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Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT)

Abstract

This document specifies conventions for creating JSON Web Token (JWT) documents that support selective disclosure of JWT claim values.

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Table of Contents

- [1. Introduction](#)
 - [1.1. Conventions and Terminology](#)
- [2. Terms and Definitions](#)
 - [2.1. Selective Disclosure JWT \(SD-JWT\)](#)
 - [2.2. SD-JWT Salt/Value Container \(SVC\)](#)
 - [2.3. SD-JWT Release \(SD-JWT-R\)](#)
 - [2.4. Holder binding](#)
 - [2.5. issuer](#)
 - [2.6. holder](#)
 - [2.7. verifier](#)
- [3. Concepts](#)
 - [3.1. Creating an SD-JWT](#)
 - [3.2. Creating an SD-JWT Release](#)
 - [3.3. Verifying an SD-JWT Release](#)
- [4. Data Formats](#)
 - [4.1. SD-JWT Format](#)
 - [4.1.1. Payload](#)
 - [4.1.2. Example 1 - Flat SD-JWT](#)
 - [4.1.3. Example 2 - Structured SD-JWT](#)
 - [4.2. SD-JWT Salt/Value Container \(SVC\)](#)
 - [4.2.1. Payload](#)
 - [4.2.2. Example 1 - SVC for a Flat SD-JWT](#)
 - [4.2.3. Example 2 - SVC for a Structured SD-JWT](#)
 - [4.3. SD-JWT and SVC Combined Format](#)
 - [4.4. SD-JWT-R Format](#)
 - [4.5. Presentation Format](#)
- [5. Verification](#)
- [6. Security Considerations](#)
 - [6.1. Holder Binding](#)
- [7. Privacy Considerations](#)
 - [7.1. Claim Names](#)
 - [7.2. Unlinkability](#)
- [8. Acknowledgements](#)
- [9. IANA Considerations](#)
- [10. Normative References](#)
- [11. Informative References](#)
- [Appendix A. Additional Examples](#)
 - [A.1. Example 3 - Complex Structured SD-JWT](#)
 - [A.2. Example 4 - W3C VC](#)
- [Appendix B. Document History](#)
- [Authors' Addresses](#)

1. Introduction

The JSON-based claims in a signed JSON Web Token (JWT) [[RFC7519](#)] document are secured against modification using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [[RFC7515](#)] digital signatures. A consumer of a signed JWT

document that has checked the document's signature can safely assume that the contents of the document have not been modified. However, anyone receiving an unencrypted JWT can read all of the claims and likewise, anyone with the decryption key receiving an encrypted JWT can also read all of the claims.

This document describes a format for JWTs that support selective disclosure (SD-JWT), enabling sharing only a subset of the claims included in the original JWT instead of releasing all the claims to every verifier. This document also defines a format for so-called SD-JWT Releases (SD-JWT-R).

One of the common use cases of a signed JWT is representing a user's identity created by an issuer. In such a use case, there has been no privacy-related concerns with existing JOSE signature schemes, because when a signed JWT is one-time use, it contains only JWT claims that the user has consented in real time to release to the verifier. However, when a signed JWT is intended to be multi-use, the ability to selectively disclose a subset of the claims depending on the verifier becomes crucial to ensure minimum disclosure and prevent verifier from obtaining claims irrelevant for the use case at hand.

One example of such a multi-use JWT is a verifiable credential, or a tamper-evident credential with a cryptographically verifiable authorship that contains claims about a subject. SD-JWTs defined in this document enable such selective disclosure of claims.

While JWTs for claims describing natural persons are a common use case, the mechanisms defined in this document can be used for many other use cases as well.

Note: so far agreed to define holder binding (user's public key contained inside an SD-JWT) as an option. It is not mandatory since holder binding is use case specific and orthogonal to the general mechanism of selective disclosure we are trying to define here.

1.1. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

base64url denotes the URL-safe base64 encoding without padding defined in Section 2 of [[RFC7515](#)].

2. Terms and Definitions

2.1. Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT)

A JWT [[RFC7515](#)] created by the issuer, which can be signed as a JWS [[RFC7515](#)], that supports selective disclosure as defined in this document.

2.2. SD-JWT Salt/Value Container (SVC)

A JSON object created by the issuer that contains mapping between raw claim values that contained in the SD-JWT and the salts for each claim value.

2.3. SD-JWT Release (SD-JWT-R)

A JWT created by the holder that contains a subset of the claim values of an SD-JWT in a verifiable way.

