Abstract

This obsoletes RFC4777 with an enhanced Automatic Sign-On PBKDF2 with HMAC SHA-512 password hash available with systems running with V7R5M0 or later and configured to use Password Level (QPWDLVL) 4 or higher for the user profile passwords Section 5.3.

Require use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) to secure the telnet session between the Telnet server and client Section 13.

Add Telnet Device Negotiation Termination Section 10.5 documenting how telnet clients that do not follow 5250 negotiation are handled.


Enhancement to add Multi Factor Authentication to automatic sign-on

Changes since -00 Draft

*Update abstract for PBKDF2 with HMAC SHA-512 password hash

*Document use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) in Security Considerations Section 13

Changes since -01 Draft

*TLS handshake must complete before invite for terminal type is sent in Section 2

*Change using TLS from RECOMENDED to REQUIRED to be ccompliant with this draft Section 13

*Change disabling port 23 from RECOMENDED to REQUIRED Section 13

*Detail use and related DCM configuration for TLS Section 13
*Add IANA Considerations use of port 992 for Telnet using TLS/SSL (service telnet-ssl) to Section 14

*Include "application definition" and "Digital Certificate Manager (DCM)" to Section 1.1

*Update abstract for Authentication factor in Section 5

*Update Response Codes for Authentication factor in Section 10.4

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

The IBM i Telnet server enables clients to negotiate both terminal and printer device names through Telnet Environment Options Negotiations [RFC1572].

This allows Telnet servers and clients to exchange environment information using a set of standard or custom variables. By using a combination of both standard VARs and custom USERVARs, the IBM i Telnet server allows client Telnet to request a pre-defined specific device by name.

If no pre-defined device exists, then the device will be created, with client Telnet having the option to negotiate device attributes, such as the code page, character set, keyboard type, etc.

Since printers can also be negotiated as a device name, terminal types have been defined to request printers. For example, you can negotiate "IBM-3812-1" and "IBM-5553-B01" as valid TERMINAL-TYPE options [RFC1091].
Finally, the IBM i Telnet server will allow exchange of user profile and password information, where the password may be in either plain text or hash form. If a valid combination of profile and password is received, then the client is allowed to bypass the sign-on panel. The local server setting of the QRMTSIGN system value must be either *VERIFY or *SAMEPRF for the bypass of the sign-on panel to succeed.

1.1. Terminology and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] and [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Application definition
The application definition encapsulates some System TLS attributes for the application. IBM i System TLS users know this application definition as an "Application ID."

Authentication factor
The Authentication factor is a generic term for a secondary Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) credential used to authenticate the user during an automatic sign-on. The secondary credential may be a Time-based one-time password (TOTP) [RFC6238] or some other credential used by the system.

Coded character set identifier (CCSID)
Coded character set identifier (CCSID) [CCSID] is a 16-bit number that includes a specific set of encoding scheme identifiers, character set identifiers, code page identifiers, and other information that uniquely identifies the coded graphic-character representation.

Digital Certificate Manager (DCM)
Digital Certificate Manager (DCM) manages an application database that contains application definitions on IBM i. Each application definition encapsulates certificate processing information for a specific application.

QPWDLVL
The Password Level (QPWDLVL) system value is an OS wide system configuration for the IBM i system that defines what characters are allowed and the maximum length for user profile passwords. This also determines how the system generates one-way password
hashes on the system that are used when authenticating all sign-on requests.

**QRMTSIGN**

The Remote Sign-On Control (QRMTSIGN) system value specifies how the system handles automatic sign-on requests.

2. **Standard Telnet Option Negotiation**

Telnet server option negotiation [RFC855] typically begins with the issuance, by the server, of an invitation to engage in terminal type negotiation with the Telnet client (DO TERMINAL-TYPE) [RFC1091].

When using Transport Layer Security (TLS) as described in Section 13, the handshake must complete successfully before the invitation to engage in terminal type negotiation is sent over the secured socket session.

The client and server then enter into a series of sub-negotiations to determine the level of terminal support that will be used. After the terminal type is agreed upon, the client and server will normally negotiate a required set of additional options (EOR [RFC885], BINARY [RFC856], SGA [RFC858]) that are required to support "transparent mode" or full screen 5250/3270 block mode support. As soon as the required options have been negotiated, the server will suspend further negotiations and begin with initializing the actual virtual device on the IBM i. A typical exchange might start as follows:
Some negotiations are symmetrical between client and server, and some are negotiated in one direction only. Also, it is permissible and common practice to bundle more than one response or request, or to combine a request with a response, so in practice the actual exchange may look different from what is shown above.

3. Enhanced Telnet Option Negotiation

In order to accommodate the environment option negotiations, the server will bundle an environment option invitation along with the standard terminal type invitation request to the client.

A client should either send a negative acknowledgment (WONT NEW-ENVIRON), or at some point after completing terminal-type negotiations, but before completing the full set of negotiations
required for 5250 transparent mode, engage in environment option sub-negotiation with the server. A maximum of 1024 bytes of environment strings may be sent to the server. A recommended sequence might look like the following:

IBM i Telnet server  Enhanced Telnet client
--------------------------  -------------------------
IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON          
IAC DO TERMINAL-TYPE --> (2 requests bundled)
IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND     ---> IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON
VAR IAC SE  
--> IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS
    VAR "USER" VALUE "JONES"
    USERVAR "DEVNAME"
    VALUE "MYDEVICE07"
  ---> IAC SE
  ---> IAC WILL TERMINAL-TYPE
    (do the terminal type sequence first)
IAC SB TERMINAL-TYPE SEND 
IAC SE  
--> IAC SB TERMINAL-TYPE IS
  ---> IBM-5555-C01 IAC SE  
    (terminal type negotiations completed)
IAC DO EOR  --> (server will continue with normal transparent mode negotiations)
  ---> IAC WILL EOR
  .
  .
  (other negotiations)

Actual bytes transmitted in the above example are shown in hex below.
Telnet environment options defines 6 standard VARs: USER, JOB, ACCT, PRINTER, SYSTEMTYPE, and DISPLAY. The USER standard VAR will hold the value of the IBM i user profile name to be used in Automatic Sign-On requests. The Telnet server will make no direct use of the additional 5 VARs, nor are any of them required to be sent. All standard VARs and their values that are received by the Telnet server will be placed in a buffer, along with any USERVARs received (described below), and made available to a registered initialization exit program to be used for any purpose desired.

There are some reasons you may want to send NEW-ENVIRON negotiations prior to TERMINAL-TYPE negotiations. With an IBM i Telnet server, several virtual device modes can be negotiated: 1) VTxxx device, 2) 3270 device, and 3) 5250 device. The virtual device mode selected depends on the TERMINAL-TYPE negotiated plus any other Telnet option negotiations necessary to support those modes. The IBM i Telnet server will create the desired virtual device at the first opportunity it thinks it has all the requested attributes needed to create the device. This can be as early as completion of the TERMINAL-TYPE negotiations.
For the case of Transparent mode (5250 device), the moment TERMINAL-TYPE, BINARY, and EOR options are negotiated, the Telnet server will go create the virtual device. Receiving any NEW-ENVIRON negotiations after these option negotiations are complete will result in the NEW-ENVIRON negotiations having no effect on device attributes, as the virtual device will have already been created.

So, for Transparent mode, NEW-ENVIRON negotiations are effectively closed once EOR is negotiated, since EOR is generally the last option done.

For other devices modes (such as VTxxx or 3270), you cannot be sure when the IBM i Telnet server thinks it has all the attributes to create the device. Recall that NEW-ENVIRON negotiations are optional, and therefore the IBM i Telnet server need not wait for any NEW-ENVIRON options prior to creating the virtual device. It is in the clients’ best interest to send NEW-ENVIRON negotiations as soon as possible, preferably before TERMINAL-TYPE is negotiated. That way, the client can be sure that the requested attributes were received before the virtual device is created.

4. Enhanced Display Emulation Support

Telnet environment option USERVARs have been defined to allow a compliant Telnet client more control over the Telnet server virtual device on the IBM i and to provide information to the Telnet server about the client. These USERVARs allow the client Telnet to create or select a previously created virtual device. If the virtual device does not exist and must be created, then the USERVAR variables are used to create and initialize the device attributes. If the virtual device already exists, the device attributes are modified.

