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Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VII: Security Considerations

#### Abstract

The Mathematical Mesh 'The Mesh' is an end-to-end secure infrastructure that facilitates the exchange of configuration and credential data between multiple user devices. The core protocols of the Mesh are described with examples of common use cases and reference data.

[Note to Readers]

Discussion of this draft takes place on the MATHMESH mailing list (mathmesh@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email\_list=mathmesh.

This document is also available online at <a href="http://mathmesh.com/">http://mathmesh.com/</a>
<a href="Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-security.html">Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-security.html</a>.

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#### 1. Introduction

#### 2. Definitions

This section presents the related specifications and standard, the terms that are used as terms of art within the documents and the terms used as requirements language.

### 2.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

#### 2.2. Defined Terms

The terms of art used in this document are described in the *Mesh Architecture Guide* [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].

### 2.3. Related Specifications

The architecture of the Mathematical Mesh is described in the *Mesh Architecture Guide* [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]. The Mesh documentation set and related specifications are described in this document.

# 2.4. Implementation Status

The implementation status of the reference code base is described in the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer].

#### 2.5. Shared Classes

The following classes are used as common elements in Mesh profile specifications.

# 2.5.1. Classes describing keys

# 2.5.2. Structure: KeyData

The KeyData class is used to describe public key pairs and trust assertions associated with a public key.

UDF: String (Optional) UDF fingerprint of the public key
 parameters/

X509Certificate: Binary (Optional) List of X.509 Certificates

X509Chain: Binary [0..Many] X.509 Certificate chain.

X509CSR: Binary (Optional)

X.509 Certificate Signing Request.

**NotBefore: DateTime (Optional)** If present specifies a time instant that use of the private key is not valid before.

**NotOnOrAfter: DateTime (Optional)** If present specifies a time instant that use of the private key is not valid on or after.

# 2.5.3. Structure: KeyComposite

**Service: String (Optional)** Service holding the additional contribution

# 2.5.4. Structure: DeviceRecryptionKey

UDF: String (Optional) The fingerprint of the encryption key

RecryptionKey: KeyData (Optional) The recryption key

**EnvelopedRecryptionKeyDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional)** The decryption key encrypted under the user's device key.

# 2.5.5. Structure: EscrowedKeySet

A set of escrowed keys.

[No fields]

#### 2.6. Assertion classes

Classes that are derived from an assertion.

# 2.6.1. Structure: Assertion

Parent class from which all assertion classes are derived

Names: String [0..Many] Fingerprints of index terms for profile retrieval. The use of the fingerprint of the name rather than the name itself is a precaution against enumeration attacks and other forms of abuse.

Updated: DateTime (Optional) The time instant the profile was last modified.

**NotaryToken: String (Optional)** A Uniform Notary Token providing evidence that a signature was performed after the notary token was created.

#### 2.6.2. Structure: Condition

Parent class from which all condition classes are derived.

[No fields]

#### 2.6.3. Base Classes

Abstract classes from which the Profile, Activation and Connection classes are derrived.

#### 2.6.4. Structure: Profile

**Inherits: Assertion** 

Parent class from which all profile classes are

derived

**KeyOfflineSignature: KeyData (Optional)** The permanent signature key used to sign the profile itself. The UDF of the key is used as the permanent object identifier of the profile. Thus, by definition, the KeySignature value of a Profile does not change under any circumstance. The only case in which a

**KeysOnlineSignature: KeyData [0..Many]** A Personal profile contains at least one OSK which is used to sign device administration application profiles.

## 2.6.5. Structure: Connection

Inherits: Assertion UDF of the connection target.

SubjectUDF: String (Optional)

AuthorityUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the connection source.

#### 2.6.6. Structure: Activation

**Inherits: Assertion** 

Contains the private activation information for a Mesh application running on a specific device

**EnvelopedConnection: DareEnvelope (Optional)** The signed AssertionDeviceConnection.

ActivationKey: String (Optional) The master secret from which all the key contributions are derrived.

#### 2.6.7. Structure: Permission

Name: String (Optional) Keys or key contributions enabling the

Role: String (Optional) operation to be performed

Capabilities: DareEnvelope (Optional)

#### 2.6.8. Mesh Profile Classes

A Mesh profile does not have activation or connection classes associated with it.

It might be more consistent to represent administation devices as activations on the ProfileMesh class though.

#### 2.6.9. Structure: ProfileMesh

**Inherits: Profile** 

Describes the long term parameters associated with a personal profile.

**KeysMasterEscrow: KeyData [0..Many]** A Personal Profile MAY contain one or more PMEK keys to enable escrow of private keys used for stored data.

**KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional)** Key used to pass encrypted data to the device such as a DeviceUseEntry

# 2.6.10. Mesh Device Classes

# 2.6.11. Structure: ProfileDevice

**Inherits: Profile** 

Describes a mesh device.

Description: String (Optional) Description of the device

**KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional)** Key used to pass encrypted data to the device such as a DeviceUseEntry

**KeyAuthentication: KeyData (Optional)** Key used to authenticate requests made by the device.

#### 2.6.12. Structure: ActivationDevice

**Inherits: Activation** 

[No fields]

# 2.6.13. Structure: ConnectionDevice

Inherits: Connection List of the permissions that the device has **Permissions: Permission [0..Many]** been granted.

**KeySignature: KeyData (Optional)** The signature key for use of the device under the profile

**KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional)** The encryption key for use of the device under the profile

# **KeyAuthentication: KeyData (Optional)**

The authentication key for

use of the device under the profile

## 2.6.14. Structure: CatalogedDevice

Inherits: CatalogedEntry

Public device entry, indexed under the

device ID

UDF: String (Optional) UDF of the signature key of the device in

the Mesh

EnvelopedProfileMesh: DareEnvelope (Optional) The Mesh profile

DeviceUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the signature key of the device

EnvelopedProfileDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) The device profile

**EnvelopedConnectionDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional)** The public

assertion demonstrating connection of the Device to the Mesh

 $\textbf{EnvelopedActivationDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional)} \quad \textbf{The activations}$ 

of the device within the  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{Mesh}}$ 

Accounts: AccountEntry [0..Many] The accounts that this device is

connected to

# 2.6.15. Structure: CatalogedPublication

Inherits: CatalogedEntry

A publication.

ID: String (Optional) Unique identifier code

Authenticator: String (Optional) The witness key value to use to

request access to the record.

EnvelopedData: DareEnvelope (Optional) Dare Envelope containing the

entry data

NotOnOrAfter: DateTime (Optional) Epiration time (inclusive)

### 2.6.16. Mesh Account Classes

### 2.6.17. Structure: ProfileAccount

**Inherits: Profile** 

Account assertion. This is signed by the service

hosting the account.

AccountAddresses: String [0..Many]

Service address(es).

**MeshProfileUDF: String (Optional)** Master profile of the account being registered.

**KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional)** Key used to encrypt data under this profile

**KeyAuthentication: KeyData (Optional)** Key used to authenticate requests made by the device.

**EnvelopedProfileService: DareEnvelope (Optional)** The service profile

#### 2.6.18. Structure: ActivationAccount

Inherits: Activation The UDF of the account

AccountUDF: String (Optional)

**KeyAccountEncryption: KeyData (Optional)** Key used to encrypt data under this profile

**KeyAccountSignature: KeyData (Optional)** Key used to encrypt data under this profile

### 2.6.19. Structure: ConnectionAccount

Inherits: Connection The list of service identifiers.

AccountAddresses: String [0..Many]

**Permissions: Permission [0..Many]** List of the permissions that the device has been granted.

**KeySignature: KeyData (Optional)** The signature key for use of the device under the profile

**KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional)** The encryption key for use of the device under the profile

**KeyAuthentication: KeyData (Optional)** The authentication key for use of the device under the profile

# 2.6.20. Structure: AccountEntry

Contains the Account information for an account with a CatalogedDevice.

AccountUDF: String (Optional) UDF of the account profile

EnvelopedProfileAccount: DareEnvelope (Optional) The account
 profile

EnvelopedConnectionAccount: DareEnvelope (Optional)

The connection

of this device to the account

 $\textbf{EnvelopedActivationAccount: DareEnvelope (Optional)} \quad \textbf{The activation}$ 

data for this device to the account

2.6.21. Structure: ConnectionApplication

**Inherits: Connection** 

[No fields]

2.6.22. Mesh Group Classes

2.6.23. Structure: ProfileGroup

Inherits: Profile

Describes a group. Note that while a group is created by one person who becomes its first administrator, control of the group may pass to other administrators over time.

AccountAddresses: String [0..Many] Service address(es).

**KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional)** Key currently used to encrypt

data under this profile

2.6.24. Structure: ActivationGroup

Inherits: Activation The UDF of the group

GroupUDF: String (Optional)

2.6.25. Structure: ConnectionGroup

Describes the connection of a member to a group.

Inherits: Connection The decryption key for the user within the
KeyEncryption: KeyComposite (Optional) group

2.6.26. Mesh Service Classes

2.6.27. Structure: ProfileService

Inherits: Profile

Profile of a Mesh Service

**KeyAuthentication: KeyData (Optional)** Key used to authenticate

service connections.

**KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional)** Key used to encrypt data under

this profile

2.6.28. Structure: ConnectionService

**Inherits: Connection** 

[No fields]

2.6.29. Mesh Host Classes

2.6.30. Structure: ProfileHost

Inherits: Profile Key used to authenticate service connections.

**KeyAuthentication: KeyData (Optional)** 

2.6.31. Structure:

ConnectionHost

**Inherits: Connection** 

[No fields]

2.7. Cataloged items

2.7.1. Data Structures

Classes describing data used in cataloged data.

2.7.2. Structure: Contact

**Inherits: Assertion** 

Base class for contact entries.

Id: String (Optional) The globally unique contact identifier.

**Anchors: Anchor [0..Many]** Mesh fingerprints associated with the contact.

NetworkAddresses: NetworkAddress [0..Many] Network address entries

**Locations: Location [0..Many]** The physical locations the contact is associated with.

Roles: Role [0..Many] The roles of the contact

**Bookmark: Bookmark [0..Many]** The Web sites and other online presences of the contact

**Sources: TaggedSource [0..Many]** Source(s) from which this contact was constructed.

2.7.3. Structure: Anchor

Trust anchor

UDF: String (Optional) The trust anchor.

**Validation: String (Optional)** 

The means of validation.

## 2.7.4. Structure: TaggedSource

Source from which contact information was obtained.

**LocalName: String (Optional)** Short name for the contact information.

Validation: String (Optional) The means of validation.

BinarySource: Binary (Optional) The contact data in binary form.

**EnvelopedSource: DareEnvelope (Optional)** The contact data in enveloped form. If present, the BinarySource property is ignored.

### 2.7.5. Structure: ContactGroup

**Inherits: Contact** 

Contact for a group, including encryption groups.

[No fields]

### 2.7.6. Structure: ContactPerson

Inherits: Contact List of person names in order of preference

CommonNames: PersonName [0..Many]

2.7.7. Structure:

### ContactOrganization

Inherits: Contact List of person names in order of preference

CommonNames: OrganizationName [0..Many]

2.7.8. Structure:

### **OrganizationName**

The name of an organization

Inactive: Boolean (Optional) If true, the name is not in current

use.

 $\label{lem:RegisteredName: String (Optional)} \ \ \mbox{The registered name}.$ 

DBA: String (Optional) Names that the organization uses including

trading names and doing business as names.

# 2.7.9. Structure: PersonName

The name of a natural person

**Inactive: Boolean (Optional)** 

If true, the name is not in current use.

**FullName: String (Optional)** The preferred presentation of the full name.

First: String (Optional) First name.

Middle: String [0..Many] Middle names or initials.

Last: String (Optional) Last name.

Suffix: String (Optional) Nominal suffix, e.g. Jr., III, etc.

PostNominal: String (Optional) Post nominal letters (if used).

#### 2.7.10. Structure: NetworkAddress

Provides all means of contacting the individual according to a particular network address

Inactive: Boolean (Optional) If true, the name is not in current
 use.

**Address: String (Optional)** The network address, e.g. alice@example.com

**NetworkCapability: String [0..Many]** The capabilities bound to this address.

**EnvelopedProfileAccount: DareEnvelope (Optional)** Optional enveloped profile for the Address

Protocols: NetworkProtocol [0..Many] Public keys associated with
 the network address

#### 2.7.11. Structure: NetworkProtocol

**Protocol: String (Optional)** The IANA protocol|identifier of the network protocols by which the contact may be reached using the specified Address.

#### 2.7.12. Structure: Role

OrganizationName: String (Optional) The organization at which the role is held

**Titles: String [0..Many]** The titles held with respect to that organization.

**Locations: Location [0..Many]** Postal or physical addresses associated with the role.

#### 2.7.13. Structure: Location

**Appartment: String (Optional)** 

Street: String (Optional) 2.7.14. Structure: Bookmark

District: String (Optional) Locality: String (Optional) County: String (Optional) Postcode: String (Optional) Country: String (Optional)

Uri: String (Optional)

Title: String (Optional) 2.7.15. Structure: Reference

Role: String [0..Many]

**MessageID: String (Optional)** The received message to which this is a response

**ResponseID: String (Optional)** Message that was generated in response to the original (optional).

Relationship: String (Optional) The relationship type. This can be Read, Unread, Accept, Reject.

#### 2.7.16. Structure: Task

**Key: String (Optional)** Unique key.

Start: DateTime (Optional) 2.8. Catalog Entries

Finish: DateTime (Optional)

StartTravel: String (Optional) 2.8.1. Structure: CatalogedEntry

FinishTravel: String (Optional)

TimeZone: String (Optional) Base class for cataloged Mesh data.

