

IPv6 Operations Working Group (v6ops)  
Internet-Draft  
Intended status: Informational  
Expires: April 17, 2016

F. Gont  
SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH  
N. Hilliard  
INEX  
G. Doering  
SpaceNet AG  
W. Liu  
Huawei Technologies  
W. Kumari  
Google  
October 15, 2015

Operational Implications of IPv6 Packets with Extension Headers  
draft-gont-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-packet-drops-01

## Abstract

This document summarizes the security and operational implications of IPv6 extension headers, and attempts to analyze reasons why packets with IPv6 extension headers may be dropped in the public Internet.

## Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of [BCP 78](#) and [BCP 79](#).

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at <http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/>.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on April 17, 2016.

## Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to [BCP 78](#) and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (<http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info>) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents

Internet-Draft

IPv6 Extension Headers

October 2015

carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

## Table of Contents

<a href="#">1.</a>	<a href="#">Introduction . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">2</a>
<a href="#">2.</a>	<a href="#">Previous Work on IPv6 Extension Headers . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">3</a>
<a href="#">3.</a>	<a href="#">Security Implications . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">3</a>
<a href="#">4.</a>	<a href="#">Operational Implications . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">5</a>
	4.1. Requirement to process required layer-3/layer-4 information . . . . .	<a href="#">5</a>
	<a href="#">4.2.</a> Route-Processor Protection . . . . .	<a href="#">7</a>
	<a href="#">4.3.</a> Inability to Perform Fine-grained Filtering . . . . .	<a href="#">7</a>
<a href="#">5.</a>	<a href="#">A Possible Attack Vector . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">7</a>
<a href="#">6.</a>	<a href="#">IANA Considerations . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">9</a>
<a href="#">7.</a>	<a href="#">Security Considerations . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">9</a>
<a href="#">8.</a>	<a href="#">Acknowledgements . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">9</a>
<a href="#">9.</a>	<a href="#">References . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">10</a>
	<a href="#">9.1.</a> Normative References . . . . .	<a href="#">10</a>
	<a href="#">9.2.</a> Informative References . . . . .	<a href="#">10</a>
	Authors' Addresses . . . . .	<a href="#">13</a>

## [1.](#) Introduction

IPv6 Extension Headers (EHs) allow for the extension of the IPv6 protocol, and provide support for core functionality such as IPv6 fragmentation. However, common implementation limitations suggest that EHs present a challenge for IPv6 packet routing equipment, and evidence exists to suggest that IPv6 packets with EHs may be intentionally dropped on the public Internet in some network deployments.

Discussions about the security and operational implications of IPv6 extension headers are a regular feature in IETF working groups and other places. Often in these discussions, important security and operational issues are overlooked.

This document tries to raise awareness about the security and operational implications of IPv6 Extension Headers, and presents reasons why some networks drop packets containing IPv6 Extension

Headers.

[Section 2](#) of this document summarizes the work that has been done in the area of IPv6 extension headers. [Section 3](#) discusses the security

implications of IPv6 Extension Headers, while [Section 4](#) discusses their operational implications.

## [2.](#) Previous Work on IPv6 Extension Headers

Some of the implications of IPv6 Extension Headers have been discussed in IETF circles. For example, [[I-D.taylor-v6ops-fragdrop](#)] discusses a rationale for which operators drop IPv6 fragments. [[I-D.wkumari-long-headers](#)] discusses possible issues arising from "long" IPv6 header chains. [[RFC7045](#)] clarifies how intermediate nodes should deal with IPv6 extension headers. [[RFC7112](#)] discusses the issues arising in a specific case where the IPv6 header chain is fragmented into two or more fragments (and formally forbids such case). [[I-D.kampanakis-6man-ipv6-eh-parsing](#)] describes how inconsistencies in the way IPv6 packets with extension headers are parsed by different implementations may result in evasion of security controls, and presents guidelines for parsing IPv6 extension headers with the goal of providing a common and consistent parsing methodology for IPv6 implementations. [[RFC6980](#)] analyzes the security implications of employing IPv6 fragmentation with Neighbor Discovery for IPv6, and formally recommends against such usage. Finally, [[RFC7123](#)] discusses how some popular RA-Guard implementations are subject to evasion by means of IPv6 extension headers.