The USERVARs defined to accomplish this are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USERVAR</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>EXAMPLE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEVNAME</td>
<td>us-ascii char(x)</td>
<td>MYDEVICE07</td>
<td>Display device name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBDTYPE</td>
<td>us-ascii char(3)</td>
<td>USB</td>
<td>Keyboard type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODEPAGE</td>
<td>us-ascii char(y)</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>Code page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARSET</td>
<td>us-ascii char(y)</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>Character set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMSENDCONFREC</td>
<td>us-ascii char(3)</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Record desired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMASSOCPRT</td>
<td>us-ascii char(x)</td>
<td>RFCPRT</td>
<td>Printer associated with display</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>device</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

x - up to a maximum of 10 characters
y - up to a maximum of 5 characters
For a description of the KBDTYPE, CODEPAGE, and CHARSET parameters and their permissible values, refer to Chapter 8 in the Communications Configuration Reference [COMM-CONFIG] and also to National language keyboard types and SBCS code pages [NLS-SUPPORT].

The CODEPAGE and CHARSET USERVARs must be associated with a KBDTYPE USERVAR. If either CODEPAGE or CHARSET are sent without KBDTYPE, they will default to system values. A default value for KBDTYPE can be sent to force CODEPAGE and CHARSET values to be used.

IBM i system objects such as device names, user profiles, programs, libraries, etc., are required to be specified in English uppercase. This includes:

any letter (A-Z), any number (0-9), special characters (# $ _ @)

Therefore, where us-ascii is specified for VAR or USERVAR values, it is recommended that uppercase ASCII values be sent, which will be converted to Extended Binary Coded Decimal Interchange Code (EBCDIC) by the Telnet server.

A special case occurs for password hashes (described in the next section), where both the initial password and user profile used to build the password hash must be EBCDIC English uppercase, in order to be properly authenticated by the Telnet server.

The IBMASSOCPRRT USERVAR is used to provide the device name of a printer that will be associated with the display device that is created. The device description of the printer name provided must currently exist on the Telnet server system. The IBMSENDCONFREC USERVAR is used by the enhanced Telnet client to inform the Telnet server that a display Startup Response Record should be sent to the client. This record communicates the name of the actual display device acquired. If the attempt is unsuccessful, the reason code will be set to provide additional information on why the attempt failed. In addition to the device name and reason code, the Startup Response Record will contain the name of the Telnet server system.

For more details on the Startup Response Record, see Section 11 of this document.

5. Enhanced Display Automatic Sign-On and Password Hash

To allow password hashes, IBMRSEED and IBMSUBSPW USERVARs will be used to exchange seed and substitute passwords information. IBMRSEED will carry a random seed to be used for the Data Encryption Standard (DES), Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) and Password-based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) [RFC8018] with Hashed Message Authentication Mode (HMAC) Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-512) password hash. IBMSUBSPW will carry the password hash.
The DES algorithm uses the same 7-step DES-based password substitution scheme as APPC and Access Client Solutions (ACS). For a description of DES, refer to Federal Information Processing Standards Publications (FIPS) 46-2 [FIPS-46-2] and 81 [FIPS-81].

The SHA hash is described in Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4 [FIPS-180-4].

The SHA-512 hash is described in Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 [FIPS-140-2].


The FIPS documents can be found at the Federal Information Processing Standards Publications link: https://www.nist.gov/itl/publications-0/federal-information-processing-standards-fips

If password hash exchange is not required, plain text password exchange is permitted using the same USERVARs defined for hash. For this case, the random client seed should be set either to an empty value (preferred method) or to hexadecimal zeros to indicate the password is not hashd, but is plain text.

It should be noted that security of plain text password exchange cannot be guaranteed unless the network is physically protected, a trusted network (such as an intranet) or if Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC8446] is configured for the Telnet server and used by the Telnet client Section 13.

Additional VARs and USERVARs have also been defined to allow an Automatic Sign-On user greater control over their startup environment, similar to what is supported using the Open Virtual Terminal (QTVOPNVT) API [VTAPI].

The standard VARs supported to accomplish this are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VAR</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>EXAMPLE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USER</td>
<td>us-ascii char(x)</td>
<td>USERXYZ</td>
<td>User profile name</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

x - up to a maximum of 10 characters

The custom USERVARs defined to accomplish this are:
In order to communicate the server random seed value to the client, the server will request a USERVAR name made up of a fixed part (the 8 characters "IBMRSEED") immediately followed by an 8-byte hexadecimal variable part, which is the server random seed. The client generates its own 8-byte random seed value and uses both seeds to hash the password. Both the password hash and the client random seed value are then sent to the server for authentication. Telnet environment option rules will need to be adhered to when transmitting the client random seed and substituted password values to the server. Specifically, since a typical environment string is a variable length hexadecimal field, the hexadecimal fields are required to be escaped and/or byte stuffed according to the [RFC854], where any single byte could be misconstrued as a Telnet IAC or other Telnet option negotiation control character. The client must escape and/or byte stuff any bytes that could be seen as a Telnet environment option, specifically VAR, VALUE, ESC, and USERVAR.

If you use the IBMSENDCALLUSERVAR, as described in Section 4 of this document, with a value of YES along with the Automatic Sign-On USERVARs described above, you will receive a Startup Response Record that will contain a response code informing your Telnet client of the success or failure of the Automatic Sign-On attempt. See Section 10 of this document for details on the Startup Response Record.

IBMAF is an optional additional authentication factor used to automatically sign-on if the system and user profile are configured to require an additional credential. This may be a Time-based one-time password (TOTP) [RFC6238] or another credential type. The contents if IBMAF are tagged by the IBMAFCCCSID value that defines

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USERVAR</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>EXAMPLE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBMRSEED</td>
<td>binary(8)</td>
<td>8-byte hex field</td>
<td>Random client seed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMSUBSPW</td>
<td>binary(y)</td>
<td>hex field</td>
<td>Substitute password hash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMCURLIB</td>
<td>us-ascii char(x)</td>
<td>QGPL</td>
<td>Current library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMIMENU</td>
<td>us-ascii char(x)</td>
<td>MAIN</td>
<td>Initial menu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMPROGRAM</td>
<td>us-ascii char(x)</td>
<td>QCMD</td>
<td>Program to call</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMAFCCCSID</td>
<td>us-ascii char(w)</td>
<td>1208</td>
<td>Authentication factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMAF</td>
<td>binary(z)</td>
<td>hex field</td>
<td>Authentication factor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

w - up to a maximum of 5 characters
x - up to a maximum of 10 characters
y - up to a maximum of 128 bytes
z - up to a maximum of 256 bytes
the CCSID of the IBMAF value. The IBMAF value should not exceed 64 characters using the IBMAFCCSID

The following illustrates the password hash case:

IBM i Telnet server               Enhanced Telnet client
-----------------------------------------------
IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON    -->     IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON
IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND
USERVAR "IBMRSEEDxxxxxxxx"
USERVAR "IBMSUBSPW"
VAR USERVAR IAC SE -->
   IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS
   VAR "USER" VALUE "DUMMYUSR"
   USERVAR "IBMRSEED" VALUE "yyyyyyyy"
   USERVAR "IBMSUBSPW" VALUE "zzzzzzzz"
   <- IAC SE
 ..
 ..
(other negotiations)
.

In this example, "xxxxxxxx" is an 8-byte hexadecimal random server seed, "yyyyyyyy" is an 8-byte hexadecimal random client seed, and "zzzzzzzz" is an 8-byte hexadecimal hashed password (if the DES algorithm was used), a 20-byte hexadecimal hashed password (if the SHA-1 algorithm was used) or a 64-byte hexadecimal hashed password (if the PBKDF2 with HMAC SHA-512 hash algorithm was used). If the password is not valid, then the sign-on panel is not bypassed. If the password is expired, then the sign-on panel is not bypassed.

Actual bytes transmitted in the above example are shown in hex below, where the server seed is "7D3E488F18080404", the client seed is "4E4142334E414233", and the DES hashed password is "DFB0402F22ABA3BA". The user profile used to generate the hashed password is "44554D4D59555352" (DUMMYUSR), with a plain text password of "44554D4D595057" (DUMMYPW).
In this example, "xxxxxxxx" is an 8-byte hexadecimal random server seed, and "yyyyyyyyyy" is a 128-byte us-ascii client plain text password. If the password has expired, then the sign-on panel is not bypassed.

