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Security Considerations for Tenant ID and Similar Fields

Abstract

Many protocols provide for header fields to be added to a packet on ingress to a network domain and removed on egress from that domain. Examples of such fields are Tenant ID for multi-tenant networks, ingress port ID and/or type, and other identity or handling directive fields. These fields mean that a packet may be accompanied by supplemental information as it transits the network domain that would not be present with the packet or not be visible if it were simply forwarded in a traditional manner. A particular concern is that these fields may harm privacy by identifying, in greater detail, the packet source and intended traffic handling. This document provides Security Considerations for the inclusion of such fields with a packet.

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1. Introduction

Many protocols provide for header fields to be added to a packet on ingress to a network domain and removed on egress from that domain as shown in [Figure 1](#). Examples of such fields are Tenant ID for multi-tenant networks, ingress port ID and/or type, and other identity or handling directive fields. These fields mean that a packet may be accompanied by supplemental information as it transits the network domain that would not be present with the packet or not be visible if it were simply forwarded in a traditional manner. There are many such fields. A few examples from IETF Standards Track RFCs and Other RFCs are given below in [Section 4](#). This document provides extensive Security Considerations [[RFC3552](#)] for the inclusion of such supplemental information with a packet.

packet arriving via Ethernet and which would not normally be forwarded with the packet.

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The acronyms and terms below are used in this document. For further security term definitions, see [[RFC4949](#)].

AEAD - Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data

ASCII - American Standard Code for Information Interchange [[RFC0020](#)].

ciphertext - Data that has been transformed by encryption so that its semantic information content is no longer intelligible or directly available (see [Section 3.2](#)) [[RFC4949](#)].

CPU - Central Processing Unit

DSCP - Differentiated Services Code Point [[RFC2474](#)]

LAN - Local Area Network

MAC - Media Access Control [[oneq](#)].

plaintext - Data that is input to an encryption process (see [Section 3.2](#)) [[RFC4949](#)].

QoS - Quality of Service

TLV - Type, Length, Value

VLAN - Virtual LAN [[oneq](#)]

2. Threat Model

The primary threats to be considered due to the addition of these fields are surveillance and from the modification of such fields. Such surveillance or modification could be accomplished either on links within the network domain or by the subversion of one or more nodes.

Surveillance threatens loss of privacy to the users whose traffic is transiting the network domain because it permits packets to be

associated with such users and their host or service provider with greater specificity. The additional information with packets may also reveal associations between users or aspects of the network domain structure and capabilities. And, to the extent that the additional information affects the treatment of the packet, unauthorized modification may disrupt network operation and interfere with the modified traffic or other traffic.

(Note that, without suitable countermeasures, radio links are particularly subject to surveillance and traffic modification through blocking the original version of a packet and injection of a modified copy.)

Subversion of a transit or egress node enables surveillance and modification of all the traffic through that node. Subversion of an ingress node is a threat but not closely related to adding information to the packet. All the information that might be in or associated with the packet is available at the ingress node regardless of whether any of this is added to the packet being ingressed.

3. Security Considerations

This section provides Security Considerations for the fields discussed in this document. These considerations are equally applicable to IPv4 [[RFC0791](#)] and IPv6 [[RFC8200](#)]. They are grouped into the following topics:

- * Surveillance Oriented Considerations

- o Minimization
- o Encryption
- o Obfuscation

- * Other Security Considerations

- o Integrity and Authentication Considerations
- o Covert Channel Considerations

The first three items above have a dominance relationship as follows:

Minimization > Encryption > Obfuscation

As further discussed below, where reasonably possible, the types of additional information discussed in this document SHOULD NOT be included with a packet. Where it is necessary to include the

information, it SHOULD be encrypted where practical. Where encryption of the entire packet is prohibitive, the cleartext data that is not mutable in transit MUST be authenticated through authenticated encryption with associated data mechanisms. In cases where it can be neither excluded nor encrypted, consideration should be given to obfuscating the information even though that provides only weak protection.

3.1. Minimization

The simplest method to minimize the harm that can be caused by the threats described in [Section 2](#) is to minimize the amount of additional information added to packets transiting the network domain. If some information is not necessary for controlling the treatment of a packet or other network management functions, it SHOULD NOT be included. The exceptional cases where inclusion is reasonable are

(1) transition scenarios, where information remains included for a brief time while mechanisms using the information are being removed or disabled, or included starting a brief time before mechanisms using the information are being installed or enabled, and

(2) some debugging cases where the additional information would be helpful (but note that the mere addition of this information may change behavior and mask or cause erroneous behavior).

This is the strongest method to defeat the security threats outlined in [Section 2](#) and MUST always be considered so a determination can be made as to whether the benefits of including the information exceed the risks. Any data that does not appear with the packets cannot, due to its transit of or egress from the network domain, compromise the privacy/security of the packet source.

3.2. Encryption

Encryption is a powerful technique. With the use of appropriate cryptographic algorithms and key management, encryption converts easily understandable plaintext into cyphertext from which the original plaintext cannot be derived without knowledge of the key.