Some preliminary measurements regarding the extent to which packet containing IPv6 EHs are dropped in the public Internet have been presented in [[PMTUD-Blackholes](#)], [[Gont-IEPG88](#)], [[Gont-Chown-IEPG89](#)], and [[Linkova-Gont-IEPG90](#)]. [[I-D.ietf-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-in-real-world](#)] presents more comprehensive results and documents the methodology for obtaining the presented results.

## [3.](#) Security Implications

The security implications of IPv6 Extension Headers generally fall into one or more of these categories:

- o Evasion of security controls
- o DoS due to processing requirements
- o DoS due to implementation errors
- o Extension Header-specific issues

Unlike IPv4 packets where the upper-layer protocols can be trivially found by means of the "IHL" ("Internet Header Length") IPv4 header field, the structure of IPv6 packets is more flexible and complex.

Locating upper-layer protocol information requires that all IPv6 extension headers be examined. This has presented implementation difficulties, and packet filtering mechanisms on several security devices can be trivially evaded by inserting IPv6 Extension Headers between the main IPv6 header and the upper layer protocol. [[RFC7113](#)] describes this issue for the RA-Guard case, but the same techniques can be employed to circumvent other IPv6 firewall and packet filtering mechanisms. Additionally, implementation inconsistencies in packet forwarding engines may result in evasion of security controls [[I-D.kampanakis-6man-ipv6-eh-parsing](#)] [[Atlasis2014](#)] [[BH-EU-2014](#)].

As noted in [Section 4](#), packets that use IPv6 Extension Headers may have a negative performance impact on the handling devices. Unless appropriate mitigations are put in place (e.g., packet dropping and/or rate-limiting), an attacker could simply send a large amount of IPv6 traffic employing IPv6 Extension Headers with the purpose of performing a Denial of Service (DoS) attack.

NOTE: In the most trivial case, a packet that includes a Hop-by-Hop Options header will typically go through the slow forwarding path, and be processed by the router's CPU. An implementation-dependent case might be that in which a router that has been configured to enforce an ACL based on upper-layer information (e.g., upper layer protocol or TCP Destination Port), needs to process the entire IPv6 header chain (in order to find the required information) and this causes the packet to be processed in the slow path [[Cisco-EH-Cons](#)]. We note that, for obvious reasons, the aforementioned performance issues may also affect

other devices such as firewalls, Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS), etc. [[Zack-FW-Benchmark](#)]. The extent to which these devices are affected will typically be implementation-dependent.

IPv6 implementations, like all other software, tend to mature with time and wide-scale deployment. While the IPv6 protocol itself has existed for almost 20 years, serious bugs related to IPv6 Extension Header processing continue to be discovered. Because there is currently little operational reliance on IPv6 Extension headers, the corresponding code paths are rarely exercised, and there is the potential that bugs still remain to be discovered in some implementations.

IPv6 Fragment Headers are employed to allow fragmentation of IPv6 packets. While many of the security implications of the fragmentation / reassembly mechanism are known from the IPv4 world, several related issues have crept into IPv6 implementations. These range from denial of service attacks to information leakage, for

example [[I-D.ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id](#)], [[Bonica-NANOG58](#)] and [[Atlasis2012](#)]).

## [4.](#) Operational Implications

### [4.1.](#) Requirement to process required layer-3/layer-4 information

Intermediate systems and middleboxes often need to process the entire IPv6 extension header chain to find the layer-4 header. When such devices are unable to obtain the required information, they may simply drop the corresponding packets. The following subsections discuss some of reasons for which such layer-4 information may be needed by an intermediate systems or middlebox, and why packets containing IPv6 extension headers may represent a challenge in such scenarios.

#### [4.1.1.](#) Enforcing infrastructure ACLs

Generally speaking, infrastructure ACLs drop unwanted packets destined to parts of a provider's infrastructure, because they are not operationally needed and can be used for attacks of different sorts against the router's control plane. Some traffic needs to be

differentiated depending on layer-3 or layer-4 criteria to achieve a useful balance of protection and functionality, for example:

- o Permit some amount of ICMP echo (ping) traffic towards the router's addresses for troubleshooting.
- o Permit BGP sessions on the shared network of an exchange point (potentially differentiating between the amount of packets/seconds permitted for established sessions and connection establishment), but do not permit other traffic from the same peer IP addresses.

