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The FNV Non-Cryptographic Hash Algorithm
<[draft-eastlake-fnv-05.txt](#)>

Abstract

FNV (Fowler/Noll/Vo) is a fast, non-cryptographic hash algorithm with good dispersion. The purpose of this document is to make information on FNV and open source code performing FNV conveniently available to the Internet community.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

The FNV hash algorithm is based on an idea sent as reviewer comments to the [\[IEEE\]](#) POSIX P1003.2 committee by Glenn Fowler and Phong Vo in 1991. In a subsequent ballot round Landon Curt Noll suggested an improvement on their algorithm. Some people tried this hash and found that it worked rather well. In an EMail message to Landon, they named it the "Fowler/Noll/Vo" or FNV hash. [\[FNV\]](#)

FNV hashes are designed to be fast while maintaining a low collision rate. The high dispersion of the FNV hashes makes them well suited for hashing nearly identical strings such as URLs, hostnames, filenames, text, IP addresses, etc. Their speed allows one to quickly hash lots of data while maintaining a reasonably low collision rate. However, they are generally not suitable for cryptographic use. (See [Section 6.1.](#))

The FNV hash is widely used, for example in DNS servers, the Twitter service, database indexing hashes, major web search / indexing engines, netnews history file Message-ID lookup functions, anti-spam filters, a spellchecker programmed in Ada 95, flatassembler's open source x86 assembler - user-defined symbol hashtree, non-cryptographic file fingerprints, computing Unique IDs in DASM (DTN Applications for Symbian Mobile-phones), Microsoft's hash_map implementation for VC++ 2005, the realpath cache in PHP 5.x (php-5.2.3/TSRM/tsrm_virtual_cwd.c), and many other uses.

A study has recommended FNV in connection with the IPv6 Flow Label field [\[IPv6flow\]](#).

FNV hash algorithms and source code have been released into the public domain. The authors of the FNV algorithm took deliberate steps to disclose the algorithm in a public forum soon after it was invented. More than a year passed after this public disclosure and the authors deliberately took no steps to patent the FNV algorithm. Therefore, it is safe to say that the FNV authors have no patent claims on the FNV algorithm as published.

If you use an FNV function in an application, you are kindly requested to send an EMail about it to: fnv-mail@asthe.com

2. FNV Basics

This document focuses on the FNV-1a function whose pseudo-code is as follows:

```
hash = offset_basis
for each octet_of_data to be hashed
    hash = hash xor octet_of_data
    hash = hash * FNV_Prime
return hash
```

In the pseudo-code above, hash is a power-of-two number of bits (32, 64, ... 1024) and offset_basis and FNV_Prime depend on the size of hash.

The FNV-1 algorithm is the same, including the values of offset_basis and FNV_Prime, except that the order of the two lines with the "xor" and multiply operations are reversed. Operational experience indicates better hash dispersion for small amounts of data with FNV-1a. FNV-0 is the same as FNV-1 but with offset_basis set to zero. FNV-1a is suggested for general use.

2.1 FNV Primes

The theory behind FNV_Prime's is beyond the scope of this document but the basic property to look for is how an FNV_Prime would impact dispersion. Now, consider any n-bit FNV hash where n is ≥ 32 and also a power of 2. For each such an n-bit FNV hash, an FNV_Prime p is defined as:

When s is an integer and $4 < s < 11$, then FNV_Prime is the smallest prime p of the form:

$$256^{\text{int}((5 + 2^s)/12)} + 2^8 + b$$

where b is an integer such that:

$$0 < b < 2^8$$

The number of one-bits in b is 4 or 5

and where $p \bmod (2^{40} - 2^{24} - 1) > (2^{24} + 2^8 + 2^7)$.

Experimentally, FNV_Primes matching the above constraints tend to have better dispersion properties. They improve the polynomial feedback characteristic when an FNV_Prime multiplies an intermediate hash value. As such, the hash values produced are more scattered throughout the n-bit hash space.

The case where $s < 5$ is not considered because the resulting hash quality is too low. Such small hashes can, if desired, be derived from a 32 bit FNV hash by XOR folding (see [Section 3](#)). The case where $s > 10$ is not considered because of the doubtful utility of such large FNV hashes and because the criteria for such large FNV_Primes is more complex, due to the sparsity of such large primes, and would needlessly clutter the criteria given above.

Per the above constraints, an FNV_Prime should have only 6 or 7 one-bits in it. Therefore, some compilers may seek to improve the performance of a multiplication with an FNV_Prime by replacing the multiplication with shifts and adds. However, note that the performance of this substitution is highly hardware-dependent and should be done with care. FNV_Primes were selected primarily for the quality of resulting hash function, not for compiler optimization.

