overhead,

- (2) the routing is suboptimal.

[4.](#) Our Proposal

In our scheme a mobile node uses the privacy extension described in [[RFC3041](#)] to configure its home address and care-of addresses. A mobile node must use an interface identifier for its home address that is different from the one used for its care-of addresses. It should also use a new interface identifier when configuring a new care-of address. As a result, it would be more difficult for an eavesdropper to identify a mobile node's identity and track its movement.

We also propose to assign to each mobile node a TMI (Temporary Mobile Identifier) that is a 128-bit long random number. This TMI is used by the mobile node's home agent and correspondent nodes to identify the mobile node. This TMI might be used by the correspondent node to index the correspondent IPsec security association to the mobile and might be used by firewalls to do filtering.

[4.1.](#) Protocol description

Two cases must be considered:

- Mobile Client (The mobile node initiates the communication).
- Mobile Server (the correspondent node initiates the communication).

[4.1.1.](#) Mobile client

The mobile then uses standard Mobile IPv6 with the TMI as its home address. Packets sent and received by a mobile node will contain its TMI instead of its home address. As a result, the mobile identity is hidden from the correspondent node and from potential eavesdroppers in the network.

Note that in this case the correspondent node must never use the home address, i.e., the TMI that is not routable, but must use the care-of address (Mobile IPv6 should be modified to provide such functionality.)

[4.1.2.](#) Mobile Server

In this case, the correspondent node knows the mobile identity by definition. If a mobile node wants to hide its mobility, i.e., its care-of address, to a particular correspondent node, it must not send

any binding update to this correspondent node and use bi-directional tunneling. As a result the packets that are sent to the mobile node are addressed to its home address and encapsulated by the home agent to its current care-of address. The decision to send or not to send a binding update to a correspondent node is a policy issue that is out of the scope of this draft. Any eavesdroppers between the home agent and the mobile node is able to identify and track the mobile movement by looking at the inner packet. Therefore we suggest to encrypt the packets that are sent between the mobile node and its home agent.

If the mobile node decides to use route optimization, it then sends a binding update to its correspondent node. This binding update contains the TMI in the home address option and the actual home address is encoded in a newly defined binding update sub-option. Of course to preserve privacy the binding update must be encrypted (the security association should be indexed with the TMI and not the home address). The correspondent node uses the binding update to bind the TMI with the home address and the care-of address.

Subsequent packets between the mobile node and the correspondent node will contain the TMI in the home address option and in the routing

header extension instead of the actual home address. As a result an eavesdropper won't be able to identify the packets belonging to a particular node.

[4.2.](#) Temporary Mobile Identifier (TMI)

[4.2.1.](#) TMI generation

The TMI of a mobile node should be globally unique and must be locally unique. By locally unique we mean that two mobile nodes communicating with the same correspondent node/or home agent must use different TMIs but two mobile nodes communicating with different correspondent nodes can use the same TMI. The consequences of two mobile nodes using the same TMI with the same correspondent node is similar than the consequences of two mobile nodes using the same home address with standard mobile IPv6. The correspondent node might get confused...

We propose derive the TMI from the SHA-1 message digest of the mobile node's home address. The mobile node's home address being globally unique, the TMI collision probability is therefore very small. Furthermore the probably of two mobile nodes generating the same TMI and communicating with the same correspondent node is even smaller and negligible.

SHA-1 was chosen because its particular properties were adequate to

produce the desired level of randomness and uniqueness. IPv6 nodes are already required to implement SHA-1 as part of IPsec [[RFC4301](#)] and [[RFC4305](#)].

[4.2.2.](#) TMI management

The TMI of a mobile user must be changed periodically (every few minutes, hours or days) in order to avoid TMI leakage as explained in [[RFC3041](#)]...

For example, the digest for the new TMI can be generated as follows: new digest = SHA-112 (home address | old digest), where "|" stands for concatenation and SHA-112 the 112 first bits of SHA-1.

A dedicated prefix of 16 bits should used and TMI allocated into this

prefix (i.e., an address in this prefix is known to be a TMI). This has some drawbacks and many advantages:

- the first 16 bits are fixed (but 112 bits should be enough to keep the collision probability very close to zero).
- a TMI is very easy to recognize by bad guys.
- + any mobile node can be automatically authorized to use any address in this prefix.
- + this prefix can be marked as unroutable, i.e., a wrong packet to a TMI destination will be dropped by the first router, not the first default free router. In general misuses of TMI become very easy to detect.

4.3. Ownership extension

The routing optimization evolves towards more security so we propose an extension with an integrated ownership proof. Note that some new protection devices for routing optimization signaling integrate privacy mechanisms as [[ID.privacy-omipv6](#)].

The TMI still begins with a dedicated prefix marked as not routable but the digest is derived from a public key and a random value. The new digest generation rule is: $\text{digest} = \text{SHA-112}(\text{PublicKey} \mid \text{imprint})$ where imprint is a 128-bit temporary random value.

The proof of ownership is the same than for CGAs [[RFC3972](#)]: the PublicKey and the imprint are sent to the correspondent and messages are signed by the PrivateKey.

There are essentially two ways an adversary can impersonate a mobile

node:

1. He can try to find a RSA key pair and imprint that result to the same TMI than the target node. Since the size of a TMI is 112 bits, the adversary has to try, on average, 2^{111} parameters sets. If the attacker can perform 1 billion hashes per second this would take him 8×10^{25} years. Note that our scheme is more secure than current Mobile IPv6 schemes that rely on CGA addresses generated from a 59-bit long hash function.

2. He can try to retrieve the private key associated with the mobile node's public key. A size of the modulus of at least 1024 bits is commonly assumed to provide a good security level.

The TMI of a mobile user must be changed periodically (every few minutes, hours or days) in order to avoid TMI leakage as explained in [[RFC3041](#)]. This can easily be performed with the CBIDs by keeping the same private/public key pair but changing the random value imprint periodically.

[5.](#) Security Considerations

This document address some privacy issues in the mobile IPv6 protocols. Even if privacy does not provide real security (i.e., security through obscurity is poor security) then it makes the job of bad guys (eavesdroppers, rogue correspondents, ...) harder so should improve the overall security.

The ownership extension is modeled on the CBID/CGA idea. Security of this idea is already well known [[RFC3972](#)] and in the mobile server case the proof of ownership of the TMI can be coupled with a proof of ownership of the home address, for instance when the home address is a CGA using the same RSA private/public key pair.

[6.](#) Acknowledgments

John Wells (INRIA), Karim El-Malki (Ericsson), Hesham Soliman (Ericsson), Jean-Michel Combes (France Telecom DR&D), Imad Add (INRIA), Pars Mutaf (INRIA)...

[7.](#) History

This document was directly extracted from an old proposition by the first two authors. CBID (Crypto-Based Identifier) and HMIPv6 extensions / improvements were removed to keep the first version of this draft very small.

original text is from [[MWCN04](#)].

The next version could contain more details about the use of this proposal in the [[RFC4140](#)] context. SHA-256 could replace SHA-1 if/when [[RFC4305](#)] is updated.

[8.](#) IANA Considerations

Allocation of the needed prefix is the subject of [[ID.khi](#)].

[9.](#) References

[9.1.](#) Normative References

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[9.2.](#) Informative References

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MIPv6 Privacy Ext

July 2006

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July 2006

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Acknowledgment

Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society.