#### 4.1.2. DDoS Management and Customer Requests for Filtering

The case of customer DDoS protection and edge-to-core customer protection filters is similar in nature to the infrastructure ACL protection. Similar to iACL protection, layer-4 ACLs generally need to be applied as close to the edge of the network as possible, even though the intent is to protect the customer edge rather than the provider core. Application of layer-4 DDoS protection to a network edge is often automated using Flowspec [[RFC5575](#)].

For example, a web site which normally only handled traffic on TCP ports 80 and 443 could be subject to a volumetric DDoS attack using NTP and DNS packets with randomised source IP address, thereby rendering useless traditional [[RFC5635](#)] source-based real-time black hole mechanisms. In this situation, DDoS protection ACLs could be

configured to block all UDP traffic at the network edge without impairing the web server functionality in any way. Thus, being able to block arbitrary protocols at the network edge can avoid DDoS-related problems both in the provider network and on the customer edge link.

#### 4.1.3. ECMP and Hash-based Load-Sharing

In the case of ECMP (equal cost multi path) load sharing, the router on the sending side of the link needs to make a decision regarding which of the links to use for a given packet. Since round-robin usage of the links is usually avoided in order to prevent packet reordering, forwarding engines need to use a mechanism which will consistently forward the same data streams down the same forwarding paths. Most forwarding engines achieve this by calculating a simple

hash using an n-tuple gleaned from a combination of layer-2 through to layer-4 packet header information. This n-tuple will typically use the src/dst MAC address, src/dst IP address, and if possible further layer-4 src/dst port information. As layer-4 port information increases the entropy of the hash, it is highly desirable to use it where possible.

#### 4.1.4. Packet Forwarding Engine Constraints

Most modern routers use dedicated hardware (e.g. ASICs or NPUs) to determine how to forward packets across their internal fabrics. One of the common methods of handling next-hop lookup is to send a small portion of the ingress packet to a lookup engine with specialised hardware (e.g. Tertiary CAM or RLDRAM) to determine the packet's next-hop. Technical constraints mean that there is a trade-off between the amount of data sent to the lookup engine and the overall performance of the lookup engine. If more data is sent, the lookup engine can inspect further into the packet, but the overall performance of the system will be reduced. If less data is sent, the overall performance of the router will be increased but the packet lookup engine may not be able to inspect far enough into a packet to determine how it should be handled.

Note: For example, current high-end routers at the time of authorship of this document can use up to 192 bytes of header (Cisco ASR9000 Typhoon) or 384 bytes of header (Juniper MX Trio)

If a hardware forwarding engine on a modern router cannot make a forwarding decision about a packet because critical information is not sent to the look-up engine, then the router will normally drop the packet. Historically, some packet forwarding engines punted packets of this form to the control plane for more in-depth analysis, but this is unfeasible on most current router architectures as a

result of the vast difference between the hardware forwarding capacity of the router and the size of the management link which connects the control plane to the forwarding plane.

If an IPv6 header chain is sufficiently long that its header exceeds the packet look-up capacity of the router, then it may be dropped due to hardware inability to determine how it should be handled.

## [4.2.](#) Route-Processor Protection

Most modern routers have a fast hardware-assisted forwarding plane and a loosely coupled control plane, connected together with a link that has much less capacity than the forwarding plane could handle. Traffic differentiation cannot be done by the control plane side, because this would overload the internal link connecting the forwarding plane to the control plane.

The Hop-by-Hop Options header is particularly challenging since, in most (if not all) implementations, it causes the corresponding packet to be punted to a software path. As a result, operators usually drop IPv6 packets containing this extension header.

## [4.3.](#) Inability to Perform Fine-grained Filtering

Some routers lack of fine-grained filtering of IPv6 extension headers. For example, an operator may want to drop packets containing Routing Header Type 0 (RHT0) but may only be able to filter on the extension header type (Routing Header). As a result, the operator may end up enforcing a more coarse filtering policy (e.g. "drop all packets containing a Routing Header" vs. "only drop packets that contain a Routing Header Type 0").