2.4. Holder binding

Ability of the holder to prove legitimate possession of SD-JWT by proving control over the same private key during the issuance and presentation. SD-JWT signed by the issuer contains a public key or a reference to a public key that matches to the private key controlled by the holder.

2.5. issuer

An entity that creates SD-JWTs (2.1).

2.6. holder

An entity that received SD-JWTs (2.1) from the issuer and has control over them.

2.7. verifier

An entity that entity that requests, checks and extracts the claims from SSD-JWT-R (2.2)

Note: discuss if we want to include Client, Authorization Server for the purpose of ensuring continuity and separating the entity from the actor.

3. Concepts

In the following section, the concepts of SD-JWTs and SD-JWT Releases are described at a conceptual level.

3.1. Creating an SD-JWT

An SD-JWT, at its core, is a digitally signed document containing hashes over the claim values with unique salts, optionally the holder's public key or a reference thereto and other metadata. It is digitally signed using the issuer's private key.

```
SD-JWT-DOC = (METADATA, HOLDER-PUBLIC-KEY?, HS-CLAIMS)
SD-JWT = SD-JWT-DOC | SIG(SD-JWT-DOC, ISSUER-PRIV-KEY)
```

HS-CLAIMS is usually a simple object with claim names mapped to hashes over the claim values with unique salts:

```
HS-CLAIMS = (
  CLAIM-NAME: HASH(SALT | CLAIM-VALUE)
)*
```

HS-CLAIMS can also be nested deeper to capture more complex objects, as will be shown later.

The SD-JWT is sent from the issuer to the holder, together with the mapping of the plain-text claim values, the salt values, and potentially some other information.

3.2. Creating an SD-JWT Release

To disclose to a verifier a subset of the SD-JWT claim values, a holder creates a JWS such as the following:

```
RELEASE-DOC = (METADATA, SALTS)
RELEASE = RELEASE-DOC | SIG(RELEASE-DOC, HOLDER-PRIV-KEY)?
```

Note that the signature over RELEASE-DOC is optional and required if, and only if, holder binding is desired.

SALTS is usually a simple object with claim names mapped to values and salts:

```
SALTS = (
  CLAIM-NAME: (DISCLOSED-SALT, DISCLOSED-VALUE)
)
```

Just as HS-CLAIMS, SALTS can be more complex as well.

The SD-JWT-R is sent together with the SD-JWT from the holder to the verifier.

3.3. Verifying an SD-JWT Release

A verifier checks that

- *if holder binding is desired, the RELEASE was signed by the private key belonging to the public key contained in SD-JWT-DOC.

- *for each claim in RELEASE, the hash `HASH(DISCLOSED-SALT | DISCLOSED-VALUE)` matches the hash under the given claim name in the SD-JWT.

The detailed algorithm is described below.

4. Data Formats

This section defines a data format for SD-JWTs (containing hashes of the salted claim values) and for SD-JWT Salt/Value Containers (containing the mapping of the plain-text claim values and the salt values).

4.1. SD-JWT Format

An SD-JWT is a JWT that is optionally signed using the issuer's private key.

4.1.1. Payload

The payload of an SD-JWT can consist of the following claims.

4.1.1.1. Selectively Disclosable Claims

An SD-JWT MUST include hashes of the salted claim values that are included by the issuer under the property `_sd`.

The issuer MUST choose a unique salt value for each claim value. Each salt value MUST contain at least 128 bits of pseudorandom data, making it hard for an attacker to guess. The salt value MUST then be encoded as a string. It is RECOMMENDED to base64url encode at least 16 pseudorandom bytes.

The issuer MUST build the hashes by hashing over a string that is formed by JSON-encoding an ordered array containing the salt and the claim value, e.g.: `["6qMQvRL5haj", "Peter"]`. The hash value is then base64url-encoded. Note that the precise JSON encoding can vary, and therefore, the JSON encodings MUST be sent to the holder along with the SD-JWT, as described below.

The `_sd` object can be a 'flat' object, directly containing all claim names and hashed claim values without any deeper structure. The `_sd` object can also be a 'structured' object, where some claims and

their respective hashes are contained in places deeper in the structure. It is up to the issuer to decide how to structure the representation such that it is suitable for the use case. Examples 1 and 2 below show this using the [OIDC] address claim, a structured claim. Appendix 1 shows a more complex example using claims from eKYC (todo: reference).

Note that it is at the issuer's discretion whether to turn the payload of SD-JWT into a 'flat' or 'structured' _sd SD-JWT object.

