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EAP Mutual Cryptographic Binding
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Abstract

As the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) evolves, EAP peers rely increasingly on information received from the EAP server. EAP extensions such as channel binding or network posture information are often carried in tunnel methods; peers are likely to rely on this information. [RFC 3748] is a facility that protects tunnel methods against man-in-the-middle attacks. However, cryptographic binding focuses on protecting the server rather than the peer. This memo explores attacks possible when the peer is not protected from man-in-the-middle attacks and recommends mutual cryptographic binding, a new form of cryptographic binding that protects both peer and server.

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1. Introduction

The Extensible Authentication Protocol [[RFC3778](#)] provides authentication between a peer (a party accessing some service) and an authentication server. Traditionally, peers have not relied significantly on information received from EAP servers. However facilities such as EAP Channel Binding [[I-D.ietf-emu-chbind](#)] provide the peer with confirmation of information about the resource it is accessing. Other facilities such as EAP Posture Transport [[I-D.ietf-nea-pt-eap](#)] permit a peer and EAP server to discuss the security properties of accessed networks. Both of these facilities provide peers with information they need to rely on and provide attackers who are able to impersonate an EAP server to a peer with new opportunities for attack.

Instead of adding these new facilities to all EAP methods, work has focused on adding support to tunnel methods [[I-D.ietf-emu-eaptunnel-req](#)]. There are numerous tunnel methods including [[RFC4851](#)], [[RFC5281](#)], and work on building a standards track tunnel method [[I-D.ietf-emu-eap-tunnel-method](#)]. These tunnel methods are extensible. By adding an extension to support a facility such as channel binding to a tunnel method, it can be used with any inner method carried in the tunnel.

Tunnel methods need to be careful about man-in-the-middle attacks. See [section 3.2](#) and 4.6.3 in [[I-D.ietf-emu-eaptunnel-req](#)] and [[TUNNEL-MITM](#)] for a detailed description of these attacks. An example of the attack can happen when a peer is willing to perform authentication inside and outside a tunnel. An attacker can impersonate the EAP server and offer the inner method to the peer. However, on the other side, the attacker acts as a man-in-the-middle and opens a tunnel to the real EAP server. Figure 1 illustrates this attack. At the end of the attack, the EAP server believes it is talking to the peer. At the inner method level, this is true. At the outer method level, however, the server is talking to the attacker.

the same. One common way to do this is to ask the outer party (the other end of the tunnel) to prove knowledge of the Master Session Key (MSK) of the inner method. As defined in [RFC 3748](#), cryptographic binding may prove to the peer that the inner and outer exchanges are with the same party, but it typically does not make this proof; instead it is typically limited to proving to the server that the inner and outer peer are the same.


2. An Example Problem

The GSS-EAP mechanism [[I-D.ietf-abfab-gss-eap](#)] provides application authentication using EAP. A peer could reasonably trust some applications significantly more than others. If the peer sends confidential information to some applications, an attacker may gain significant value from convincing the peer that the attacker is the trusted application. Channel bindings are used to tell the peer which application service is being connected to. Prior to channel bindings, peers could not distinguish one Network Access Service (NAS) from another, so attacks where one NAS impersonated another were out-of-scope. However channel bindings add this capability and thus expands the threat model of EAP. The GSS-EAP mechanism requires distinguishing one service from another.

A relatively untrusted service, say a print server, has been compromised. A user is attempting to connect to a trusted service such as a financial application. Both the print server and the financial application use an Authentication, Authorization and Accounting protocol (AAA) to transport EAP authentication back to the user's EAP server. The print server mounts a man-in-the-middle attack on the user's connection to the financial application and claims to be the application.

The print server offers a tunnel method towards the peer. The print server extracts the inner method from the tunnel and sends it on towards the AAA server. Channel binding happens at the tunnel method though. So, the print server is happy to confirm that it is the financial application. After the inner method completes, the EAP server sends the MSK to the print server over the AAA protocol. If only the MSK is needed for cryptographic binding then the print server can successfully perform cryptographic binding and may be able to impersonate the financial application to the peer.

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A modified tunnel attack when an extra server rather than extra client is inserted.

Channel Binding Requires More than Crypto Binding

This attack is not specific to GSS-EAP. The channel bindings specification [[I-D.ietf-emu-chbind](#)] describes a number of situations where channel bindings are important for network access. In these situations one NAS could impersonate another by using a similar attack.