[2.2](#) FNV offset_basis

The offset_basis values for the n-bit FNV-1a algorithms are computed by applying the n-bit FNV-0 algorithm to the 32 octets representing the following character string in [\[ASCII\]](#):

```
chongo <Landon Curt Noll> /\../\
```

The \s in the above string are not C-style escape characters. In C-string notation, these 32 octets are:

```
"chongo <Landon Curt Noll> /\../\"
```

[2.3](#) FNV Endianism

For persistent storage or interoperability between different hardware platforms, an FNV hash shall be represented in the little endian format. That is, the FNV hash will be stored in an array hash[N] with N bytes such that its integer value can be retrieved as follows:

```
unsigned char  hash[N];
for ( i = N-1, value = 0; i >= 0; --i )
    value = value << 8 + hash[i];
```

Of course, when FNV hashes are used in a single process or a group of processes sharing memory on processors with compatible endianness, the natural endianness of those processors can be used regardless of its type, little, big, or some other exotic form.

3. Other Hash Sizes and XOR Folding

Many hash uses require a hash that is not one of the FNV sizes for which constants are provided in [Section 4](#). If a larger hash size is needed, please contact the authors of this document.

Most hash applications make use of a hash that is a fixed size binary field. Assume that k bits of hash are desired and k is less than 1024 but not one of the sizes for which constants are provided in [Section 4](#). The recommended technique is to take the smallest FNV hash of size S , where S is larger than k , and calculate the desired hash using xor folding as shown below. The final bit masking operation is logically unnecessary if the size of hash is exactly the number of desired bits.

```
temp = FNV_S ( data-to-be-hashed )
hash = ( temp xor temp>>k ) bitwise-and ( 2**k - 1 )
```

Hash functions are a trade-off between speed and strength. For example, a somewhat stronger hash may be obtained for exact FNV sizes by calculating an FNV twice as long as the desired output ($S = 2*k$) and performing such data folding using a k equal to the size of the desired output. However, if a much stronger hash, for example one suitable for cryptographic applications, is wanted, algorithms designed for that purpose, such as those in [\[RFC6234\]](#), should be used.

If it is desired to obtain a hash result that is a value between 0 and max, where max is a not a power of two, simply choose an FNV hash size S such that $2**S > \text{max}$. Then calculate the following:

```
FNV_S mod ( max+1 )
```

The resulting remainder will be in the range desired but will suffer from a bias against large values with the bias being larger if $2**S$ is only a little bigger than max. If this bias is acceptable, no further processing is needed. If this bias is unacceptable, it can be avoided by retrying for certain high values of hash, as follows, before applying the mod operation above:

```
X = ( int( ( 2**S - 1 ) / ( max+1 ) ) ) * ( max+1 )
while ( hash >= X )
    hash = ( hash * FNV_Prime ) + offset_basis
```


4. FNV Constants

The FNV Primes are as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} 32 \text{ bit FNV_Prime} &= 2^{24} + 2^8 + 0x93 = 16,777,619 \\ &= 0x01000193 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} 64 \text{ bit FNV_Prime} &= 2^{40} + 2^8 + 0xB3 = 1,099,511,628,211 \\ &= 0x00000100\ 000001B3 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} 128 \text{ bit FNV_Prime} &= 2^{88} + 2^8 + 0x3B = \\ &309,485,009,821,345,068,724,781,371 \\ &= 0x00000000\ 01000000\ 00000000\ 0000013B \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} 256 \text{ bit FNV_Prime} &= 2^{168} + 2^8 + 0x63 = \\ 374,144,419,156,711,147,060,143,317,175,368,453,031,918,731,002,211 = \\ 0x0000000000000000\ 0000010000000000\ 0000000000000000\ 00000000000000163 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} 512 \text{ bit FNV_Prime} &= 2^{344} + 2^8 + 0x57 = 35, \\ 835,915,874,844,867,368,919,076,489,095,108,449,946,327,955,754,392, \\ 558,399,825,615,420,669,938,882,575,126,094,039,892,345,713,852,759 = \\ 0x0000000000000000\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000001000000\ 0000000000000000 \\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000000000000\ 00000000000000157 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} 1024 \text{ bit FNV_Prime} &= 2^{680} + 2^8 + 0x8D = 5, \\ 016,456,510,113,118,655,434,598,811,035,278,955,030,765,345,404,790, \\ 744,303,017,523,831,112,055,108,147,451,509,157,692,220,295,382,716, \\ 162,651,878,526,895,249,385,292,291,816,524,375,083,746,691,371,804, \\ 094,271,873,160,484,737,966,720,260,389,217,684,476,157,468,082,573 = \\ 0x0000000000000000\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000000000000 \\ 0000000000000000\ 0000010000000000\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000000000000 \\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000000000000 \\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000000000018D \end{aligned}$$

