

SMTP Require TLS Option
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Abstract

The SMTP STARTTLS option, used in negotiating transport-level encryption of SMTP connections, is not as useful from a security standpoint as it might be because of its opportunistic nature; message delivery is prioritized over security. This document describes a complementary SMTP service extension, REQUIRETLS. If the REQUIRETLS option is used when sending a message, it causes message delivery to fail if a TLS connection with the required security characteristics cannot be completed with the next hop MTA or if that MTA does not also advertise that it supports REQUIRETLS. Message originators may therefore expect transport security to be used for messages sent with this option.

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[1.](#) Introduction

The SMTP [[RFC5321](#)] STARTTLS service extension [[RFC3207](#)] provides a means by which an SMTP server and client can establish a Transport Layer Security (TLS) protected session for the transmission of email messages. In this application, TLS is used only upon mutual agreement (successful negotiation) between the client and server; if this is not possible, the message is sent unencrypted. Even if a TLS protected session is established, it is uncommon for the client to abort the SMTP session if certificate validation fails to authenticate the SMTP server.

The opportunistic nature of SMTP TLS enables several "on the wire" attacks on SMTP security between MTAs. These include passive eavesdropping on connections for which TLS is not used, interference in the SMTP protocol to prevent TLS from being negotiated (presumably followed by subsequent eavesdropping), and insertion of a man-in-the-

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middle attacker taking advantage of the lack of server authentication by the client. Attacks are more described in more detail in the Security Considerations section of this document.

The REQUIRETLS SMTP service extension allows the SMTP client to specify that a given message sent during a particular session **MUST** be sent over a TLS protected session with specified security characteristics. It also requires that the SMTP server advertise that it also supports REQUIRETLS, in effect promising that it will honor the requirement to require STARTTLS and REQUIRETLS for all onward transmissions of messages specifying that requirement.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

2. The REQUIRETLS Service Extension

1. The textual name of the extension is "Require TLS".
2. The EHLO keyword value associated with this extension is "REQUIRETLS".
3. One MAIL FROM option is defined by this extension.
4. Two new SMTP status codes are defined by this extension to convey error conditions resulting from failure of the client to negotiate a TLS connection with the required security and as a result of an attempt to send to a server not also supporting the REQUIRETLS extension.

In order to specify REQUIRETLS treatment for a given message, the REQUIRETLS option is specified on the MAIL FROM command when that message is transmitted. This option **MUST** only be specified in the context of an SMTP session meeting the security requirements that have been specified:

- o The session itself **MUST** employ TLS transmission.
- o Any server authentication requirements specified as an option to the REQUIRETLS option (see below) **MUST** have been satisfied in establishing the current session.

An optional parameter to the REQUIRETLS MAIL FROM option specifies the requirements for server authentication that **MUST** be used for any onward transmission of the following message. The parameter takes

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the form of either a single value or comma-separated list, separated from the REQUIRETLS option by a single "=" (equals-sign) character. If present, the parameter MUST take one or more of the following values:

- o CHAIN - The certificate presented by the SMTP server MUST verify successfully in a trust chain leading to a certificate trusted by the SMTP client. The choice of trusted (root) certificates by the client is at their own discretion. The client MAY choose to use the certificate set maintained by the CA/B forum [citation needed] for this purpose.
- o DANE - The certificate presented by the SMTP server MUST verify successfully using DANE as specified in [RFC 7672](#) [[RFC7672](#)].
- o DNSSEC - The server MUST confirm that any MX record or CNAME lookup used to locate the SMTP server must be DNSSEC [[RFC4035](#)] signed and valid.

The CHAIN and DANE parameters are additive; if both are specified, either method of certificate validation is acceptable. If neither CHAIN nor DANE is specified, the certificate presented by the SMTP server is not required to be verified.

[3.](#) REQUIRETLS Semantics

[3.1.](#) REQUIRETLS Receipt Requirements

Upon receipt of a REQUIRETLS option on a MAIL FROM command during the receipt of a message, an SMTP server MUST tag that message as requiring TLS transmission with the specified option(s). The manner in which this tagging takes place is implementation-dependent.

[3.2.](#) REQUIRETLS Sender Requirements

When sending a message tagged with a TLS requirement, the sending (client) MTA MUST:

- o Look up the SMTP server to which the message is to be sent. If the DNSSEC option is included in the message tag, all lookups in this process MUST use DNSSEC verification and the response MUST be DNSSEC-signed.
- o Open an SMTP session with the peer SMTP server using the EHLO verb. If the server does not advertise the REQUIRETLS capability, the client MUST bounce the message with a 5.7.xxx REQUIRETLS Needed status code.

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- o Establish a TLS-protected SMTP session with its peer SMTP server and authenticate the server's certificate with the specified authentication method. If it is unable to do so, the client **MUST** bounce the message with a 5.7.10 Encryption Needed status code [[RFC5248](#)].
- o The SMTP client **SHOULD** also require that meaningfully secure cipher algorithms and key lengths be negotiated with the server, and bounce the message as described above if this does not occur. The choices of key lengths and algorithms change over time, so a specific requirement is not presented here.
- o Transmit the message, issuing the **REQUIRETLS** option on the **MAIL FROM** command with the required option(s), if any.