Title: String (Optional)

Description: String (Optional)
Location: String (Optional)
Trigger: String [0..Many]
Conference: String [0..Many]
Repeat: String (Optional)
Busy: Boolean (Optional)

Labels: String [0..Many]

The set of labels describing the entry

# 2.8.2. Structure: CatalogedCredential

Inherits: CatalogedEntry

Protocol: String (Optional) 2.8.3. Structure: CatalogedNetwork

Service: String (Optional)
Username: String (Optional)
Password: String (Optional)

Inherits: CatalogedEntry

Protocol: String (Optional) 2.8.4. Structure: CatalogedContact

Service: String (Optional)
Username: String (Optional)
Password: String (Optional)

Inherits: CatalogedEntry Unique key.

**Key: String (Optional)** 

Self: Boolean (Optional) If true, this catalog entry is for the

user who created the catalog.

**Permissions: Permission [0..Many]** List of the permissions that the contact has been granted.

## 2.8.5. Structure: CatalogedContactRecryption

Inherits: CatalogedContact

[No fields]

### 2.8.6. Structure: CatalogedCapability

Inherits: CatalogedEntry

[No fields]

### 2.8.7. Structure: CryptographicCapability

Id: String (Optional) The identifier of the capability. If this is a user capability, MUST match the KeyData identifier. If this is a serviced capability, MUST match the value of ServiceId on the corresponding service capability.

KeyData: KeyData (Optional) The key that enables the capability

**EnvelopedKeyShares: DareEnvelope [0..Many]** One or more enveloped key shares.

**SubjectId: String (Optional)** The identifier of the resource that is controlled using the key.

SubjectAddress: String (Optional)

The address of the resource that

is controlled using the key.

2.8.8. Structure: CapabilityDecrypt

Inherits: CryptographicCapability

The corresponding key is a

decryption key

[No fields]

2.8.9. Structure: CapabilityDecryptPartial

Inherits: CapabilityDecrypt

The corresponding key is an encryption

key

**ServiceId: String (Optional)** The identifier used to claim the capability from the service.[Only present for a partial capability.]

**ServiceAddress: String (Optional)** The service account that supports a serviced capability. [Only present for a partial capability.]

2.8.10. Structure: CapabilityDecryptServiced

**Inherits: CapabilityDecrypt** 

The corresponding key is an encryption

key

AuthenticationId: String (Optional) UDF of trust root under which request to use a serviced capability must be authorized. [Only present for a serviced capability]

2.8.11. Structure: CapabilitySign

Inherits: CryptographicCapability

The corresponding key is an

administration key

[No fields]

2.8.12. Structure: CapabilityKeyGenerate

Inherits: CryptographicCapability

The corresponding key is a key

that may be used to generate key shares.

[No fields]

# 2.8.13. Structure: CapabilityFairExchange

Inherits: CryptographicCapability

The corresponding key is a decryption key to be used in accordance with the Micali Fair Electronic Exchange with Invisible Trusted Parties protocol.

[No fields]

### 2.8.14. Structure: CatalogedBookmark

Inherits: CatalogedEntry

Uri: String (Optional) 2.8.15. Structure: CatalogedTask

Title: String (Optional)
Path: String (Optional)

Inherits: CatalogedEntry Unique key.
EnvelopedTask: DareEnvelope (Optional)

Title: String (Optional) 2.8.16. Structure:

**Key: String (Optional)** CatalogedApplication

Inherits: CatalogedEntry Enveloped keys for use with Application

**Key: String (Optional)** 

EnvelopedCapabilities: DareEnvelope [0..Many] 2.8.17. Structure: CatalogedMember

ContactAddress: String (Optional)

MemberCapabilityId: String (Optional) 2.8.18. Structure: ServiceCapabilityId: String (Optional) CatalogedGroup

Inherits: CatalogedEntry

**Inherits:** CatalogedApplication

Profile: ProfileGroup (Optional) 2.8.19. Structure:

CatalogedApplicationSSH

Inherits: CatalogedApplication

[No fields]

### 2.8.20. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail

**Inherits: CatalogedApplication** 

[No fields]

# 2.8.21. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork

**Inherits: CatalogedApplication** 

[No fields]

#### 2.9. Static Assertions

# 2.9.1. Structure: DevicePreconfiguration

A data structure that is passed

EnvelopedProfileDevice: DareEnvelope (Optional) The device profile

**ConnectUri: String (Optional)** The connection URI. This would normally be printed on the device as a QR code.

### 2.10. Messages

#### 2.10.1. Structure: Message

MessageID: String (Optional) Unique per-message ID. When encapsulating a Mesh Message in a DARE envelope, the envelope EnvelopeID field MUST be a UDF fingerprint of the MessageID value.