Actual bytes transmitted in the above example are shown in hex below, where the server seed is "7D3E488F18080404", the client seed is empty, and the plain text password is "44554D4D595057" (DUMMYPW). The user profile used is "44554D4D59555352" (DUMMYUSR).
5.1. Data Encryption Standard (DES) Password Algorithm

Both APPC and Access Client Solutions (ACS) use well-known DES algorithms to create the password hash. An enhanced Telnet Client can generate compatible password hashes if it follows these steps, details of which can be found in the Federal Information Processing Standards 46-2 [FIPS-46-2].

1. The user's password must be left justified in an 8-byte variable and padded to the right with '40'X up to an 8-byte length. If the user's password is 8 bytes in length, no padding will occur. For computing password substitutes for passwords of length 9 and 10, see "Handling passwords of length 9 and 10" below. Passwords less than 1 byte or greater than 10 bytes in length are not valid. Please note that if password is not in EBCDIC, it must be converted to EBCDIC uppercase.

\[
Padded\_PW = \text{Left justified user password padded to the right with '40'X to 8 bytes.}
\]

2. The padded password is Exclusive OR'ed with 8 bytes of '55'X.

\[
XOR\_PW = Padded\_PW \text{ xor '5555555555555555'}X
\]

3. The entire 8-byte result is shifted 1 bit to the left; the left-most bit value is discarded, and the rightmost bit value is cleared to 0.

\[
\text{SHIFT\_RESULT} = \text{XOR\_PW} \ll 1
\]

4. Encrypt user identifier
This shifted result is used as key to the Data Encryption Standard (Federal Information Processing Standards 46-2 [FIPS-46-2]) to encipher the user identifier. When the user identifier is less than 8 bytes, it is left justified in an 8-byte variable and padded to the right with '40'X. When the user identifier is 9 or 10 bytes, it is first padded to the right with '40'X to a length of 10 bytes. Then bytes 9 and 10 are "folded" into bytes 1-8 using the following algorithm:

Bit 0 is the high-order bit (i.e., has value of '80'X).

Byte 1, bits 0 and 1 are replaced with byte 1, bits 0 and 1
Exclusive OR'ed with byte 9, bits 0 and 1.
Byte 2, bits 0 and 1 are replaced with byte 2, bits 0 and 1
Exclusive OR'ed with byte 9, bits 2 and 3.
Byte 3, bits 0 and 1 are replaced with byte 3, bits 0 and 1
Exclusive OR'ed with byte 9, bits 4 and 5.
Byte 4, bits 0 and 1 are replaced with byte 4, bits 0 and 1
Exclusive OR'ed with byte 9, bits 6 and 7.
Byte 5, bits 0 and 1 are replaced with byte 5, bits 0 and 1
Exclusive OR'ed with byte 10, bits 0 and 1.
Byte 6, bits 0 and 1 are replaced with byte 6, bits 0 and 1
Exclusive OR'ed with byte 10, bits 2 and 3.
Byte 7, bits 0 and 1 are replaced with byte 7, bits 0 and 1
Exclusive OR'ed with byte 10, bits 4 and 5.
Byte 8, bits 0 and 1 are replaced with byte 8, bits 0 and 1
Exclusive OR'ed with byte 10, bits 6 and 7.

User identifiers greater than 10 bytes or less than 1 byte are not the result of this encryption ID, known as PW_TOKEN in the paper.

5. Increment PWSEQs and store it.

Each LU must maintain a pair of sequence numbers for ATTACHs sent and received on each session. Each time an ATTACH is generated, (and password substitutes are in use on the session) the sending sequence number, PWSEQs, is incremented and saved for the next time. Both values are set to zero at BIND time. So the first use of PWSEQs has the value of 1 and increases by one with each use. A new field is added to the ATTACH to carry this sequence number. However, in certain error conditions, it is possible for the sending side to increment the sequence number, and the receiver may not increment it. When the sender sends a subsequent ATTACH, the receiver will detect a missing sequence.
This is allowed. However the sequence number received must always be larger than the previous one, even if some are missing.

The maximum number of consecutive missing sequence numbers allowed is 16. If this is exceeded, the session is unbound with a protocol violation.

Note: The sequence number must be incremented for every ATTACH sent. However, the sequence number field is only required to be included in the FMH5 if a password substitute is sent (byte 4, bit 3 on).

6. Get modified random value:

\[
RDrSEQ = RDr + PWSEQs \quad /* \text{RDr is server seed.} */
\]

The current value of PWSEQs is added to RDr, the random value received from the partner LU on this session, yielding RDrSEQ, essentially a predictably modified value of the random value received from the partner LU at BIND time.

7. Generate DES value

\[
\begin{align*}
PW\_SUB &= \text{DES\_CBC\_mode}(PW\_TOKEN, \quad/* \text{key} */ \\
& \quad (RDrSEQ, \quad /* 8 \text{ bytes} */ \\
& \quad RDs, \quad /* 8 \text{ bytes} */ \\
& \quad ID \oplus \ RDrSEQ, \quad /* 16 \text{ bytes} */ \\
& \quad PWSEQs, \quad /* 8 \text{ bytes} */ \\
& \quad ) \quad /* \text{data} */
\end{align*}
\]

The PW\_TOKEN is used as a key to the DES function to generate an 8-byte value for the following string of inputs. The DES CBC mode Initialization Vector (IV) used is 8 bytes of '00'X.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{RDrSEQ:}
    \begin{itemize}
      \item the random data value received from the partner LU plus the sequence number.
    \end{itemize}
  \item \textbf{RDs:}
    \begin{itemize}
      \item the random data value sent to the partner LU on BIND for this session.
    \end{itemize}
  \item \textbf{A 16-byte value created by:}
    \begin{itemize}
      \item -padding the user identifier with '40'X to a length of 16 bytes.
      \item -Exclusive OR'ing the two 8-byte halves of the padded user identifier with the RDrSEQ value.
    \end{itemize}
\end{itemize}
Note: User ID must first be converted to EBCDIC uppercase.

**PWSEQs:**
the sequence number.

This is similar to the process used on LU-LU verification as described in the Enhanced LU-LU Bind Security. The resulting enciphered random data is the 'password substitute'.

8. Handling passwords of length 9 and 10
   a. Generate PW_TOKENa by using characters 1 to 8 of the password and steps 1-4 from the previous section.
   b. Generate PW_TOKENb by using characters 9 and 10 and steps 1-4 from the previous section. In this case, Padded_PW from step 1 will be characters 9 and 10 padded to the right with '40'X, for a total length of 8.
   c. PW_TOKEN = PW_TOKENa xor PW_TOKENb
   d. Now compute PW_SUB by performing steps 5-7 from the previous section.

9. Example DES Password Hash Calculation

   | ID:           | USER123 |
   | Password:     | ABCDEFG |
   | Server seed:  | '7D4C2319F28004B2'X |
   | Client seed:  | '08BEF662D851F4B1'X |
   | PWSEQs:       | 1       |

   (PWSEQs is a sequence number needed in the 7-step algorithm, and it is always one for Telnet)

   DES Encrypted Password should be: '5A58BD50E4DD9B5F'X

5.2. Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) Password Hash

An Enhanced Telnet Client can generate SHA-1 password hash if it follows these steps.

1. Convert the user identifier to uppercase UTF-16 (CCSID 13488) format (if it is not already in this format).

   The user identifier must be left justified in a 10-byte variable and padded to the right with spaces (' ') up to a 10-byte length prior to converting it to UTF-16. If the user's password is 10 bytes in length, no padding will occur. User identifiers of less than 1 byte or greater than 10 bytes in
length are not valid. The user identifier will be 20 bytes in length after conversion to UTF-16, so the variable that will hold the UTF-16 user identifier should have a length of 20 bytes.

2. Ensure the password is in UTF-16 (CCSID 13488) format (if it is not already in this format).

The user's password must be left justified in a 128-byte variable. It does not need to be padded to the right with spaces up to a 128-byte length. Passwords less than 1 byte or greater than 128 bytes in length are not valid. The password will be 2 times its original length after conversion to UTF-16, so the maximum length of the variable that will hold the UTF-16 password is 256 bytes.