3.3. REQUIRETLS Submission

An MUA or other agent making the initial introduction of a message to SMTP has authority to decide whether to require TLS, and if so, using what authentication method(s). It does so by issuing the **REQUIRETLS** option in the **MAIL FROM** command during message submission. This **MAY** be done based on a user interface selection, on a header field included in the message, or based on policy. The manner in which the decision to require TLS is made is implementation-dependent and is beyond the scope of this specification.

3.4. Delivery of REQUIRETLS messages

Messages are usually delivered to end users using protocols other than SMTP such as IMAP [[RFC3501](#)], POP [[RFC1939](#)], or web mail systems. Mail delivery agents supporting **REQUIRETLS** **SHOULD** require that message delivery take place over authenticated, encrypted channels.

4. Error handling

Error ("bounce") messages contain important metadata, and therefore **MUST** be protected in the same manner as the original message. All error handling, whether resulting from a **REQUIRETLS** error or some other, **MUST** employ **REQUIRETLS** at the same authentication method(s) as the message that caused the error to occur.

It should be noted that the path from the origination of an error bounce message back to the **MAIL FROM** address may not share the same **REQUIRETLS** support as the forward path. Therefore, users of **REQUIRETLS** are advised to make sure that they are capable of receiving mail using **REQUIRETLS** at the same authentication method(s) as messages they send. Otherwise, such error bounces will be lost.

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5. IANA Considerations

If published as an RFC, this draft requests the addition of the keyword REQUIRETLS to the SMTP Service Extensions Registry [[MailParams](#)].

If published as an RFC, this draft also requests the creation of a registry, REQUIRETLS Security Requirements, to be initially populated with the CHAIN, DANE, and DNSSEC keywords.

If published as an RFC, this draft requests the addition of an entry to the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) Enhanced Status Codes Registry [[SMTPStatusCodes](#)] in the 5.7.YYY range to indicate lack of REQUIRETLS support by an SMTP server to which a message is being routed.

This section is to be removed during conversion into an RFC by the RFC Editor.

6. Security Considerations

The purpose of REQUIRETLS is to improve communications security for email by giving the originator of a message an expectation that it will be transmitted in an encrypted form "over the wire". When used, REQUIRETLS changes the traditional behavior of email transmission, which favors delivery over the ability to send email messages using transport-layer security, to one in which messages are not transmitted unless the required security is available.

6.1. Passive attacks

REQUIRETLS is generally effective against passive attackers who are merely trying to eavesdrop on an SMTP exchange between an SMTP client and server. This assumes, of course, the cryptographic integrity of the TLS connection being used.

6.2. Active attacks

Active attacks against TLS encrypted SMTP connections can take many forms. One such attack is to interfere in the negotiation by changing the STARTTLS command to something illegal such as XXXXXXXX. This causes TLS negotiation to fail and messages to be sent in the clear, where they can be intercepted. REQUIRETLS detects the failure of STARTTLS and declines to send the message rather than send it insecurely.

A second form of attack is a man-in-the-middle attack where the attacker terminates the TLS connection rather than the intended SMTP

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server. This is possible when, as is commonly the case, the SMTP client either does not verify the server's certificate or establishes the connection even when the verification fails. The REQUIRETLS CHAIN and DANE options allow the message sender to specify that successful certificate validation, using either or both of two different methods, is required before sending the message.

Another active attack involves the spoofing of DNS MX records of the recipient domain. An attacker having this capability could cause the message to be redirected to a mail server under the attacker's own control, which would presumably have a valid certificate. The REQUIRETLS DNSSEC option allows the message sender to require that valid DNSSEC [[RFC4033](#)] signatures be obtained when locating the recipient's mail server, in order to address that attack.

In addition to support of the DNSSEC option, domains receiving email SHOULD deploy DNSSEC and SMTP clients SHOULD deploy DNSSEC verification.

[6.3.](#) Bad Actor MTAs

A bad-actor MTA along the message transmission path could misrepresent its support of REQUIRETLS and/or actively strip REQUIRETLS tags from messages it handles. However, since intermediate MTAs are already trusted with the cleartext of messages they handle, and are not part of the threat model for transport-layer security, they are also not part of the threat model for REQUIRETLS.

It should be reemphasized that since SMTP TLS is a transport-layer security protocol, messages sent using REQUIRETLS are not encrypted end-to-end and are visible to MTAs that are part of the message delivery path. Messages containing sensitive information that MTAs should not have access to MUST be sent using end-to-end content encryption such as OpenPGP [[RFC4880](#)] or S/MIME [[RFC5751](#)].

[7.](#) Acknowledgements

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[8.](#) Revision History

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8.1. Changes Since -00 Draft

- o Conversion of REQUIRETLS from an SMTP verb to a MAIL FROM parameter to better associate REQUIRETLS requirements with transmission of individual messages.
- o Addition of an option to require DNSSEC lookup of the remote mail server, since this affects the common name of the certificate that is presented.
- o Clarified the wording to more clearly state that TLS sessions must be established and not simply that STARTTLS is negotiated.
- o Introduced need for minimum encryption standards (key lengths and algorithms)
- o Substantially rewritten Security Considerations section

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