Sender: String (Optional) 2.10.2. Structure: MessageError

Recipient: String (Optional)
References: Reference [0..Many]

**Inherits: Message** 

ErrorCode: String (Optional) 2.10.3. Structure: MessageComplete

Inherits: Message

[No fields]

### 2.10.4. Structure: MessagePinValidated

Inherits: Message Enveloped data that is authenticated by means of
AuthenticatedData: DareEnvelope (Optional) the PIN

ClientNonce: Binary (Optional) Fingerprint of the PIN value used to PinUDF: String (Optional) authenticate the request.

PinWitness: Binary (Optional) Witness value calculated as KDF (Device.UDF + AccountAddress, ClientNonce)

### 2.10.5. Structure: MessagePIN

Account: String (Optional) If true, authentication against the PIN Inherits: Message code is sufficient to complete the associated Expires: DateTime (Optional) action without further authorization.

**Automatic: Boolean (Optional)** 

SaltedPIN: String (Optional) PIN code bound to the specified

action.

**Action: String (Optional)** The action to which this PIN code is bound.

# 2.10.6. Structure: RequestConnection

Connection request message. This message contains the information

Inherits: MessagePinValidated

AccountAddress: String (Optional) 2.10.7. Structure: AcknowledgeConnection

Connection request message generated by a service on receipt of a valid MessageConnectionRequestClient

Inherits: Message The client connection request.
EnvelopedRequestConnection: DareEnvelope (Optional)
ServerNonce: Binary (Optional) 2.10.8. Structure:
Witness: String (Optional) RespondConnection

Respond to RequestConnection message to grant or refuse the connection request.

Inherits: Message The response to the request. One of "Accept",
Result: String (Optional) "Reject" or "Pending".

CatalogedDevice: CatalogedDevice (Optional) The device information.

MUST be present if the value of Result is "Accept". MUST be
absent or null otherwise.

### 2.10.9. Structure: RequestContact

Inherits: Message One time authentication code.

Reply: Boolean (Optional)

Subject: String (Optional) The contact data.

PIN: String (Optional)

Self: DareEnvelope (Optional) 2.10.10. Structure: ReplyContact

Inherits: MessagePinValidated

Subject: String (Optional) 2.10.11. Structure: GroupInvitation

Inherits: Message

**Text: String (Optional)** 

#### 2.10.12. Structure: RequestConfirmation

**Inherits:** Message

Text: String (Optional) 2.10.13. Structure: ResponseConfirmation

**Inherits:** Message

Request: DareEnvelope (Optional) 2.10.14. Structure: RequestTask

Accept: Boolean (Optional)

**Inherits:** Message

[No fields]

#### 2.10.15. Structure: MessageClaim

**Inherits:** Message

PublicationId: String (Optional) 3. Mesh Portal Service Reference

ServiceAuthenticate: String (Optional)
DeviceAuthenticate: String (Optional)

Expires: DateTime (Optional)

#### HTTP Well Known Service Prefix: /.well-known/mmm

Every Mesh Portal

Service transaction consists of exactly one request followed by exactly one response. Mesh Service transactions MAY cause modification of the data stored in the Mesh Portal or the Mesh itself but do not cause changes to the connection state. The protocol itself is thus idempotent. There is no set sequence in which operations are required to be performed. It is not necessary to perform a Hello transaction prior to a ValidateAccount, Publish or any other transaction.

#### 3.1. Request Messages

A Mesh Portal Service request consists of a payload object that inherits from the MeshRequest class. When using the HTTP binding, the request MUST specify the portal DNS address in the HTTP Host field.

# 3.1.1. Message: MeshRequest

Base class for all request messages.

**Portal: String (Optional)** Name of the Mesh Portal Service to which the request is directed.

# 3.2. Response Messages

A Mesh Portal Service response consists of a payload object that inherits from the MeshResponse class. When using the HTTP binding, the response SHOULD report the Status response code in the HTTP response message. However the response code returned in the payload object MUST always be considered authoritative.

### 3.2.1. Message: MeshResponse

Base class for all response messages. Contains only the status code and status description fields.

[No fields]

# 3.3. Imported Objects

The Mesh Service protocol makes use of JSON objects defined in the JOSE Signatgure and Encryption specifications.

### 3.4. Common Structures

The following common structures are used in the protocol messages:

### 3.4.1. Structure: KeyValue

Describes a Key/Value structure used to make queries for records matching one or more selection criteria.

