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**Security Requirements of NV03  
draft-hartman-nvo3-security-requirements-01**

Abstract

This draft discusses the security requirements and several issues which need to be considered in securing a virtualized data center network for multiple tenants (a NV03 network for short). In addition, the draft also attempts to discuss how such issues could be addressed or mitigated.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

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**1. Introduction**

Security is the key issue which needs to be considered in the design of a data center network. This document first lists the security risks that a NV03 network may encounter and the security requirements that a NV03 network need to fulfill. Then, this draft discusses the



essential security approaches which could be applied to fulfill such requirements.

The remainder of this document is organized as follows. ([Section 4](#)) introduces the attack model of this work and the properties that a NV03 security mechanism needs to enforce. [Section 5](#) describes the essential security mechanisms which should be provide in the generation of a NV03 network. Then, in [Section 6](#), we analyze the challenges brought by the new features mentioned in[I-D.ietf-nvo3-overlay-problem-statement].

## 2. Terminology

This document uses the same terminology as found in the NV03 Framework document [[I-D.ietf-nvo3-framework](#)] and [[I-D.kreeger-nvo3-hypervisor-nve-cp](#)]. Some of the terms defined in the framework document have been repeated in this section for the convenience of the reader, along with additional terminology that is used by this document.

Tenant System (TS): A physical or virtual system that can play the role of a host, or a forwarding element such as a router, switch, firewall, etc. It belongs to a single tenant and connects to one or more VNs of that tenant.

End System (ES): An end system of a tenant, which can be, e.g., a virtual machine(VM), a non-virtualized server, or a physical appliance. A TS is attached to a Network Virtualization Edge(NVE) node.

Network Virtualization Edge (NVE): An NVE implements network virtualization functions that allow for L2/L3 tenant separation and tenant-related control plane activity. An NVE contains one or more tenant service instances whereby a TS interfaces with its associated instance. The NVE also provides tunneling overlay functions.

Virtual Network (VN): This is a virtual L2 or L3 domain that belongs to a tenant.


Information Mapping Authority (IMA). A back-end system that is responsible for distributing and maintaining the mapping information for the entire overlay system. Note that the WG never reached consensus on what to call this architectural entity within the overlay system, so this term is subject to change. In [I-D.ietf-nvo3-overlay-problem-statement], such a back-end system is referred to as a "oracle".



3. NV03 Overlay Architecture

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This figure illustrates a simple nov3 overlay example where NVEs provide a logical L2/L3 interconnect for the Tses that belong to a specific tenant network over L3 networks. A packet from a tenant system is encapsulated when they reach the egress NVE. Then encapsulated packet is then sent to the remote NVE through a proper tunnel. When reaching the ingress NVE, the packet is decapsulated and forwarded to the target tenant system. The address advertisements and tunnel mappings are distributed among the NVEs through either distributed control protocols or by certain centralized servers (called Information Mapping Authorities).

4. Threat Model

To benefit the discussion, in this analysis work, attacks are classified into two categories: inside attacks and outside attacks. An attack is considered as an inside attack if the adversary performing the attack (inside attacker or insider) has got certain privileges in changing the configuration or software of a NV03 device (or a network devices of the underlying network where the overlay is located upon) and initiates the attack within the overlay security perimeter. In contrast, an attack is referred to as an outside attack if the adversary performing the attack (outside attacker or outsider) has no such privilege and can only initiate the attacks from compromised Tses. Note that in a complex attack inside and outside attacking operations may be performed in a well organized way to expand the damages caused by the attack.



This analysis assumes that security protocols, algorithms, and implementations provide the security properties for which they are designed; attacks depending on a failure of this assumption are out of scope. As an example, an attack caused by a weakness in a cryptographic algorithm is out of scope, while an attack caused by failure to use confidentiality when confidentiality is a security requirement is in scope.

#### **4.1. Outsider Capabilities**

The following capabilities of outside attackers MUST be considered in the design of a NOV3 security mechanism:

1. Eavesdropping on the packets,
2. Replaying the intercepted packets, and
3. Generating illegal packets and injecting them into the network.

With a successful outside attack, an attacker may be able to:

1. Analyze the traffic pattern of a tenant or an end device,
2. Disrupt the network connectivity or degrade the network service quality, or
3. Access the contents of the data/control packets if they are not encrypted.