## [5.](#) A Possible Attack Vector

The widespread drop of IPv6 packets employing IPv6 Extension Headers can, in some scenarios, be exploited for malicious purposes: if packets employing IPv6 EHs are known to be dropped on the path from system A to system B, an attacker could cause packets sent from A to B to be dropped by sending a forged ICMPv6 Packet Too Big (PTB) [[RFC4443](#)] error message to A (advertising an MTU smaller than 1280), such that subsequent packets from A to B include a fragment header (i.e., they result in atomic fragments [[RFC6946](#)]).

Possible scenarios where this attack vector could be exploited include (but are not limited to):

- o Communication between any two systems through to public network (e.g., client from/to server or server from/to server), where



intermediate router

- o Communication between two BGP peers employing IPv6 transport, where these BGP peers implement ACLs to drop IPv6 fragments (to avoid control-plane attacks)

The aforementioned attack vector is exacerbated by the following factors:

- o The attacker does not need to forge the IPv6 Source Address of his attack packets. Hence, deployment of simple [BCP38](#) filters will not help as a counter-measure.
- o Only the IPv6 addresses of the IPv6 packet embedded in the ICMPv6 payload need to be forged. While one could envision filtering devices enforcing [BCP38](#)-style filters on the ICMPv6 payload, the use of extension headers (by the attacker) could make this difficult, if not impossible.
- o Many implementations fail to perform validation checks on the received ICMPv6 error messages, as recommended in [Section 5.2 of RFC4443](#) and documented in [RFC5927](#). It should be noted that in some cases, such as when an ICMPv6 error message has (supposedly) been elicited by a connection-less transport protocol (or some other connection-less protocol being encapsulated in IPv6), it may be virtually impossible to perform validation checks on the received ICMPv6 error messages. And, because of IPv6 extension headers, the ICMPv6 payload might not even contain any useful information on which to perform validation checks.
- o Upon receipt of one of the aforementioned ICMPv6 "Packet Too Big" error messages, the Destination Cache [RFC4861](#) is usually updated to reflect that any subsequent packets to such destination should include a Fragment Header. This means that a single ICMPv6 "Packet Too Big" error message might affect multiple communication instances (e.g. TCP connections) with such destination.
- o A router or other middlebox cannot simply drop all incoming ICMPv6 Packet Too Big error messages, as this would create a PMTUD blackhole.

Possible mitigations for this issue include:

- o Dropping incoming ICMPv6 Packet Too Big error messages that advertise a Next-Hop MTU smaller than 1280 bytes.

- o Artificially reducing the MTU to 1280 bytes and dropping incoming ICMPv6 PTB error messages.

Both of these mitigations come at the expense of possibly preventing communication through SIIT [[RFC6145](#)] that relies on IPv6 atomic fragments (see [[I-D.ietf-6man-deprecate-atomfrag-generation](#)]), and also implies that the filtering device has the ability to filter ICMP PTB messages based on the contents of the MTU field.

[[I-D.ietf-6man-deprecate-atomfrag-generation](#)] has recently proposed to deprecate the generation of IPv6 atomic fragments, and update SIIT [[RFC6145](#)] such that it does not rely on ICMPv6 atomic fragments. Thus, any of the above mitigations would eliminate the attack vector without any interoperability implications.

## [6.](#) IANA Considerations

There are no IANA registries within this document. The RFC-Editor can remove this section before publication of this document as an RFC.

## [7.](#) Security Considerations

The security implications of IPv6 extension headers are discussed in [Section 3](#). A specific attack vector that could leverage the widespread dropping of packets with IPv6 EHs (along with possible countermeasures) is discussed in [Section 5](#). This document does not introduce any new security issues.

## [8.](#) Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Mikael Abrahamsson, and Eric Vyncke, for providing valuable comments on earlier versions of this document. Additionally, the authors would like to thank participants of the v6ops working group for their valuable input on the topics that led to the publication of this document.

Fernando Gont would like to thank Fernando Gont would like to thank Jan Zorz / Go6 Lab <<http://go6lab.si/>>, and Jared Mauch / NTT America, for providing access to systems and networks that were employed to perform experiments and measurements involving packets with IPv6 Extension Headers. Additionally, he would like to thank SixXS <<https://www.sixxs.net>> for providing IPv6 connectivity.