4.1.1.2. Holder Public Key

If the issuer wants to enable holder binding, it includes a public key associated with the holder, or a reference thereto.

It is out of the scope of this document to describe how the holder key pair is established. For example, the holder MAY provide a key pair to the issuer, the issuer MAY create the key pair for the holder, or holder and issuer MAY use pre-established key material.

Note: need to define how holder public key is included, right now examples are using sub_jwk I think.

4.1.1.3. Other Claims

The SD-JWT payload MAY contain other claims and will typically contain other JWT claims, such as iss, iat, etc.

4.1.2. Example 1 - Flat SD-JWT

This example shows a simple SD-JWT containing user claims. The issuer here decided to use a completely flat structure, i.e., the address claim can only be disclosed in full.

In this example, these claims are the payload of the SD-JWT:

```
{
  "sub": "6c5c0a49-b589-431d-bae7-219122a9ec2c",
  "given_name": "John",
  "family_name": "Doe",
  "email": "johndoe@example.com",
  "phone_number": "+1-202-555-0101",
  "address": {
    "street_address": "123 Main St",
    "locality": "Anytown",
    "region": "Anystate",
    "country": "US"
  },
  "birthdate": "1940-01-01"
}
```

The following shows the resulting SD-JWT payload:

```
{
  "iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
  "sub_jwk": {
    "kty": "RSA",
    "n": "6GwTTwcjVy0tKtuGf7ft5PAU0GiDtnD4DGcmtVrFQHVhtx05-DJigfmR-3Tetw-Od5su4TNZYzjh3tQ6Bj",
    "e": "AQAB"
  },
  "iat": 1516239022,
  "exp": 1516247022,
  "_sd": {
    "sub": "Lbnhk0r5oS7KjeUrxezAu8TG0CpWz0jSixy6tffuo04",
    "given_name": "fUMdn88aaoyKTHrvZd6AuLmPraGhPJ0zF5r_JhxCVZs",
    "family_name": "9h5vgv6TpFV6GmnPtugiMLl5tHetHeb5X_2cKHjN7cw",
    "email": "fPZ92dtYMCN2Nb-2ac_zSH19p4yakUXrZl_-wSgaazA",
    "phone_number": "QdSffzNzzd0n60MsSmuiKj6Y6Enk2b-BS-KtEePde5M",
    "address": "JFu99NUXPq55f6DFBZ22rMkxMNHayCrFG0FDsqbyDs",
    "birthdate": "Ia1Tc6_Xnt5CJc2LtKcu6Wvqr42glBGGcjG0ye8Zf3U"
  }
}
```

The SD-JWT is then signed by the issuer to create a document like the following:

(Line breaks for presentation only.)

In this example, the issuer decided to create a structured object for the hashes. This allows for the release of individual members of the address claim separately.

The user claims are as in Example 1 above. The resulting SD-JWT payload is as follows:

```
{
  "iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
  "sub_jwk": {
    "kty": "RSA",
    "n": "lg9Nie6g-pgoUrDK5Kyni4xZd5ILVnGtBcWx-caAq2FLmtGNIHD9qEzlcLjJCNhrGAUNY0BlkpS0ySJPB1",
    "e": "AQAB"
  },
  "iat": 1516239022,
  "exp": 1516247022,
  "_sd": {
    "sub": "Lbnhk0r5oS7KjeUrxezAu8TG0CpWz0jSixy6tffuo04",
    "given_name": "fUMdn88aaoyKTHrvZd6AuLmPraGhPJ0zF5r_JhxCVZs",
    "family_name": "9h5vgv6TpFV6GmnPtugiMLl5tHetHeb5X_2cKHjN7cw",
    "email": "fPZ92dtYMCN2Nb-2ac_zSH19p4yakUXrZl_-wSgaazA",
    "phone_number": "QdSffzNzzd0n60MsSmuiKj6Y6Enk2b-BS-KtEePde5M",
    "address": {
      "street_address": "4FpVpd5630wh9G3HkGNTN9FiSHT0e6y9-Abk_IuG86M",
      "locality": "Kr0BpdZz6yU8HMhjyYHh1EEgJxeUyLIpJEi47iXhp8Y",
      "region": "QXxWKvcV4Bc9t3M7MF43W5vdCnWtA9hsYX8ycWLu1LQ",
      "country": "3itkoMzrDrinn7T0MUbAmrMm1ya1LzbBgif_50WoF0s"
    },
    "birthdate": "fvLCnDm3r4VSYcBF3pIlXP4ulEoHuH0fG_YmFZEuxpQ"
  }
}
```

4.2. SD-JWT Salt/Value Container (SVC)

Besides the SD-JWT itself, the holder needs to learn the raw claim values that are contained in the SD-JWT, along with the precise input to the hash calculation, and the salts. There MAY be other information the issuer needs to communicate to the holder, such as a private key key if the issuer selected the holder key pair.