Use of encryption provides clear benefits but there also costs. The computational burden of encryption/decryption at line speed may increase the cost of CPU or port hardware and requirements for key management and pseudorandom number generation [[RFC4086](#)] will impose some burden.

Even with strong encryption, surveillance can yield information such as the size and number of packets in transit. Padding and dummy packets can obscure this meta information about encrypted traffic

but only at a significant expense in bandwidth consumed. In addition, enough addressing and service information must be present outside the encryption to get the packet through the one or more hops it needs to transit with the desired QoS to the point where it will be decrypted. Finally, there is usually some encryption control information such as a Key ID to facilitate key rollover and the like. Also, depending on the encryption mode, a packet sequence number may be needed. When part of a packet is encrypted, authentication of such fields in the remainder of the packet SHOULD be considered (see [Section 3.4](#)).

The subsections below discuss the use of encryption at the link level and edge-to-edge. It is RECOMMENDED that both be used unless careful consideration shows the costs to exceed the benefits in a particular case. If both are not being used, then it RECOMMENDED that one or the other be used with default preference for edge-to-edge encryption in wired networks and link encryption for radio networks.

3.2.1. Link Encryption

Link encryption encrypts a packet as it is output from the ingress node or a transit node and decrypts it on input to the next node in the path, which will be a transit node or the egress node. This protects information inside the packet from surveillance of the link. However, it is usual that some addressing information, such as a MAC address, and control information is needed by the destination node and in some cases needed by devices within the link. For example, if routers are connected by a bridged LAN [[oneq](#)] proper handling of the packets between them may require that the packet be sent with a VLAN/priority tag.

With link encryption, the packet will be decrypted inside the destination node so any additional information within the packet will be exposed there and privacy can still be harmed by a subverted transit or egress node.

Link encryption is common by default on radio links which are easily surveilled. For example, almost all Wi-Fi [[eleven](#)] chip sets have built in cryptographic hardware so link encryption for Wi-Fi is usually thought of as "free" in that its use does not impose significant additional overhead or speed limitations.

3.2.2. Edge-to-Edge Encryption

Encryption between the ingress node and the egress node provides protection from surveillance of all the links along that path as well as surveillance by the transit nodes used. However, such encryption cannot cover any fields that are needed to control the

treatment of the packet along its path in the network domain or that cause it to be routed to and decrypted at its egress node (or possibly nodes in the case of multicast).

While Link Encryption involves key setup only between the nodes on the link, usually two nodes, strong Edge-to-Edge Encryption would require key setup for every pair of edge (ingress or egress) nodes that will be communicating traffic. This is potentially up to $N*(N-1)/2$ pairs if there are N edge nodes. And additional key set up and management may be required for multicast groups or the like.

3.3. Obfuscation

Obfuscation refers to weak methods of hiding the content of a field or packet or reducing the predictability of some identifier fields.

The first type obfuscation of can be thought of as weak encryption that is unkeyed or uses a fixed key. There is, nevertheless, some benefit to its use. Roughly speaking, it protects against inadvertent disclosure but provides very weak protection against deliberate attack.

For example, someone debugging a network problem might do a capture of the packets on a link with a program that will display the packet data in hexadecimal and ASCII. This data might include personally identifying information or other sensitive information that could be immediately read if interpreted as ASCII. Such inadvertent disclosure could be avoided by an obfuscation as simple as XORing a fixed non-zero byte value with each data byte.

The second case type of obfuscation involves, to the extent practical, avoiding easily predictable numbers for identifiers such as IP address, source socket numbers, Tenant IDs, and the like. If successively allocated identifiers of this sort are easily predictable, it makes it much easier to forge packets that may be accepted as genuine. For example, instead of simply counting to determine the next value to use, something like the output of a linear feedback shift register could be used.

3.4. Integrity and Authentication Considerations

Providing for the integrity and authentication of packets in the network domain is generally a good idea for reasons including the following:

(1) To the extent that additional information with a packet affects network handling of that packet, it is important that the information is not corrupted or forged. Not only can the treatment of the packet be affected but if, for example, arbitrary numbers of high priority packets can be forged, performance of the network domain can be

disrupted. Thus, integrity and authentication SHOULD be used in such circumstances.

(2) Many modes of encryption (see [Section 3.2](#)) are sensitive to modified, dropped, or extra packets which may result in garbling the decryption of following genuine packets. Appropriate integrity and authentication SHOULD be used with flow that are so encrypted.

Where part of a packet is encrypted and authenticated, unencrypted parts may be authenticated using AEAD.

3.5. Covert Channel Considerations

The presence of additional information in a packet, particularly in an encrypted form, provides a place into which a node forwarding a packet can hide information and from which such a node can retrieve information.

