

Network Working Group
Internet-Draft
Expires: February 26, 2006

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August 25, 2005

Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) key exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH)
Transport Layer Protocol
draft-harris-ssh-rsa-kex-05

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Abstract

This memo describes a key-exchange method for the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol based on Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public-key encryption. It uses much less client CPU time than the Diffie-Hellman algorithm specified as part of the core protocol, and hence is particularly suitable for slow client systems.

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[1.](#) Introduction

Secure Shell (SSH) [[I-D.ietf-secsh-architecture](#)] is a secure remote-login protocol. The core protocol uses Diffie-Hellman key exchange. On slow CPUs, this key exchange can take tens of seconds to complete, which can be irritating for the user. A previous version of the SSH protocol, described in [[SSH1](#)] uses a key-exchange method based on Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public-key encryption, which consumes an order of magnitude less CPU time on the client, and hence is particularly suitable for slow client systems such as mobile devices. This memo describes a key-exchange mechanism for the version of SSH described in [[I-D.ietf-secsh-architecture](#)] which is similar to that used by the older version, and about as fast, while retaining the security advantages of the newer protocol.

[2.](#) Conventions Used in this Document

The key words "MUST" and "SHOULD" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

[3.](#) Overview

The RSA key-exchange method consists of three messages. The server sends to the client an RSA public key, K_T , to which the server holds the private key. This may be a transient key generated solely for this SSH connection, or it may be re-used for several connections. The client generates a string of random bytes, K , encrypts it using K_T , and sends the result back to the server, which decrypts it. The client and server each hash K , K_T , and the various key-exchange parameters to generate the exchange hash, H , which is used to generate the encryption keys for the session, and the server signs H with its host key and sends the signature to the client. The client then verifies the host key as described in [[I-D.ietf-secsh-transport](#)].

This method provides explicit server identification as defined in section 7 of [[I-D.ietf-secsh-transport](#)]. It requires a signature-capable host key.

[4.](#) Details

The RSA key exchange method has the following parameters, which are defined by the method name:

HASH	hash algorithm for calculating exchange hash etc.
HLEN	output length of HASH in bits
MINKLEN	minimum transient RSA modulus length in bits

The method uses the following messages.

First, the server sends:

byte	SSH_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY
string	server public host key and certificates (K_S)
string	K_T, transient RSA public key

The key K_T is encoded according to the "ssh-rsa" scheme described in section 6.6 of [[I-D.ietf-secsh-transport](#)]. Note that unlike an "ssh-rsa" host key, K_T is only used for encryption, and not for signature. The modulus of K_T MUST be at least MINKLEN bits long.

The client generates a random integer, K, in the range $0 \leq K < 2^{(KLEN-2HLEN-49)}$, where KLEN is the length of the modulus of K_T, in bits. The client then uses K_T to encrypt:

mpint	K, the shared secret
-------	----------------------

The encryption is performed according to the RSAES-OAEP scheme of [[RFC3447](#)], with a mask generation function of MGF1-with-HASH, a hash of HASH, and an empty label. See [Appendix A](#) for a proof that the encoding of K is always short enough to be thus encrypted. Having performed the encryption, the client sends:

byte	SSH_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET
string	RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT(K_T, K)

Note that the last stage of RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT is to encode an

integer as an octet-string using the I2OSP primitive of [[RFC3447](#)]. This, combined with encoding the result as an SSH "string", gives a result which is similar, but not identical, to the SSH "mpint" encoding applied to that integer. This is the same encoding as is used by "ssh-rsa" signatures in [[I-D.ietf-secsh-transport](#)].

The server decrypts K. If a decryption error occurs, the server SHOULD send SSH_MESSAGE_DISCONNECT with a reason code of SSH_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED and MUST disconnect. Otherwise, the server responds with:

byte SSH_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE

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string signature of H with host key

The hash H is computed as the HASH hash of the concatenation of the following:

string	V_C, the client's version string (CR and NL excluded)
string	V_S, the server's version string (CR and NL excluded)
string	I_C, the payload of the client's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
string	I_S, the payload of the server's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
string	K_S, the host key
string	K_T, the transient RSA key
string	RSAES_OAEP_ENCRYPT(K_T, K), the encrypted secret
mpint	K, the shared secret

This value is called the exchange hash, and it is used to authenticate the key exchange. The exchange hash SHOULD be kept secret.

The signature algorithm MUST be applied over H, not the original data. Most signature algorithms include hashing and additional padding. For example, "ssh-dss" specifies SHA-1 hashing. In such cases, the data is first hashed with HASH to compute H, and H is then hashed again as part of the signing operation.