4.2.1. Payload

A SD-JWT Salt/Value Container (SVC) is a JSON object containing at least the top-level property `_sd`. Its structure mirrors the one of `_sd` in the SD-JWT, but the values are the inputs to the hash calculations the issuer used, as strings.

The SVC MAY contain further properties, for example, to transport the holder private key.

4.2.2. Example 1 - SVC for a Flat SD-JWT

The SVC for Example 1 is as follows:

```
{
  "_sd": {
    "sub": "[\"eluV50g3gSNII8EYnsxA_A\", \"6c5c0a49-b589-431d-bae7-219122a9ec2c\"]",
    "given_name": "[\"6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA\", \"John\"]",
    "family_name": "[\"eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ\", \"Doe\"]",
    "email": "[\"Qg_064zqAxe412a108iroA\", \"johndoe@example.com\"]",
    "phone_number": "[\"AJx-095VPrpTtN4QM0qROA\", \"+1-202-555-0101\"]",
    "address": "[\"Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ\", {\"street_address\": \"123 Main St\", \"locality\": \"Anytown\", \"region\": \"Anystate\", \"country\": \"US\"}]",
    "birthdate": "[\"G02NSrQfjFXQ7Io09syajA\", \"1940-01-01\"]"
  }
}
```

4.2.3. Example 2 - SVC for a Structured SD-JWT

The SVC for Example 2 is as follows:

```
{
  "_sd": {
    "sub": "[\"eluV50g3gSNII8EYnsxA_A\", \"6c5c0a49-b589-431d-bae7-219122a9ec2c\"]",
    "given_name": "[\"6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA\", \"John\"]",
    "family_name": "[\"eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ\", \"Doe\"]",
    "email": "[\"Qg_064zqAxe412a108iroA\", \"johndoe@example.com\"]",
    "phone_number": "[\"AJx-095VPrpTtN4QM0qROA\", \"+1-202-555-0101\"]",
    "address": {
      "street_address": "[\"Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ\", \"123 Main St\"]",
      "locality": "[\"G02NSrQfjFXQ7Io09syajA\", \"Anytown\"]",
      "region": "[\"1klxF5jMY1GTPUovMNIvCA\", \"Anystate\"]",
      "country": "[\"nPuoQnkRFq3BIeAm7AnXFA\", \"US\"]"
    },
    "birthdate": "[\"5bPs1IquZNa0hkaFzzzZNw\", \"1940-01-01\"]"
  }
}
```

4.3. SD-JWT and SVC Combined Format

For transporting the SVC together with the SD-JWT from the issuer to the holder, the SVC is base64ur-encoded and appended to the SD-JWT using . as the separator. For Example 1, the combined format looks as follows:

eyJhbGciOiAiU1MyNTYifQ.eyJpc3MiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc3N1ZXI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.rJmWAVghpour5wvdqw8xwdpSEEDMwGJKX1UZ-4mLxYUFv2qCJJ
gQrwtXNccxHpR86F3_51zT9v2TffwZcuU3q4xi-YdyUrVtB6PHHo8F11qanGtnhxqAcFMM
XXQRb7iO_P2Vr7j0Ad8yMcxLituyVLxwjJ0T1s3X-PTomH_zb2wsNsSgrltpjNdoVDHE9k
K8u0Wmvx8VMXlaxks74gwJFQoBpnySrlo6PDy2V8zGnj7qc93Qo2Ei0lrLYua2jMZJQlRE
ZEp1mI25WYGuz4lJMMjq_SsysLr_r1qGCK1YU12yVz9-xtgL7zVz7KEUY-8TjQEsr_UTbg
vcSUDyd3Smgg.ewogICAgIl9zZCI6IHsKICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIC
1NOSUk4RVluc3hBX0FcIiwgXCI2YzVjMGE0S1iNTg5LTQzMWQtYmFlNy0yMTkxMjJhOWV
jMmNcIl0iLAogICAgICAgICJnaXZlbn9uYW1lIjogIlRlcjZJaW90TS1hNWlWUEdib1M1d
G12VkfciIiwgXCJkb2huXCJdIiwKICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAg
tOVFuS1BwTlBlTmVuSGRoUVwiLCBcIkRvZVwiXSIsCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAg
lFnX082NHpxQXhlNDEyYU0Glyb0FcIiwgXCI2YzVjMGE0S1iNTg5LTQzMWQtYmFlNy0yMTkxMjJhOWV
KICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAg
iwgXCiRMS0yMDItNTU1LTAxMDFcIl0iLAogICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIC
KTTJMY2hjV9sSGdnd191ZlFciIiwge1wic3RyZWV0X2FkZlJlc3NcIjogXCiXmMgTWFpb
iBTdFwiLCBcImxvY2FsaXR5XCI6IFwiQW55dG93blwiLCBcInJlZ2lvdWl0iBcIkFueXN
0YXRlXCIsIFwiY291bnRyeVwiOiBcIlVTXCJ9XSIsCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAg
CjBxcJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFEE3SW8wOXN5YwpBXCIsIFwiMTk0MC0wMS0wMVwiXSIKICAgIH0
KfQ

