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**DHCPv6-Shield: Protecting Against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers**  
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Abstract

This document specifies a mechanism for protecting hosts connected to a broadcast network against rogue DHCPv6 servers. The aforementioned mechanism is based on DHCPv6 packet-filtering at the layer-2 device on which the packets are received. The aforementioned mechanism has been widely deployed in IPv4 networks ('DHCP snooping'), and hence it is desirable that similar functionality be provided for IPv6 networks.

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## **1. Introduction**

This document specifies a mechanism for protecting hosts connected to a broadcast network against rogue DHCPv6 servers. This mechanism is analogous to the RA-Guard mechanism [[RFC6104](#)] [[RFC6105](#)] [[I-D.ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-implementation](#)] intended for protection against rogue Router Advertisement messages.

The basic concept behind DHCPv6-Shield is that a layer-2 device filters DHCPv6 messages meant to DHCPv6 clients, according to a number of different criteria. The most basic filtering criterion being that the aforementioned DHCPv6 messages are discarded by the layer-2 device unless they are received on a specified port of the layer-2 device.

Before the DHCPv6-Shield device is deployed, the administrator specifies the layer-2 port(s) on which DHCPv6 packets meant for DHCPv6 clients are allowed. Only those ports to which a DHCPv6 server is to be connected should be specified as such. Once deployed, the DHCPv6-Shield device inspects received packets, and allows (i.e. passes) DHCPv6 messages meant for DHCPv6 clients only if they are received on layer-2 ports that have been explicitly configured for such purpose.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].



## **2. DHCPv6-Shield Configuration**

Before being deployed for production, the DHCPv6-Shield device MUST be configured with respect to which layer-2 ports are allowed to send DHCPv6 packets to DHCPv6 clients. Only those layer-2 ports explicitly configured for such purpose will be allowed to send DHCPv6 packets to DHCPv6 clients.

### **3. DHCPv6-Shield Implementation Advice**

The following filtering rules **MUST** be enforced as part of an DHCPv6-Shield implementation on those ports that are not allowed to send DHCPv6 packets to DHCPv6 clients:

1. DHCPv6-Shield **MUST** parse the IPv6 entire header chain present in the packet, to identify whether it is a DHCPv6 packet meant for a DHCPv6 client.

RATIONALE: [[RFC6564](#)] specifies a uniform format for IPv6 Extension Header, thus meaning that an IPv6 node can parse an IPv6 header chain even if it contains Extension Headers that are not currently supported by that node. Additionally, [[I-D.ietf-6man-oversized-header-chain](#)] requires that if a packet is fragmented, the first fragment contains the entire IPv6 header chain.

DHCPv6-Shield implementations **MUST NOT** enforce a limit on the number of bytes they can inspect (starting from the beginning of the IPv6 packet), since this could introduce false-positives: legitimate packets could be dropped simply because the DHCPv6-Shield device does not parse the entire IPv6 header chain present in the packet. An implementation that has such an implementation-specific limit **MUST NOT** claim compliance with this specification, and **MUST** pass the packet when such implementation-specific limit is reached.

2. When parsing the IPv6 header chain, if the packet is a first-fragment (i.e., a packet containing a Fragment Header with the Fragment Offset set to 0) and it fails to contain the entire IPv6 header chain (i.e., all the headers starting from the IPv6 header up to, and including, the upper-layer header), DHCPv6-Shield **MUST** drop the packet, and **SHOULD** log the packet drop event in an implementation-specific manner as a security fault.

RATIONALE: [[I-D.ietf-6man-oversized-header-chain](#)] specifies that the first-fragment (i.e., the fragment with the Fragment Offset set to 0) **MUST** contain the entire IPv6 header chain, and allows intermediate systems such as routers to drop those packets that fail to comply with this requirement.