Key: String (Optional) The data retrieval key.

Value: String (Optional) The data value to match.

#### 3.4.2. Structure: SearchConstraints

Specifies constraints to be applied to a search result. These allow a client to limit the number of records returned, the quantity of data returned, the earliest and latest data returned, etc.

NotBefore: DateTime (Optional)

 $\label{eq:continuous} \text{Only data published on or after the specified time instant is requested.}$ 

**Before: DateTime (Optional)** Only data published before the specified time instant is requested. This excludes data published at the specified time instant.

**MaxEntries: Integer (Optional)** Maximum number of data entries to return.

MaxBytes: Integer (Optional) Maximum number of data bytes to

**PageKey: String (Optional)** Specifies a page key returned in a previous search operation in which the number of responses exceeded the specified bounds.

When a page key is specified, all the other search parameters except for MaxEntries and MaxBytes are ignored and the service returns the next set of data responding to the earlier query.

3.5. Transaction: Hello

Request: HelloRequest

Response: HelloResponse Report service and version information.

The Hello transaction provides a means of determining which protocol versions, message encodings and transport protocols are supported by the service.

3.6. Transaction: ValidateAccount

Request: ValidateRequest

**Response:** ValidateResponse Request validation of a proposed name

for a new account.

For validation of a user's account name during profile creation.

3.6.1. Message: ValidateRequest

Inherits: MeshRequest

Describes the proposed account properties. Currently, these are limited to the account name but could be extended in future versions of the protocol.

Account: String (Optional)

Account name requested

**Reserve: Boolean (Optional)** If true, request a reservation for the specified account name. Note that the service is not obliged to honor reservation requests.

**Language: String [0..Many]** List of ISO language codes in order of preference. For creating explanatory text.

### 3.6.2. Message: ValidateResponse

### **Inherits:** MeshResponse

States whether the proposed account properties are acceptable and (optional) returns an indication of what properties are valid.

Note that receiving a 'Valid' response to a Validate Request does not guarantee creation of the account. In addition to the possibility that the account namecould be requested by another user between the Validate and Create transactions, a portal service MAY perform more stringent validation criteria when an account is actually being created. For example, checking with the authoritative list of current accounts rather than a cached copy.

Valid: Boolean (Optional) If true, the specified account identifier is acceptable. If false, the account identifier is rejected.

**Minimum: Integer (Optional)** Specifies the minimum length of an account name.

**Maximum: Integer (Optional)** Specifies the maximum length of an account name.

InvalidCharacters: String (Optional) A list of characters that the service does not accept in account names. The list of characters MAY not be exhaustive but SHOULD include any illegal characters in the proposed account name.

**Reason: String (Optional)** Text explaining the reason an account name was rejected.

# 3.7. Transaction: CreateAccount

Request: CreateRequest

Response: CreateResponse Request creation of a new portal account.

Unlike a profile, a mesh account is specific to a particular Mesh portal. A mesh account must be created and accepted before a profile can be published.

# 3.7.1. Message: CreateRequest

Request creation of a new portal account. The request specifies the requested account identifier and the Mesh profile to be associated with the account.

Inherits: MeshRequest Account identifier requested.

Account: String (Optional)

3.7.2. Message: CreateResponse

Inherits: MeshResponse

Reports the success or failure of a Create

transaction.

[No fields]

3.8. Transaction: DeleteAccount

Request: DeleteRequest

Response: DeleteResponse Request deletion of a portal account.

Deletes a portal account but not the underlying profile. Once registered, profiles are permanent.

3.8.1. Message: DeleteRequest

Request deletion of a new portal account. The request specifies the requested account identifier.

Inherits: MeshRequest Account identifier to be deleted.

Account: String (Optional)

3.8.2. Message: DeleteResponse

Inherits: MeshResponse

Reports the success or failure of a Delete

transaction.

[No fields]

3.9. Transaction: Get

Request: GetRequest

Response: GetResponse Search for data in the mesh that matches a

set of properties described by a sequence of

key/value pairs.

3.9.1. Message: GetRequest

Describes the Portal or Mesh data to be retreived.

Inherits: MeshRequest

Identifier: String (Optional)

Lookup by profile ID

Account: String (Optional) Lookup by Account ID

**KeyValues: KeyValue [0..Many]** List of KeyValue pairs specifying the conditions to be met

SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional) Constrain the search to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total size of data records returned.

Multiple: Boolean (Optional) If true return multiple responses if available

**Full: Boolean (Optional)** If true, the client requests that the full Mesh data record be returned containing both the Mesh entry itself and the Mesh metadata that allows the date and time of the publication of the Mesh entry to be verified.