The FNV offset_basis values are as follows:

$$32 \text{ bit offset_basis} = 2,166,136,261 = 0x811C9DC5$$

$$64 \text{ bit offset_basis} = 14695981039346656037 = 0xCB F29CE4\ 84222325$$

$$\begin{aligned} 128 \text{ bit offset_basis} &= 144066263297769815596495629667062367629 = \\ &0x6C62272E\ 07BB0142\ 62B82175\ 6295C58D \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} 256 \text{ bit offset_basis} &= 100,029,257,958,052,580,907,070,968, \\ 620,625,704,837,092,796,014,241,193,945,225,284,501,741,471,925,557 = \\ 0xDD268DBCAAC55036\ 2D98C384C4E576CC\ C8B1536847B6BBB3\ 1023B4C8CAEE0535 \end{aligned}$$


```
512 bit offset_basis = 9,  
659,303,129,496,669,498,009,435,400,716,310,466,090,418,745,672,637,  
896,108,374,329,434,462,657,994,582,932,197,716,438,449,813,051,892,  
206,539,805,784,495,328,239,340,083,876,191,928,701,583,869,517,785 =  
0xB86DB0B1171F4416 DCA1E50F309990AC AC87D059C9000000 00000000000000D21  
E948F68A34C192F6 2EA79BC942DBE7CE 182036415F56E34B AC982AAC4AFE9FD9
```

```
1024 bit offset_basis = 14,197,795,064,947,621,068,722,070,641,403,  
218,320,880,622,795,441,933,960,878,474,914,617,582,723,252,296,732,  
303,717,722,150,864,096,521,202,355,549,365,628,174,669,108,571,814,  
760,471,015,076,148,029,755,969,804,077,320,157,692,458,563,003,215,  
304,957,150,157,403,644,460,363,550,505,412,711,285,966,361,610,267,  
868,082,893,823,963,790,439,336,411,086,884,584,107,735,010,676,915 =  
0x000000000000000000 005F7A76758ECC4D 32E56D5A591028B7 4B29FC4223FDADA1  
6C3BF34EDA3674DA 9A21D9000000000000 000000000000000000 0000000000000000  
000000000000000000 000000000000000000 000000000000000000 0000000000004C6D7  
EB6E73802734510A 555F256CC005AE55 6BDE8CC9C6A93B21 AFF4B16C71EE90B3
```


5. The Source Code

The following sub-sections are intended, in later versions, to include reference C source code and a test driver for FNV-1a.

5.1 FNV C Headers

TBD

5.2 FNV C Code

TBD

5.3 FNV Test Code

TBD

6. Security Considerations

This document is intended to provide convenient open source access by the Internet community to the FNV non-cryptographic hash. No assertion of suitability for cryptographic applications is made for the FNV hash algorithms.

6.1 Why is FNV Non-Cryptographic?

A full discussion of cryptographic hash requirements and strength is beyond the scope of this document. However, here are three characteristics of FNV that would generally be considered to make it non-cryptographic:

1. Work Factor - To make brute force inversion hard, a cryptographic hash should be computationally expensive, especially for a general purpose processor. But FNV is designed to be very inexpensive on a general-purpose processor. (See [Appendix A](#).)
2. Sticky State - A cryptographic hash should not have a state in which it can stick for a plausible input pattern. But, in the very unlikely event that the FNV hash variable becomes zero and the input is a sequence of zeros, the hash variable will remain at zero until there is a non-zero input byte and the final hash value will be unaffected by the length of that sequence of zero input bytes. Of course, for the common case of fixed length input, this would not be significant because the number of non-zero bytes would vary inversely with the number of zero bytes and for some types of input runs of zeros do not occur. Furthermore, the inclusion of even a little unpredictable input may be sufficient to stop an adversary from inducing a zero hash variable.
3. Diffusion - Every output bit of a cryptographic hash should be an equally complex function of every input bit. But it is easy to see that the least significant bit of a direct FNV hash is the XOR of the least significant bits of every input byte and does not depend on any other input bit. While more complex, the second least significant bit of an FNV hash has a similar weakness. If these properties are considered a problem, they can be easily fixed by XOR folding (see [Section 3](#)).

Nevertheless, none of the above have proven to be a problem in actual practice for the many applications of FNV.

7. IANA Considerations

This document requires no IANA Actions. RFC Editor Note: please delete this section before publication.

8. Acknowledgements

The contributions of the following are gratefully acknowledged:

Frank Ellermann, Bob Moskowitz, and Stefan Santesson.

9. References

Below are the normative and informative references for this document.

9.1 Normative References

[ASCII] - American National Standards Institute (formerly United States of America Standards Institute), "USA Code for Information Interchange", ANSI X3.4-1968, 1968. ANSI X3.4-1968 has been replaced by newer versions with slight modifications, but the 1968 version remains definitive for the Internet.