## [9.](#) References

### [9.1.](#) Normative References

- [RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", [RFC 2460](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC2460, December 1998, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>>.
- [RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", [RFC 4443](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>>.
- [RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman, "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", [RFC 4861](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>>.
- [RFC6145] Li, X., Bao, C., and F. Baker, "IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm", [RFC 6145](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC6145, April 2011, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6145>>.
- [RFC6946] Gont, F., "Processing of IPv6 "Atomic" Fragments", [RFC 6946](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC6946, May 2013, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6946>>.

### [9.2.](#) Informative References

- [Atlasis2012] Atlasis, A., "Attacking IPv6 Implementation Using Fragmentation", BlackHat Europe 2012. Amsterdam, Netherlands. March 14-16, 2012, <[https://media.blackhat.com/bh-eu-12/Atlasis/bh-eu-12-Atlasis-Attacking\\_IPv6-Slides.pdf](https://media.blackhat.com/bh-eu-12/Atlasis/bh-eu-12-Atlasis-Attacking_IPv6-Slides.pdf)>.
- [Atlasis2014] Atlasis, A., "A Novel Way of Abusing IPv6 Extension Headers to Evade IPv6 Security Devices", May 2014,

<<http://www.insinuator.net/2014/05/a-novel-way-of-abusing-ipv6-extension-headers-to-evade-ipv6-security-devices/>>.

[BH-EU-2014]

Atlasis, A., Rey, E., and R. Schaefer, "Evasion of High-End IDPS Devices at the IPv6 Era", BlackHat Europe 2014, 2014, <<https://www.ernw.de/download/eu-14-Atlasis-Rey-Schaefer-briefings-Evasion-of-HighEnd-IPS-Devices-wp.pdf>>.

Gont, et al.

Expires April 17, 2016

[Page 10]

---

Internet-Draft

IPv6 Extension Headers

October 2015

[Bonica-NANOG58]

Bonica, R., "IPv6 Extension Headers in the Real World v2.0", NANOG 58. New Orleans, Louisiana, USA. June 3-5, 2013, <<https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/mon.general.fragmentation.bonica.pdf>>.

[Cisco-EH-Cons]

Cisco, , "IPv6 Extension Headers Review and Considerations", October 2006, <[http://www.cisco.com/en/US/technologies/tk648/tk872/technologies\\_white\\_paper0900aecd8054d37d.pdf](http://www.cisco.com/en/US/technologies/tk648/tk872/technologies_white_paper0900aecd8054d37d.pdf)>.

[Gont-Chown-IEPG89]

Gont, F. and T. Chown, "A Small Update on the Use of IPv6 Extension Headers", IEPG 89. London, UK. March 2, 2014, <<http://www.iepg.org/2014-03-02-ietf89/fgont-iepg-ietf89-eh-update.pdf>>.

[Gont-IEPG88]

Gont, F., "Fragmentation and Extension header Support in the IPv6 Internet", IEPG 88. Vancouver, BC, Canada. November 13, 2013, <<http://www.iepg.org/2013-11-ietf88/fgont-iepg-ietf88-ipv6-frag-and-eh.pdf>>.

[I-D.ietf-6man-deprecate-atomfrag-generation]

Gont, F., LIU, S., and T. Anderson, "Deprecating the Generation of IPv6 Atomic Fragments", [draft-ietf-6man-deprecate-atomfrag-generation-03](#) (work in progress), July 2015.

[I-D.ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id]

Gont, F., "Security Implications of Predictable Fragment

Identification Values", [draft-ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id-10](#) (work in progress), October 2015.

[I-D.ietf-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-in-real-world]

Gont, F., Linkova, J., Chown, T., and S. LIU, "Observations on the Dropping of Packets with IPv6 Extension Headers in the Real World", [draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-in-real-world-01](#) (work in progress), October 2015.

[I-D.kampanakis-6man-ipv6-eh-parsing]

Kampanakis, P., "Implementation Guidelines for parsing IPv6 Extension Headers", [draft-kampanakis-6man-ipv6-eh-parsing-01](#) (work in progress), August 2014.

Gont, et al.