(Line breaks for presentation only.)

4.4. SD-JWT-R Format

The following shows the contents of an SD-JWT-R for Example 1:

```
{
  "nonce": "2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w",
  "aud": "https://example.com/verifier",
  "_sd": {
    "given_name": "[\"6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA\", \"John\"]",
    "family_name": "[\"eI8Zwm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ\", \"Doe\"]",
    "address": "[\"Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ\", {\"street_address\": \"123 Main St\", \"locality\"}]"
  }
}
```

For each claim, an array of the salt and the claim value is contained in the `_sd` object.

Again, the SD-JWT-R follows the same structure as the `_sd` in the SD-JWT. For Example 2, a SD-JWT-R limiting address to region and country only could look as follows:

```
{
  "nonce": "2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w",
  "aud": "https://example.com/verifier",
  "_sd": {
    "given_name": "[\"6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA\", \"John\"]",
    "family_name": "[\"eI8Zwm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ\", \"Doe\"]",
    "birthdate": "[\"5bPs1IquZNa0hkaFzzzZNw\", \"1940-01-01\"]",
    "address": {
      "region": "[\"1klxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA\", \"Anystate\"]",
      "country": "[\"nPuoQnkRFq3BIeAm7AnXFA\", \"US\"]"
    }
  }
}
```

The SD-JWT-R MAY contain further claims, for example, to ensure a binding to a concrete transaction (in the example the nonce and aud claims).

If holder binding is desired, the SD-JWT-R is signed by the holder. If no holder binding is to be used, the none algorithm is used, i.e., the document is not signed.

In any case, the result is encoded as described in [\[RFC7519\]](#) (here for Example 1):

eyJhbGciOiAiU1MyNTYifQ.eyJub25jZSI6ICIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STj13IiwgImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL3Zlcm1maWVyIiwgIl9zZCI6IHsiZ212ZW5fbmFtZSI6ICJbXCI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBH9m9TNXRtdlZBXCI6IFwiSm9oblwiXSIsICJmYW1pbHlfbmFtZSI6ICJbXCI1SThaV205UW5LUHB0UGV0ZW5IZGhRXCIsIFwiRG9lXCJdIiwgImFkZHI3Mi0iAiW1wiUGMzM0pNMkxjaGNVX2xIZ2d2X3VmUVwiLCB7XCJzdHJlZXRfYWRkcmVzc1wiOiBcIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0XCIsIFwibG9jYWxpdiHlcIjogXCJBbnl0b3duXCIsIFwicmVnaW9uXCI6IFwiQW55c3RhdGVcIiwgXCJjb3VudHJ5XCI6IFwiVVNcIn1dIn19.b0hg3v71rzHvtoDTdroZ9m-1t9tf8nobFKb2YGiyG0jIk1fcKc2KWj72oi_tBKc0CqZhdX6IV4BRXIw-aspQfLh-xBrNLuGqiC-Y3rZBB1Ww0Wwnbbtsy1tj8yZ0iXBr8v06mCgZGA d4MgPYPd-QzOr9uk0bYDRB4I24xHrq1AEYPJIZSw9MI_dEmIkNnAuIfLQKiuyTqVVVp6Ly pBIz6fBLm6NOLC4-uVXl0zI91iT4z1krhP0-vj8TmfB-XL9aD3-xqytlBHTESct490SRZ FrwkLUKTM56_6KW3pG7Ucuv8VnpHXHIka0SGRa0h8x6v5-rcQJl_IbM8wb7CSHvQ

(Line breaks for presentation only.)

