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H. Haverinen, Ed.  
Nokia  
J. Salowey, Ed.  
Cisco Systems  
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**Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for GSM Subscriber Identity  
Modules (EAP-SIM)  
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IESG Note

The EAP-SIM protocol was developed by 3GPP. The documentation of EAP-SIM is provided as information to the Internet community. While the EAP WG has verified that EAP-SIM is compatible with EAP as defined in [RFC 3748](#), no other review has been done, including validation of the security claims.



## Abstract

This document specifies an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) mechanism for authentication and session key distribution using the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). GSM is a second generation mobile network standard. The EAP-SIM mechanism specifies enhancements to GSM authentication and key agreement whereby multiple authentication triplets can be combined to create authentication responses and session keys of greater strength than the individual GSM triplets. The mechanism also includes network authentication, user anonymity support, result indications, and a fast re-authentication procedure.

## Table of Contents

<a href="#">1.</a>	<a href="#">Introduction . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">2.</a>	<a href="#">Terms . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">6</a>
<a href="#">3.</a>	<a href="#">Overview . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">8</a>
<a href="#">4.</a>	<a href="#">Operation . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">11</a>
<a href="#">4.1</a>	<a href="#">Version Negotiation . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">11</a>
<a href="#">4.2</a>	<a href="#">Identity Management . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">12</a>
<a href="#">4.2.1</a>	<a href="#">Format, Generation and Usage of Peer Identities . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">12</a>
<a href="#">4.2.2</a>	<a href="#">Communicating the Peer Identity to the Server . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">18</a>
<a href="#">4.2.3</a>	<a href="#">Choice of Identity for the EAP-Response/Identity . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">19</a>
4.2.4	<a href="#">Server Operation in the Beginning of EAP-SIM Exchange . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">20</a>
<a href="#">4.2.5</a>	<a href="#">Processing of EAP-Request/SIM/Start by the Peer . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">20</a>
<a href="#">4.2.6</a>	<a href="#">Attacks against Identity Privacy . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">22</a>
<a href="#">4.2.7</a>	<a href="#">Processing of AT_IDENTITY by the Server . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">22</a>
<a href="#">4.3</a>	<a href="#">Message Sequence Examples (Informative) . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">23</a>
<a href="#">4.3.1</a>	<a href="#">Full Authentication . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">23</a>
<a href="#">4.3.2</a>	<a href="#">Fast Re-authentication . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">24</a>
<a href="#">4.3.3</a>	<a href="#">Fall Back to Full Authentication . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">25</a>
<a href="#">4.3.4</a>	<a href="#">Requesting the Permanent Identity 1 . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">26</a>
<a href="#">4.3.5</a>	<a href="#">Requesting the Permanent Identity 2 . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">27</a>
<a href="#">4.3.6</a>	<a href="#">Three EAP-SIM/Start Roundtrips . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">28</a>
<a href="#">5.</a>	<a href="#">Fast Re-Authentication . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">30</a>
<a href="#">5.1</a>	<a href="#">General . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">30</a>
<a href="#">5.2</a>	<a href="#">Comparison to UMTS AKA . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">31</a>
<a href="#">5.3</a>	<a href="#">Fast Re-authentication Identity . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">32</a>
<a href="#">5.4</a>	<a href="#">Fast Re-authentication Procedure . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">33</a>
5.5	<a href="#">Fast Re-authentication Procedure when Counter is Too Small . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">36</a>
<a href="#">6.</a>	<a href="#">EAP-SIM Notifications . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">38</a>
<a href="#">6.1</a>	<a href="#">General . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">38</a>
<a href="#">6.2</a>	<a href="#">Result Indications . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">39</a>
<a href="#">6.3</a>	<a href="#">Error Cases . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">40</a>
<a href="#">6.3.1</a>	<a href="#">Peer Operation . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">40</a>



6.3.2	Server Operation . . . . .	41
6.3.3	EAP-Failure . . . . .	42
6.3.4	EAP-Success . . . . .	42
6.4	Key Generation . . . . .	43
7.	Message Format and Protocol Extensibility . . . . .	46
7.1	Message Format . . . . .	46
7.2	Protocol Extensibility . . . . .	47
8.	Messages . . . . .	48
8.1	EAP-Request/SIM/Start . . . . .	48
8.2	EAP-Response/SIM/Start . . . . .	49
8.3	EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge . . . . .	50
8.4	EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge . . . . .	50
8.5	EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication . . . . .	51
8.6	EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication . . . . .	52
8.7	EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error . . . . .	52
8.8	EAP-Request/SIM/Notification . . . . .	52
8.9	EAP-Response/SIM/Notification . . . . .	53
9.	Attributes . . . . .	53
9.1	Table of Attributes . . . . .	53
9.2	AT_VERSION_LIST . . . . .	55
9.3	AT_SELECTED_VERSION . . . . .	55
9.4	AT_NONCE_MT . . . . .	56
9.5	AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ . . . . .	56
9.6	AT_ANY_ID_REQ . . . . .	57
9.7	AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ . . . . .	57
9.8	AT_IDENTITY . . . . .	57
9.9	AT RAND . . . . .	58
9.10	AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM . . . . .	59
9.11	AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID . . . . .	59
9.12	AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_PADDING . . . . .	60
9.13	AT_RESULT_IND . . . . .	62
9.14	AT_MAC . . . . .	62
9.15	AT_COUNTER . . . . .	63
9.16	AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL . . . . .	63
9.17	AT_NONCE_S . . . . .	63
9.18	AT_NOTIFICATION . . . . .	64
9.19	AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE . . . . .	65
10.	IANA Considerations . . . . .	65
11.	Security Considerations . . . . .	66
11.1	A3 and A8 Algorithms . . . . .	66
11.2	Identity Protection . . . . .	66
11.3	Mutual Authentication and Triplet Exposure . . . . .	67
11.4	Flooding the Authentication Centre . . . . .	68
11.5	Key Derivation . . . . .	69
11.6	Cryptographic Separation of Keys and Session Independence . . . . .	69
11.7	Dictionary Attacks . . . . .	70
11.8	Credentials Reuse . . . . .	70



<a href="#">11.9</a>	Integrity and Replay Protection, and Confidentiality . .	<a href="#">71</a>
<a href="#">11.10</a>	Negotiation Attacks . . . . .	<a href="#">73</a>
<a href="#">11.11</a>	Protected Result Indications . . . . .	<a href="#">73</a>
<a href="#">11.12</a>	Man-in-the-middle Attacks . . . . .	<a href="#">73</a>
<a href="#">11.13</a>	Generating Random Numbers . . . . .	<a href="#">74</a>
<a href="#">12.</a>	Security Claims . . . . .	<a href="#">74</a>
<a href="#">13.</a>	Acknowledgements and Contributions . . . . .	<a href="#">75</a>
<a href="#">13.1</a>	Contributors . . . . .	<a href="#">75</a>
<a href="#">13.2</a>	Acknowledgements . . . . .	<a href="#">75</a>
<a href="#">13.2.1</a>	Contributors' Addresses . . . . .	<a href="#">76</a>
<a href="#">14.</a>	References . . . . .	<a href="#">77</a>
<a href="#">14.1</a>	Normative References . . . . .	<a href="#">77</a>
<a href="#">14.2</a>	Informative References . . . . .	<a href="#">78</a>
	Authors' Addresses . . . . .	<a href="#">79</a>
<a href="#">A.</a>	Test Vectors . . . . .	<a href="#">80</a>
<a href="#">A.1</a>	EAP-Request/Identity . . . . .	<a href="#">80</a>
<a href="#">A.2</a>	EAP-Response/Identity . . . . .	<a href="#">80</a>
<a href="#">A.3</a>	EAP-Request/SIM/Start . . . . .	<a href="#">81</a>
<a href="#">A.4</a>	EAP-Response/SIM/Start . . . . .	<a href="#">81</a>
<a href="#">A.5</a>	EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge . . . . .	<a href="#">81</a>
<a href="#">A.6</a>	EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge . . . . .	<a href="#">84</a>
<a href="#">A.7</a>	EAP-Success . . . . .	<a href="#">85</a>
<a href="#">A.8</a>	Fast Re-authentication . . . . .	<a href="#">85</a>
<a href="#">A.9</a>	EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication . . . . .	<a href="#">85</a>
<a href="#">A.10</a>	EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication . . . . .	<a href="#">88</a>
<a href="#">B.</a>	Pseudo-Random Number Generator . . . . .	<a href="#">89</a>
	Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . .	<a href="#">90</a>





## 1. Introduction

This document specifies an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [[RFC3748](#)] mechanism for authentication and session key distribution using the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity Module (SIM).

GSM is a second generation mobile network standard. Second generation mobile networks and third generation mobile networks use different authentication and key agreement mechanisms. EAP-AKA [[EAP-AKA](#)] specifies an EAP method that is based on the authentication and key agreement mechanism used in 3rd generation mobile networks.

GSM authentication is based on a challenge-response mechanism. The A3/A8 authentication and key derivation algorithms that run on the SIM can be given a 128-bit random number (RAND) as a challenge. The SIM runs operator-specific algorithms, which take the RAND and a secret key Ki stored on the SIM as input, and produce a 32-bit response (SRES) and a 64-bit long key Kc as output. The Kc key is originally intended to be used as an encryption key over the air interface, but in this protocol it is used for deriving keying material and not directly used. Hence the secrecy of Kc is critical to the security of this protocol. Please find more information about GSM authentication in [GSM 03.20]. Please see [Section 11.1](#) for more discussion about the GSM algorithms used in EAP-SIM.

The lack of mutual authentication is a weakness in GSM authentication. The 64 bit cipher key (Kc) that is derived is not strong enough for data networks where stronger and longer keys are required. Hence in EAP-SIM, several RAND challenges are used for generating several 64-bit Kc keys, which are combined to constitute stronger keying material. In EAP-SIM the client issues a random number NONCE\_MT to the network, in order to contribute to key derivation, and to prevent replays of EAP-SIM requests from previous exchanges. The NONCE\_MT can be conceived as the client's challenge to the network. EAP-SIM also extends the combined RAND challenges and other messages with a message authentication code in order to provide message integrity protection along with mutual authentication.

EAP-SIM specifies optional support for protecting the privacy of subscriber identity using the same concept as GSM, which is using pseudonyms/temporary identifiers. It also specifies an optional fast re-authentication procedure.

The security of EAP-SIM builds on underlying GSM mechanisms. The security properties of EAP-SIM are documented in [Section 11](#) of this document. Implementers and users of EAP-SIM are advised to carefully



study the security considerations in [Section 11](#) in order to determine whether the security properties are sufficient for the environment in question, especially as the secrecy of Kc keys is key to the security of EAP-SIM. In brief, EAP-SIM is in no sense weaker than the GSM mechanisms. In some cases EAP-SIM provides better security properties than the underlying GSM mechanisms, particularly if the SIM credentials are only used for EAP-SIM and not re-used from GSM/GPRS. Many of the security features of EAP-SIM rely upon the secrecy of the Kc values in the SIM triplets, so protecting these values is key to the security of the EAP-SIM protocol.

The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has specified an enhanced Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) architecture for the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS). The 3rd generation AKA mechanism includes mutual authentication, replay protection and derivation of longer session keys. EAP-AKA [[EAP-AKA](#)] specifies an EAP method that is based on the 3rd generation AKA. EAP-AKA, which is a more secure protocol, may be used instead of EAP-SIM, if 3rd generation identity modules and 3G network infrastructure are available.

## 2. Terms

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

The terms and abbreviations "authenticator", "backend authentication server", "EAP server", "peer", "Silently Discard", "Master Session Key (MSK)", and "Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC3748](#)].

This document frequently uses the following terms and abbreviations:

AAA protocol

Authentication, Authorization and Accounting protocol

AuC

Authentication Centre. The GSM network element that provides the authentication triplets for authenticating the subscriber.

Authentication vector

GSM triplets can be alternatively called authentication vectors



## EAP

Extensible Authentication Protocol.

## Fast re-authentication

An EAP-SIM authentication exchange that is based on keys derived upon a preceding full authentication exchange. The GSM authentication and key exchange algorithms are not used in the fast re-authentication procedure.

## Fast Re-authentication Identity

A fast re-authentication identity of the peer, including an NAI realm portion in environments where a realm is used. Used on fast re-authentication only.

## Fast Re-authentication Username

The username portion of fast re-authentication identity, ie. not including any realm portions.

## Full authentication

An EAP-SIM authentication exchange based on the GSM authentication and key agreement algorithms.

## GSM

Global System for Mobile communications.