3. Create a 20-byte password token as follows:

\[
PW\_token = \text{SHA-1}\left(\text{uppercase_utf16_userid}, \text{utf16_password}\right)
\]

The actual routine to be used to perform the SHA-1 processing is dependent on the programming language being used. For example, if using the Java language, then use the java.security class to perform the actual SHA-1 processing.

The PW_token will be used in subsequent step to actually generate the final password hash.

4. Increment PWSEQs and store it.

5. Create the 20-byte password hash as follows:

\[
PW\_SUB = \text{SHA-1}\left(PW\_token, \text{serverseed}, \text{clientseed}, \text{uppercase_utf16_userid}, \text{PWSEQ}\right)
\]

The actual routine to be used to perform the SHA-1 processing is dependent on the programming language being used. For example, if using the Java language, then use the java.security class to perform the actual SHA-1 processing.

6. Example SHA-1 Password Hash Calculation:
SHA Encrypted Password should be:

5.3. PBKDF2 with HMAC SHA-512 Password Hash

An Enhanced Telnet Client can generate a PBKDF2 with HMAC SHA-512 password hash if it follows these steps.

1. Convert the user identifier to uppercase UTF-16 (CCSID 13488) (if it is not already in this format).

The user identifier must be left justified in a 10-byte variable and padded to the right with spaces (' ') up to a 10-byte length prior to converting it to UTF-16 (CCSID 13488). If the user's password is 10 bytes in length, no padding will occur. User identifiers of less than 1 byte or greater than 10 bytes in length are not valid. The user identifier will be 20 bytes in length after conversion to UTF-16, so the variable that will hold the UTF-16 user identifier should have a length of 20 bytes.

2. Convert the password to UTF-16 (CCSID 13488) format (if it is not already in this format).

The user's password must be left justified in a 128-byte variable. It does not need to be padded to the right with spaces up to a 128-byte length. Passwords less than 1 byte or greater than 128 bytes in length are not valid. The password will be 2 times its original length after conversion to UTF-16, so the maximum length of the variable that will hold the UTF-16 password is 256 bytes.

3. Convert the UTF-16 password to UTF-8 (CCSID 1208) format. The UTF-8 password will encode using 1 to 512 bytes.

4. Generate the salt value:

   a. Fill a 28-byte variable with UTF-16 (CCSID 13488) blanks (0x0020).

   b. Copy the UTF-16 user ID value into the first 20 bytes of the 28-byte blank filled variable.

---

**Example:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID:</th>
<th>USER123</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Password:</td>
<td>AbCdEfGh123?+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Server seed:</td>
<td>'3E3A71C78795E5F5'X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client seed:</td>
<td>'B1C806D5D377D994'X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWSEQs:</td>
<td>1 (PWSEQs is a sequence number needed in the SHA-1 hash, and it is always one for Telnet)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHA Encrypted Password should be:

'E7FAB5F034BEDA42E91F439DD07532A24140E3DD'X
c. Copy the last 8 bytes (last 4 characters) of the UTF-16 password value into the last 8 bytes of the 28-byte variable. If the password is less than 4 characters, then copy the entire UTF-16 password value.

d. Calculate a SHA-256 hash on the 28-byte variable to produce the 32-byte salt value.

5. Create a 64-byte password token as follows:

\[
PW\_token = PBKDF2\ with\ HMAC\ SHA-512( \\
    Data = utf8\_password /* from 1 to 512 bytes from Step #3 */ \\
    Data Length = Length of UTF-8 password value \\
    Iterations = 10022 \\
    Initialization vector length = 32 \\
    Initialization vector (salt value) /* 32 bytes generated in Step #4 */
)\]

The actual routine to be used to perform the PBKDF2 with HMAC SHA-512 processing is dependent on the programming language being used. For example, if using the Java language, then use the java.security class to perform the actual PBKDF2 with HMAC SHA-512 processing.

The PW_token will be used in subsequent step to actually generate the final password hash.

6. Create the 64-byte password hash as follows:

\[
PW\_SUB = SHA-512(PW\_token, \\
    serverseed, /* 64 bytes */ \\
    clientseed, /* 8 bytes */ \\
    uppercase\_utf16\_userid, /* 20 bytes */ \\
    PWSEQ) /* 8 bytes */
]\]

The actual routine to be used to perform the SHA-512 processing is dependent on the programming language being used. For example, if using the Java language, then use the java.security class to perform the actual SHA-512 processing.

7. Example PBKDF2 with HMAC SHA-512 Password hash Calculation

An IBM i Telnet server specific USERVAR defined below will contain the complete Generic Security Services (GSS) token for use on the IBM i. Enhanced Telnet clients will need to obtain the Kerberos services ticket from a Key Distribution Center (KDC). Implementation steps for acquiring the Kerberos services ticket will be limited to the Microsoft Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI) example below. For information on Kerberos services tickets, refer to your Network Authentication Service (NAS) documentation.

The custom USERVAR defined is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USERVAR</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>EXAMPLE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBMTICKET</td>
<td>binary(16384)</td>
<td>16384-byte hex field Kerberos services token</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several other USERVARs, as defined in Section 4, can be used along with the IBMTICKET USERVAR to allow a user greater control over their startup environment.
The custom USERVARS defined to accomplish this are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USERVAR</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>EXAMPLE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBMCURLIB</td>
<td>us-ascii char(x)</td>
<td>QGPL</td>
<td>Current library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMIMENU</td>
<td>us-ascii char(x)</td>
<td>MAIN</td>
<td>Initial menu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMPROGRAM</td>
<td>us-ascii char(x)</td>
<td>QCMD</td>
<td>Program to call</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

x - up to a maximum of 10 characters

If you use the IBMSENDCONFREC USERVAR, as described in Section 4, with a value of YES along with the Kerberos ticket USERVARS described above, you will receive a Startup Response Record that will contain a response code informing your Telnet client of the success or failure of the Kerberos validation attempt. See Section 10 for details on the Startup Response Record.

The following Microsoft SSPI example illustrates how to get the client security token, which contains the Kerberos services ticket.

1. Get a handle to the user's credentials:

   ```c
   PSecurityFunctionTable pSSPI_;
   CredHandle credHandle;
   TimeStamp timeStamp;

   ss = pSSPI_->_AcquireCredentialsHandle(
       NULL,        // Principal
       "Kerberos",  // PackageName
       SECPKG_CRED_OUTBOUND, // CredentialUse
       NULL,        // LogonID
       NULL,        // AuthData
       NULL,        // GetKeyFnc
       NULL,        // GetKeyArg
       &credHandle,  // CredHandle
       &timeStamp);  // ExpireTime
   ```

2. Initialize security context to "request delegation". Mutual authentication is also requested, although it is not required and may not be performed.
CtxtHandle newContext;
unsigned long contextAttr;
unsigned char token[16384];
unsigned long tokenLen = sizeof(token);
SecBuffer sbo = {tokenLen, SECBUFFER_TOKEN, token};
SecBufferDesc sbdo = {SECBUFFER_VERSION, 1, &sbo}

pSSPI_->InitializeSecurityContext(
    &credHandle,  // CredHandle
    NULL,        // Context
    "krbsrv400/fullyqualifiedLowerCaseSystemName", // ServicePrincipalName
    ISC_REQ_CONNECTION|ISC_REQ_MUTUAL_AUTH, // ContextRequest
    NULL,        // Reserved
    SECURITY_NATIVE_DREP, // DataRep
    NULL,        // Input
    NULL,        // Reserved
    &newContext,  // NewContext
    &sbdo,       // Output
    &contextAttr, // ContextAttr
    &timeStamp);  // ExpireTime

3. Free the user credentials handle with FreeCredentialsHandle().

4. Send security token to Telnet Server (padded with escape characters).

The following illustrates the Kerberos Token Negotiation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IBM i Telnet server</th>
<th>Enhanced Telnet client</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON</td>
<td>--&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON</td>
<td>&lt;--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON</td>
<td>SEND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USERVAR &quot;IBMRSEEDxxxxxxx&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAR USERVAR IAC SE</td>
<td>--&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS USERVAR &quot;IBMTICKET&quot; VALUE &quot;zzzzzzzz...&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;-- IAC SE</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>(other negotiations)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this example, "xxxxxxxx" is an 8-byte hexadecimal random server seed, and "zzzzzzzz..." is the complete Kerberos services token. If the Kerberos services token is not valid, then the sign-on panel is not bypassed. It should be noted that for the Kerberos token a
random server seed is not needed, although it will be sent by the Telnet Server.