4.5. Presentation Format

The SD-JWT and the SD-JWT-R can be combined into one document using . as a separator (here for Example 1):

eyJhbGciOiAiU1MyNTYifQ.eyJpc3MiOiAiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc3N1ZXI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.rJmWAVghpour5wvdqw8xwdpSEEDMwGJKX1UZ-4mLxYUFv2qCJJ
gQrwtXNccxHpR86F3_51zT9v2TffwZcuU3q4xi-YdyUrVtB6PHHo8F11qanGtnhxqAcFMM
XXQRb7iO_P2Vr7j0Ad8yMcxLituyVLxwjJ0T1s3X-PTomH_zb2wsNsSgrltpjNdoVDHE9k
K8u0Wmvx8VMXlaxks74gwJFQoBpnySrlo6PDy2V8zGnj7qc93Qo2Ei0lrLYua2jMZJQlRE
ZEp1mI25WYGuz4lJMMjq_SsysLr_r1qGCK1YU12yVz9-xtgL7zVz7KEUY-8TjQEsr_UTbg
vcSUDyd3Smgg.eyJhbGciOiAiU1MyNTYifQ.eyJub25jZSI6ICIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2
ZyeU5STj13IiwgImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwcovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL3Zlcm1maWVyIiwgIl9z
ZCI6IHsia2Zl2ZW5fbmFtZSI6ICJbXCJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRXCI6IFwiSm
9oblwiXSI6ICJmYw1pbHlfbmFtZSI6ICJbXCJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRXCI6IFwiRG9lXCJdIiwgImFkZjHjlc3MiOiAiW1wiUGMzM0pNMkxjaGNVX2xIZ2d2X3VmUVwiLC
B7XCJzdHJlZXRFYWRkcmVzc1wiOiBcIjEyMyBNYwluIFN0XCIsIFwibG9jYWxpdlhCIjog
XCJBbnl0b3duXCIsIFwicmVnaW9uXCI6IFwiQW55c3RhdGVcIiwgXCJjb3VudHJ5XCi6IF
wiVWNCIn1dIn19.b0hG3v71rzHvtoDTdroZ9m-lt9tf8nobFKb2YGiyG0jIklfcKc2KWj7
2oi_tBKc0CqZhdX6IV4BRXIw-aspQfLh-xBrNLuGqiC-Y3rZBB1Ww0Wwnbbsy1tj8yZ0i
XBr8v06mCgZGAd4MgPYPd-Qz0r9uk0bYDRB4I24xHrqlAEYPJIzSw9MI_dEmIkNnAuIfLQ
KiuyTqVVVp6LypBiZ6fBLm6N0LC4-uVXl0zI91i1T4zlkhrhP0-vj8TmfB-XL9aD3-xqytvL
BHTESct490SRZFrwkLUKTM56_6KW3pG7Ucuv8VnpHXHIka0SGRa0h8x6v5-rCQJl_IbM8w
b7CSHvQ

(Line breaks for presentation only.)

5. Verification

Verifiers MUST follow [[RFC8725](#)] for checking the SD-JWT and, if signed, the SD-JWT Release.

Verifiers MUST go through (at least) the following steps before trusting/using any of the contents of an SD-JWT:

1. Determine if holder binding is to be checked for the SD-JWT. Refer to [Section 6.1](#) for details.

2. Check that the presentation consists of six .-separated elements; if holder binding is not required, the last element can be empty.
3. Separate the SD-JWT from the SD-JWT Release.
4. Validate the SD-JWT:
 1. Ensure that a signing algorithm was used that was deemed secure for the application. Refer to [[RFC8725](#)], Sections 3.1 and 3.2 for details.
 2. Validate the signature over the SD-JWT.
 3. Validate the issuer of the SD-JWT and that the signing key belongs to this issuer.
 4. Check that the SD-JWT is valid using nbf, iat, and exp claims, if provided in the SD-JWT.
 5. Check that the claim _sd is present in the SD-JWT.
5. Validate the SD-JWT Release:
 1. If holder binding is required, validate the signature over the SD-JWT using the same steps as for the SD-JWT plus the following steps:
 1. Determine that the public key for the private key that used to sign the SD-JWT-R is bound to the SD-JWT, i.e., the SD-JWT either contains a reference to the public key or contains the public key itself.
 2. Determine that the SD-JWT-R is bound to the current transaction and was created for this verifier (replay protection). This is usually achieved by a nonce and aud field within the SD-JWT Release.
 2. For each claim in the SD-JWT Release:
 1. Ensure that the claim is present as well in _sd in the SD-JWT. If _sd is structured, the claim MUST be present at the same place within the structure.
 2. Check that the base64url-encoded hash of the claim value in the SD-JWT-R (which includes the salt and the actual claim value) matches the hash provided in the SD-JWT.