## GSM Triplet

The tuple formed by the three GSM authentication values RAND, Kc and SRES

## IMSI

International Mobile Subscriber Identifier, used in GSM to identify subscribers.

## MAC

Message Authentication Code

## NAI

Network Access Identifier



## Nonce

A value that is used at most once or that is never repeated within the same cryptographic context. In general, a nonce can be predictable (e.g. a counter) or unpredictable (e.g. a random value). Since some cryptographic properties may depend on the randomness of the nonce, attention should be paid to whether a nonce is required to be random or not. In this document, the term nonce is only used to denote random nonces, and it is not used to denote counters.

## Permanent Identity

The permanent identity of the peer, including an NAI realm portion in environments where a realm is used. The permanent identity is usually based on the IMSI. Used on full authentication only.

## Permanent Username

The username portion of permanent identity, ie. not including any realm portions.

## Pseudonym Identity

A pseudonym identity of the peer, including an NAI realm portion in environments where a realm is used. Used on full authentication only.

## Pseudonym Username

The username portion of pseudonym identity, ie. not including any realm portions.

## SIM

Subscriber Identity Module. The SIM is traditionally a smart card distributed by a GSM operator.

### **3. Overview**

Figure 1 shows an overview of the EAP-SIM full authentication procedure, when optional protected success indications are not used. The authenticator typically communicates with an EAP server that is located on a backend authentication server using an AAA protocol. The authenticator shown in the figure is often simply relaying EAP messages to and from the EAP server, but these back end AAA





communications are not shown.




Figure 1: EAP-SIM full authentication procedure

The first EAP Request issued by the authenticator is EAP-Request/Identity. On full authentication, the peer's response includes either the user's International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) or a temporary identity (pseudonym) if identity privacy is in effect, as specified in [Section 4.2](#).

Following the peer's EAP-Response/Identity packet, the peer receives EAP Requests of type 18 (SIM) from the EAP server and sends the corresponding EAP Responses. The EAP packets that are of the Type SIM also have a Subtype field. On full authentication, the first EAP-Request/SIM packet is of the Subtype 10 (Start). EAP-SIM packets encapsulate parameters in attributes, encoded in a Type, Length, Value format. The packet format and the use of attributes are specified in [Section 7](#).



The EAP-Request/SIM/Start packet contains the list of EAP-SIM version supported by the EAP server in the AT\_VERSION\_LIST attribute. This packet may also include attributes for requesting the subscriber identity, as specified in [Section 4.2](#).

The peer responds to EAP-Request/SIM/Start with the EAP-Response/SIM/Start packet, which includes the AT\_NONCE\_MT attribute that contains a random number NONCE\_MT, chosen by the peer, and the AT\_SELECTED\_VERSION attribute that contains the version number selected by the peer. The version negotiation is protected by including the version list and the selected version in the calculation of keying material ([Section 6.4](#)).

After receiving the EAP Response/SIM/Start, the EAP server obtains  $n$  GSM triplets for use in authenticating the subscriber, where  $n = 2$  or  $n = 3$ . From the triplets, the EAP server derives the keying material, as specified in [Section 6.4](#). The triplets may be obtained by contacting an Authentication Centre (AuC) on the GSM network; per GSM specifications, between 1 and 5 triplets may be obtained at a time. Triplets may be stored in the EAP server for use at a later time, but triplets MUST NOT be reused, except in some error cases that are specified in [Section 9.9](#).

The next EAP Request the EAP Server issues is of the type SIM and subtype Challenge (11). It contains the RAND challenges and a message authentication code attribute AT\_MAC to cover the challenges. The AT\_MAC attribute is a general message authentication code attribute that is used in many EAP-SIM messages.

On receipt of the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message, the peer runs the GSM authentication algorithm and calculates a copy of the message authentication code. The peer then verifies that the calculated MAC equals the received MAC. If the MAC's do not match, then the peer sends the EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet and the authentication exchange terminates.

Since the RAND's given to a peer are accompanied with the message authentication code AT\_MAC, and since the peer's NONCE\_MT value contributes to AT\_MAC, the peer is able to verify that the EAP-SIM message is fresh (not a replay) and that the sender possesses valid GSM triplets for the subscriber.

If all checks out, the peer responds with the EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge, containing the AT\_MAC attribute that covers the peer's SRES response values ([Section 8.4](#)). The EAP server verifies that the MAC is correct. Because protected success indications are not used in this example, the EAP server sends the EAP-Success packet, indicating that the authentication was



successful. (Protected success indications are discussed in [Section 6.2](#).) The EAP server may also include derived keying material in the message it sends to the authenticator. The peer has derived the same keying material, so the authenticator does not forward the keying material to the peer along with EAP-Success.

EAP-SIM also includes a separate fast re-authentication procedure, which does not make use of the A3/A8 algorithms or the GSM infrastructure. Fast re-authentication is based on keys derived on full authentication. If the peer has maintained state information for fast re-authentication and wants to use fast re-authentication, then the peer indicates this by using a specific fast re-authentication identity instead of the permanent identity or a pseudonym identity. The fast re-authentication procedure is described in [Section 5](#).

## **4. Operation**

### **4.1 Version Negotiation**

EAP-SIM includes version negotiation so as to allow future developments in the protocol. The version negotiation is performed on full authentication and it uses two attributes, AT\_VERSION\_LIST, which the server always includes in EAP-Request/SIM/Start, and AT\_SELECTED\_VERSION, which the peer includes in EAP-Response/SIM/Start on full authentication.

AT\_VERSION\_LIST includes the EAP-SIM versions supported by the server. If AT\_VERSION\_LIST does not include a version that is implemented by the peer and allowed in the peer's security policy, then the peer MUST send the EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet ([Section 8.7](#)) to the server with the error code "unsupported version". If a suitable version is included, then the peer includes the AT\_SELECTED\_VERSION attribute, containing the selected version, in the EAP-Response/SIM/Start packet. The peer MUST only indicate a version that is included in AT\_VERSION\_LIST. If several versions are acceptable, then the peer SHOULD choose the version that occurs first in the version list.

The version number list of AT\_VERSION\_LIST and the selected version of AT\_SELECTED\_VERSION are included in the key derivation procedure ([Section 6.4](#)). If an attacker modifies either one of these attributes, then the peer and the server derive different keying material. Because K<sub>aut</sub> keys are different, the server and peer calculate different AT\_MAC values. Hence, the peer detects that AT\_MAC included in EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge is incorrect and sends the EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet. The authentication procedure terminates.



## **4.2 Identity Management**

### **4.2.1 Format, Generation and Usage of Peer Identities**

#### **4.2.1.1 General**

In the beginning of EAP authentication, the Authenticator or the EAP server usually issues the EAP-Request/Identity packet to the peer. The peer responds with EAP-Response/Identity, which contains the user's identity. The formats of these packets are specified in [\[RFC3748\]](#).

GSM subscribers are identified with the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) [GSM 03.03]. The IMSI is a string of not more than 15 digits. It is composed of a three digit Mobile Country Code (MCC), a two or three digit Mobile Network Code (MNC) and a not more than 10 digit Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (MSIN). MCC and MNC uniquely identify the GSM operator and help identify the AuC from which the authentication vectors need to be retrieved for this subscriber.

Internet AAA protocols identify users with the Network Access Identifier (NAI) [\[RFC2486\]](#). When used in a roaming environment, the NAI is composed of a username and a realm, separated with "@" (username@realm). The username portion identifies the subscriber within the realm.

This section specifies the peer identity format used in EAP-SIM. In this document, the term identity or peer identity refers to the whole identity string that is used to identify the peer. The peer identity may include a realm portion. "Username" refers to the portion of the peer identity that identifies the user, i.e. the username does not include the realm portion.

#### **4.2.1.2 Identity Privacy Support**

EAP-SIM includes optional identity privacy (anonymity) support that can be used to hide the cleartext permanent identity and thereby to make the subscriber's EAP exchanges untraceable to eavesdroppers. Because the permanent identity never changes, revealing it would help observers to track the user. The permanent identity is usually based on the IMSI, which may further help the tracking, because the same identifier may be used in other contexts as well. Identity privacy is based on temporary identities, or pseudonyms, which are equivalent to but separate from the Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identities (TMSI) that are used on cellular networks. Please see [Section 11.2](#) for security considerations regarding identity privacy.





#### **4.2.1.3 Username Types in EAP-SIM identities**

There are three types of usernames in EAP-SIM peer identities:

- (1) Permanent usernames. For example, 1123456789098765@myoperator.com might be a valid permanent identity. In this example, 1123456789098765 is the permanent username.
- (2) Pseudonym usernames. For example, 3s7ah6n9q@myoperator.com might be a valid pseudonym identity. In this example, 3s7ah6n9q is the pseudonym username.
- (3) Fast re-authentication usernames. For example, 53953754@myoperator.com might be a valid fast re-authentication identity. In this case, 53953754 is the fast re-authentication username. Unlike permanent usernames and pseudonym usernames, fast re-authentication usernames are one-time identifiers, which are not re-used across EAP exchanges.

The first two types of identities are only used on full authentication and the last one only on fast re-authentication. When the optional identity privacy support is not used, the non-pseudonym permanent identity is used on full authentication. The fast re-authentication exchange is specified in [Section 5](#).

#### **4.2.1.4 Username Decoration**

In some environments, the peer may need to decorate the identity by prepending or appending the username with a string, in order to indicate supplementary AAA routing information in addition to the NAI realm. (The usage of a NAI realm portion is not considered to be decoration.) Username decoration is out of the scope of this document. However, it should be noted that username decoration might prevent the server from recognizing a valid username. Hence, although the peer MAY use username decoration in the identities the peer includes in EAP-Response/Identity, and the EAP server MAY accept a decorated peer username in this message, the peer or the EAP server MUST NOT decorate any other peer identities that are used in various EAP-SIM attributes. Only the identity used in EAP-Response/Identity may be decorated.

#### **4.2.1.5 NAI Realm Portion**

The peer MAY include a realm portion in the peer identity, as per the NAI format. The use of a realm portion is not mandatory.

If a realm is used, the realm MAY be chosen by the subscriber's home operator and it MAY be a configurable parameter in the EAP-SIM peer



implementation. In this case, the peer is typically configured with the NAI realm of the home operator. Operators MAY reserve a specific realm name for EAP-SIM users. This convention makes it easy to recognize that the NAI identifies a GSM subscriber. Such reserved NAI realm may be useful as a hint as to the first authentication method to use during method negotiation. When the peer is using a pseudonym username instead of the permanent username, the peer selects the realm name portion similarly as it select the realm portion when using the permanent username.

If no configured realm name is available, the peer MAY derive the realm name from the MCC and MNC portions of the IMSI. A RECOMMENDED way to derive the realm from the IMSI using the realm `3gppnetwork.org` will be specified in [Draft 3GPP TS 23.003].

Some old implementations derive the realm name from the IMSI by concatenating "mnc", the MNC digits of IMSI, ".mcc", the MCC digits of IMSI and ".owlan.org". For example, if the IMSI is 123456789098765, and the MNC is three digits long, then the derived realm name is "mnc456.mcc123.owlan.org". As there are no DNS servers running at owlan.org, these realm names can only be used with manually configured AAA routing. New implementations SHOULD use the mechanism specified in [Draft 3GPP TS 23.003] instead of owlan.org as soon as the 3GPP specification is finalized.

The IMSI is a string of digits without any explicit structure, so the peer may not be able to determine the length of the MNC portion. If the peer is not able to determine whether the MNC is two or three digits long, the peer MAY use a 3-digit MNC. If the correct length of the MNC is two, then the MNC used in the realm name includes the first digit of MSIN. Hence, when configuring AAA networks for operators that have 2-digit MNC's, the network SHOULD also be prepared for realm names with incorrect 3-digit MNC's.

#### **4.2.1.6 Format of the Permanent Username**

The non-pseudonym permanent username SHOULD be derived from the IMSI. In this case, the permanent username MUST be of the format "1" | IMSI, where the character "|" denotes concatenation. In other words, the first character of the username is the digit one (ASCII value 31 hexadecimal), followed by the IMSI. The IMSI is encoded as an ASCII string that consists of not more than 15 decimal digits (ASCII values between 30 and 39 hexadecimal), one character per IMSI digit, in the order as specified in [GSM 03.03]. For example, a permanent username derived from the IMSI 295023820005424 would be encoded as the ASCII string "1295023820005424" (byte values in hexadecimal notation: 31 32 39 35 30 32 33 38 32 30 30 30 35 34 32 34)



The EAP server MAY use the leading "1" as a hint to try EAP-SIM as the first authentication method during method negotiation, rather than for example EAP/AKA. The EAP-SIM server MAY propose EAP-SIM even if the leading character was not "1".