# 3.9.2. Message: GetResponse

Reports the success or failure of a Get transaction. If a Mesh entry matching the specified profile is found, contains the list of entries matching the request.

Inherits: MeshResponse List of mesh data records matching the
DataItems: DataItem [0..Many] request.

PageKey: String (Optional) If non-null, indicates that the number and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server limits.

# 3.10. Transaction: Publish

Request: PublishRequest

**Response:** PublishResponse Publish a profile or key escrow entry to the mesh.

# 3.10.1. Message: PublishRequest

Requests publication of the specified Mesh entry.

Inherits: MeshRequest

[No fields]

# 3.10.2. Message: PublishResponse

Reports the success or failure of a Publish transaction.

**Inherits: MeshResponse** 

[No fields]

3.11. Transaction: Status

Request: StatusRequest

Response: StatusResponse Request the current status of the mesh as

seen by the portal to which it is

directed.

The response to the status request contains the last signed checkpoint and proof chains for each of the peer portals that have been checkpointed.

[Not currently implemented]

3.11.1. Message: StatusRequest

Inherits: MeshRequest

Initiates a status transaction.

[No fields]

3.11.2. Message: StatusResponse

Reports the success or failure of a Status transaction.

Inherits: MeshResponse Time that the last write update was made to
LastWriteTime: DateTime (Optional) the Mesh

**LastCheckpointTime: DateTime (Optional)** Time that the last Mesh checkpoint was calculated.

**NextCheckpointTime: DateTime (Optional)** Time at which the next Mesh checkpoint should be calculated.

CheckpointValue: String (Optional) Last checkpoint value.

3.12. Transaction: ConnectStart

Request: ConnectStartRequest

Response: ConnectStartResponse Request connection of a new device

to a mesh profile

3.12.1. Message: ConnectStartRequest

Inherits: MeshRequest

Initial device connection request.

**SignedRequest: SignedConnectionRequest (Optional)** 

Device connection request signed by the signature key of the device requesting connection.

**AccountID: String (Optional)** Account identifier of account to which the device is requesting connection.

# 3.12.2. Message: ConnectStartResponse

Reports the success or failure of a ConnectStart transaction.

Inherits: MeshRequest

[No fields]

#### 3.13. Transaction: ConnectStatus

Request: ConnectStatusRequest

Response: ConnectStatusResponse Request status of pending

connection request of a new device

to a mesh profile

### **3.13.1.** Message: ConnectStatusRequest

Inherits: MeshRequest

Request status information for a pending request posted previously.

**AccountID: String (Optional)** Account identifier for which pending connection information is requested.

**DeviceID: String (Optional)** Device identifier of device requesting status information.

### **3.13.2.** Message: ConnectStatusResponse

Reports the success or failure of a ConnectStatus transaction.

Inherits: MeshRequest The signed ConnectionResult object.

Result: SignedConnectionResult (Optional)

3.14. Transaction:

### ConnectPending

Request: ConnectPendingRequest

**Response: ConnectPendingResponse** Request a list of pending requests for an administration profile.

# 3.14.1. Message: ConnectPendingRequest

Inherits: MeshRequest

Specify the criteria for pending requests.

AccountID: String (Optional)

The account identifier of the account for which pending connection requests are requested.

SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional) Constrain the search to a specific time interval and/or limit the number and/or total size of data records returned.

#### 3.14.2. Message: ConnectPendingResponse

Reports the success or failure of a ConnectPending transaction.

Inherits: MeshRequest A list of pending requests satisfying the
Pending: SignedConnectionRequest [0..Many] criteria set out in the
 request.

PageKey: String (Optional) If non-null, indicates that the number and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server limits.

# 3.15. Transaction: ConnectComplete

Request: ConnectCompleteRequest

**Response: ConnectCompleteResponse** Post response to a pending connection request.

### 3.15.1. Message: ConnectCompleteRequest

Reports the success or failure of a ConnectComplete transaction.

Inherits: MeshRequest The connection result to be posted to the
Result: SignedConnectionResult (Optional) portal. The result MUST
 be signed by a valid administration key for the Mesh profile.

**AccountID: String (Optional)** The account identifier to which the connection result is posted.

### 3.15.2. Message: ConnectCompleteResponse

Inherits: MeshRequest

 $\label{eq:Reports} \mbox{Reports the success or failure of a } \\ \mbox{ConnectComplete transaction.}$ 

[No fields]

## 3.16. Transaction: Transfer

Request: TransferRequest
Response: TransferResponse

Perform a bulk transfer of the log between the specified transaction identifiers. Requires appropriate authorization

[Not currently implemented]

### 3.16.1. Message: TransferRequest

Request a bulk transfer of the log between the specified transaction identifiers. Requires appropriate authorization

Inherits: MeshRequest Constrain the search to a specific time
SearchConstraints: SearchConstraints (Optional) interval and/or
limit the number and/or total size of data records returned.

