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HTTP Integrity Header draft-hallambaker-httpintegrity-00

Abstract

The HTTP Integrity header provides a means of authenticating HTTP requests and responses using a Message Authentication Code (MAC). This document defines the HTTP integrity header and specifies its use to authenticate and verify specific parts of an HTTP message. the means by which the symmetric or asymmetric keys used to authenticate the messages is outside the scope of this document.

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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Author's Address

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