Alternatively, an implementation MAY choose a permanent username that is not based on the IMSI. In this case the selection of the username, its format, and its processing is out of the scope of this document. In this case, the peer implementation MUST NOT prepend any leading characters to the username.

#### **4.2.1.7 Generating Pseudonyms and Fast Re-authentication Identities by the Server**

Pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication identities are generated by the EAP server. The EAP server produces pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication identities in an implementation-dependent manner. Only the EAP server needs to be able to map the pseudonym username to the permanent identity, or to recognize a fast re-authentication identity.

EAP-SIM includes no provisions to ensure that the same EAP server that generated a pseudonym username will be used on the authentication exchange when the pseudonym username is used. It is recommended that the EAP servers implement some centralized mechanism to allow all EAP servers of the home operator to map pseudonyms generated by other servers to the permanent identity. If no such mechanism is available, then the EAP server failing to understand a pseudonym issued by another server can request the peer to send the permanent identity.

When issuing a fast re-authentication identity, the EAP server may include a realm name in the identity to make the fast re-authentication request be forwarded to the same EAP server.

When generating fast re-authentication identities, the server SHOULD choose a fresh new fast re-authentication identity that is different from the previous ones used after the same full authentication exchange. A full authentication exchange and the associated fast re-authentication exchanges are referred to here as the same "full authentication context". The fast re-authentication identity SHOULD include a random component. The random component works as a full authentication context identifier. A context-specific fast re-authentication identity can help the server to detect whether its fast re-authentication state information matches the peer's fast re-authentication state information (in other words whether the state information is from the same full authentication exchange). The random component also makes the fast re-authentication identities



unpredictable, so an attacker cannot initiate a fast re-authentication exchange to get the server's EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication packet.

Transmitting pseudonyms and fast re-authentication identities from the server to the peer is discussed in [Section 4.2.1.8](#). The pseudonym is transmitted as a username, without an NAI realm, and the fast re-authentication identity is transmitted as a complete NAI, including a realm portion if a realm is required. The realm is included in the fast re-authentication identity in order to allow the server to include a server-specific realm.

Regardless of construction method, the pseudonym username MUST conform to the grammar specified for the username portion of an NAI. The fast re-authentication identity also MUST conform to the NAI grammar. The EAP servers that the subscribers of an operator can use MUST ensure that the pseudonym usernames and the username portions used in fast re-authentication identities they generate are unique.

In any case, it is necessary that permanent usernames, pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication usernames are separate and recognizable from each other. It is also desirable that EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA [[EAP-AKA](#)] user names be recognizable from each other as an aid for the server to which method to offer.

In general, it is the task of the EAP server and the policies of its administrator to ensure sufficient separation in the usernames. Pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication usernames are both produced and used by the EAP server. The EAP server MUST compose pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication usernames so that it can recognize if a NAI username is an EAP-SIM pseudonym username or an EAP-SIM fast re-authentication username. For instance, when the usernames have been derived from the IMSI, the server could use different leading characters in the pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication usernames (e.g. the pseudonym could begin with a leading "3" character). When mapping a fast re-authentication identity to a permanent identity, the server SHOULD only examine the username portion of the fast re-authentication identity and ignore the realm portion of the identity.

Because the peer may fail to save a pseudonym username sent to in an EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge, for example due to malfunction, the EAP server SHOULD maintain at least the most recently used pseudonym username in addition to the most recently issued pseudonym username. If the authentication exchange is not completed successfully, then the server SHOULD NOT overwrite the pseudonym username that was issued during the most recent successful authentication exchange.





#### **4.2.1.8 Transmitting Pseudonyms and Fast Re-authentication Identities to the Peer**

The server transmits pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication identities to the peer in cipher, using the AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute.

The EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message MAY include an encrypted pseudonym username and/or an encrypted fast re-authentication identity in the value field of the AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute. Because identity privacy support and fast re-authentication are optional to implement, the peer MAY ignore the AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute and always use the permanent identity. On fast re-authentication (discussed in [Section 5](#)), the server MAY include a new encrypted fast re-authentication identity in the EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication message.

On receipt of the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge, the peer MAY decrypt the encrypted data in AT\_ENCR\_DATA. If the authentication exchange is successful, and the encrypted data includes a pseudonym username, then the peer may use the obtained pseudonym username on the next full authentication. If a fast re-authentication identity is included, then the peer MAY save it together with other fast re-authentication state information, as discussed in [Section 5](#), for the next fast re-authentication. If the authentication exchange does not complete successfully, the peer MUST ignore the received pseudonym username and the fast re-authentication identity.

If the peer does not receive a new pseudonym username in the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message, the peer MAY use an old pseudonym username instead of the permanent username on next full authentication. The username portions of fast re-authentication identities are one-time usernames, which the peer MUST NOT re-use. When the peer uses a fast re-authentication identity in an EAP exchange, the peer MUST discard the fast re-authentication identity and not re-use it in another EAP authentication exchange, even if the authentication exchange was not completed.

#### **4.2.1.9 Usage of the Pseudonym by the Peer**

When the optional identity privacy support is used on full authentication, the peer MAY use a pseudonym username received as part of a previous full authentication sequence as the username portion of the NAI. The peer MUST NOT modify the pseudonym username received in AT\_NEXT\_PSEUDONYM. However, as discussed above, the peer MAY need to decorate the username in some environments by appending or prepending the username with a string that indicates supplementary AAA routing information.



When using a pseudonym username in an environment where a realm portion is used, the peer concatenates the received pseudonym username with the "@" character and a NAI realm portion. The selection of the NAI realm is discussed above. The peer can select the realm portion similarly regardless of whether it uses the permanent username or a pseudonym username.

#### **4.2.1.10 Usage of the Fast Re-authentication Identity by the Peer**

On fast re-authentication, the peer uses the fast re-authentication identity, received as part of the previous authentication sequence. A new re-authentication identity may be delivered as part of both full authentication and fast re-authentication. The peer **MUST NOT** modify the username part of the fast re-authentication identity received in `AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID`, except in cases when username decoration is required. Even in these cases, the "root" fast re-authentication username must not be modified, but it may be appended or prepended with another string.

### **4.2.2 Communicating the Peer Identity to the Server**

#### **4.2.2.1 General**

The peer identity **MAY** be communicated to the server with the EAP-Response/Identity message. This message **MAY** contain the permanent identity, a pseudonym identity, or a fast re-authentication identity. If the peer uses the permanent identity or a pseudonym identity, which the server is able to map to the permanent identity, then the authentication proceeds as discussed in the overview of [Section 3](#). If the peer uses a fast re-authentication identity, and if the fast re-authentication identity matches with a valid fast re-authentication identity maintained by the server, and if the server agrees on using fast re-authentication, then a fast re-authentication exchange is performed, as described in [Section 5](#).

The peer identity can also be transmitted from the peer to the server using EAP-SIM messages instead of EAP-Response/Identity. In this case, the server includes an identity requesting attribute (`AT_ANY_ID_REQ`, `AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ` or `AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ`) in the EAP-Request/SIM/Start message, and the peer includes the `AT_IDENTITY` attribute, which contains the peer's identity, in the EAP-Response/SIM/Start message. The `AT_ANY_ID_REQ` attribute is a general identity requesting attribute, which the server uses if it does not specify which kind of an identity the peer should return in `AT_IDENTITY`. The server uses the `AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ` attribute to request either the permanent identity or a pseudonym identity. The server uses the `AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ` attribute to request the peer to send its permanent identity.



The identity format in the AT\_IDENTITY attribute is the same as in the EAP-Response/Identity packet (except that identity decoration is not allowed). The AT\_IDENTITY attribute contains a permanent identity, a pseudonym identity or a fast re-authentication identity.

Please note that the EAP-SIM peer and the EAP-SIM server only process the AT\_IDENTITY attribute and entities that only pass through EAP packets do not process this attribute. Hence, the authenticator and other intermediate AAA elements (such as possible AAA proxy servers) will continue to refer to the peer with the original identity from the EAP-Response/Identity packet unless the identity authenticated in the AT\_IDENTITY attribute is communicated to them in another way within the AAA protocol.

#### **4.2.2.2 Relying on EAP-Response/Identity Discouraged**

The EAP-Response/Identity packet is not method specific so in many implementations it may be handled by an EAP Framework. This introduces an additional layer of processing between the EAP peer and EAP server. The extra layer of processing may cache identity responses or add decorations to the identity. A modification of the identity response will cause the EAP peer and EAP server to use different identities in the key derivation which will cause the protocol to fail.

For this reason, it is RECOMMENDED that the EAP peer and server use the method specific identity attributes in EAP-SIM and the server is strongly discouraged from relying upon the EAP-Response/Identity.

In particular, if the EAP server receives a decorated identity in EAP-Response/Identity, then the EAP server MUST use the identity-requesting attributes to request the peer to send an unmodified and undecorated copy of the identity in AT\_IDENTITY.

#### **4.2.2.3 Choice of Identity for the EAP-Response/Identity**

If EAP-SIM peer is started upon receiving an EAP-Request/Identity message, then the peer performs the following steps.

If the peer has maintained fast re-authentication state information and if the peer wants to use fast re-authentication, then the peer transmits the fast re-authentication identity in EAP-Response/Identity.

Else, if the peer has a pseudonym username available, then the peer transmits the pseudonym identity in EAP-Response/Identity.

In other cases, the peer transmits the permanent identity in



EAP-Response/Identity.

#### **4.2.4 Server Operation in the Beginning of EAP-SIM Exchange**

If the EAP server has not received any EAP-SIM peer identity (permanent identity, pseudonym identity or fast re-authentication identity) from the peer when sending the first EAP-SIM request, or if the EAP server has received an EAP-Response/Identity packet but the contents do not appear to be a valid permanent identity, pseudonym identity or a re-authentication identity, then the server **MUST** request an identity from the peer using one of the methods below.

The server sends the EAP-Request/SIM/Start message with the AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ attribute to indicate that the server wants the peer to include the permanent identity in the AT\_IDENTITY attribute of the EAP-Response/SIM/Start message. This is done in the following cases:

- o The server does not support fast re-authentication or identity privacy.
- o The server received an identity that it recognizes as a pseudonym identity but the server is not able to map the pseudonym identity to a permanent identity.

The server issues the EAP-Request/SIM/Start packet with the AT\_FULLAUTH\_ID\_REQ attribute to indicate that the server wants the peer to include a full authentication identity (pseudonym identity or permanent identity) in the AT\_IDENTITY attribute of the EAP-Response/SIM/Start message. This is done in the following cases:

- o The server does not support fast re-authentication and the server supports identity privacy
- o The server received an identity that it recognizes as a re-authentication identity but the server is not able to map the re-authentication identity to a permanent identity

The server issues the EAP-Request/SIM/Start packet with the AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ attribute to indicate that the server wants the peer to include an identity in the AT\_IDENTITY attribute of the EAP-Response/SIM/Start message, and the server does not indicate any preferred type for the identity. This is done in other cases, such as when the server does not have any identity, or the server does not recognize the format of a received identity.

#### **4.2.5 Processing of EAP-Request/SIM/Start by the Peer**

Upon receipt of an EAP-Request/SIM/Start message, the peer **MUST** perform the following steps.





If the EAP-Request/SIM/Start does not include any identity request attribute, then the peer responds with EAP-Response/SIM/Start without AT\_IDENTITY. The peer includes the AT\_SELECTED\_VERSION and AT\_NONCE\_MT attributes, because the exchange is a full authentication exchange.

If the EAP-Request/SIM/Start includes AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ, and if the peer does not have a pseudonym available, then the peer MUST respond with EAP-Response/SIM/Start and include the permanent identity in AT\_IDENTITY. If the peer has a pseudonym available then the peer MAY refuse to send the permanent identity; hence in this case the peer MUST either respond with EAP-Response/SIM/Start and include the permanent identity in AT\_IDENTITY or respond with EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet with code "unable to process packet".

If the EAP-Request/SIM/Start includes AT\_FULL\_AUTH\_ID\_REQ, and if the peer has a pseudonym available, then the peer SHOULD respond with EAP-Response/SIM/Start and include the pseudonym identity in AT\_IDENTITY. If the peer does not have a pseudonym when it receives this message, then the peer MUST respond with EAP-Response/SIM/Start and include the permanent identity in AT\_IDENTITY. The Peer MUST NOT use a re-authentication identity in the AT\_IDENTITY attribute.