Actual bytes transmitted in the above example are shown in hex below, where the server seed is "7D3E488F18080404", and the Kerberos services token starts with "DFB0402F22ABA3BA...". The complete Kerberos services token is not shown here, as the length of the token could be 16384 bytes and would make this document extremely large. As described in Section 6, the client must escape and/or byte stuff any Kerberos token bytes, which could be seen as a Telnet environment option [RFC1572], specifically VAR, VALUE, ESC, and USERVAR.

IBM i Telnet server          Enhanced Telnet client
--------------------------------------------------------
FF FD 27                      -->
                              FF FB 27
FF FA 27 01 03 49 42 4D
52 53 45 45 44 7D 3E 48
8F 18 08 04 00 03 FF          -->
F0                              FF FA 27 00 03 49 42 4D
54 49 43 48 45 54 01 DF
B0 40 2F 22 AB A3 BA...        <-- FF F0

7. Device Name Collision Processing

Device name collision occurs when a Telnet client sends the Telnet server a virtual device name that it wants to use, but that device is already in use on the server. When this occurs, the Telnet server sends a request to the client asking it to try another device name. The environment option negotiation uses the USERVAR name of DEVNAME to communicate the virtual device name. The following shows how the Telnet server will request the Telnet client to send a different DEVNAME when device name collision occurs.

IBM i Telnet server          Enhanced Telnet client
--------------------------------------------------------
IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND
VAR USERVAR IAC SE          -->

Server requests all environment variables be sent.

IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS USERVAR
"DEVNAME" VALUE "MYDEVICE1"
USERVAR "xxxxx" VALUE "xxx"
...
 <-- IAC SE
Client sends all environment variables, including DEVNAME. Server tries to select device MYDEVICE1. If the device is already in use, server requests DEVNAME be sent again.

IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND
USERVAR "DEVNAME" IAC SE  -->

Server sends a request for a single environment variable: DEVNAME

IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS USERVAR
<-- "DEVNAME" VALUE "MYDEVICE2" IAC SE

Client sends one environment variable, calculating a new value of MYDEVICE2. If MYDEVICE2 is different from the last request, then server tries to select device MYDEVICE2, else server disconnects client. If MYDEVICE2 is also in use, server will send DEVNAME request again and keep doing so until it receives a device that is not in use, or the same device name twice in row.

8. Enhanced Printer Emulation Support

Telnet environment option USERVARs have been defined to allow a compliant Telnet client more control over the Telnet server virtual device on the IBM i. These USERVARs allow the client Telnet to select a previously created virtual device or auto-create a new virtual device with requested attributes.

This makes the enhancements available to any Telnet client that chooses to support these negotiations.

The USERVARs defined to accomplish this are:
The **DEVNAME USERVAR** is used for both displays and printers. The **IBMFONT** and **IBMASCII899** are used only for SBCS environments. For a description of most of these parameters (drop the "IBM" from the USERVAR) and their permissible values, refer to Chapter 8 in the Communications Configuration Reference [COMM-CONFIG].

The **IBMIGCFEAT** supports the following variable DBCS language identifiers in position 5 (positions 1-4 must be '2424'; position 6 must be '0'):

- 'J' = Japanese
- 'K' = Korean
- 'C' = Traditional Chinese
- 'S' = Simplified Chinese

The **IBMTRANSFORM** and **IBMASCII899** values correspond to:

- '1' = Yes  '0' = No

The **IBMFORMFEED** values correspond to:

- 'C' = Continuous  'U' = Cut  'A' = Autocut

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USERVAR</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>EXAMPLE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEVNAME</td>
<td>us-ascii char(x)</td>
<td>PRINTER1</td>
<td>Printer device name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMIGCFEAT</td>
<td>us-ascii char(6)</td>
<td>2424J0</td>
<td>IGC feature (DBCS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMMSGQNAME</td>
<td>us-ascii char(x)</td>
<td>QSYSOPR</td>
<td>*MSGQ name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMMSGQLIB</td>
<td>us-ascii char(x)</td>
<td>QSYS</td>
<td>*MSGQ library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMFONT</td>
<td>us-ascii char(x)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Font</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMFORMFEED</td>
<td>us-ascii char(1)</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMMTRANSFORM</td>
<td>us-ascii char(1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMMFRTYPMDL</td>
<td>us-ascii char(x)</td>
<td>*IBM42023</td>
<td>Mfg. type and model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMPPRSRC1</td>
<td>binary(1)</td>
<td>1-byte hex field</td>
<td>Paper source 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMPPRSRC2</td>
<td>binary(1)</td>
<td>1-byte hex field</td>
<td>Paper source 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMENVENVELOPE</td>
<td>binary(1)</td>
<td>1-byte hex field</td>
<td>Envelope hopper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMASCII899</td>
<td>us-ascii char(1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMWSCSTNAME</td>
<td>us-ascii char(x)</td>
<td>*NONE</td>
<td>WSCST name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBMWSCSTLIB</td>
<td>us-ascii char(x)</td>
<td>*LIBL</td>
<td>WSCST library</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

x - up to a maximum of 10 characters

The "IBM" prefix on the USERVARs denotes IBM i-specific attributes.

The **DEVNAME USERVAR** is used for both displays and printers. The **IBMFONT** and **IBMASCII899** are used only for SBCS environments.

For a description of most of these parameters (drop the "IBM" from the USERVAR) and their permissible values, refer to Chapter 8 in the Communications Configuration Reference [COMM-CONFIG].

The **IBMIGCFEAT** supports the following variable DBCS language identifiers in position 5 (positions 1-4 must be '2424'; position 6 must be '0'):

- 'J' = Japanese
- 'K' = Korean
- 'C' = Traditional Chinese
- 'S' = Simplified Chinese

The **IBMTRANSFORM** and **IBMASCII899** values correspond to:

- '1' = Yes  '0' = No

The **IBMFORMFEED** values correspond to:

- 'C' = Continuous  'U' = Cut  'A' = Autocut

The **IBMPPRSRC1**, **IBMPPRSRC2**, and **IBMENVENVELOPE** custom USERVARs do not map directly to their descriptions in Chapter 8 in the Communications Configuration Reference [COMM-CONFIG]. To map these, use the index listed here:
9. Telnet Printer Terminal Types

Telnet options are defined for the printer pass-through mode of operation. To enable printer pass-through mode, both the client and server must agree to support at least the Transmit-Binary, End-Of-Record, and Terminal-Type Telnet options. The following are new terminal types for printers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERMINAL-TYPE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBM-5553-B01</td>
<td>Double-Byte printer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM-3812-1</td>
<td>Single-Byte printer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Specific characteristics of the IBM-5553-B01 or IBM-3812-1 printers are specified through the USERVAR IBMMFRTYPMDL, which specifies the manufacturer type and model.

An example of a typical negotiation process to establish printer pass-through mode of operation is shown below. In this example, the server initiates the negotiation by sending the DO TERMINAL-TYPE request.

For DBCS environments, if IBMTRANSFORM is set to 1 (use Host Print Transform), then the virtual device created is 3812, not 5553. Therefore, IBM-3812-1 (and not IBM-5553-B01) should be negotiated for TERMINAL-TYPE.
Some points about the above example. The IBMPPRSRC1 value requires escaping the value using ESC according to Telnet environment options [RFC1572]. The IBMPPRSRC2 does not require an ESC character since '04'X has no conflict with environment options. Finally, to send 'FF'X for the IBMENVELOPE value, escape the 'FF'X value by using another 'FF'X (called "doubling"), so as not to have the value interpreted as a Telnet character per the Telnet protocol specification [RFC885].

Actual bytes transmitted in the above example are shown in hex below.
10. Startup Response Record for Printer and Display Devices

Once Telnet negotiation for a 5250 pass-through mode is completed, the IBM i Telnet server will initiate a virtual device (printer or display) power-on sequence on behalf of the Telnet client. The Telnet server will supply a Startup Response Record to the Telnet client with the status of the device power-on sequence, indicating success or failure of the virtual device power-on sequence.