# 3.16.2. Message: TransferResponse

### **Inherits:** MeshResponse

Reports the success or failure of a Transfer transaction. If successful, contains the list of Mesh records to be transferred.

DataItems: DataItem [0..Many] List of mesh data records matching
 the request.

PageKey: String (Optional) If non-null, indicates that the number and/or size of the data records returned exceeds either the SearchConstraints specified in the request or internal server limits.

- 4. Assets
- 4.1. Data
- 4.2. Credentials
- 4.3. Reputation
- 4.3.1. Outbound Messaging Abuse ()
- 5. Risks
- 5.1. Confidentiality

Is a regulatory requirement GDPR/HIPPA

### **5.1.1.** Privacy

Stronger requirement, given data but with restrictions on use
Unintended use within an organization may put it in default

HIPPA

# 5.2. Integrity

Modification of data enables control breaches

### 5.3. Availability

### 5.3.1. Data loss

Loss of the pictures of the kids at 5

# 5.3.2. Partial data survivability

Where they buried Aunt Agatha's jewelry but not where they buried Aunt Agatha.

# 5.4. Inbound Messaging Abuse (Spam)

- 6. Threats
- 6.1. End point Compromise
- 7. Controls
- 7.1. Cryptographic
- 7.1.1. Triple lock

# 7.1.1.1. Transport Security

Traffic analysis protection

# 7.1.1.2. Message Security

Access control

Authentication / Integrity

# 7.1.1.3. Data Level Security

Data Confidentiality

Non-Repudiation

# 7.1.2. Key Protection

Use of platform provided facilities to bind private keys in the Device profile to the device is highly desirable. Ideally, private

keys should be protected against extraction by hardware techniques presenting a high degree of resistance.

## 7.1.2.1. Windows

Use encrypted key store

Preferably use BitLocker

# 7.1.2.2. OSX

Use Key Ring

### 7.1.2.3. iOS

Use ???

# 7.1.2.4. Linux

Use the DBUS mechanism

### 7.1.2.5. Android

Hope and prayers.

### 7.1.3. Key and Nonce Generation

Use strong mechanisms as described in RFC???

Use of key co-generation as described in part 8 is advised

# 7.1.4. Key Escrow and Recovery

Master profile keys should be escrowed

Escrow strategies for DARE should take account of the fact that users may want some but not all their data assets to survive them.

## 7.1.5. Profile Verification

Check that the device credential has been signed by an administration device and that the administration device was properly authorized by the master profile.

Device catalog MUST be signed by the admin device.

Future ? provide protection against rollback attacks.

# 7.1.6. Identity Validation

See the separate document on the trust model

# 7.1.7. Trust Broker Accountability

Cert transparency type techniques

## 7.2. Mesh Messaging

# 7.2.1. Ingress Control

Every message is subject to access control

Mesh Services should perform abuse filtering on inbound mail

Mesh Services **MUST** apply user specified ingress control as specified in their contacts catalog.

# 7.2.2. Egress Control

Some applications may require egress control

For example, classified environments

Mail too stupid to send

### 7.2.3. Security Signal

Confirmation messages requiring payments

Need Accountability

Need to know the source of the accountability assertions

Should be distinguished from sender controlled part of a message

#### 7.2.3.1. Brand

If messages are being sent on behalf of a corporate entity, this should be signaled to both sender and receiver

Sender ? remind them that they are speaking on behalf of another party

Receiver ? establish who is speaking by the familiar technique.

# 7.2.4. Accountability

Authentication and consequences

### 8. Security Considerations

This document comprises the security considerations for the use and implementation of the Mathematical Mesh.

- 8.1. Integrity
- 8.1.1. DNS Spoofing
- 8.1.2. TLS Downgrade
- 8.1.3. TLS Service Impersonation
- 8.1.4. Request Replay Attack
- 8.1.5. Response Replay Attack
- 8.2. Confidentiality
- 8.2.1. Side Channel Attack
- 8.2.2. Session Key Leakage
- 9. IANA Considerations

All the IANA considerations for the Mesh documents are specified in this document

### 10. Acknowledgements

A list of people who have contributed to the design of the Mesh is presented in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].

#### 11. Normative References

### [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]

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### 12. Informative References

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