3. The Server insertion Attack

The previous section described an example of the server insertion attack. In this attack, one party adds a layer of tunneling such that from the perspective of the EAP peer, there are more methods than from the perspective of the EAP server. This attack is most beneficial when the party inserting the extra tunnel is a legitimate NAS, so mitigations need to be able to prevent a legitimate NAS from inappropriately adding a layer of tunneling. Some deployments utilize an intentional intermediary that adds an extra level of EAP tunneling between the peer and the EAP server; see [Section 3.3](#) for a discussion.

3.1. Conditions for the Attack

For an inserted server attack to have value, the attacker needs to gain an advantage from its attack. An advantage to the attacker could come from:

- o The attacker can send information to a peer that the peer would trust from the EAP server but not the attacker. Examples of this include channel binding responses.
- o The peer sending information to the attacker that was intended for the EAP server. For example, the inner user identity may disclose privacy-sensitive information. The channel binding request may disclose what service the peer wishes to connect to.
- o The attacker may influence session parameters. For example, if the attacker can influence the MSK, then the attacker may be able to read or influence session traffic and mount an attack on the confidentiality or integrity of the resulting session.
- o An attacker may impact availability of the session. In practice though, an attacker that can mount a server insertion attack is likely to be able to impact availability in other ways.

For this attack to be possible, the following conditions need to hold:

1. The attacker needs to be able to establish a tunnel method with the peer over which the peer will authenticate.
2. The attacker needs to be able to respond to any inner authentication. For example an attacker who is a legitimate NAS can forward the inner authentication over AAA towards the EAP server. Note that the inner authentication may not be EAP.

3. Typically, the attacker needs to be able to complete the tunnel method after inner authentication. This may not be necessary if the attacker is gaining advantage from information sent by the peer over the tunnel.
4. In some cases the attacker may need to complete a Secure Association Protocol (SAP) or otherwise demonstrate knowledge of the MSK after the tunnel method successfully completes.

Attackers who are legitimate NASes are the primary focus of this memo. Previous work has provided mitigation against attackers who are not a NAS; these mitigations are briefly discussed.

3.2. Mitigation Strategies

3.2.1. Server Authentication

If the peer confirms the identity of the party that the tunnel method is established with, the peer prevents the first condition (attacker establishing a tunnel method). Many tunnel methods rely on TLS [[RFC5281](#)] [[I-D.ietf-emu-eap-tunnel-method](#)]. The specifications for these methods tend to encourage or mandate certificate checking. If the TLS certificate is validated back to a trust anchor and the identity of the tunnel method server confirmed, then the first attack condition cannot be met.

Many challenges make server authentication difficult. There is not an obvious name by which to identify a tunnel method server. It is not obvious where in the tunnel server certificate the name should be found. One particularly problematic practice is to use a certificate that names the host on which the tunnel server runs. Given such a name it is very difficult for a peer to understand whether that server is intended to be a tunnel method server for the realm.

It's not clear what trust anchors to use for tunnel servers. Using commercial Certificate Authorities (CAs) is probably undesirable because tunnel servers often operate in a closed community and are often provisioned with certificates issued by that community. Using commercial CAs can be particularly problematic with peers that support hostnames in certificates. Then anyone who can obtain a certificate for any host in the domain being contacted can impersonate a tunnel server.

These difficulties lead to poor deployment of good certificate validation. Many peers make it easy to disable certificate validation. Other peers validate back to trust anchors but do not check names of certificates. What name types are supported and what configuration is easy to perform depends significantly on the peer in

question.

Specifications also make the problem worse. For example [[RFC5281](#)] indicates that the only impact of failing to perform certificate validation is that the inner method can be attacked. Administrators and implementors believing this claim may believe that protection from passive attacks is sufficient.

In addition, some deployments such as provisioning or strong inner methods are designed to work without certificate validation. [Section 3.9](#) of the tunnel requirements [[I-D.ietf-emu-eaptunnel-req](#)] discusses this requirement.

[3.2.2. Server Policy](#)

Server policy can potentially prevent the second condition (attacker being able to respond to inner authentication) from being possible. If the server only performs a particular inner authentication within a tunnel, then the attacker cannot gain a response to the inner authentication without their being such a tunnel. The attacker may be able to add a second layer of tunnels; see Figure 1. The inner tunnel may limit the attacker's capabilities; for example if channel binding is performed over tunnel t2 in the figure, then an attacker cannot observe or influence it.

A tunnel t1 from the peer to the attacker contains a tunnel t2 from the peer to the home EAP server. Inside t2 is an inner authentication.