This section shows an example of two Startup Response Records. The source device is a type 3812 model 01 printer with the name "PCPRINTER" on the target system "TARGET".

Figure 1 shows an example of a successful response; Figure 2 shows an example of an error response.
10.1. Example of a Success Response Record

The response record in Figure 1 was sent by an IBM i. It is an example of the target sending back a successful Startup Response Record.

```
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
<p>|       +-----  Pass-Through header                                |
|       |          +---  Response data                             |
|       |          |            +----  Start diagnostic information|
|       |          |            |                                  |
| +----------++----------++--------------------------------------- |
| |          ||          ||                                        |
| 004912A09000056006002OC0003D0000C9F9F0F2E3C1D9C7C5E34040D7C3D7D9 |
|                                 |      | T A R G E T     P C P R |
|                                 +------+                         |
|                           Response Code (I902)                  |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C9D5E3C5D9400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I N T E R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+------- End of diagnostic information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000000000000000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
```

Figure 1: Example of a success response record

- '0049'X = Length pass-through data, including this length field
- '12A0'X = GDS LU6.2 header
- '900056006002OC0003D0000'X = Fixed value fields
- 'C9F9F0F2'X = Response Code (I902)
- 'E3C1D9C7C5E34040'X = System Name (TARGET)
- 'D7C3D7D9C9D5E3C5D940'X = Object Name (PCPRINTER)

10.2. Example of an Error Response Record

The response record in Figure 2 is one that reports an error. The virtual device named "PCPRINTER" is not available on the target system "TARGET" because the device is not available. You would normally see this error if the printer were already assigned to another Telnet session.
Figure 2: Example of an error response record

- '0049'X = Length pass-through data, including this length field
- '12A0'X = GDS LU6.2 header
- '90000560060020C0003D0000'X = Fixed value fields
- 'F8F9F0F2'X = Response Code (8902)
- 'E3C1D9C7C5E34040'X = System Name (TARGET)
- 'D7C3D7D9C9D5E3C5D940'X = Object Name (PCPRINTER)

10.3. Example of a Response Record with Device Name Retry

The Response Record can be used in conjunction with the DEVNAME Environment variable to allow client emulators to inform users of connection failures. In addition, this combination could be used by client emulators that accept multiple device names to try on session connections. The client would be able to walk through a list of possible device names and provide feedback based on the response code(s) received for each device name that was rejected.

The following sequence shows a negotiation between the client and the server in which a named device "RFCTEST" is requested by the client. The device name is already assigned to an existing condition. The server responds with the Response Record showing an 8902 response code. The client could use this information to inform the user that the device name just tried was already in use.
Following the Response Record the server would then invite the client to try another device name. Because the same device name was used again by the client, the server closed the session.

```
IBM i Telnet server                        Enhanced Telnet client
-------------------------------------------
IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON  -->                    IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON
IAC DO TERMINAL-TYPE  -->                  IAC WILL TERMINAL-TYPE
IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND
USERVAR "IBMRSEEDxxxxx"  -->                USERVAR "DEVNAME"  -->
VAR USERVAR IAC SE      -->                VALUE "RFCTEST"
                       -->                USERVAR "IBMSENDCONFREC"
                       -->                VALUE "YES"
                       <---                  IAC SE
IAC SB TERMINAL-TYPE SEND
IAC SE  -->                               IAC SB TERMINAL-TYPE IS
IAC DO EOR  -->                            IBM-3180-2 IAC SE
IAC WILL EOR  -->                           (terminal type negotiations completed)
IAC DO BINARY  -->                          IAC DO EOR
IAC WILL BINARY  -->                         IAC DO BINARY
(73 BYTE RFC 1205 RECORD
WITH 8902 ERROR CODE)  -->
IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND
USERVAR "DEVNAME"  -->                    USERVAR "DEVNAME"  -->
IAC SE              -->                    VALUE "RFCTEST"
                       -->                    USERVAR "IBMSENDCONFREC"
                       -->                    VALUE "YES"
                       <---                  IAC SE
```

(server closes connection)

Actual bytes transmitted in the above example are shown in hex below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IBM i Telnet server</th>
<th>Enhanced Telnet client</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FF FD 27</td>
<td>FF FB 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF FD 18</td>
<td>FF FB 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF FA 27 01 03 49 42 4D</td>
<td>FF FA 27 00 03 44 45 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52 53 45 45 44 C4 96 67</td>
<td>4E 41 4D 45 01 52 46 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76 9A 23 E3 34 00 03 FF F0</td>
<td>54 45 54 03 49 42 4D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53 45 4E 44 43 4F 4E 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52 45 43 01 59 45 53 FF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF FA 18 01 FF F0</td>
<td>FF FA 18 00 49 42 4D 2D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33 31 38 30 2D 32 FF F0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF FD 19</td>
<td>FF FB 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF FB 19</td>
<td>FF FA 27 01 03 44 45 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF FD 00</td>
<td>FF FA 27 00 03 44 45 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF FB 00</td>
<td>FF FA 27 00 03 44 45 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00 49 12 A0 00 00 05 60</td>
<td>4E 41 4D 45 01 52 46 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 00 20 C0 00 3D 00 00</td>
<td>54 45 54 03 49 42 4D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F8 F9 F0 F2 D9 E2 F0 F3</td>
<td>53 45 4E 44 43 4F 4E 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F5 40 40 40 00 00 00 00 00</td>
<td>52 45 43 01 59 45 53 FF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00 FF EF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF FA 27 01 03 44 45 56</td>
<td>FF FA 27 00 03 44 45 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4E 41 4D 45 FF F0</td>
<td>4E 41 4D 45 01 52 46 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54 45 54 03 49 42 4D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53 45 4E 44 43 4F 4E 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52 45 43 01 59 45 53 FF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 10.4. Response Codes

The Start-Up Response Record success response codes:
The Start-Up Response Record error response codes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I901</td>
<td>Virtual device has less function than source device.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I902</td>
<td>Session successfully started.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I906</td>
<td>Automatic Sign-On requested, but not allowed. Session still allowed; a sign-on screen will be coming.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2702</td>
<td>Device description not found.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2703</td>
<td>Controller description not found.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2777</td>
<td>Damaged device description.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8901</td>
<td>Device not varied on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8902</td>
<td>Device not available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8903</td>
<td>Device not valid for session.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8906</td>
<td>Session initiation failed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8907</td>
<td>Session failure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8910</td>
<td>Controller not valid for session.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8916</td>
<td>No matching device found.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8917</td>
<td>Not authorized to object.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8918</td>
<td>Job canceled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8920</td>
<td>Object partially damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8921</td>
<td>Communications error.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8922</td>
<td>Negative response received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8923</td>
<td>Start-up record built incorrectly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8925</td>
<td>Creation of device failed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8928</td>
<td>Change of device failed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8929</td>
<td>Vary on or vary off failed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8930</td>
<td>Message queue does not exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8934</td>
<td>Start-up for S/36 WSF received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8935</td>
<td>Session rejected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8936</td>
<td>Security failure on session attempt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8937</td>
<td>Automatic Sign-On rejected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8940</td>
<td>Automatic configuration failed or not allowed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I904</td>
<td>Source system at incompatible release.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Start-Up Response Record error response codes for non-Kerberos Services Token Automatic Sign-On:
The Start-Up Response Record error response codes for Kerberos Services Token Automatic Sign-On support:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0001</td>
<td>System error.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0002</td>
<td>Userid unknown (deprecated).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0003</td>
<td>Userid disabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0004</td>
<td>Userid not found, password not correct, authentication factor not valid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0005</td>
<td>Password/passphrase/token is expired.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0008</td>
<td>Next invalid password/passphrase/token will revoke userid.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the case where the USERVAR, DEVNAME USERVAR, IBMSENDCONFREC USERVAR, IBMSUBSPW USERVAR, and IBMRESEED USERVAR are all used together, any device errors will take precedence over automatic sign-on errors. That is:

1. If the requested named device is not available or an error occurs when attempting to create the device on the server system, a device related return code (i.e., 8902) will be sent to the client system in the display confirmation record.