9.2 Informative References

[FNV] - FNV web site:

<http://www.isthe.com/chongo/tech/comp/fnv/index.html>

[IEEE] - <http://www.ieee.org>

[IPv6flow] - <https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/2292/13240/flowhashRep.pdf>

[RFC3174] - Eastlake 3rd, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)", [RFC 3174](#), September 2001.

[RFC6194] - Polk, T., Chen, L., Turner, S., and P. Hoffman, "Security Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest Algorithms", [RFC 6194](#), March 2011.

[RFC6234] - Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", [RFC 6234](#), May 2011.

Appendix A: Work Comparison with SHA-1

This section provides a simplistic rough comparison of the level of effort required per input byte to compute FNV-1a and SHA-1 [[RFC3174](#)].

Ignoring transfer of control and conditional tests and equating all logical and arithmetic operations, FNV requires 2 operations per byte, an XOR and a multiply.

SHA-1 is a relatively weak cryptographic hash producing a 160-bit hash. It that has been partially broken [[RFC6194](#)]. It is actually designed to accept a bit vector input although almost all computer uses apply it to an integer number of bytes. It processes blocks of 512 bits (64 bytes) and we estimate the effort involved in SHA-1 processing a full block. Ignoring SHA-1 initial set up, transfer of control, and conditional tests, but counting all logical and arithmetic operations, including counting indexing as an addition, SHA-1 requires 1,744 operations per 64 bytes block or 27.25 operations per byte. So by this rough measure, it is a little over 13 times the effort of FNV for large amounts of data. However, FNV is commonly used for small inputs. Using the above method, for inputs of N bytes, where N is ≤ 55 so SHA-1 will take one block (SHA-1 includes padding and an 8-byte length at the end of the data in the last block), the ratio of the effort for SHA-1 to the effort for FNV will be $872/N$. For example, with an 8 byte input, SHA-1 will take 109 times as much effort as FNV.

Stronger cryptographic functions than SHA-1 generally have an even high work factor.

Appendix B: Previous IETF Reference to FNV

FNV-1a was referenced in [draft-ietf-tls-cached-info-08.txt](#) that has since expired. It was later decided that it would be better to use a cryptographic hash for that application.

Below is the Java code for FNV64 from that TLS draft include by the kind permission of the author:

```
/**
 * Java code sample, implementing 64 bit FNV-1a
 * By Stefan Santesson
 */

import java.math.BigInteger;

public class FNV {

    static public BigInteger getFNV1aToByte(byte[] inp) {

        BigInteger m = new BigInteger("2").pow(64);
        BigInteger fnvPrime = new BigInteger("1099511628211");
        BigInteger fnvOffsetBasis =
            new BigInteger("14695981039346656037");

        BigInteger digest = fnvOffsetBasis;

        for (byte b : inp) {
            digest = digest.xor(BigInteger.valueOf((int) b & 255));
            digest = digest.multiply(fnvPrime).mod(m);
        }
        return digest;
    }
}
```


Appendix C: A Few Test Vectors

Below are a few test vectors in the form of ASCII strings and their FNV32 and FNV64 hashes using the FNV-1a algorithm.

Strings without null (zero byte) termination:

String	FNV32	FNV64
""	0x811c9dc5	0xcbf29ce484222325
"a"	0xe40c292c	0xaf63dc4c8601ec8c
"foobar"	0xbf9cf968	0x85944171f73967e8

Strings including null (zero byte) termination:

String	FNV32	FNV64
""	0x050c5d1f	0xaf63bd4c8601b7df
"a"	0x2b24d044	0x089be207b544f1e4
"foobar"	0x0c1c9eb8	0x34531ca7168b8f38

Appendix Z: Change Summary

RFC Editor Note: Please delete this appendix on publication.

From -00 to -01

1. Add Security Considerations section on why FNV is non-cryptographic.
2. Add [Appendix A](#) on a work factor comparison with SHA-1.
3. Add [Appendix B](#) concerning previous IETF draft referenced to FNV.
4. Minor editorial changes.

From -01 to -02

1. Correct FNV_Prime determination criteria and add note as to why $s < 5$ and $s > 10$ are not considered.
2. Add acknowledgements list.
3. Add a couple of references.
4. Minor editorial changes.

From -02 to -03

1. Replace direct reference to US-ASCII standard with reference to [RFC 20](#).
2. Update dates and version number.
3. Minor editing changes.

From -03 to -04

1. Change reference to [RFC 20](#) back to a reference to the ANSI 1968 ASCII standard.
2. Minor addition to [Section 6](#), point 3.

3. Update dates and version number.
4. Minor editing changes.

From -04 to -05

1. Add Twitter as a use example and IPv6 flow hash study reference.
2. Update dates and version number.

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