Figure 1: Multiple Layered Tunnels

Peer policy can be combined with this server policy to help prevent conditions 1 (attacker can establish a tunnel the peer will use) and 2 (attacker can respond to inner authentication). If the peer requires exactly one tunnel of a particular type and the EAP server only performs inner authentication over a tunnel of this type, then the attacker cannot establish tunnel t1 in the figure above.

An attacker may be able to mount a more traditional man-in-the-middle attack in this instance; see Figure 2. This policy on the peer and EAP server combined with a tunnel method that supports cryptographic binding will allow the EAP server to detect the attacker. This means the attacker cannot act as a legitimate NAS and in particular does not obtain the MSK. So, if the tunnel between the attacker and peer also requires cryptographic binding and if the cryptographic binding requires both the EAP server and peer to prove knowledge of the inner MSK, then the authentication will fail.

A tunnel t1 extends from the peer to the attacker. a tunnel t2 extends from the attacker to the home EAP server. An inner EAP authentication is forwarded unmodified by the attacker from t1 to t2. The attacker can observe this inner authentication.

Figure 2: A Traditional Man-in-the-Middle Attack

Cryptographic binding is only a valuable component of a defense if the inner authentication is a key-deriving EAP method. Most tunnel methods also support non-EAP inner authentication such as Microsoft Chap version 2 [[RFC2759](#)]. This may undermine cryptographic binding in a number of ways. An attacker may be able to convert an EAP method into a compatible non-EAP form of the same credential to suppress cryptographic binding. In addition, an inner authentication may be available through an entirely different means. For example, a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol [[RFC4510](#)] or other directory server may provide an attacker a way to get challenges and provide responses for an authentication mechanism entirely outside of the AAA/EAP context. An attacker with this capability may be able to get around server policy requiring an inner authentication be used only in a given type of tunnel.

An attacker can convert an inner authentication using an EAP method to a inner authentication that does not use EAP in some cases. This may avoid cryptographic binding.

Converting EAP Inner Authentication

An attacker may contact another authentication resource to gain a challenge useful for an inner authentication.

Non-EAP Sources of Inner Authentication

To Recap, the following policy conditions appear sufficient to prevent a server insertion attack:

1. Peer and EAP server require a particular inner EAP method used within a particular tunnel method
2. The inner EAP method's authentication is only available within the tunnel and through no other means including non-EAP means
3. The inner EAP method produces a key
4. The tunnel method supports cryptographic authentication and the peer requires the other end of the tunnel to prove knowledge of the inner MSK.

3.2.3. Existing Cryptographic Binding

The most advanced examples of cryptographic binding today work at two levels. First, the server and peer prove to each other knowledge of the inner MSK. Then, the inner MSK is combined into some outer key material to form the tunnel's keys. This is sufficient to detect an inserted server or peer provided that the attacker does not learn the inner MSK. This seems sufficient to defend against attackers who cannot act as a legitimate NAS.

The definition of cryptographic binding in [RFC 3748](#) does not require these steps. To meet that definition it would be sufficient for a peer to prove knowledge of the inner key to the EAP server. This would open some additional attacks. For example by indicating success an attacker might be able to mask a cryptographic binding failure. Especially if only the tunnel key material is used for the final keys, the peer is unlikely to be able to detect the failure.

As discussed in the previous section, cryptographic binding is only effective when the inner method is EAP.

3.2.4. Introducing Mutual Cryptographic Binding

Cryptographic binding can be strengthened when the inner EAP method supports an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK). The EMSK is never disclosed to any party other than the EAP server or peer, so even a legitimate NAS cannot learn the EMSK. So, if the same techniques currently applied to the inner MSK are applied to the inner EMSK, then condition 3 (completing tunnel authentication) will not hold because the attacker cannot complete this new form of cryptographic binding. This does not prevent the attacker from learning confidential information such as a channel binding request sent over the tunnel prior to cryptographic binding.

Obviously as with all forms of cryptographic binding, cryptographic binding only works for key-deriving inner EAP methods. Also, some deployments (see [Section 3.3](#) insert intermediates between the peer and the EAP server. EMSK-based cryptographic binding is incompatible with these deployments because the intermediate cannot learn the EMSK.

Formally, mutual cryptographic binding is a security claim for EAP tunnel methods that holds when:

1. The peer proves to the server that the peer participating in any inner method is the same as the peer for the tunnel method.