3. Ensure that the claim value in the SD-JWT-R is a JSON-encoded array of exactly two values.

4. Store the second of the two values.

3. Once all necessary claims have been verified, their values can be validated and used according to the requirements of the application. It MUST be ensured that all claims required for the application have been released.

If any step fails, the input is not valid and processing MUST be aborted.

6. Security Considerations

For the security of this scheme, the following properties are required of the hash function:

*Given a claim value, a salt, and the resulting hash, it is hard to find a second salt value so that `HASH(salt | claim_value)` equals the hash.

Add: The Salts must be random/long enough so that the attacker cannot brute force them.

Note: No need for the wallet-generated hashes? to prevent issuer-verifier collusion

6.1. Holder Binding

7. Privacy Considerations

7.1. Claim Names

Claim names are not hashed in the SD-JWT and are used as keys in a key-value pair, where the value is the hash. This is because SD-JWT already reveals information about the issuer and the schema, and revealing the claim names does not provide any additional information.

7.2. Unlinkability

It is also important to note that this format enables selective disclosure of claims, but in itself it does not achieve unlinkability of the subject of a JWS document.

8. Acknowledgements

We would like to thank ...

9. IANA Considerations

TBD

10. Normative References

- [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>>.
- [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 2015, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>>.
- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>>.
- [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>>.

11. Informative References

- [RFC8725] Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best Current Practices", BCP 225, RFC 8725, DOI 10.17487/RFC8725, February 2020, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8725>>.
- [OIDC] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 1", 8 November 2014, <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.

Appendix A. Additional Examples

A.1. Example 3 - Complex Structured SD-JWT

In this example, a complex object such as those used for ekyc (todo reference) is used.

These claims are the payload of the SD-JWT:

```
{
  "verified_claims": {
    "verification": {
      "trust_framework": "de_aml",
      "time": "2012-04-23T18:25Z",
      "verification_process": "f24c6f-6d3f-4ec5-973e-b0d8506f3bc7",
      "evidence": [
        {
          "type": "document",
          "method": "pipp",
          "time": "2012-04-22T11:30Z",
          "document": {
            "type": "idcard",
            "issuer": {
              "name": "Stadt Augsburg",
              "country": "DE"
            },
            "number": "53554554",
            "date_of_issuance": "2010-03-23",
            "date_of_expiry": "2020-03-22"
          }
        }
      ]
    },
    "claims": {
      "given_name": "Max",
      "family_name": "Meier",
      "birthdate": "1956-01-28",
      "place_of_birth": {
        "country": "DE",
        "locality": "Musterstadt"
      },
      "nationalities": [
        "DE"
      ],
      "address": {
        "locality": "Maxstadt",
        "postal_code": "12344",
        "country": "DE",
        "street_address": "An der Weide 22"
      }
    }
  },
  "birth_middle_name": "Timotheus",
  "salutation": "Dr.",
  "msisdn": "49123456789"
}
```