If the EAP-Request/SIM/Start includes AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ, and if the peer has maintained fast re-authentication state information and the peer wants to use fast re-authentication, then the peer responds with EAP-Response/SIM/Start and includes the fast re-authentication identity in AT\_IDENTITY. Else, if the peer has a pseudonym identity available, then the peer responds with EAP-Response/SIM/Start and includes the pseudonym identity in AT\_IDENTITY. Else, the peer responds with EAP-Response/SIM/Start and includes the permanent identity in AT\_IDENTITY.

An EAP-SIM exchange may include several EAP/SIM/Start rounds. The server may issue a second EAP-Request/SIM/Start, if it was not able to recognize the identity the peer used in the previous AT\_IDENTITY attribute. At most three EAP/SIM/Start rounds can be used, so the peer MUST NOT respond to more than three EAP-Request/SIM/Start messages within an EAP exchange. The peer MUST verify that the sequence of EAP-Request/SIM/Start packets the peer receives comply with the sequencing rules defined in this document. That is, AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ can only be used in the first EAP-Request/SIM/Start, in other words AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ MUST NOT be used in the second or third EAP-Request/SIM/Start. AT\_FULLAUTH\_ID\_REQ MUST NOT be used if the previous EAP-Request/SIM/Start included AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ. The peer operation in cases when it receives an unexpected attribute or an unexpected message is specified in [Section 6.3.1](#).



#### **4.2.6 Attacks against Identity Privacy**

The section above specifies two possible ways the peer can operate upon receipt of AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ. This is because a received AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ does not necessarily originate from the valid network, but an active attacker may transmit an EAP-Request/SIM/Start packet with an AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ attribute to the peer, in an effort to find out the true identity of the user. If the peer does not want to reveal its permanent identity, then the peer sends the EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet with the error code "unable to process packet", and the authentication exchange terminates.

Basically, there are two different policies that the peer can employ with regard to AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ. A "conservative" peer assumes that the network is able to maintain pseudonyms robustly. Therefore, if a conservative peer has a pseudonym username, the peer responds with EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error to the EAP packet with AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ, because the peer believes that the valid network is able to map the pseudonym identity to the peer's permanent identity. (Alternatively, the conservative peer may accept AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ in certain circumstances, for example if the pseudonym was received a long time ago.) The benefit of this policy is that it protects the peer against active attacks on anonymity. On the other hand, a "liberal" peer always accepts the AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ and responds with the permanent identity. The benefit of this policy is that it works even if the valid network sometimes loses pseudonyms and is not able to map them to the permanent identity.

#### **4.2.7 Processing of AT\_IDENTITY by the Server**

When the server receives an EAP-Response/SIM/Start message with the AT\_IDENTITY (in response to the server's identity requesting attribute), the server MUST operate as follows.

If the server used AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ, and if the AT\_IDENTITY does not contain a valid permanent identity, then the server sends EAP-Request/SIM/Notification with AT\_NOTIFICATION code "General failure" (16384), and the EAP exchange terminates. If the server recognizes the permanent identity and is able to continue, then the server proceeds with full authentication by sending EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge.

If the server used AT\_FULLAUTH\_ID\_REQ, and if AT\_IDENTITY contains a valid permanent identity or a pseudonym identity that the server can map to a valid permanent identity, then the server proceeds with full authentication by sending EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge. If AT\_IDENTITY



contains a pseudonym identity that the server is not able to map to a valid permanent identity, or an identity that the server is not able to recognize or classify, then the server sends EAP-Request/SIM/Start with AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ.

If the server used AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ, and if the AT\_IDENTITY contains a valid permanent identity or a pseudonym identity that the server can map to a valid permanent identity, then the server proceeds with full authentication by sending EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge.

If the server used AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ, and if AT\_IDENTITY contains a valid fast re-authentication identity and the server agrees on using re-authentication, then the server proceeds with fast re-authentication by sending EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication ([Section 5](#)).

If the server used AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ, and if the peer sent an EAP-Response/SIM/Start with only AT\_IDENTITY (indicating re-authentication), but the server is not able to map the identity to a permanent identity, then the server sends EAP-Request/SIM/Start with AT\_FULLAUTH\_ID\_REQ.

If the server used AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ, and if AT\_IDENTITY contains a valid fast re-authentication identity, which the server is able to map to a permanent identity, and if the server does not want to use fast re-authentication, then the server sends EAP-Request/SIM/Start without any identity requesting attributes.

If the server used AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ, and AT\_IDENTITY contains an identity that the server recognizes as a pseudonym identity but the server is not able to map the pseudonym identity to a permanent identity, then the server sends EAP-Request/SIM/Start with AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ.

If the server used AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ, and AT\_IDENTITY contains an identity that the server is not able to recognize or classify, then the server sends EAP-Request/SIM/Start with AT\_FULLAUTH\_ID\_REQ.

### [4.3](#) Message Sequence Examples (Informative)

This section contains non-normative message sequence examples to illustrate how the peer identity can be communicated to the server.

#### [4.3.1](#) Full Authentication

This case for full authentication is illustrated below in Figure 2. In this case, AT\_IDENTITY contains either the permanent identity or a pseudonym identity. The same sequence is also used in case the



server uses the AT\_FULLAUTH\_ID\_REQ in EAP-Request/SIM/Start.




Figure 2: Requesting any identity, full authentication

If the peer uses its full authentication identity and the AT\_IDENTITY attribute contains a valid permanent identity or a valid pseudonym identity that the EAP server is able to map to the permanent identity, then the full authentication sequence proceeds as usual with the EAP Server issuing the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message.

#### [4.3.2](#) Fast Re-authentication

The case when the server uses the AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ and the peer wants to perform fast re-authentication is illustrated below in Figure 3.








Figure 3: Requesting any identity, fast re-authentication

On fast re-authentication, if the AT\_IDENTITY attribute contains a valid fast re-authentication identity and the server agrees on using fast re-authentication, then the server proceeds with the fast re-authentication sequence and issues the EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication packet, as specified in [Section 5](#).

#### **4.3.3 Fall Back to Full Authentication**

The case when the server does not recognize the fast re-authentication identity the peer used in AT\_IDENTITY, and issues a second EAP-Request/SIM/Start message is illustrated in Figure 4.






Figure 4: Fall back to full authentication

#### [4.3.4](#) Requesting the Permanent Identity 1

Figure 5 illustrates the case when the EAP server fails to map the pseudonym identity included in the EAP-Response/Identity packet to a valid permanent identity.






Figure 5: Requesting the permanent identity

If the server recognizes the permanent identity, then the authentication sequence proceeds as usual with the EAP Server issuing the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message.

#### [4.3.5](#) Requesting the Permanent Identity 2

Figure 6 illustrates the case when the EAP server fails to map the pseudonym included in the AT\_IDENTITY attribute to a valid permanent identity.







Figure 6: Requesting a permanent identity (two EAP-SIM Start rounds)

#### 4.3.6 Three EAP-SIM/Start Roundtrips

In the worst case, there are three EAP/SIM/Start round trips before the server has obtained an acceptable identity. This case is illustrated in Figure 7.












Figure 7: Three EAP-SIM Start rounds

After the last EAP-Response/SIM/Start message, the full authentication sequence proceeds as usual. If the EAP Server recognizes the permanent identity and is able to proceed, the server issues the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message.

## 5. Fast Re-Authentication

### 5.1 General

In some environments, EAP authentication may be performed frequently. Because the EAP-SIM full authentication procedure makes use of the GSM SIM A3/A8 algorithms, and it therefore requires 2 or 3 fresh triplets from the Authentication Centre, the full authentication procedure is not very well suitable for frequent use. Therefore, EAP-SIM includes a more inexpensive fast re-authentication procedure that does not make use of the SIM A3/A8 algorithms and does not need new triplets from the Authentication Centre. Re-authentication can be performed in fewer roundtrips than the full authentication.

Fast re-authentication is optional to implement for both the EAP-SIM server and peer. On each EAP authentication, either one of the entities may also fall back on full authentication if they do not want to use fast re-authentication.



Fast re-authentication is based on the keys derived on the preceding full authentication. The same  $K_{aut}$  and  $K_{encr}$  keys as in full authentication are used to protect EAP-SIM packets and attributes, and the original Master Key from full authentication is used to generate a fresh Master Session Key, as specified in [Section 6.4](#).

The fast re-authentication exchange makes use of an unsigned 16-bit counter, included in the AT\_COUNTER attribute. The counter has three goals: 1) it can be used to limit the number of successive reauthentication exchanges without full authentication 2) it contributes to the keying material, and 3) it protects the peer and the server from replays. On full authentication, both the server and the peer initialize the counter to one. The counter value of at least one is used on the first fast re-authentication. On subsequent fast re-authentications, the counter MUST be greater than on any of the previous re-authentications. For example, on the second fast re-authentication, counter value is two or greater etc. The AT\_COUNTER attribute is encrypted.

Both the peer and the EAP server maintain a copy of the counter. The EAP server sends its counter value to the peer in the fast re-authentication request. The peer MUST verify that its counter value is less than or equal to the value sent by the EAP server.

The server includes an encrypted server random nonce (AT\_NONCE\_S) in the fast re-authentication request. The AT\_MAC attribute in the peer's response is calculated over NONCE\_S to provide a challenge/response authentication scheme. The NONCE\_S also contributes to the new Master Session Key.

Both the peer and the server SHOULD have an upper limit for the number of subsequent fast re-authentications allowed before a full authentication needs to be performed. Because a 16-bit counter is used in fast re-authentication, the theoretical maximum number of re-authentications is reached when the counter value reaches FFFF hexadecimal.

In order to use fast re-authentication, the peer and the EAP server need to store the following values: Master Key, latest counter value and the next fast re-authentication identity.  $K_{aut}$ ,  $K_{encr}$  may either be stored or derived again from MK. The server may also need to store the permanent identity of the user.

## **[5.2](#) Comparison to UMTS AKA**

When analyzing the fast re-authentication exchange, it may be helpful to compare it with the UMTS Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) exchange, which it resembles closely. The counter corresponds to the



UMTS AKA sequence number, NONCE\_S corresponds to RAND, and AT\_MAC in EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication corresponds to AUTN, the AT\_MAC in EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication corresponds to RES, AT\_COUNTER\_TOO\_SMALL corresponds to AUTS, and encrypting the counter corresponds to the usage of the Anonymity Key. Also the key generation on fast re-authentication with regard to random or fresh material is similar to UMTS AKA -- the server generates the NONCE\_S and counter values, and the peer only verifies that the counter value is fresh.

It should also be noted that encrypting the AT\_NONCE\_S, AT\_COUNTER or AT\_COUNTER\_TOO\_SMALL attributes is not important to the security of the fast re-authentication exchange.

### **5.3 Fast Re-authentication Identity**

The fast re-authentication procedure makes use of separate re-authentication user identities. Pseudonyms and the permanent identity are reserved for full authentication only. If a re-authentication identity is lost and the network does not recognize it, the EAP server can fall back on full authentication.

If the EAP server supports fast re-authentication, it MAY include the skippable AT\_NEXT\_REAUTH\_ID attribute in the encrypted data of EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message ([Section 8.3](#)). This attribute contains a new fast re-authentication identity for the next fast re-authentication. The attribute also works as a capability flag that indicates the fact that the server supports fast re-authentication, and that the server wants to continue using fast re-authentication within the current context. The peer MAY ignore this attribute, in which case it MUST use full authentication next time. If the peer wants to use re-authentication, it uses this fast re-authentication identity on next authentication. Even if the peer has a fast re-authentication identity, the peer MAY discard the fast re-authentication identity and use a pseudonym or the permanent identity instead, in which case full authentication MUST be performed. If the EAP server does not include the AT\_NEXT\_REAUTH\_ID in the encrypted data of EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge or EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication, then the peer MUST discard its current fast re-authentication state information and perform a full authentication next time.

In environments where a realm portion is needed in the peer identity, the fast re-authentication identity received in AT\_NEXT\_REAUTH\_ID MUST contain both a username portion and a realm portion, as per the NAI format. The EAP Server can choose an appropriate realm part in order to have the AAA infrastructure route subsequent fast re-authentication related requests to the same AAA server. For





example, the realm part MAY include a portion that is specific to the AAA server. Hence, it is sufficient to store the context required for fast re-authentication in the AAA server that performed the full authentication.

The peer MAY use the fast re-authentication identity in the EAP-Response/Identity packet or, in response to server's AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ attribute, the peer MAY use the fast re-authentication identity in the AT\_IDENTITY attribute of the EAP-Response/SIM/Start packet.

The peer MUST NOT modify the username portion of the fast re-authentication identity, but the peer MAY modify the realm portion or replace it with another realm portion. The peer might need to modify the realm in order to influence the AAA routing, for example to make sure that the correct server is reached. It should be noted that sharing the same fast re-authentication key among several servers may have security risks, so changing the realm portion of the NAI in order to change the EAP server is not desirable.