2. If the requested named device is available or no errors occur when attempting to create the device on the server system, an automatic sign-on return code (i.e., 0002) will be sent to the client system in the display confirmation record.
10.5. Telnet Device Negotiation Termination

Device Negotiation is terminated when any non Telnet option data is received from the Telnet client before a successful 109x Start-Up Response Record response code is issued, including during Device Name Collision Processing. The device terminal type defaults to VT100 mode. Any negotiated TERMINAL-TYPE is ignored.

11. Printer Steady-State Pass-Through Interface

The information in this section applies to the pass-through session after the receipt of startup confirmation records is complete.

Following is the printer header interface used by Telnet.

```
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
|   +-- Length of structure (LLLL)                                 |
|   |                                                              |
|   |    +-- GDS identifier                                        |
|   |    |                                                         |
|   |    |    +-- Data flow record                                   |
|   |    |    |                                                    |
|   |    |    |   +-- Length of pass-through specific header (LL)       |
|   |    |    |   |                                                |
|   |    |    |   |   +-- Flags                                      |
|   |    |    |   |   |                                            |
|   |    |    |   |   |   +-- Printer operation code                    |
|   |    |    |   |   |   |                                        |
|   |    |    |   |   |   |      +-- Diagnostic field - zero pad to LL specified |
|   |    |    |   |   |   |      |   LL specified                  |
|   |    |    |   |   |   |      |                                 |
|   |    |    |   |   |   |      |            +-- Printer data |
|   |    |    |   |   |   |      |            |                    |
| +--+ +--+ +--+ ++ +--+ ++ +----------+ +----------------+        |
| |  | |  | |  | || |  | || |          | |                |        |
| xxxx 12A0 xxxx xx xxxx xx xxxxxxxxxxxxxx ... print data ... |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
```

Figure 3: Layout of the printer pass-through header
BYTES 0-1: Length of structure including this field (LLLL)

BYTES 2-3: GDS Identifier ('12A0'X)

BYTE 4-5: Data flow record

This field contains flags that describe what type of data pass-through should be expected to be found following this header. Generally, bits 0-2 in the first byte are mutually exclusive (that is, if one of them is set to '1'B, the rest will be set to '0'B.) The bits and their meanings follow.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BIT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Start-Up confirmation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Termination record</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Start-Up Record</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Diagnostic information included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Printer record</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-13</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Client-originated (inbound) printer record</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Server-originated (outbound) printer record</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BYTE 6: Length printer pass-through header including this field (LL)

BYTES 7-8: Flags

BYTE 7 BITS: xxxx x111 --> Reserved
             xxxx 1xxx --> Last of chain
             xxx1 xxxx --> First of chain
             xx1x xxxx --> Printer now ready
             x1xx xxxx --> Intervention Required
             1xxx xxxx --> Error Indicator

BYTE 8 BITS: xxxx xxxx --> Reserved

BYTE 9: Printer operation code

'01'X Print/Print complete
'02'X Clear Print Buffers

BYTE 10-LL: Diagnostic information (Note 1)

If BYTE 7 = xx1x xxxx, then bytes 10-LL may contain:

Printer ready C9 00 00 00 02
If BYTE 7 = x1xx xxxx, then bytes 10-LL may contain: (Note 2)
Command/parameter not valid         C9 00 03 02 2x
Print check                          C9 00 03 02 3x
Forms check                         C9 00 03 02 4x
Normal periodic condition            C9 00 03 02 5x
Data stream error                    C9 00 03 02 6x
Machine/print/ribbon check           C9 00 03 02 8x

If BYTE 7 = 1xxx xxxx, then bytes 10-LL may contain: (Note 3)
Cancel                               08 11 02 00
Invalid print parameter              08 11 02 29
Invalid print command                08 11 02 28
Diagnostic information notes:

*LL is the length of the structure defined in Byte 6. If no additional data is present, the remainder of the structure must be padded with zeroes.

*These are printer SIGNAL commands. Further information on these commands may be obtained from the 5494 Remote Control Unit Functions Reference guide [SC30-3533].

Refer to your IBM i printer documentation for more specific information on these data stream exceptions. The following are some 3812 and 5553 errors that may be seen:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Machine check</td>
<td>C9 00 03 02 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graphics check</td>
<td>C9 00 03 02 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Print check</td>
<td>C9 00 03 02 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form jam</td>
<td>C9 00 03 02 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper jam</td>
<td>C9 00 03 02 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of forms</td>
<td>C9 00 03 02 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printer not ready</td>
<td>C9 00 03 02 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data stream - class 1</td>
<td>C9 00 03 02 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data stream - class 2</td>
<td>C9 00 03 02 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data stream - class 3</td>
<td>C9 00 03 02 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data stream - class 4</td>
<td>C9 00 03 02 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cover unexpectedly open</td>
<td>C9 00 03 02 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine check</td>
<td>C9 00 03 02 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine check</td>
<td>C9 00 03 02 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ribbon check</td>
<td>C9 00 03 02 88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These are printer negative responses. Further information on these commands may be obtained from the 5494 Remote Control Unit Functions Reference guide [SC30-3533].

The print data will start in byte LL+1.

11.1. Example of a Print Record

Figure 4 shows the server sending the client data with a print record. This is normally seen following receipt of a Success Response Record, such as the example in Figure 1.
Figure 4: Server sending client data with a print record

- '0085'X = Logical record length, including this byte (LLLL)
- '12A0'X = GDS LU6.2 header
- '0101'X = Data flow record (server to client)
- '0A'X = Length of pass-through specific header (LL)
- '1800'X = First of chain / Last of chain indicators
- '01'X = Print
- '000000000000'X = Zero pad header to LL specified
- '34C401'X = First piece of data for spooled data
- Remainder is printer data/commands/orders

11.2. Example of a Print Complete Record

Figure 5 shows the client sending the server a print complete record. This would normally follow receipt of a print record, such
as the example in Figure 4. This indicates successful completion of a print request.

Figure 5: Client sending server a print complete record

- '000A'X = Logical record length, including this byte (LLLL)
- '12A0'X = GDS LU6.2 header
- '0102'X = Data flow response record (client to server)
- '04'X   = Length of pass-through specific header (LL)
- '0000'X = Good Response
- '01'X   = Print Complete

11.3. Example of a Null Print Record

Figure 6 shows the server sending the client a null print record. The null print record is the last print command the server sends to the client for a print job, and it indicates to the printer that there is no more data. The null data byte '00'X is optional and in some cases may be omitted (in particular, this scenario occurs in DBCS print streams).

This example would normally follow any number of print records, such as the example in Figure 4. This indicates successful completion of a print job. The client normally responds to this null print record with another print complete record, such as in Figure 5.
12. End-to-End Print Example

The next example shows a full print exchange between a Telnet client and server for a 526 byte spooled file. Selective translation of the hexadecimal streams into 1) Telnet negotiations and 2) ASCII/EBCDIC characters is done to aid readability. Telnet negotiations are delimited by '{' and '}' parenthesis characters; ASCII/EBCDIC conversions are bracketed by '|' vertical bar characters.