2. The server proves to the peer that the server for any inner method is the same as the server for the tunnel method.
3. The MSK and EMSK for the tunnel depend on the MSK and EMSK of inner methods.
4. A tunnel method may support mutual cryptographic binding optionally and fall back to MSK-based cryptographic binding (for example when an intermediate is intended) but MUST NOT prevent an attacker who is unaware of the inner MSK from forcing a bid-down to MSK-based cryptographic binding. Peers MUST be able to require that if mutual cryptographic binding is unavailable, the authentication will fail.
5. Proofs offered need to be secure even against attackers who know the inner method MSK.

If mutual cryptographic binding is not an optional facility it provides a strong defense against server insertion attacks and other tunnel MITM attacks for inner methods that provide an EMSK. The strength of the defense is dependent on the strength of the inner method. The value of mutual cryptographic binding is reduced somewhat if it is an optional feature. It permits configurations where a peer requires mutual cryptographic binding if the peer has insufficient information configured to validate the certificate and identity of an EAP server.

3.2.5. Mix Key into Long-Term Credentials

Another defense against tunnel MITM attacks potentially including server insertion attacks is to use a different credential for tunneled methods from other authentications. This may prevent the second condition (attacker being able to respond to inner authentication) from taking place. For example, if key material from the tunnel is mixed into a shared secret or password that is the basis of the inner authentication, then the second condition will not hold unless the attacker already knows this shared secret. The advantage of this approach is that it seems to be the only way to strengthen non-EAP inner authentications within a tunnel.

There are several disadvantages. Choosing a function to mix the tunnel key material into the inner authentication will be very dependent on the inner authentication. In addition, this appears to involve a layering violation. However, exploring the possibility of providing a solution like this seems important because it can function for inner authentications where no other approach will work.

3.3. Intended Intermediates

Some deployments introduce a tunnel server separate from the EAP server; see [[RFC5281](#)] for an example of this style of deployment. The only difference between such an intermediate and an attacker is that the intermediate provides some function valuable to the peer or EAP server and that the intermediate is trusted by the peer. If peers are configured with the necessary information to validate certificates of these intermediates and to confirm their identity, then tunnel MITM and inserted server attacks can be defended against. The intermediates need to be trusted with regard to channel binding and other services that the peer depends on.

Support for trusted intermediates is not a requirement according to the tunnel method requirements.

It seems reasonable to treat trusted intermediates as a special case if they are supported and to focus on the security of the case where there are not intermediates in the tunnel as the common case.

4. Recommendations

4.1. Mutual Cryptographic Binding

The EAP Tunnel Method [[I-D.ietf-emu-eap-tunnel-method](#)] should gain support for mutual cryptographic binding.

As channel binding support is added to existing EAP methods, mutual cryptographic binding should also be added to these methods. Mutual cryptographic binding may also be valuable when other services are added to EAP methods that may require a peer trust an EAP server.

4.2. State Tracking

Today, mutual authentication in EAP is thought of as a security claim about a method. However, in practice it's an attribute of a particular exchange. Mutual authentication can be obtained via checking certificates, through mutual cryptographic binding, or in very controlled cases through carefully crafted peer and server policy combined with existing cryptographic binding. Using services like channel binding that involve the peer trusting the EAP server should require mutual authentication be present in the session.

to accomplish this, implementations including channel binding or other peer services MUST track whether mutual authentication has happened. They SHOULD default to not permitting these peer services unless mutual authentication has happened. They SHOULD support a configuration where the peer fails to authenticate unless mutual authentication takes place. Discussion of whether this configuration should be recommended as a default is required.

The EAP Tunnel Method should permit peers to force authentication failure if they are unable to perform mutual authentication. The protocol should permit this to be deferred until after mutual cryptographic binding is considered.

Services such as channel binding should be deferred until after cryptographic binding/mutual cryptographic binding.

4.3. Certificate Naming

Work is required to promote interoperable deployment of server certificate validation by peers. A standard way to name EAP servers is required. Recommendations for what name forms peers should implement is required.

4.4. Inner Mixing

More consideration of the proposal to mix some key material into inner authentications is desired. As stated today, the proposal is under-defined and fairly invasive. Are there versions of this proposal that would be valuable? Is there a way to view it as something more abstract so that it does not involve tunnel and inner method specific combinatorial explosion?

[5.](#) Survey of Tunnel Methods

[6.](#) Survey of Inner Methods

[7.](#) Security Considerations

8. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Alan DeKok for helping to explore these attacks. Alan focused the discussion on the importance of inner authentications that are not EAP and proposed mixing in key material as a way to resolve these authentications.

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