Even if the peer uses a fast re-authentication identity, the server may want to fall back on full authentication, for example because the server does not recognize the fast re-authentication identity or does not want to use fast re-authentication. In this case, the server starts the full authentication procedure by issuing an EAP-Request/SIM/Start packet. This packet always starts a full authentication sequence if it does not include the AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ attribute. If the server was not able to recover the peer's identity from the fast re-authentication identity, the server includes either the AT\_FULLAUTH\_ID\_REQ or the AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ attribute in this EAP request.

#### **5.4 Fast Re-authentication Procedure**

Figure 8 illustrates the fast re-authentication procedure. In this example, the optional protected success indication is not used. Encrypted attributes are denoted with '\*'. The peer uses its re-authentication identity in the EAP-Response/Identity packet. As discussed above, an alternative way to communicate the re-authentication identity to the server is for the peer to use the AT\_IDENTITY attribute in the EAP-Response/SIM/Start message. This latter case is not illustrated in the figure below, and it is only possible when the server requests the peer to send its identity by including the AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ attribute in the EAP-Request/SIM/Start packet.

If the server recognizes the identity as a valid fast re-authentication identity, and if the server agrees on using fast



re-authentication, then the server sends the EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication packet to the peer. This packet MUST include the encrypted AT\_COUNTER attribute, with a fresh counter value, the encrypted AT\_NONCE\_S attribute that contains a random number chosen by the server, the AT\_ENCR\_DATA and the AT\_IV attributes used for encryption, and the AT\_MAC attribute that contains a message authentication code over the packet. The packet MAY also include an encrypted AT\_NEXT\_REAUTH\_ID attribute that contains the next fast re-authentication identity.


Fast re-authentication identities are one-time identities. If the peer does not receive a new fast re-authentication identity, it MUST use either the permanent identity or a pseudonym identity on the next authentication to initiate full authentication.

The peer verifies that AT\_MAC is correct, and that the counter value is fresh (greater than any previously used value). The peer MAY save the next fast re-authentication identity from the encrypted AT\_NEXT\_REAUTH\_ID for next time. If all checks are successful, the peer responds with the EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication packet, including the AT\_COUNTER attribute with the same counter value and the AT\_MAC attribute.

The server verifies the AT\_MAC attribute and also verifies that the counter value is the same that it used in the EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication packet. If these checks are successful, the re-authentication has succeeded and the server sends the EAP-Success packet to the peer.

If protected success indications ([Section 6.2](#)) were used, the EAP-Success packet would be preceded by an EAP-SIM notification round.










Figure 8: Fast Re-authentication

### 5.5 Fast Re-authentication Procedure when Counter is Too Small

If the peer does not accept the counter value of EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication, it indicates the counter synchronization problem by including the encrypted AT\_COUNTER\_TOO\_SMALL in EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication. The server responds with EAP-Request/SIM/Start to initiate a normal full authentication procedure. This is illustrated in Figure 9. Encrypted attributes are denoted with '\*'.








Figure 9: Fast Re-authentication, counter is not fresh

In the figure above, the first three messages are similar to the basic fast re-authentication case. When the peer detects that the counter value is not fresh, it includes the `AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL` attribute in `EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication`. This attribute doesn't contain any data but it is a request for the server to initiate full authentication. In this case, the peer MUST ignore the contents of the server's `AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID` attribute.

On receipt of `AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL`, the server verifies `AT_MAC` and verifies that `AT_COUNTER` contains the same counter value as in the



EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication packet. If not, the server terminates the authentication exchange by sending the EAP-Request/SIM/Notification with AT\_NOTIFICATION code "General failure" (16384). If all checks on the packet are successful, the server transmits a new EAP-Request/SIM/Start packet and the full authentication procedure is performed as usual. Since the server already knows the subscriber identity, it MUST NOT include AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ, AT\_FULLAUTH\_ID\_REQ or AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ in the EAP-Request/SIM/Start.

It should be noted that in this case, peer identity is only transmitted in the AT\_IDENTITY attribute at the beginning of the whole EAP exchange. The fast re-authentication identity used in this AT\_IDENTITY attribute will be used in key derivation (see [Section 6.4](#)).

## **6. EAP-SIM Notifications**

### **6.1 General**

EAP-SIM does not prohibit the use of the EAP Notifications as specified in [\[RFC3748\]](#). EAP Notifications can be used at any time in the EAP-SIM exchange. It should be noted that EAP-SIM does not protect EAP Notifications. EAP-SIM also specifies method specific EAP-SIM notifications, which are protected in some cases.

The EAP server can use EAP-SIM notifications to convey notifications and result indications ([Section 6.2](#)) to the peer.

The server MUST use notifications in cases discussed in [Section 6.3.2](#). When the EAP server issues an EAP-Request/SIM/Notification packet to the peer, the peer MUST process the notification packet. The peer MAY show a notification message to the user and the peer MUST respond to the EAP server with an EAP-Response/SIM/Notification packet, even if the peer did not recognize the notification code.

An EAP-SIM full authentication exchange or a fast re-authentication exchange MUST NOT include more than one EAP-SIM notification round.

The notification code is a 16-bit number. The most significant bit is called the Success bit (S bit). The S bit specifies whether the notification implies failure. The code values with the S bit set to zero (code values 0...32767) are used on unsuccessful cases. The receipt of a notification code from this range implies failed EAP exchange, so the peer can use the notification as a failure indication. After receiving the EAP-Response/SIM/Notification for these notification codes, the server MUST send the EAP-Failure packet.



The receipt of a notification code with the S bit set to one (values 32768...65536) does not imply failure. Notification code "Success" (32768) has been reserved as a general notification code to indicate successful authentication.

The second most significant bit of the notification code is called the Phase bit (P bit). It specifies at which phase of the EAP-SIM exchange the notification can be used. If the P bit is set to zero, the notification can only be used after a successful EAP/SIM/Challenge round in full authentication or a successful EAP/SIM/Re-authentication round in reauthentication. A re-authentication round is considered successful only if the peer has successfully verified AT\_MAC and AT\_COUNTER attributes, and does not include the AT\_COUNTER\_TOO\_SMALL attribute in EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication.

If the P bit is set to one, the notification can only be used before the EAP/SIM/Challenge round in full authentication, or before the EAP/SIM/Re-authentication round in reauthentication. These notifications can only be used to indicate various failure cases. In other words, if the P bit is set to one, then the S bit MUST be set to zero.

[Section 8.8](#) and [Section 8.9](#) specify what other attributes must be included in the notification packets.

Some of the notification codes are authorization related and hence not usually considered as part of the responsibility of an EAP method. However, they are included as part of EAP-SIM because there are currently no other ways to convey this information to the user in a localizable way, and the information is potentially useful for the user. An EAP-SIM server implementation may decide never to send these EAP-SIM notifications.

## **[6.2](#) Result Indications**

As discussed in [Section 6.3](#), the server and the peer use explicit error messages in all error cases. If the server detects an error after successful authentication, the server uses an EAP-SIM notification to indicate failure to the peer. In this case, the result indication is integrity and replay protected.

By sending an EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge packet or an EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication packet (without AT\_COUNTER\_TOO\_SMALL), the peer indicates that it has successfully authenticated the server and that the peer's local policy accepts the EAP exchange. In other words, these packets are implicit success indications from the peer to the server.



EAP-SIM also supports optional protected success indications from the server to the peer. If the EAP server wants to use protected success indications, it includes the AT\_RESULT\_IND attribute in the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge or the EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication packet. This attribute indicates that the EAP server would like to use result indications in both successful and unsuccessful cases. If the peer also wants this, the peer includes AT\_RESULT\_IND in EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge or EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication. The peer MUST NOT include AT\_RESULT\_IND if it did not receive AT\_RESULT\_IND from the server. If both the peer and the server used AT\_RESULT\_IND, then the EAP exchange is not complete yet, but an EAP-SIM notification round will follow. The following EAP-SIM notification may indicate either failure or success.

Success indications with the AT\_NOTIFICATION code "Success" (32768) can only be used if both the server and the peer indicate they want to use them with AT\_RESULT\_IND. If the server did not include AT\_RESULT\_IND in the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge or EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication packet, or if the peer did not include AT\_RESULT\_IND in the corresponding response packet, then the server MUST NOT use protected success indications.

Because the server uses the AT\_NOTIFICATION code "Success" (32768) to indicate that the EAP exchange has completed successfully, the EAP exchange cannot fail when the server processes the EAP-SIM response to this notification. Hence, the server MUST ignore the contents of the EAP-SIM response it receives to the EAP-Request/SIM/Notification with this code. Regardless of the contents of the EAP-SIM response, the server MUST send EAP-Success as the next packet.

### **6.3 Error Cases**

This section specifies the operation of the peer and the server in error cases. The subsections below require the EAP-SIM peer and server to send an error packet (EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error from the peer or EAP-Request/SIM/Notification from the server) in error cases. However, implementations SHOULD NOT rely upon the correct error reporting behavior of the peer, authenticator, or the server. It is possible for error and other messages to be lost in transit or for a malicious participant to attempt to consume resources by not issuing error messages. Both the peer and the EAP server SHOULD have a mechanism to clean up state even if an error message or EAP-Success is not received after a timeout period.

#### **6.3.1 Peer Operation**

In general, if an EAP-SIM peer detects an error in a received EAP-SIM packet, the EAP-SIM implementation responds with the





EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet. In response to the EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error, the EAP server MUST issue the EAP-Failure packet and the authentication exchange terminates.

By default, the peer uses the client error code 0, "unable to process packet". This error code is used in the following cases:

- o EAP exchange is not acceptable according to the peer's local policy.
- o the peer is not able to parse the EAP request, i.e. the EAP request is malformed
- o the peer encountered a malformed attribute
- o wrong attribute types or duplicate attributes have been included in the EAP request
- o a mandatory attribute is missing
- o unrecognized non-skippable attribute
- o unrecognized or unexpected EAP-SIM Subtype in the EAP request
- o A RAND challenge repeated in AT\_RANDOM
- o invalid AT\_MAC. The peer SHOULD log this event.
- o invalid pad bytes in AT\_PADDING
- o the peer does not want to process AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ

Separate error codes have been defined for the following error cases in [Section 9.19](#):

As specified in [Section 4.1](#), when processing the AT\_VERSION\_LIST attribute, which lists the EAP-SIM versions supported by the server, if the attribute does not include a version that is implemented by the peer and allowed in the peer's security policy, then the peer MUST send the EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet with the error code "unsupported version".

When processing the AT\_RANDOM attribute, the peer MUST send the EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet with the error code "insufficient number of challenges", if the number of RAND challenges is smaller than what is required by peer's local policy.

If the peer believes that the RAND challenges included in AT\_RANDOM are not fresh e.g. because it is capable of remembering some previously used RANDs, the peer MUST send the EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet with the error code "RANDs are not fresh".

### **[6.3.2](#) Server Operation**

If an EAP-SIM server detects an error in a received EAP-SIM response, the server MUST issue the EAP-Request/SIM/Notification packet with an AT\_NOTIFICATION code that implies failure. By default, the server uses one of the general failure codes ("General failure after



authentication" (0), or "General failure" (16384)). The choice between these two codes depends on the phase of the EAP-SIM exchange, see [Section 6](#). The error cases when the server issues an EAP-Request/SIM/Notification that implies failure include the following:

- o the server is not able to parse the peer's EAP response
- o the server encounters a malformed attribute, a non-recognized non-skippable attribute, or a duplicate attribute
- o a mandatory attribute is missing or an invalid attribute was included
- o unrecognized or unexpected EAP-SIM Subtype in the EAP Response
- o invalid AT\_MAC. The server SHOULD log this event.
- o invalid AT\_COUNTER

### [6.3.3](#) EAP-Failure

The EAP-SIM server sends EAP-Failure in two cases:

- 1) In response to an EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet the server has received from the peer, or
- 2) Following an EAP-SIM notification round, when the AT\_NOTIFICATION code implies failure.

The EAP-SIM server MUST NOT send EAP-Failure in other cases than these two. However, it should be noted that even though the EAP-SIM server would not send an EAP-Failure, an authorization decision that happens outside EAP-SIM, such as in the AAA server or in an intermediate AAA proxy, may result in a failed exchange.

The peer MUST accept the EAP-Failure packet in case 1) and case 2) above. The peer SHOULD silently discard the EAP-Failure packet in other cases.

### [6.3.4](#) EAP-Success

On full authentication, the server can only send EAP-Success after the EAP/SIM/Challenge round. The peer MUST silently discard any EAP-Success packets if they are received before the peer has successfully authenticated the server and sent the EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge packet.

