On the generation of TCP timestamps
draft-gont-timestamps-generation-00.txt

Abstract

   This document discusses the generation of TCP timestamps. In
   particular, it discusses a number of algorithms for producing
   monotonically-increasing timestamps such that timestamps can be used
   to reduce the TIME-WAIT state, and an algorithm for generating
   timestamps that allows for extended SYN-cookies.

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1. Introduction

   The Timestamps option, specified in RFC 1323 [RFC1323], allows a TCP
   to include a timestamp value in its segments, that can be used used
   to perform two functions: Round-Trip Time Measurement (RTTM), and
   Protection Against Wrapped Sequences (PAWS).

   For the purpose of PAWS, the timestamps sent on a connection are
   required to be monotonically increasing. RFC 1323 does not include
   any further requirements for the TCP timestamps (such as the initial
   timestamp value or the relationship between timestamps that
   correspond to different connections).

   [I-D.gont-tcpm-tcp-timestamps] discusses an algorithm that employs
   TCP timestamps to reduce the TIME-WAIT state. The aforementioned
   algorithm benefits from timestamps that are monotonically-increasing
   across connections.

   Some TCP implementations have employed TCP timestamps to implement
   extended SYN-Cookies [RFC4987]. These implementations encode part of
   the information received in an incomming SYN segment in the TCP
   timestamps sent in the SYN/ACK.

   It should be noted that a TCP implementation could benefit from the
   benefits of both timestamps generation approaches. Monotonically-
   increasing timestamps could be generated for TCPs that perform the
   active open, while timestamps for TCPs that perform the passive open
   could be generated according to [Opperman].

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2. Timestamps generation for TCPs that perform the active open

   While there is no requirement that timestamps are monotonically
   increasing across TCP connections, the generation of timestamps such
   that they are monotonically increasing across connections between the
   same two endpoints allows the use of timestamps for improving the
   handling of SYN segments that are received while the corresponding
   four-tuple is in the TIME-WAIT state. That is, the timestamp option
   could be used to perform heuristics to determine whether to allow the
   creation of a new incarnation of a connection that is in the TIME-
   WAIT state.

   It is RECOMMENDED that timestamps are generated with a similar
   algorithm to that introduced by RFC 1948 [RFC1948] for the generation

of Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs). That is,

timestamp = T() + F(localhost, localport, remotehost, remoteport, secret_key)

where the result of T() is a global system clock that complies with the requirements of Section 4.2.2 of RFC 1323 [RFC1323], and F() is a function that should not be computable from the outside without knowledge of the secret key (secret_key). Therefore, we suggest F() to be a cryptographic hash function of the connection-id and some secret data (which could be chosen randomly).

F() provides an offset that will be the same for all incarnations of a connection between the same two endpoints, while T() provides the monotonically increasing values that are needed for PAWS.

3. Timestamps generation for TCPs that perform the passive open

3.1. Extended SYN cookies

The purpose of SYN cookies is to avoid keeping track of all SYN's we receive and to be able to handle SYN floods from bogus source addresses (where we will never receive any reply). SYN floods try to exhaust all our memory and available slots in the SYN cache table to cause a denial of service to legitimate users of the local host.

The idea of SYN cookies is to encode and include all necessary information about the connection setup state within the SYN-ACK we send back and thus to get along without keeping any local state until the ACK to the SYN-ACK arrives (if ever). Everything we need to know should be available from the information we encoded in the SYN-ACK.

This implementation extends the orginal idea and first implementation of FreeBSD by using not only the initial sequence number field to store information but also the timestamp field if present. This way we can keep track of the entire state we need to know to recreate the session in its original form. Almost all TCP speakers implement RFC1323 timestamps these days. For those that do not we still have to live with the known shortcomings of the ISN-only SYN cookies.

Initial Sequence Number (ISN) we send:

```
               31|...............................|0
                  DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDMMMRRRP


                     D = MD5 Digest (first dword)
                     M = MSS index
                     R = Rotation of secret
                     P = Odd or Even secret


                            Figure 1
```

The MD5 Digest is computed with over following parameters:

o   randomly rotated secret

o   struct in_conninfo containing the remote/local ip/port (IPv4&IPv6)

o   the received initial sequence number from remote host

o   the rotation offset and odd/even bit

Timestamp we send:

```
                31|...............................|0
                   DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDSSSSRRRRA5


               D = MD5 Digest (third dword) (only as filler)
               S = Requested send window scale
               R = Requested receive window scale
               A = SACK allowed
               5 = TCP-MD5 enabled (not implemented yet)

               XORed with MD5 Digest (forth dword)


                            Figure 2
```

The timestamp isn't cryptographically secure and doesn't need to be.
The double use of the MD5 digest dwords ties it to a specific remote/
local host/port, remote initial sequence number and our local time
limited secret. A received timestamp is reverted (XORed) and then
the contained MD5 dword is compared to the computed one to ensure the
timestamp belongs to the SYN-ACK we sent. The other parameters may
have been tampered with but this isn't different from supplying bogus
values in the SYN in the first place.

3.2. Potential problems with SYN-cookies

Some of the problems of ISN-only SYN cookies remain, nevertheless.
Consider the problem of a recreated (and retransmitted) cookie. If

the original SYN was accepted, the connection is established. The
second SYN is inflight, and if it arrives with an ISN that falls
within the receive window, the connection is killed.

A heuristic to determine when to accept syn cookies is not necessary.
An ACK flood would cause the syncookie verification to be attempted,
but a SYN flood causes syncookies to be generated. Both are of equal
cost, so there's no point in trying to optimize the ACK flood case.

Also, if you don't process certain ACKs for some reason, then all
someone would have to do is launch a SYN and ACK flood at the same
time, which would stop cookie verification and defeat the entire
purpose of syncookies.

4. Security Considerations

This document describes a number of algorithms for generating TCP
timestamps.

[CPNI-TCP] provides a thorough discussion of the security
implications of TCP timestamps.

5. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

6. Acknowledgements

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Protection of National Infrastructure (UK CPNI) for their continued
support.

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Authors' Addresses

    Fernando Gont
    UK Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure

    Email: fernando@gont.com.ar
    URI: http://www.cpni.gov.uk

    Andre Oppermann
    FreeBSD

    Email: andre@freebsd.org