#### **4.2. Insider Capabilities**

It is assumed that an inside attacker can perform any types of outside attacks from the inside or outside of the overlay perimeter. In addition, in an inside attack, an attacker may use already obtained privilege to, for instance,

1. Interfere with the normal operations of the overlay as a legal entity, by sending packets containing invalid information or with improper frequencies,
2. Perform spoofing attacks and impersonate another legal device to communicate with victims using the cryptographic information it obtained, and
3. Access the contents of the data/control packets if they are encrypted with the keys held by the attacker.





Note that in practice an insider controlling an underlying network device may break the communication of the overlays by discarding or delaying the delivery of the packets passing through it. However, this type of attack is out of scope.

#### **4.3. Security Properties**

When encountering an attack, a virtual data center network MUST guarantee the following security properties:

1. Isolation of the VNs: In [\[I-D.ietf-nvo3-overlay-problem-statement\]](#), the data plane isolation requirement amongst different VNs has been discussed. The traffic within a virtual network can only be transited into another one in a controlled fashion (e.g., via a configured router and/or a security gateway). In addition, it MUST be ensured that an entity cannot make use of its privilege obtained within a VN to manipulate the overlay control plane to affect on the operations of other VNs.
2. Spoofing detection: Under the attacks performed by a privileged inside attacker, the attacker cannot use the obtained cryptographic materials to impersonate another one.
3. Integrity protection and message origin authentication for the control packets: The implementation of an overlay control plane MUST support the integrity protection on the signaling packets. No entity can modify a overlay signaling packet during its transportation without being detected. Also, an attacker cannot impersonate a legal victim (e.g., a NVE or another servers within the overlay) to send signaling packets without detection.
4. Availability of the control plane: The design of the control plan must consider the DoS/DDoS attacks. Especially when there are centralized servers in the control plan of the overlay, the servers need to be well protected and make sure that they will not become the bottle neck of the control plane especially under DDOS attacks.

The following properties SHOULD be optionally provided:



1. Confidentiality and integrity of the data traffic of TSeS. In some conditions, the cryptographic protection on the TS traffic is not necessary. For example, if most of the ES data is headed towards the Internet and nothing is confidential, encryption or integrity protection on such data may be unnecessary. In addition, in the cases where the underlay network is secure enough, no additional cryptographic protection needs to be provided.
2. Confidentiality of the control plane. On many occasions, the signaling messages can be transported in plaintext. However, when the information contained within the signaling messages are sensitive or valuable to attackers (e.g., the location of a ES, when a VM migration happens), the signaling messages related with that tenant SHOULD be encrypted.

## 5. Basic Security Approaches

This section introduces the security mechanisms which could be used to provided in order to guarantee the security properties mentioned in [section 4](#) when encountering attacks.

### 5.1. Securing the Communications between NVEs and TSeS

Assume there is a VNE providing a logical L2/L3 interconnect for a set of TSeS. Apart from data traffics, the NVE and the TSeS also need to exchange signaling messages in order to facilitate, e.g., VM online detection, VM migration detection, or auto-provisioning/service discovery [[I-D.ietf-nvo3-framework](#)].

The NVE and its associated TSeS can be deployed in a distributed way (e.g., a NVE is implemented in an individual device, and VMs are located on servers) or in a co-located way (e.g., a NVE and the TSeS it serves are located on the same server).

In the former case, the data and control traffic between the NVE and the TSeS are exchanged over network. If the NVE supports multiple VNs concurrently, the data/control traffics in different VNs MUST be isolated physically or by using VPN technologies. If the network connecting the NVE and the TSeS is potentially accessible to attackers, the security properties of data traffic (e.g., integrity, confidentiality, and message origin authenticity) SHOULD be provided. The security mechanisms such as IPsec, SSL, and TCP-AO, can be used according to different security requirements.

