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Default Port for IRC via TLS/SSL
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Abstract

This document describes the commonly accepted practice of listening on TCP port 6697 for incoming IRC connections encrypted via TLS/SSL.

Status of this Memo

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1. Rationale

Although system port assignments for both plain text (TCP/UDP port 194) and TLS/SSL [[RFC5246](#)] encrypted (TCP/UDP port 994) IRC traffic exist [[IANALIST](#)], it is common practice amongst IRC networks not to use them for reasons of convenience and general availability on systems where no root access is granted or desired.

IRC networks have defaulted to listening on TCP port 6667 for plain text connections for considerable time, now. This is covered by the IRCU assignment of TCP/UDP ports 6665-6669.

Similar consensus has been reached within the IRC community about listening on TCP port 6697 for incoming IRC connections encrypted via TLS/SSL.

2. Technical Details

2.1. Connection Establishment

An IRC client connects to an IRC server. Immediately after that, a normal TLS/SSL handshake takes place. Once the TLS/SSL connection has been established, a normal IRC connection is established via the tunnel. Optionally, the IRC server may set a specific umode for the client, marking it as using TLS/SSL. Again optionally, an IRC server might offer the option to create channels in such a way that only clients connected via TLS/SSL may join.

For details on how IRC works, see [[RFC1459](#)], [[RFC2810](#)], [[RFC2811](#)], [[RFC2812](#)], [[RFC2813](#)]. Please note that IRC is extremely fragmented and implementation details can vary wildly. Most implementations regard the latter RFCs as suggestions, not as binding.

2.2. Certificate Details

2.2.1. Server Certificate

The IRC server's certificate should be issued by a commonly trusted CA.

The Common Name should match the FQDN of the IRC server or have appropriate wildcards, if applicable.

The IRC client should verify the certificate.

2.2.2. Client Certificate

If the client is using a certificate as well, it should be issued by

a commonly trusted CA or a CA designated by the IRC network.

The certificate's Common Name should match the main IRC nickname.

If the network offers nick registration, this nick should be used.

If the network offers grouped nicks, the main nick or account name should be used.

If the network offers nick registration, the client certificate should be used to identify the user against the nick database. See [CERTFP] for a possible implementation.

3. Security Considerations

The lack of a common, well established listening port for IRC via TLS/SSL could lead to end users being unaware of their IRC network of choice supporting TLS/SSL. Thus, they might not use encryption even if they wanted to.

It should be noted that this document merely describes client-to-server encryption. There are still other attack vectors like malicious administrators, compromised servers, insecure server-to-server communication, channels that do not enforce encryption for all channel members, malicious clients or comprised client machines on which logs are stored.

Those attacks can by their very nature not be addressed by client-to-server encryption. Additional safe-guards are needed if a user fears any of the threats above.

This document does not address server links as there are no commonly accepted ports or even back-end protocols. Ports and back-end protocols are normally established in a bilateral agreement. All operators are encouraged to use strong encryption for back-end traffic, no matter if they offer IRC via TLS/SSL to end users.

4. IANA Considerations

An assignment of TCP port 6697 for IRC via TLS/SSL will be requested. The proposed keyword is "ircs-u" and the description "Internet Relay Chat via TLS/SSL":

ircs-u 6697/tcp Internet Relay Chat via TLS/SSL

5. Informative References

[IANALIST] <http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers> , Sep 15,

2010

[TOP100] <http://irc.netsplit.de/networks/top100.php> , Sep 15, 2010

[MAVERICK] <http://irc.netsplit.de/networks/lists.php?query=maverick> ,
Sep 27, 2010

[CERTFP] <http://www.oftc.net/oftc/NickServ/CertFP> , Mar 17 2011

5. Normative References

[RFC1459] J. Oikarinen, Internet Relay Chat Protocol

[RFC2810] C. Kalt, Internet Relay Chat: Architecture

[RFC2811] C. Kalt, Internet Relay Chat: Channel Management

[RFC2812] C. Kalt, Internet Relay Chat: Client Protocol

[RFC2813] C. Kalt, Internet Relay Chat: Server Protocol

[RFC5246] T. Dierks, E. Rescorla, The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol Version 1

6. Acknowledgements

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Special thanks go to the IRC operators who were eager to support port 6697 on their respective networks.

Special thanks also go to Nevil Brownlee and James Schaad for working on this document in their capacities as RFC Editor and Reviewer, respectively.

APPENDIX A: Supporting data

As of October 2010, out of the top twenty IRC networks [\[TOP100\]](#), [\[MAVERICK\]](#), ten support TLS/SSL. Only one of those networks does not support TLS/SSL via port 6697 and has no plans to support it. All others supported it already or are supporting it since being contacted by the author. A more detailed analysis is available but does not fit within the scope of this document.

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Version History

- 00 - initial version
- 01 - fixed [[MAVERICK](#)]
- 02 - removed self-reference as RFC
added reference to [[RFC1700](#)]
- 03 - removed reference to [RFC 1700](#) as per [RFC 3232](#)
- 04 - added section "Technical Details"
expanded section "Security Considerations"
Changed "Intended status" to "Experimental" at RFC authors'
suggestion
- 05 - Moved "Abstract" to the top of the document
Changed "Intended status" back to "Informational"
Added renaming suggestions for old assignments
Removed section "Comments"
Removed ".txt" from document name
Removed "Full Copyright Statement"
Other minor clean-ups
- 06 - Introduced unique port keys
- 07 - Extended document based on feedback by James Schaad and
Mykyta Yevstifeyev
- 08 - Removed naming updates to 6665-6669/TCP and 994/TCP (i.e. unique port
keys)
at the request of Pearl Liang (IANA staff) and Nevil Brownlee (RFC
Editor)
- 09 - New version as -08 is stuck in the submission queue
- 10 - Removed updates to RFCs 2812 and 2813, and to STARTTLS