Expires April 17, 2016

[Page 11]

---

Internet-Draft

IPv6 Extension Headers

October 2015

[I-D.taylor-v6ops-fragdrop]

Jaeggli, J., Colitti, L., Kumari, W., Vyncke, E., Kaeo, M., and T. Taylor, "Why Operators Filter Fragments and What It Implies", [draft-taylor-v6ops-fragdrop-02](#) (work in progress), December 2013.

[I-D.wkumari-long-headers]

Kumari, W., Jaeggli, J., Bonica, R., and J. Linkova, "Operational Issues Associated With Long IPv6 Header Chains", [draft-wkumari-long-headers-03](#) (work in progress), June 2015.

[Linkova-Gont-IEPG90]

Linkova, J. and F. Gont, "IPv6 Extension Headers in the Real World v2.0", IEPG 90. Toronto, ON, Canada. July 20, 2014, <<http://www.iepg.org/2014-07-20-ietf90/iepg-ietf90-ipv6-ehs-in-the-real-world-v2.0.pdf>>.

[PMTUD-Blackholes]

De Boer, M. and J. Bosma, "Discovering Path MTU black holes on the Internet using RIPE Atlas", July 2012, <<http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/publications/pmtu-black-holes-msc-thesis.pdf>>.

[RFC5575] Marques, P., Sheth, N., Raszuk, R., Greene, B., Mauch, J.,

and D. McPherson, "Dissemination of Flow Specification Rules", [RFC 5575](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC5575, August 2009, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5575>>.

- [RFC5635] Kumari, W. and D. McPherson, "Remote Triggered Black Hole Filtering with Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF)", [RFC 5635](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC5635, August 2009, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5635>>.
- [RFC5927] Gont, F., "ICMP Attacks against TCP", [RFC 5927](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC5927, July 2010, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5927>>.
- [RFC6980] Gont, F., "Security Implications of IPv6 Fragmentation with IPv6 Neighbor Discovery", [RFC 6980](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC6980, August 2013, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6980>>.
- [RFC7045] Carpenter, B. and S. Jiang, "Transmission and Processing of IPv6 Extension Headers", [RFC 7045](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC7045, December 2013, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7045>>.

Gont, et al.

Expires April 17, 2016

[Page 12]

---

Internet-Draft

IPv6 Extension Headers

October 2015

- [RFC7112] Gont, F., Manral, V., and R. Bonica, "Implications of Oversized IPv6 Header Chains", [RFC 7112](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC7112, January 2014, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7112>>.
- [RFC7113] Gont, F., "Implementation Advice for IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard)", [RFC 7113](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC7113, February 2014, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7113>>.
- [RFC7123] Gont, F. and W. Liu, "Security Implications of IPv6 on IPv4 Networks", [RFC 7123](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC7123, February 2014, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7123>>.
- [RIPE-Atlas] RIPE, , "RIPE Atlas", <<https://atlas.ripe.net/>>.
- [Zack-FW-Benchmark]

Zack, E., "Firewall Security Assessment and Benchmarking IPv6 Firewall Load Tests", IPv6 Hackers Meeting #1, Berlin, Germany. June 30, 2013,  
<<http://www.ipv6hackers.org/meetings/ipv6-hackers-1/zack-ipv6hackers1-firewall-security-assessment-and-benchmarking.pdf>>.

#### Authors' Addresses

Fernando Gont  
SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH  
Evaristo Carriego 2644  
Haedo, Provincia de Buenos Aires 1706  
Argentina

Phone: +54 11 4650 8472  
Email: [fgont@si6networks.com](mailto:fgont@si6networks.com)  
URI: <http://www.si6networks.com>

Nick Hilliard  
INEX  
4027 Kingswood Road  
Dublin 24  
IE

Email: [nick@inex.ie](mailto:nick@inex.ie)

Gont, et al.

Expires April 17, 2016

[Page 13]

---

Internet-Draft

IPv6 Extension Headers

October 2015

Gert Doering  
SpaceNet AG  
Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14  
Muenchen D-80807  
Germany

Email: [gert@space.net](mailto:gert@space.net)

Will (Shucheng) Liu  
Huawei Technologies

Bantian, Longgang District  
Shenzhen 518129  
P.R. China

Email: liushucheng@huawei.com

Warren Kumari  
Google  
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway  
Mountain View, CA 94043  
US

Email: warren@kumari.net