In order to guarantee the integrity and the origin authentication of signaling messages, integrated security mechanisms or additional security protocols need to be provided. In order to secure the data/



control traffic, cryptographic keys need to be distributed to generate digests or signatures for the control packets. Such cryptographic keys can be manually deployed in advance or dynamically generated with certain automatic key management protocols (e.g., TLS [[RFC5246](#)]). The TSes belonging to different VNs MUST use different keys to secure the control packets exchanges with their NVE. Therefore, an attacker cannot use the keys it obtained from a compromised TS to generate bogus signaling messages and inject them into other VNs without being detected. For a better damage confinement capability, different TSes SHOULD use different keys to secure their control packet exchanges with NVEs, even if they belong to the same VN.

In the co-located case, all the information exchanges between the NVE and the TSes are within the same device, and no standardized protocol need to be provided for transporting control/data packets. It is also important to keep the isolation of the TS traffic in different VNs. In addition, in the co-location fashion, because the NVE, the hypervisor, and the VMs are deployed on the same device, the computing and memory resources used by the NVE, the hypervisor, and the TSes need to be isolated to prevents a malicious or compromised TS from, e.g., accessing the memory of the NVE or affecting the performance of the NVE by occupying large amounts of computing resources.

## **[5.2.](#) Securing the Communications within Overlays**

This section analyzes the security issues in the control and data plans of a NV03 overlay.

### **[5.2.1.](#) Control Plane Security**

It is the responsibility of the NV03 network to protect the control plane packets transported over the underlay network against the attacks from the underlying network. The integrity and origin authentication of the messages MUST be guaranteed. The signaling packets SHOULD be encrypted when the signaling messages are confidential. To achieve such objectives, when the network devices exchange control plane packets, integrated security mechanisms or security protocols need to provided. In addition, cryptographic keys need to be deployed manually in advance or dynamically generated by using certain automatic key management protocols (e.g., TLS [[RFC5246](#)]).

In order to enforce the security boundary of different VNs in the existence of inside adversaries, the signaling messages belonging to different VNs need to be secured by different keys. Otherwise, an inside attacker may try to use the keys obtained within a VN to



impersonate the NVEs in other VNs and generate illegal signaling messages without being detected. If we expect to provide a better attack confinement capability and prevent a compromised NVE to impersonate other NVEs in the same VN, different NVEs working inside a VN need to secure their signaling messages with different keys. When there are centralized servers providing mapping information (IMAs) within the overlay, it will be important to prevent a compromised NVE from impersonating the centralized servers to communicate with other NVEs. A straightforward solution is to associate different NVEs with different keys when they exchange information with the centralized servers.

In the cases where there are a large amount of NVEs working within a NV03 overlay, manual key management may become infeasible. First, it could be burdensome to deploy pre-shared keys for thousands of NVEs, not to mention that multiple keys may need to be deployed on a single device for different purposes. Key derivation can be used to mitigate this problem. Using key derivation functions, multiple keys for different usages can be derived from a pre-shared master key. However, key derivation cannot protect against the situation where a system was incorrectly trusted to have the key used to perform the derivation. If the master key were somehow compromised, all the resulting keys would need to be changed. In addition, VM migration will introduce challenges to manual key management. The migration of a VM in a VN may cause the change of the NVEs which are involved within the NV. When a NVE is newly involved within a VN, it needs to get the key to join the operations within the VN. If a NVE stops supporting a VN, it should not keep the keys associated with that VN. All those key updates need to be performed at run time, and difficult to be handled by human beings. As a result, it is reasonable to introduce automated key management solutions such as EAP [[RFC4137](#)] for NV03 overlays.

When an automated key management solution for NV03 overlays is deployed, as a part of the key management protocol, mutual authentication needs to be performed before two network devices in the overlay (NVEs or IMAs) start exchanging the control packets. After an authentication, an device can find out whether its peer holds valid security credentials is is the one who it has claimed. The authentication results is also necessary for authorization; it is important for a device to clarify the roles (e.g., a NVE or a IMA) that its authentication peer acts as in the overlay. Therefore, a compromised NVE cannot use it credential to impersonate an IMA to communicate with other NVEs. Only the control messages from the authenticated entity will be adopted. In addition, authorization MAY need to be performed. For instance, before accepting a control message, the receiver NVE needs to verify whether the message comes from one which is authorized to send that message. If the





authorization fail, the control message will be discarded. For instance, if a control packet about a VN is sent from a NVE which is not authorized to support the VN, the packet will be discarded.