If the peer did not indicate that it wants to use protected success indications with AT\_RESULT\_IND (as discussed in [Section 6.2](#)) on full authentication, then the peer MUST accept EAP-Success after a successful EAP/SIM/Challenge round.



If the peer indicated that it wants to use protected success indications with AT\_RESULT\_IND (as discussed in [Section 6.2](#)), then the peer MUST NOT accept EAP-Success after a successful EAP/SIM/Challenge round. In this case, the peer MUST only accept EAP-Success after receiving an EAP-SIM Notification with the AT\_NOTIFICATION code "Success" (32768).

On fast re-authentication, EAP-Success can only be sent after the EAP/SIM/Re-authentication round. The peer MUST silently discard any EAP-Success packets if they are received before the peer has successfully authenticated the server and sent the EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication packet.

If the peer did not indicate that it wants to use protected success indications with AT\_RESULT\_IND (as discussed in [Section 6.2](#)) on fast re-authentication, then the peer MUST accept EAP-Success after a successful EAP/SIM/Re-authentication round.

If the peer indicated that it wants to use protected success indications with AT\_RESULT\_IND (as discussed in [Section 6.2](#)), then the peer MUST NOT accept EAP-Success after a successful EAP/SIM/Re-authentication round. In this case, the peer MUST only accept EAP-Success after receiving an EAP-SIM Notification with the AT\_NOTIFICATION code "Success" (32768).

If the peer receives an EAP-SIM notification ([Section 6](#)) that indicates failure, then the peer MUST no longer accept the EAP-Success packet even if the server authentication was successfully completed.

#### [6.4](#) Key Generation

This section specifies how keying material is generated.

On EAP-SIM full authentication, a Master Key (MK) is derived from the underlying GSM authentication values (Kc keys), the NONCE\_MT and other relevant context as follows.

$$\text{MK} = \text{SHA1}(\text{Identity}|\text{n*Kc}| \text{NONCE\_MT}| \text{Version List}| \text{Selected Version})$$

In the formula above, the "|" character denotes concatenation. Identity denotes the peer identity string without any terminating null characters. It is the identity from the last AT\_IDENTITY attribute sent by the peer in this exchange, or, if AT\_IDENTITY was not used, the identity from the EAP-Response/Identity packet. The identity string is included as-is, without any changes. As discussed in [Section 4.2.2.2](#), relying on EAP-Response/Identity for conveying the EAP-SIM peer identity is discouraged, and the server SHOULD use



the EAP-SIM method specific identity attributes.

The notation  $n \cdot K_c$  in the formula above denotes the  $n$   $K_c$  values concatenated. The  $K_c$  keys are used in the same order as the RAND challenges in AT\_RANDOM attribute. NONCE\_MT denotes the NONCE\_MT value (not the AT\_NONCE\_MT attribute but just the nonce value). The Version List includes the 2-byte supported version numbers from AT\_VERSION\_LIST, in the same order as in the attribute. The Selected Version is the 2-byte selected version from AT\_SELECTED\_VERSION. Network byte order is used, just as in the attributes. The hash function SHA-1 is specified in [\[SHA-1\]](#). If several EAP/SIM/Start roundtrips are used in an EAP-SIM exchange, then the NONCE\_MT, Version List and Selected version from the last EAP/SIM/Start round are used, and the previous EAP/SIM/Start rounds are ignored.

The Master Key is fed into a Pseudo-Random number Function (PRF) which generates separate Transient EAP Keys (TEKs) for protecting EAP-SIM packets, as well as a Master Session Key (MSK) for link layer security and an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) for other purposes. On fast re-authentication, the same TEKs MUST be used for protecting EAP packets, but a new MSK and a new EMSK MUST be derived from the original MK and new values exchanged in the fast re-authentication.

EAP-SIM requires two TEKs for its own purposes, the authentication key  $K_{aut}$  to be used with the AT\_MAC attribute, and the encryption key  $K_{encr}$ , to be used with the AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute. The same  $K_{aut}$  and  $K_{encr}$  keys are used in full authentication and subsequent fast re-authentications.

Key derivation is based on the random number generation specified in NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 186-2 [\[PRF\]](#). The pseudo-random number generator is specified in the change notice 1 (2001 October 5) of [\[PRF\]](#) (Algorithm 1). As specified in the change notice (page 74), when Algorithm 1 is used as a general-purpose pseudo-random number generator, the "mod  $q$ " term in step 3.3 is omitted. The function  $G$  used in the algorithm is constructed via Secure Hash Standard as specified in Appendix 3.3 of the standard. It should be noted that the function  $G$  is very similar to SHA-1, but the message padding is different. Please refer to [\[PRF\]](#) for full details. For convenience, the random number algorithm with the correct modification is cited in [Appendix B](#).

160-bit XKEY and XVAL values are used, so  $b = 160$ . On each full authentication, the Master Key is used as the initial secret seed-key XKEY. The optional user input values ( $XSEED_j$ ) in step 3.1 are set to zero.





On full authentication, the resulting 320-bit random numbers  $x_0$ ,  $x_1$ , ...,  $x_{m-1}$  are concatenated and partitioned into suitable-sized chunks and used as keys in the following order:  $K_{encr}$  (128 bits),  $K_{aut}$  (128 bits), Master Session Key (64 bytes), Extended Master Session Key (64 bytes).

On fast re-authentication, the same pseudo-random number generator can be used to generate a new Master Session Key and a new Extended Master Session Key. The seed value  $XKEY'$  is calculated as follows:

$$XKEY' = \text{SHA1}(\text{Identity}|\text{counter}|\text{NONCE\_S}| \text{MK})$$

In the formula above, the Identity denotes the fast re-authentication identity, without any terminating null characters, from the AT\_IDENTITY attribute of the EAP-Response/SIM/Start packet, or, if EAP-Response/SIM/Start was not used on fast re-authentication, the identity string from the EAP-Response/Identity packet. The counter denotes the counter value from AT\_COUNTER attribute used in the EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication packet. The counter is used in network byte order. NONCE\_S denotes the 16-byte NONCE\_S value from the AT\_NONCE\_S attribute used in the EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication packet. The MK is the Master Key derived on the preceding full authentication.

On fast re-authentication, the pseudo-random number generator is run with the new seed value  $XKEY'$ , and the resulting 320-bit random numbers  $x_0$ ,  $x_1$ , ...,  $x_{m-1}$  are concatenated and partitioned into two 64-byte chunks and used as the new 64-byte Master Session Key and the new 64-byte Extended Master Session Key. Note that because  $K_{encr}$  and  $K_{aut}$  are not derived on fast re-authentication, the Master Session Key and the Extended Master Session key are obtained from the beginning of the key stream  $x_0$ ,  $x_1$ , ....

The first 32 bytes of the MSK can be used as the Pairwise Master Key (PMK) for IEEE 802.11i.

When the RADIUS attributes specified in [[RFC2548](#)] are used to transport keying material, then the first 32 bytes of the MSK correspond to MS-MPPE-RECV-KEY and the second 32 bytes to MS-MPPE-SEND-KEY. In this case, only 64 bytes of keying material (the MSK) are used.

When generating the initial Master Key, the hash function is used as a mixing function to combine several session keys ( $K_c$ 's) generated by the GSM authentication procedure and the random number NONCE\_MT into a single session key. There are several reasons for this. The current GSM session keys are at most 64 bits, so two or more of them are needed to generate a longer key. By using a one-way function to



Indicates the particular type of attribute. The attribute type values are listed in the IANA considerations section of the EAP-AKA specification.



## [EAP-AKA]

### Length

Indicates the length of this attribute in multiples of four bytes. The maximum length of an attribute is 1024 bytes. The length includes the Attribute Type and Length bytes.

### Value

The particular data associated with this attribute. This field is always included and it may be two or more bytes in length. The type and length fields determine the format and length of the value field.

Attributes numbered within the range 0 through 127 are called non-skippable attributes. When an EAP-SIM peer encounters a non-skippable attribute that the peer does not recognize, the peer MUST send the EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet which terminates the authentication exchange. If an EAP-SIM server encounters a non-skippable attribute that the server does not recognize, then the server sends the EAP-Request/SIM/Notification packet with an AT\_NOTIFICATION code that implies general failure ("General failure after authentication" (0), or "General failure" (16384), depending on the phase of the exchange), which terminates the authentication exchange.

Attributes within the range of 128 through 255 are called skippable attributes. When a skippable attribute is encountered that is not recognized it is ignored. The rest of the attributes and message data MUST still be processed. The Length field of the attribute is used to skip the attribute value in searching for the next attribute.

Unless otherwise specified, the order of the attributes in an EAP-SIM message is insignificant and an EAP-SIM implementation should not assume a certain order to be used.

Attributes can be encapsulated within other attributes. In other words, the value field of an attribute type can be specified to contain other attributes.

## **7.2 Protocol Extensibility**

EAP-SIM can be extended by specifying new attribute types. If skippable attributes are used, it is possible to extend the protocol without breaking old implementations.

However, any new attributes added to the EAP-Request/SIM/Start or



EAP-Response/SIM/Start packets would not be integrity protected. Therefore, these messages MUST NOT be extended in the current version of EAP-SIM. If the list of supported EAP-SIM versions in AT\_VERSION\_LIST does not include other versions than 1, then the server MUST NOT include other attributes besides those specified in this document in the EAP-Request/SIM/Start message. Note that future versions of this protocol might specify new attributes for EAP-Request/SIM/Start and still support version 1 of the protocol. In this case, the server might send an EAP-Request/SIM/Start message that includes new attributes, and indicate support for protocol version 1 and some other version in the AT\_VERSION\_LIST attribute. If the peer selects version 1, then the peer MUST ignore any other attributes included in EAP-Request/SIM/Start besides those specified in this document. If the selected EAP-SIM version in peer's AT\_SELECTED\_VERSION is 1, then the peer MUST NOT include other attributes besides those specified in this document in the EAP-Response/SIM/Start message.

When specifying new attributes, it should be noted that EAP-SIM does not support message fragmentation. Hence, the sizes of the new extensions MUST be limited so that the maximum transfer unit (MTU) of the underlying lower layer is not exceeded. According to [\[RFC3748\]](#), lower layers must provide an EAP MTU of 1020 bytes or greater, so any extensions to EAP-SIM SHOULD NOT exceed the EAP MTU of 1020 bytes.

Because EAP-SIM supports version negotiation, new versions of the protocol can also be specified by using a new version number.

## **8. Messages**

This section specifies the messages used in EAP-SIM. It specifies when a message may be transmitted or accepted, which attributes are allowed in a message, which attributes are required in a message, and other message specific details. The general message format is specified in [Section 7.1](#).

### **8.1 EAP-Request/SIM/Start**

In full authentication the first SIM specific EAP Request is EAP-Request/SIM/Start. The EAP/SIM/Start roundtrip is used for two purposes. In full authentication this packet is used to request the peer to send the AT\_NONCE\_MT attribute to the server. In addition, as specified in [Section 4.2](#), the Start round trip may be used by the server for obtaining the peer identity. As discussed in [Section 4.2](#), several Start rounds may be required in order to obtain a valid peer identity.

The server MUST always include the AT\_VERSION\_LIST attribute.





The server MAY include one of the following identity requesting attributes: AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ, AT\_FULLAUTH\_ID\_REQ, and AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ. These three attributes are mutually exclusive, so the server MUST NOT include more than one of the attributes.

If the server has received a response from the peer, it MUST NOT issue a new EAP-Request/SIM/Start packet if it has either previously issued an EAP-Request/SIM/Start message without any identity requesting attributes or with the AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ attribute.

If the server has received a response from the peer, it MUST NOT issue a new EAP-Request/SIM/Start packet with the AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ or AT\_FULLAUTH\_ID\_REQ attributes if it has previously issued an EAP-Request/SIM/Start message with the AT\_FULLAUTH\_ID\_REQ attribute.

If the server has received a response from the peer, it MUST NOT issue a new EAP-Request/SIM/Start packet with the AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ attribute if the server has previously issued an EAP-Request/SIM/Start message with the AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ attribute.

This message MUST NOT include AT\_MAC, AT\_IV, or AT\_ENCR\_DATA.

## **8.2 EAP-Response/SIM/Start**

The peer sends EAP-Response/SIM/Start in response to a valid EAP-Request/SIM/Start from the server.

If and only if the server's EAP-Request/SIM/Start includes one of the identity requesting attributes, then the peer MUST include the AT\_IDENTITY attribute. The usage of AT\_IDENTITY is defined in [Section 4.2](#).