[5.](#) rsa1024-sha1

The "rsa1024-sha1" method specifies RSA key exchange as described above with the following parameters:

HASH SHA-1, as defined in [[RFC3174](#)]
HLEN 160
MINKLEN 1024

[6.](#) rsa2048-sha256

The "rsa2048-sha256" method specifies RSA key exchange as described above with the following parameters:

HASH SHA-256, as defined in [[FIPS-180-2](#)]
HLEN 256
MINKLEN 2048

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[7.](#) Message numbers

The following message numbers are defined:

SSH_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY 30
SSH_MSG_KEXRSA_SECRET 31
SSH_MSG_KEXRSA_DONE 32

[8.](#) Security Considerations

The security considerations in [[I-D.ietf-secsh-architecture](#)] apply.

If the RSA private key generated by the server is revealed then the session key is revealed. The server should thus arrange to erase this from memory as soon as it is no longer required. If the same RSA key is used for multiple SSH connections, an attacker who can find the private key (either by factorising the public key or by other means) will gain access to all of the sessions which used that key. As a result, servers SHOULD use each RSA key for as few key exchanges as possible.

[RFC3447] recommends that RSA keys used with RSAES-OAEP not be used with other schemes, or with RSAES-OAEP using a different hash function. In particular, this means that K_T should not be used as a host key, or as a server key in earlier versions of the SSH protocol.

K, the random integer generated by the client, is the only secret shared by client and server. Thus its entropy directly determines the security of the session against eavesdropping.

The size of transient key used should be sufficient to protect the encryption and integrity keys generated by the key exchange method. For recommendations on this, see [RFC3766]. The strength of RSAES-OAEP is in part dependent on the hash function it uses. [RFC3447] suggests using a hash with an output length of twice the security level required, so SHA-1 is appropriate for applications requiring up to 80 bits of security, and SHA-512 for those requiring up to 256 bits.

Unlike the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method defined by [I-D.ietf-secsh-transport], this method allows the client to fully determine the shared secret, K. This is believed not to be significant, since K is only ever used when hashed with data provided in part by the server (usually in the form of the exchange hash, H). If an extension to SSH were to use K directly and to assume that it had been generated by Diffie-Hellman key exchange, this could produce a security weakness. Protocol extensions using K directly should be

viewed with extreme suspicion.

This key-exchange method is designed to be resistant to collision attacks on the exchange hash, by ensuring that neither side is able to freely choose its input to the hash after seeing all of the other side's input. The server's last input is in SSH_MSG_KEXRSA_PUBKEY, before it has seen the client's choice of K. The client's last input is K and its RSA encryption, and the one-way nature of RSA encryption should ensure that the client cannot choose K so as to cause a collision.

9. IANA Considerations

IANA should assign the names "rsa1024-sha1" and "rsa2048-sha256" as

Key Exchange Method Names in accordance with [I-D.ietf-secsh-assignednumbers].

10. Acknowledgments

The author acknowledges the assistance of Simon Tatham with the design of this key exchange method.

The text of this document is derived in part from [I-D.ietf-secsh-transport].

11. References

11.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 2119](#), March 1997.

[RFC3174] Eastlake, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)", [RFC 3174](#), September 2001.

[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1", [RFC 3447](#), February 2003.

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[FIPS-180-2]

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[11.2.](#) Informative References

[SSH1] Ylonen, T., "SSH -- Secure Login Connections over the Internet", 6th USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 37-42, July 1996.

[RFC3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", [BCP 86](#), [RFC 3766](#), April 2004.

[Appendix A.](#) On the size of K

The requirements on the size of K are intended to ensure that it is always possible to encrypt it under K_T. The mpint encoding of K requires a leading zero bit, padding to a whole number of bytes, and a four-byte length field, giving a maximum length in bytes,
$$B = (KLEN - 2HLEN - 49 + 1 + 7) / 8 + 4 = (KLEN - 2HLEN - 9) / 8$$
(where "/" represents integer division rounding down).

The maximum length of message that can be encrypted using RSAEP-OAEP is defined by [\[RFC3447\]](#) in terms of the key length in bytes, which is $(KLEN + 7) / 8$. The maximum length is thus $L = (KLEN + 7 - 2HLEN - 16) / 8 = (KLEN - 2HLEN - 9) / 8$. Thus, the encoded version of K is always small enough to be encrypted under K_T.

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"SSH" is a registered trademark in the United States.

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Acknowledgment

Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the

Internet Society.

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