The issues of DDOS attacks also need to be considered in designing the overlay control plane. For instance, in the VXLAN solution[I-D.mahalingam-dutt-dcops-vxlan], an attacker attached to a NVE can try to manipulate the NVE to keep multicasting control messages by sending a large amount of ARP packets to query the inexistent VMs. In order to mitigate this type of attack, the NVEs SHOULD be only allowed to send signaling message in the overlay with a limited frequency. When there are centralized servers (e.g., the backend oracles providing mapping information for NVEs[I-D.ietf-nvo3-overlay-problem-statement], or the SDN controllers) are located within the overlay, the potential security risks caused by DDOS attack on such servers can be more serious.

In addition, during the design of the control plane, it is important to consider the amplification effects which may potential be used by attackers to carry out reflection attacks.

### **5.2.2. Data Plan Security**

[I-D.ietf-nvo3-framework] specifies a NV03 overlay needs to generate tunnels between NVEs for data transportation. When a data packet reaches the boundary of a overlay, it will be encapsulated and forwarded to the destination NVE through a proper tunnel. It is normally assume that the underlying network connecting NVEs are secure to outside attacks since it is under the management of DC vendor and cannot be directly accessed by tenants. However, when facing inside attacks, conditions could be complex. For instance, an inside attacker compromising a underlying network device may intercept an encapsulated data packet transported a tunnel, modify the contents in the encapsulating tunnel packet and, transfer it into another tunnel without being detected. When the modified packet reaches a NVE, the NVE may decapsulated the data packet and forward it into a VN according to the information within the encapsulating header generated by the attacker. Similarly, a compromised NVE may try to redirect the data packets within a VN into another VN by adding improper encapsulating tunnel headers to the data packets. Under such circumstances, in order to enforce the VN isolation property, signatures or digests need to be generated for both data packets and the encapsulating tunnel headers in order to provide data origin authentication and integrity protection. In addition, NVEs SHOULD use different keys to secure the packets transported in different tunnels.



## **6. Security Issues Imposed by the New Overlay Design Characteristics**

### **6.1. Scalability Issues**

NOV3 WG requires an overlay be able to work in an environment where there are many thousands of NVEs (e.g. residing within the hypervisors) and large amounts of trust domains (VNs). Therefore, the scalability issues should be considered. In the cases where a NVE only has a limited number of NVEs to communicate with, the scalability problem brought by the overhead of generating and maintaining the security channels with the remote NVEs is not serious. However, if a NVE needs to communicate with a large number of peers, the scalability issue could be serious. For instance, in[I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ad-vpn-problem], it has been demonstrated it is not trivial to enabling a large number of systems to communicate directly using IPsec to protect the traffic between them.

### **6.2. Influence on Security Devices**

If the data packets transported through out an overlay are encrypted (e.g., by NVEs), it is difficult for a security device, e.g., a firewall deployed on the path connecting two NVEs to inspect the contents of the packets. The firewall can only know which VN the packets belong to through the VN ID transported in the outer header. If a firewall would like to identify which end device sends a packets or which end device a packet is sent to, the firewall can be deployed in some place where it can access the packet before it is encapsulated or un-encapsulated by NVEs. However, in this case, the firewall cannot get VN ID from the packet. If the firewall is used to process two VNs concurrently and there are IP or MAC addresses of the end devices in the two VNs overlapped, confusion will be caused. If a firewall can generate multiple firewalls instances for different tenants respectively, this issue can be largely addressed.

### **6.3. Security Issues with VM Migration**

The support of VM migration is an important issue considered in NV03 WG. The migration may also cause security risks. Because the VMs within a VN may move from one server to another which connects to a different NVE, the packets exchanging between two VMs may be transferred in a new path. If the security policies deployed on the firewalls of the two paths are conflict or the firewalls on the new path lack essential state to process the packets. The communication between the VMs may be broken. To address this problem, one option is to enable the state migration and policy confliction detection between firewalls. The other one is to force all the traffic within a VN be processed by a single firewall. However this solution may cause traffic optimization issues.



## **7. IANA Considerations**

This document makes no request of IANA.

Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an RFC.

## **8. Security Considerations**

TBD

## **9. Acknowledgements**

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