NOTE: This rule should only be applied to IPv6 fragments with a Fragment Offset of 0 (non-first fragments can be safely passed, since they will never reassemble into a complete datagram if they are part of a DHCPv6 packet meant for a DHCPv6 client received on a port where such packets are not allowed).





3. When parsing the IPv6 header chain, if the packet is identified to be a DHCPv6 packet meant for a DHCPv6 client, DHCPv6-Shield MUST drop the packet, and SHOULD log the packet drop event in an implementation-specific manner as a security fault.
4. In all other cases, RA-Guard MUST pass the packet as usual.

NOTE: For the purpose of enforcing the DHCPv6-Shield filtering policy, an ESP header [[RFC4303](#)] should be considered to be an "upper-layer protocol" (that is, it should be considered the last header in the IPv6 header chain). This means that packets employing ESP would be passed by the DHCPv6-Shield device to the intended destination. If the destination host does not have a security association with the sender of the aforementioned IPv6 packet, the packet would be dropped. Otherwise, if the packet is considered valid by the IPsec implementation at the receiving host and encapsulates a DHCPv6 message, it is up to the receiving host what to do with such packet.

If a packet is dropped due to this filtering policy, then the packet drop event SHOULD be logged in an implementation-specific manner as a security fault. The logging mechanism SHOULD include a drop counter dedicated to DHCPv6-Shield packet drops.

In order to protect current end-node IPv6 implementations, Rule #2 has been defined as a default rule to drop packets that cannot be positively identified as not being DHCPv6 packets meant for DHCPv6 clients (because the packet is a fragment that fails to include the entire IPv6 header chain). This means that, at least in theory, DHCPv6-Shield could result in false-positive blocking of some legitimate (non DHCPv6-server) packets. However, as noted in [[I-D.ietf-6man-oversized-header-chain](#)], IPv6 packets that fail to include the entire IPv6 header chain are virtually impossible to police with state-less filters and firewalls, and hence are unlikely to survive in real networks. [[I-D.ietf-6man-oversized-header-chain](#)] requires that hosts employing fragmentation include the entire IPv6 header chain in the first fragment (the fragment with the Fragment Offset set to 0), thus eliminating the aforementioned false positives.

The aforementioned filtering rules implicitly handle the case of fragmented packets: if the DHCPv6-Shield device fails to identify the upper-layer protocol as a result of the use of fragmentation, the corresponding packets would be dropped.

Finally, we note that IPv6 implementations that allow overlapping fragments (i.e. that do not comply with [[RFC5722](#)]) might still be subject of DHCPv6-based attacks. However, a recent assessment of



IPv6 implementations [[SI6-FRAG](#)] with respect to their fragment reassembly policy seems to indicate that most current implementations comply with [[RFC5722](#)].

#### **4. IANA Considerations**

This document has no actions for IANA.

## 5. Security Considerations

The mechanism specified in this document can be used to mitigate DHCPv6-based attacks. Attack vectors based on other messages (such as ICMPv6 Router Advertisements) are out of the scope of this document.

As noted in [Section 3](#), IPv6 implementations that allow overlapping fragments (i.e. that do not comply with [\[RFC5722\]](#)) might still be subject of DHCPv6-based attacks. However, most current implementations seem to comply with [\[RFC5722\]](#), and hence forbid IPv6 overlapping fragments.

We note that if an attacker sends a fragmented DHCPv6 packets on a port not allowed to send such packets, the first-fragment would be dropped, and the rest of the fragments would be passed. This means that the victim node would tie memory buffers for the aforementioned fragments, which would never reassemble into a complete datagram. If a large number of such packets were sent by an attacker, and the victim node failed to implement proper resource management for the fragment reassembly buffer, this could lead to a Denial of Service (DoS). However, this does not really introduce a new attack vector, since an attacker could always perform the same attack by sending forged fragmented datagram in which at least one of the fragments is missing. [\[CPNI-IPv6\]](#) discusses some resource management strategies that could be implemented for the fragment reassembly buffer.



## **6. Acknowledgements**

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