The AT\_NONCE\_MT attribute MUST NOT be included if the AT\_IDENTITY with a fast re-authentication identity is present for fast re-authentication. AT\_NONCE\_MT MUST be included in all other cases (full authentication).

The AT\_SELECTED\_VERSION attribute MUST NOT be included if the AT\_IDENTITY attribute with a fast re-authentication identity is present for fast re-authentication. In all other cases, AT\_SELECTED\_VERSION MUST be included (full authentication). This attribute is used in version negotiation, as specified in [Section 4.1](#).

This message MUST NOT include AT\_MAC, AT\_IV, or AT\_ENCR\_DATA.



### **8.3 EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge**

The server sends the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge after receiving a valid EAP-Response/SIM/Start, containing AT\_NONCE\_MT and AT\_SELECTED\_VERSION, and after successfully obtaining the subscriber identity.

The AT\_RANDOM attribute MUST be included.

The AT\_RESULT\_IND attribute MAY be included. The usage of this attribute is discussed in [Section 6.2](#).

The AT\_MAC attribute MUST be included. For EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge, the MAC code is calculated over the following data:

EAP packet | NONCE\_MT

The EAP packet is represented as specified in [Section 7.1](#). It is followed by the 16-byte NONCE\_MT value from the peer's AT\_NONCE\_MT attribute.

The EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge packet MAY include encrypted attributes for identity privacy and for communicating the next fast re-authentication identity. In this case, the AT\_IV and AT\_ENCR\_DATA attributes are included ([Section 9.12](#)).

The plaintext of the AT\_ENCR\_DATA value field consists of nested attributes. The nested attributes MAY include AT\_PADDING (as specified in [Section 9.12](#)). If the server supports identity privacy and wants to communicate a pseudonym to the peer for the next full authentication, then the nested encrypted attributes include the AT\_NEXT\_PSEUDONYM attribute. If the server supports re-authentication and wants to communicate a fast re-authentication identity to the peer, then the nested encrypted attributes include the AT\_NEXT\_REAUTH\_ID attribute.

When processing this message, the peer MUST process AT\_RANDOM before processing other attributes. Only if AT\_RANDOM is verified to be valid, the peer derives keys and verifies AT\_MAC. The operation in case an error occurs is specified in [Section 6.3.1](#).

### **8.4 EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge**

The peer sends EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge in response to a valid EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge.

Sending this packet indicates, that the peer has successfully



authenticated the server and that the EAP exchange will be accepted by the peer's local policy. Hence, if these conditions are not met, then the peer MUST NOT send EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge, but the peer MUST send EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error.

The AT\_MAC attribute MUST be included. For EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge, the MAC code is calculated over the following data:

EAP packet | n\*SRES

The EAP packet is represented as specified in [Section 7.1](#). The EAP packet bytes are immediately followed by the two or three SRES values concatenated, denoted above with the notation n\*SRES. The SRES values are used in the same order as the corresponding RAND challenges in server's AT\_RANDOM attribute.

The AT\_RESULT\_IND attribute MAY be included, if it was included in EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge. The usage of this attribute is discussed in [Section 6.2](#).

Later versions of this protocol MAY make use of the AT\_ENCR\_DATA and AT\_IV attributes in this message to include encrypted (skippable) attributes. The EAP server MUST process EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge messages that include these attributes even if the server did not implement these optional attributes.

## **8.5 EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication**

The server sends the EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication message if it wants to use fast re-authentication, and if it has received a valid fast re-authentication identity in EAP-Response/Identity or EAP-Response/SIM/Start.

AT\_MAC MUST be included. No message-specific data is included in the MAC calculation. See [Section 9.14](#).

The AT\_RESULT\_IND attribute MAY be included. The usage of this attribute is discussed in [Section 6.2](#).

The AT\_IV and AT\_ENCR\_DATA attributes MUST be included. The plaintext consists of the following nested encrypted attributes, which MUST be included: AT\_COUNTER and AT\_NONCE\_S. In addition, the nested encrypted attributes MAY include the following attributes: AT\_NEXT\_REAUTH\_ID and AT\_PADDING.



## **8.6 EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication**

The client sends the EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication packet in response to a valid EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication.

The AT\_MAC attribute MUST be included. For EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication, the MAC code is calculated over the following data:

EAP packet | NONCE\_S

The EAP packet is represented as specified in [Section 7.1](#). It is followed by the 16-byte NONCE\_S value from the server's AT\_NONCE\_S attribute.

The AT\_IV and AT\_ENCR\_DATA attributes MUST be included. The nested encrypted attributes MUST include the AT\_COUNTER attribute. The AT\_COUNTER\_TOO\_SMALL attribute MAY be included in the nested encrypted attributes, and it is included in cases specified in [Section 5](#). The AT\_PADDING attribute MAY be included.

The AT\_RESULT\_IND attribute MAY be included, if it was included in EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication. The usage of this attribute is discussed in [Section 6.2](#).

Sending this packet without AT\_COUNTER\_TOO\_SMALL indicates, that the peer has successfully authenticated the server and that the EAP exchange will be accepted by the peer's local policy. Hence, if these conditions are not met, then the peer MUST NOT send EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication, but the peer MUST send EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error.

## **8.7 EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error**

The peer sends EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error in error cases, as specified in [Section 6.3.1](#).

The AT\_CLIENT\_ERROR\_CODE attribute MUST be included.

The AT\_MAC, AT\_IV, or AT\_ENCR\_DATA attributes MUST NOT be used with this packet.

## **8.8 EAP-Request/SIM/Notification**

The usage of this message is specified in [Section 6](#).

The AT\_NOTIFICATION attribute MUST be included.





The AT\_MAC attribute MUST be included if the P bit of the notification code in AT\_NOTIFICATION is set to zero, and MUST NOT be included in cases when the P bit is set to one. The P bit is discussed in [Section 6](#).

No message-specific data is included in the MAC calculation. See [Section 9.14](#).

If EAP-Request/SIM/Notification is used on fast a re-authentication exchange, and if the P bit in AT\_NOTIFICATION is set to zero, then AT\_COUNTER is used for replay protection. In this case, the AT\_ENCR\_DATA and AT\_IV attributes MUST be included, and the encapsulated plaintext attributes MUST include the AT\_COUNTER attribute. The counter value included in AT\_COUNTER MUST be the same as in the EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication packet on the same fast re-authentication exchange.

### **8.9 EAP-Response/SIM/Notification**

The usage of this message is specified in [Section 6](#). This packet is an acknowledgement of EAP-Request/SIM/Notification.

The AT\_MAC attribute MUST be included in cases when the P bit of the notification code in AT\_NOTIFICATION of EAP-Request/SIM/Notification is set to zero, and MUST NOT be included in cases when the P bit is set to one. The P bit is discussed in [Section 6](#).

No message-specific data is included in the MAC calculation, see [Section 9.14](#).

If EAP-Request/SIM/Notification is used on fast a re-authentication exchange, and if the P bit in AT\_NOTIFICATION is set to zero, then AT\_COUNTER is used for replay protection. In this case, the AT\_ENCR\_DATA and AT\_IV attributes MUST be included, and the encapsulated plaintext attributes MUST include the AT\_COUNTER attribute. The counter value included in AT\_COUNTER MUST be the same as in the EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication packet on the same fast re-authentication exchange.

## **9. Attributes**

This section specifies the format of message attributes. The attribute type numbers are specified in the IANA considerations section of the EAP-AKA specification [[EAP-AKA](#)].

### **9.1 Table of Attributes**

The following table provides a guide to which attributes may be found



in which kinds of messages, and in what quantity. Messages are denoted with numbers in parentheses as follows: (1) EAP-Request/SIM/Start, (2) EAP-Response/SIM/Start, (3) EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge, (4) EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge, (5) EAP-Request/SIM/Notification, (6) EAP-Response/SIM/Notification, (7) EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error (8) EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication, and (9) EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication. The column denoted with "Encr" indicates whether the attribute is a nested attribute that MUST be included within AT\_ENCR\_DATA, and the column denoted with "Skip" indicates whether the attribute is a skippable attribute.

"0" indicates that the attribute MUST NOT be included in the message, "1" indicates that the attribute MUST be included in the message, "0-1" indicates that the attribute is sometimes included in the message, and "0\*" indicates that the attribute is not included in the message in cases specified in this document, but MAY be included in the future versions of the protocol.

Attribute	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	Encr	Skip
AT_VERSION_LIST	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N	N
AT_SELECTED_VERSION	0	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N	N
AT_NONCE_MT	0	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N	N
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N	N
AT_ANY_ID_REQ	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N	N
AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N	N
AT_IDENTITY	0	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N	N
AT_RAND	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	N	N
AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM	0	0	0-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	Y	Y
AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID	0	0	0-1	0	0	0	0	0-1	0	Y	Y
AT_IV	0	0	0-1	0*	0-1	0-1	0	1	1	N	Y
AT_ENCR_DATA	0	0	0-1	0*	0-1	0-1	0	1	1	N	Y
AT_PADDING	0	0	0-1	0*	0-1	0-1	0	0-1	0-1	Y	N
AT_RESULT_IND	0	0	0-1	0-1	0	0	0	0-1	0-1	N	Y
AT_MAC	0	0	1	1	0-1	0-1	0	1	1	N	N
AT_COUNTER	0	0	0	0	0-1	0-1	0	1	1	Y	N
AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0-1	Y	N
AT_NONCE_S	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	Y	N
AT_NOTIFICATION	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	N	N
AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	N	N

It should be noted that attributes AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ, AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ and AT\_FULLAUTH\_ID\_REQ are mutually exclusive, so that only one of them can be included at the same time. If one of the attributes AT\_IV and AT\_ENCR\_DATA is included, then both of the attributes MUST be included.



## 9.2 AT\_VERSION\_LIST

The format of the AT\_VERSION\_LIST attribute is shown below.

```

      0                               1                               2                               3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| AT_VERSION_L..| Length          | Actual Version List Length      |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| Supported Version 1          | Supported Version 2                |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
.                               .
.                               .
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| Supported Version N          | Padding                      |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+

```

This attribute is used in version negotiation, as specified in [Section 4.1](#). The attribute contains the version numbers supported by the EAP-SIM server. The server **MUST** only include versions that it implements and that are allowed in its security policy. The server **SHOULD** list the versions in the order of preference, most preferred versions first. At least one version number **MUST** be included. The version number for the protocol described in this document is one (0001 hexadecimal).

The value field of this attribute begins with 2-byte Actual Version List Length, which specifies the length of the Version List in bytes, not including the Actual Version List Length attribute length. This field is followed by the list of the versions supported by the server, which each have a length of 2 bytes. For example, if there is only one supported version, then the Actual Version List Length is 2. Because the length of the attribute must be a multiple of 4 bytes, the sender pads the value field with zero bytes when necessary.

## 9.3 AT\_SELECTED\_VERSION

The format of the AT\_SELECTED\_VERSION attribute is shown below.

```

      0                               1                               2                               3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| AT_SELECTED...| Length = 1      | Selected Version                |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+

```


This attribute is used in version negotiation, as specified in [Section 4.1](#). The value field of this attribute contains a two-byte



version number, which indicates the EAP-SIM version that the peer wants to use.

#### 9.4 AT\_NONCE\_MT

The format of the AT\_NONCE\_MT attribute is shown below.




The value field of the NONCE\_MT attribute contains two reserved bytes followed by a random number generated by the peer (16 bytes long) freshly for this EAP-SIM authentication exchange. The random number is used as a seed value for the new keying material. The reserved bytes are set to zero upon sending and ignored upon reception.

The peer MUST NOT re-use the NONCE\_MT value from a previous EAP-SIM authentication exchange. If an EAP-SIM exchange includes several EAP/SIM/Start rounds, then the peer SHOULD use the same NONCE\_MT value in all EAP-Response/SIM/Start packets. The peer SHOULD use a good source of randomness to generate NONCE\_MT. Please see [\[RFC1750\]](#) for more information about generating random numbers for security applications.

#### 9.5 AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ

The format of the AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ attribute is shown below.



The use of the AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ is defined in [Section 4.2](#). The value field only contains two reserved bytes, which are set to zero on sending and ignored on reception.





### 9.6 AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ

The format of the AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ attribute is shown below.

```

      0                               1                               2                               3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|AT_ANY_ID_REQ | Length = 1   |               Reserved               |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

```

The use of the AT\_ANY\_ID\_REQ is defined in [Section 4.2](#). The value field only contains two reserved bytes, which are set to zero on sending and ignored on reception.