The following shows the resulting SD-JWT payload:

```
{
  "iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
  "sub_jwk": {
    "kty": "RSA",
    "n": "wlcpcuJjcdshL2NqMsT2HMJiqyPFEPQZ2FMXKD_r3an-09_k-cdoJifVodKUZ8QBiU6w_JUYh3lScrJ-TSE",
    "e": "AQAB"
  },
  "iat": 1516239022,
  "exp": 1516247022,
  "_sd": {
    "verified_claims": {
      "verification": {
        "trust_framework": "UI-SRn1QFy-YEFE46yyHKqc64jmM65q8ma9cq2V_erY",
        "time": "jI-FYlteydXzsJrIRXBZs9foBSNF10d1Q-4XnuqpgjI",
        "verification_process": "F979I7b5ZhADtyYmLYxctdc9-Ia1D_Td0HpfcFBzVXs",
        "evidence": [
          {
            "type": "i2w3mrKAQV2nhTa5c2koZ-aQTBD0SaVfvYk7aLQianc",
            "method": "fEQ0tVPD67Gf030h_SRs8ZPbnZ_vwEt5S8lU0R77va0",
            "time": "9jueDP5r0gTB64DqdCZbek3yaS5AJJnW8FEkwtPTa0k",
            "document": {
              "type": "K-rZQk89w89YBhjUNUho07suLxhG8S12JTPAcoAJB34",
              "issuer": {
                "name": "BkCULCU-txVGvzNqnWe5DxefFvJE8LMib8GV3I3W090",
                "country": "DSyF5TtmYgLk92u4GkDQzSdFbvIbw5rkFjzSsJJsyw4"
              },
              "number": "epH30uU51TBel0E4PX6ueHwr1ZtoUjzG-7pZjIASxg8",
              "date_of_issuance": "cVvqTueVq60Wz-dJj2cdo19A0Ajj859eGDzDfwPYyN4",
              "date_of_expiry": "nxJBndtwvb2TKKJNGvF6_1ywEdKrotj66C88WPomLfo"
            }
          }
        ]
      },
      "claims": {
        "given_name": "y9uFPHAVqNAZ7PJyk1-1yQJZZWZzKGP5FLt9txKM84M",
        "family_name": "XyUikY8V8MWeBfXU0p8gI7F7-yC28Jr5IyDgvBxXzd4",
        "birthdate": "7GlieMLJhM78C_uQQp9wUXSZLeqBN1YGQT87BIubyKU",
        "place_of_birth": {
          "country": "RN3xcnLYX_GDhVwfPvtisuLPfi0d74zqihFbQrd_UG0",
          "locality": "iNkpWqJ9kIZQq95dzSyEZjbPJs6Fqu7GFBKouEC30xE"
        },
        "nationalities": "-tinYGK0GXnkfARxiNIWq0VnzNRl-Kv3KY3m5g5Femg",
        "address": "63EzPV0yvTpe0gV34yCwweCv0-2wxts2Wqbja_SuwPQ"
      }
    },
    "birth_middle_name": "vM68I6XnrVlyt1LxK9xxgFycsjtw2vLdGpNgk3E8QQ4",
    "salutation": "iThfCu2uLloe5i6gCEq--Y6R-gxHhtIukXb9qnfjH5k",
    "msisdn": "xUpU-azBYdXeJidc8Yw5MXtfPz4_4kArJhflXcxzkzs"
  }
}
```

```
}  
}
```

The SD-JWT is then signed by the issuer to create a document like the following:

[illegible]

[illegible]

(Line breaks for presentation only.)

A SD-JWT-R for some of the claims:

```
{
  "nonce": "2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w",
  "aud": "https://example.com/verifier",
  "_sd": {
    "verified_claims": {
      "verification": {
        "trust_framework": "[\"eluV50g3gSNII8EYnsxA_A\", \"de_aml\"]",
        "time": "[\"6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA\", \"2012-04-23T18:25Z\"]",
        "evidence": [
          {
            "type": "[\"Qg_064zqAxe412a108iroA\", \"document\"]"
          }
        ]
      },
      "claims": {
        "given_name": "[\"HbQ4X8srVW3QDxnIJdqy0A\", \"Max\"]",
        "family_name": "[\"C9GSoujviJquEgYfojCb1A\", \"Meier\"]",
        "birthdate": "[\"kx5kF17V-x0JmwUx9vgvtw\", \"1956-01-28\"]",
        "place_of_birth": {
          "country": "[\"H3o1uswP760Fi2yeGdVCEQ\", \"DE\"]"
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
```

A.2. Example 4 - W3C VC

```
{
  "sub": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
  "jti": "http://example.edu/credentials/3732",
  "iss": "https://example.com/keys/foo.jwk",
  "nbf": 1541493724,
  "iat": 1541493724,
  "exp": 1573029723,
  "nonce": "660!6345FSer",
  "vc": {
    "@context": [
      "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1",
      "https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/examples/v1"
    ],
    "type": [
      "VerifiableCredential",
      "UniversityDegreeCredential"
    ]
  },
  "_sd": {
    "given_name": "Lbnhk0r5oS7KjeUrxezAu8TG0CpWz0jSixy6tffuo04",
    "family_name": "9h5vgv6TpFV6GmnPtugiMLl5tHetHeb5X_2cKHjN7cw",
    "birthdate": "fPZ92dtYMCN2Nb-2ac_zSH19p4yakUXrZl_-wSgaazA"
  }
}
```

Appendix B. Document History

[[To be removed from the final specification]]

-00

*Renamed to SD-JWT (focus on JWT instead of JWS since signature is optional)

*Make holder binding optional

*Rename proof to release, since when there is no signature, the term "proof" can be misleading

*Improved the structure of the description

*Described verification steps

*All examples generated from python demo implementation

*Examples for structured objects

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