Figure 6: Server sending client a null print record

- '0011'X = Logical record length, including this byte
- '12A0'X = GDS LU6.2 header
- '0101'X = Data flow record
- '0A'X = Length of pass-through specific header (LL)
- '0800'X = Last of Chain
- '01'X = Print
- '000000000000'X = Zero pad header to LL specified
- '00'X = Null data byte
IBM i Telnet server                  Enhanced Telnet client
-----------------------------------                         -----------------------------------
FFFD27              -->

(IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON)

<-- FFFB27

FFFD18FFFA270103 49424D5253454444
7EA5DFDDFD300404 0003FFF0       -->

(IAC DO TERMINAL-TYPE
IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND USERVAR
IBMRSEED xxxxxxxx VAR USERVAR
IAC SE)

<-- FFFB18

(IAC WILL TERMINAL-TYPE)

(IAC SB TERMINAL-TYPE SEND IAC
SE)

FFFA27000349424D 5253454547EA5DF
DDFD300404000344 45564E414D450144
554D45950525403 49424D5347514E
414D450151535953 4F50520349424D4D
5347514C4942012A 4C49424C0349424D
464F4E4501313103 49424D5452144E53
464F524D01310349 424D4D52545950
4D444C012A485049 490349424D505052
5352433101020103 49424D505025352
433201040349424D 454E56454C4F5045
01FFFF0349424D41 5343494938393901
<-- 30FFF0

(IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS USERVAR
IBMRSEED xxxxxxxx VAR
USERVAR DEVNAME VALUE DUMMYPR
USERVAR IBMMSSGQNAME VALUE
QSYSPR
USERVAR IBMMSSGLIB VALUE *LIBL
USERVAR IBMFONT VALUE 11
USERVAR IBMTRANSFORM VALUE 1
USERVAR IBMMFRTYPMDL VALUE *HPII
USERVAR IBMPRSCRC1 VALUE
ESC '01'X
USERVAR IBMPRSCRC2 VALUE '04'X
USERVAR IBMENVELOPE VALUE IAC
UServar IBMASCII899 Value 0
IAC SE)

<- FFFA180049424D2D 333831322D31FFF0

(IAC SB TERMINAL-TYPE IS IBM-3812-1 IAC SE)

FFFD19  -->

(IAC DO EOR)

<- FFB19

(IAC WILL EOR)

FFB19  -->

(IAC WILL EOR)

<- FFD19

(IAC DO EOR)

FFD00  -->

(IAC DO BINARY)

<- FFB00

(IAC WILL BINARY)

FFB00  -->

(IAC WILL BINARY)

<- FFD00

(IAC DO BINARY)

004912A090000560 060020C0003D000     |       -   {    |
C9F9F0F2C5D3C3D9 E3D7F0F6C4E4D4D4     |I902ELCRTP06DUMM| (EBCDIC)
E8D7D9E340400000 0000000000000000     |YPRT            |
0000000000000000 0000000000000000     |                |
0000000000000000 00FFEF           --> |                |

(73-byte startup success response record ... IAC EOR)
00DF12A001010A18 0001000000000000     |                |
03CD1B451B283130 551B287330703130     |                |
2E30300631327630 733062303033541B     |                |
287330421B266440 1B266C304F1B266C     |                |
303038431B266C30 3035431B28733070     |                |
3172E3130683130 7630733062303030      |17.10h10v0s0b000T |
541B283130551B28 73307031372E3130     |                |
6831307630733062 303030541B287330     |                |
421B2664401B266C 314F1B266C303035      |                |

20454C4352545030 360D0A1B26612B30  System: ELCRTP06 &a+0
3032313648205365 6C656374206F6E65 |0216H Select one|
206F662746656290 666F6C666F7796E | of the followin|
673A0D0A1B26612B 3030323136480D0A |g: &a+00216H |
1B26612B30303231 3648202020202020 | &a+00216H |
312E205573657220 7461736B730D0A1B |1. User tasks |
26612B3033233136 4820202020202032 | &[a+00216H 2 |
2E04466669636E35 207461736B730D0A |. Office tasks |
1B26612B30303231 36480D0A1B26612B | &a+00216H &a+|
3030323136482029 20202020202046 |00216H 4. F |
696C65732C206C69 673A0D0A1B26612B |iles, libraries, |
2061EFFEEF | an |

(... 784-byte print record ...) 
... first of chain ... IAC EOR)

020312A001010A00 0001000000000000 | | (10-byte print complete header)
020312A001010A00 0001000000000000 | | (ASCII)
64206663FFFE6F6C 646572730D0A1B26 6. Com |
612B303323313648 0D0A1B26612B3030 | &a+00216H &a+00 |
3231364820202020 2030323136482020 |216H 6. Com |
6D756E6963617469 6F6E0D0A1B2661 Jem handling & |
2B3033233136480D 0A1B26612B303032 |+00216H &a+002 |
3136482020202020 203323136826F62 |16H 8. Prob |
6C6563206C696261 6E670D0A1B2661 An | &a+00216H 9. |
612B303323313648 2061202020202020 | &a+00216H 9.

02469737066C6179 206120206656750D | Display a menu |
0A1B26612B303032 3136482020202020 | &a+00216H |
31302E204966666F 726D61736B730D0A |10. Information |
417373697374616E 742020206656726F6E |[Assistant option] |
730D0A1B26612B30 3032313648202020 |s &a+00216H |
2020313222403E36 69656E61736B730D0A |11. Client Acc |
6573732F34303020 7461736B730D0A1B |ess/400 tasks |
26612B3030323136 480D0A1B26612B30 | &a+00216H &a+0 |
30323136483020 2020202039302020 |0216H 90. |
5369676E0D0A1B26612B303030 |Sign off &a+00 |
323136480D0A1B26 612B303032313648 |216H &a+00216H |
205366C65637469 6F6E0D0A1B2661 Selection or co |
6D6D616E520D0A1B 26612B3030323136 |mmand &a+00216 |
4820333333333D0A 1B26612B30303231 |H >>> &a+0021 |
36400D0A1B26612B 3033233136482046 |6H &a+00216H F |
333D457869742029 2046343D50726F6D |3=Exit F4=Prom |
707420202046393D 526574269657665 |pt F9=Retrieve |
(... 515-byte print record ...
IAC EOR)

(10-byte print complete header)

(10-byte print complete header)

(10-byte print complete header)
13. Security Considerations

Automatic Sign-On and Password Hash SHOULD be used to avoid negotiating with clear text passwords. The hash required depends entirely on the Password Level (QPWDLVL) system value configured on the IBM i system the Telnet server is running on. The Telnet server uses this to authenticate the substitute password hash. IBM i Systems configured with QPWDLVL 0 or 1 MUST use DES, QPWDLVL 2 or 3 MUST use SHA-1 and QPWDLVL 4 MUST uses PBKDF2 with HMAC SHA-512.

The Automatic Sign-On feature provided by this RFC describes a way to hash an automatic signon user profile password. However, while passwords can be hashed by using the IBMRSEED and IBMSUBSPW USERVAR negotiations, users should understand that only the negotiated automatic signon user profile password is hashed and not the entire Telnet data payload.

The Automatic Sign-On feature supports plain text passwords, password hashes, and Kerberos tokens. However, Telnet clients using plain text passwords are strongly discouraged.

The password hash algorithm required depends on how the IBM i system has configured the Password Level (QPWDLVL) system value. Configuring the system to use a stronger QPWDLVL determines the password hash that is required by the Telnet client as well as all other password authentication methods used on the IBM i system. The QPWDLVL system value is not negotiated with the Telnet client and thus the required Automatic Sign-On and Password Hash required must be determined seperately from this RFC, such as through external Telnet configuration, parameters, client application install options or other out of band methods.

Encryption of the entire Telnet client session requires that Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC8446] version 1.2 or higher is used to secure the entire Telnet session.

Certificates are configured using IBM Digital Certificate Manager for i [DCM] and assigned to the QIBM_QTV_TELNET_SERVER application definition to enable TLS.

When connecting to the "telnet-ssl" service (default port 992) the TLS handshake begins immediately. Once the TLS handshake has successfully completed, the Telnet negotiation documented in this document proceeds using the secured session.

Configuring the IBM i system to use the highest version of TLS available on the secure Telnet port 992 and disabling the non secure Telnet port 23 is REQUIRED to secure all Telnet sessions.
14. IANA Considerations

IANA registered the terminal types "IBM-3812-1" and "IBM-5553-B01" as a terminal type [RFC1091]. They are used when communicating with IBM i Telnet servers.

Secure telnet on IBM i is established using the telnet-ssl service name, normally using the Well Known Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) registered port 992 for Telnet using TLS/SSL [PORTREG].

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16. References

16.1. Normative References


16.2. Informative References

[PORTREG] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers>.


[RFC6238] M'Raihi, D., Machani, S., Pei, M., and J. Rydell, "TOTP: Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm", RFC 6238, DOI


Appendix A. Relation to Other RFCs

This RFC relies on the 5250 Telnet Interface [RFC1205] in all examples.
This RFC replaces IBM's iSeries Telnet Enhancements RFC4777, adding new PBKDF2 with HMAC SHA-512 hash, IBM i Telent security requirement for TLS, Authentication factor for Multi Factor Authentication and minor corrections.

Appendix B. Property

The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the ISOC's procedures with respect to rights in ISOC Documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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