Many of the headers discussed in [Section 4](#) which provide for the sort of additional information fields which are the primary focus of this document also have reserved fields. Most commonly the specification for these fields, which are reserved for later definition, state they must be sent as zero and ignored on receipt. Since their value is ignored by standards compliant nodes, such fields could be used for covert channel communications.

4. Examples of Applicable Fields

The subsections below give some examples of fields to which the Security Considerations material in [Section 3](#) apply.

4.1. Example Fields from Standards Track RFCs

The following are examples of fields specified in Standards Track RFCs to which these Security Considerations would apply.

4.1.1. Service Function Chaining Network Service Header

The Service Function Header (SFC) Network Service Header (NSH) [[RFC8300](#)] provides for the inclusion of metadata with packets inside an SFC enabled domain as shown in [Figure 2](#).

NSH Header:




Figure 2: SFC NSH

The MD Type field in the NSH header indicates the type of metadata field or fields in the Context Headers section of the NSH header. Such fields are appropriate for including additional information with a packet that would otherwise only be available at the ingress node. See, for example, the context headers specified in [\[RFC9263\]](#).

The NSH is used to encapsulate the traffic and requires an outer transport header as shown in [Figure 3](#). This encapsulation is applied on ingress to the SFC enabled domain and removed on egress. If the transport encapsulation is, for example, IP, transport encapsulation fields may also be available to add information to the packet within the network domain (see [Section 4.1.3](#)).




Figure 3: NSH Encapsulation

4.1.2. Geneve

The Geneve (General Network Virtualization Encapsulation) [\[RFC8926\]](#) header provides for a Virtual Network Identifier which is equivalent to a Tenant ID, as shown in [Figure 4](#). It also has a flexible provision for header options encoded at TLVs.




Figure 4: VXLAN Header

Geneve is used to encapsulate the traffic transiting the network domain with an IP transport encapsulation in a manner similar to the NSH Header as shown in [Figure 3](#) and similar considerations apply.

4.1.3. IP Header Fields

There are a number of IPv4 [[RFC0791](#)] and IPv6 [[RFC8200](#)] header fields that can be used to encode supplemental information. Some of these fields are in general mutable, so they could change as a packet is propagated through a network; however, this document is restricted to considerations within a single network domain with coordinated management which can avoid changing such fields.

There is particular freedom to use IP fields where the traffic transiting the network domain is encapsulated in a manner that provides for a new outer IP header. For example, IP-in-IP or where the traffic is encapsulated in a tunnel header, such as VXLAN, NVGRE, SFC NSH, or Geneve, which is in turn encapsulated in an outer IP header.

Options Both IPv4 and IPv6 provide for header options with IPv6 having provisions for more flexible and extensive options but these have proven hard to use in practice.

IPv6 Flow Label In the IPv6 header, a 20-bit Flow Label field is available.

Addresses Where an outer IP header is used within a network domain, not all of the IPv4 or generously sized IPv6 address is needed to direct transit traffic from ingress to egress. Thus other additional information could be encoded into the address field, perhaps in low order bits.

DSCP/ToS There is an 8-bit field in the IPv6 and IPv4 header. Two of these bits are commonly used for Explicit Congestion

Notification (ECN, [[RFC3168](#)]) and the other six are commonly used to encode hop-by-hop behaviors [[RFC2474](#)]; however, within a network domain with common management those six bits or all 8 bits could be used for other purposes.

Sockets, Etc There are additional fields available in the commonly used UDP and TCP headers that could, in an outer IP encapsulation inside a network domain, be interpreted as holding other information.

4.2. Example Fields from Other RFCs

The following are examples of fields specified in RFCs that are not Standards Track to which the Security Considerations material in [Section 3](#) apply.

4.2.1. VXLAN

VXLAN (Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network) is specified in [[RFC7348](#)] and the VXLAN header is shown in [Figure 5](#).

VXLAN Header:

```
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|R|R|R|R|I|R|R|R|                Reserved                |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|                VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI) |   Reserved   |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
```

Figure 5: VXLAN Header

The Virtual Network Identifier (VNI) is a tenant identifier in multi-tenant domains. It is intended to identify traffic that uses an overlay network for that tenant. In addition, the use of VXLAN involves encapsulation of the traffic being forwarded so there is an outer IP and UDP header with various fields that could be used for additional information.

4.2.2. NVGRE

NVGRE (Network Virtualization Using Generic Routing Encapsulation) is specified in [[RFC7637](#)] and the NVGRE header is shown in [Figure 6](#).

GRE Header:

```
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|0| |1|0|   Reserved0       | Ver |   Protocol Type 0x6558       |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|                               Virtual Subnet ID (VSID)           |   FlowID   |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
```

Figure 6: NVGRE Header

The Virtual Subnet ID (VSID) is a tenant identifier in multi-tenant domains. It is intended to identify traffic that uses an overlay network for that tenant. In addition, the use of NVGRE involves encapsulation of the traffic being forwarded so there is an outer IP and UDP header with various fields that could be used for additional information

5. IANA Considerations

This document requires no IANA actions.

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