### 9.7 AT\_FULLAUTH\_ID\_REQ

The format of the AT\_FULLAUTH\_ID\_REQ attribute is shown below.

```

      0                               1                               2                               3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|AT_FULLAUTH_...| Length = 1   |               Reserved               |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

The use of the AT\_FULLAUTH\_ID\_REQ is defined in [Section 4.2](#). The value field only contains two reserved bytes, which are set to zero on sending and ignored on reception.

### 9.8 AT\_IDENTITY

The format of the AT\_IDENTITY attribute is shown below.

```

      0                               1                               2                               3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| AT_IDENTITY   | Length       | Actual Identity Length             |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|
.               Identity (optional)
.
|
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

```


The use of the AT\_IDENTITY is defined in [Section 4.2](#). The value field of this attribute begins with 2-byte actual identity length, which specifies the length of the identity in bytes. This field is followed by the subscriber identity of the indicated actual length. The identity is the permanent identity, a pseudonym identity or a



fast re-authentication identity. The identity format is specified in [Section 4.2.1](#). The same identity format is used in the AT\_IDENTITY attribute and the EAP-Response/Identity packet, with the exception that the peer MUST NOT decorate the identity it includes in AT\_IDENTITY. The identity does not include any terminating null characters. Because the length of the attribute must be a multiple of 4 bytes, the sender pads the identity with zero bytes when necessary.

## 9.9 AT\_RANDOM

The format of the AT\_RANDOM attribute is shown below.



The value field of this attribute contains two reserved bytes followed by n GSM RANDs, each 16 bytes long. The value of n can be determined by the attribute length. The reserved bytes are set to zero upon sending and ignored upon reception.

The number of RAND challenges (n) MUST be two or three. The peer MUST verify that the number of RAND challenges is sufficient according to the peer's policy. The server MUST use different RAND values. In other words, a RAND value can only be included once in AT\_RANDOM. When processing the AT\_RANDOM attribute, the peer MUST check that the RANDs are different.

The EAP server MUST obtain fresh RANDs for each EAP-SIM full authentication exchange. More specifically, the server MUST consider RANDs it included in AT\_RANDOM to be consumed if the server receives an EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge packet with a valid AT\_MAC, or an EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error with the code "insufficient number of challenges" or "RANDs are not fresh". However, in other cases (if the server does not receive any response to its EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge packet, or if the server receives some other kind of response than the cases listed above), the server does not need to consider the RANDs to be consumed, and the server MAY re-use the RANDs in the AT\_RANDOM attribute of the next full authentication attempt.



### 9.10 AT\_NEXT\_PSEUDONYM

The format of the AT\_NEXT\_PSEUDONYM attribute is shown below.

```

      0                               1                               2                               3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| AT_NEXT_PSEU..| Length           | Actual Pseudonym Length       |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|                                                         |
|                                     Next Pseudonym          |
|                                                         |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

```

The value field of this attribute begins with 2-byte actual pseudonym length, which specifies the length of the following pseudonym in bytes. This field is followed by a pseudonym username that the peer can use in the next authentication. The username MUST NOT include any realm portion. The username does not include any terminating null characters. Because the length of the attribute must be a multiple of 4 bytes, the sender pads the pseudonym with zero bytes when necessary. The username encoding MUST follow the UTF-8 transformation format [[RFC2279](#)]. This attribute MUST always be encrypted by encapsulating it within the AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute.

### 9.11 AT\_NEXT\_REAUTH\_ID

The format of the AT\_NEXT\_REAUTH\_ID attribute is shown below.

```

      0                               1                               2                               3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| AT_NEXT_REAU..| Length           | Actual Re-Auth Identity Length|
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|                                                         |
|               Next Fast Re-authentication Username        |
|                                                         |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

```

The value field of this attribute begins with 2-byte actual re-authentication identity length which specifies the length of the following fast re-authentication identity in bytes. This field is followed by a fast re-authentication identity that the peer can use in the next fast re-authentication, as described in [Section 5](#). In environments where a realm portion is required, the fast re-authentication identity includes both a username portion and a




realm name portion. The fast re-authentication identity does not include any terminating null characters. Because the length of the attribute must be a multiple of 4 bytes, the sender pads the fast re-authentication identity with zero bytes when necessary. The identity encoding MUST follow the UTF-8 transformation format [RFC2279]. This attribute MUST always be encrypted by encapsulating it within the AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute.

### 9.12 AT\_IV, AT\_ENCR\_DATA and AT\_PADDING

AT\_IV and AT\_ENCR\_DATA attributes can be used to transmit encrypted information between the EAP-SIM peer and server.

The value field of AT\_IV contains two reserved bytes followed by a 16-byte initialization vector required by the AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute. The reserved bytes are set to zero when sending and ignored on reception. The AT\_IV attribute MUST be included if and only if the AT\_ENCR\_DATA is included. [Section 6.3](#) specifies the operation if a packet that does not meet this condition is encountered.


The sender of the AT\_IV attribute chooses the initialization vector at random. The sender MUST NOT reuse the initialization vector value from previous EAP-SIM packets. The sender SHOULD use a good source of randomness to generate the initialization vector. Please see [RFC1750] for more information about generating random numbers for security applications. The format of AT\_IV is shown below.



The value field of the AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute consists of two reserved bytes followed by cipher text bytes encrypted using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [AES] with a 128-bit key in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode of operation using the initialization vector from the AT\_IV attribute. The reserved bytes are set to zero when sending and ignored on reception. Please see [CBC] for a description of the CBC mode. The format of the AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute is shown below.








The derivation of the encryption key (K\_encr) is specified in [Section 6.4](#).

The plaintext consists of nested EAP-SIM attributes.

The encryption algorithm requires the length of the plaintext to be a multiple of 16 bytes. The sender may need to include the AT\_PADDING attribute as the last attribute within AT\_ENCR\_DATA. The AT\_PADDING attribute is not included if the total length of other nested attributes within the AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute is a multiple of 16 bytes. As usual, the Length of the Padding attribute includes the Attribute Type and Attribute Length fields. The length of the Padding attribute is 4, 8 or 12 bytes. It is chosen so that the length of the value field of the AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute becomes a multiple of 16 bytes. The actual pad bytes in the value field are set to zero (00 hexadecimal) on sending. The recipient of the message MUST verify that the pad bytes are set to zero. If this verification fails on the peer, then it MUST send the EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet with the error code "unable to process packet" to terminate the authentication exchange. If this verification fails on the server, then the server sends the peer the EAP-Request/SIM/Notification packet with an AT\_NOTIFICATION code that implies failure to terminate the authentication exchange. The format of the AT\_PADDING attribute is shown below.





### 9.13 AT\_RESULT\_IND

The format of the AT\_RESULT\_IND attribute is shown below.

```

      0               1               2               3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| AT_RESULT_... | Length = 1    |                Reserved                |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+

```

The value field of this attribute consists of two reserved bytes, which are set to zero upon sending and ignored upon reception. This attribute is always sent unencrypted, so it MUST NOT be encapsulated within the AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute.

### 9.14 AT\_MAC

The AT\_MAC attribute is used for EAP-SIM message authentication. [Section 8](#) specifies which messages AT\_MAC MUST be included.

The value field of the AT\_MAC attribute contains two reserved bytes followed by a keyed message authentication code (MAC). The MAC is calculated over the whole EAP packet concatenated with optional message-specific data, with the exception that the value field of the MAC attribute is set to zero when calculating the MAC. The EAP packet includes the EAP header that begins with the Code field, the EAP-SIM header that begins with the Subtype field, and all the attributes, as specified in [Section 7.1](#). The reserved bytes in AT\_MAC are set to zero when sending and ignored on reception. The contents of the message-specific data that may be included in the MAC calculation are specified separately for each EAP-SIM message in [Section 8](#).

The format of the AT\_MAC attribute is shown below.

```

      0               1               2               3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|   AT_MAC   | Length = 5    |                Reserved                |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|
|                                MAC                                |
|
|
|
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+

```

The MAC algorithm is HMAC-SHA1-128 [[RFC2104](#)] keyed hash value. (The HMAC-SHA1-128 value is obtained from the 20-byte HMAC-SHA1 value by



truncating the output to the first 16 bytes. Hence, the length of the MAC is 16 bytes.) The derivation of the authentication key (K<sub>aut</sub>) used in the calculation of the MAC is specified in [Section 6.4](#).

When the AT\_MAC attribute is included in an EAP-SIM message, the recipient MUST process the AT\_MAC attribute before looking at any other attributes, except when processing EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge. The processing of EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge is specified in [Section 8.3](#). If the message authentication code is invalid, then the recipient MUST ignore all other attributes in the message and operate as specified in [Section 6.3](#).

### 9.15 AT\_COUNTER

The format of the AT\_COUNTER attribute is shown below.

```

      0                               1                               2                               3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| AT_COUNTER | Length = 1 | Counter |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

```

The value field of the AT\_COUNTER attribute consists of a 16-bit unsigned integer counter value, represented in network byte order. This attribute MUST always be encrypted by encapsulating it within the AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute.

### 9.16 AT\_COUNTER\_TOO\_SMALL

The format of the AT\_COUNTER\_TOO\_SMALL attribute is shown below.

```

      0                               1                               2                               3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| AT_COUNTER... | Length = 1 | Reserved |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

```

The value field of this attribute consists of two reserved bytes, which are set to zero upon sending and ignored upon reception. This attribute MUST always be encrypted by encapsulating it within the AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute.

### 9.17 AT\_NONCE\_S

The format of the AT\_NONCE\_S attribute is shown below.



0 - General failure after authentication. (Implies failure, used after successful authentication.)





EAP-SIM shares most of the protocol design, such as attributes and message Subtypes, with EAP-AKA [[EAP-AKA](#)]. EAP-SIM protocol numbers should be administered in the same IANA registry with EAP-AKA. The initial values are listed in [[EAP-AKA](#)] for both protocols, so this document does not require any new registries or parameter allocation.



As a common registry is used for EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA, the protocol number allocation policy for both protocols is specified in [\[EAP-AKA\]](#).

## **[11.](#) Security Considerations**

The EAP specification [\[RFC3748\]](#) describes the security vulnerabilities of EAP, which does not include its own security mechanisms. This section discusses the claimed security properties of EAP-SIM as well as vulnerabilities and security recommendations.

### **[11.1](#) A3 and A8 Algorithms**

The GSM A3 and A8 algorithms are used in EAP-SIM. [\[GSM 03.20\]](#) specifies the general GSM authentication procedure and the external interface (inputs and outputs) of the A3 and A8 algorithms. The operation of these functions falls completely within the domain of an individual operator, and the functions are therefore specified by each operator rather than being fully standardised. The GSM-MILENAGE algorithm, specified publicly in [\[3GPP TS 55.205\]](#), is an example algorithm set for A3 and A8 algorithms.

The security of the A3 and A8 algorithms is important to the security of EAP-SIM. Some A3/A8 algorithms have been compromised; see for example [\[GSM Cloning\]](#) for discussion about the security of COMP-128 version 1. Note that several revised versions of the COMP-128 A3/A8 algorithm have been devised after the publication of these weaknesses and that the publicly specified GSM-MILENAGE algorithm is not vulnerable to any known attacks.

### **[11.2](#) Identity Protection**

EAP-SIM includes optional identity privacy support that protects the privacy of the subscriber identity against passive eavesdropping. This document only specifies a mechanism to deliver pseudonyms from the server to the peer as part of an EAP-SIM exchange. Hence, a peer that has not yet performed any EAP-SIM exchanges does not typically have a pseudonym available. If the peer does not have a pseudonym available, then the privacy mechanism cannot be used, but the permanent identity will have to be sent in the clear. The terminal SHOULD store the pseudonym in a non-volatile memory so that it can be maintained across reboots. An active attacker that impersonates the network may use the AT\_PERMANENT\_ID\_REQ attribute to attempt to learn the subscriber's permanent identity. However, as discussed in [Section 4.2.2](#), the terminal can refuse to send the cleartext permanent identity if it believes that the network should be able to recognize the pseudonym.



If the peer and server cannot guarantee that the pseudonym will be maintained reliably and identity privacy is required then additional protection from an external security mechanism such as Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) [[PEAP](#)] may be used. If an external security mechanism is in use the identity privacy features of EAP-SIM may not be useful. The security considerations of using an external security mechanism with EAP-SIM are beyond the scope of this document.

### **11.3 Mutual Authentication and Triplet Exposure**

EAP-SIM provides mutual authentication. The peer believes that the network is authentic because the network can calculate a correct AT\_MAC value in the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge packet. To calculate AT\_MAC it is sufficient to know the RAND and Kc values from the GSM triplets (RAND, SRES, Kc) used in the authentication. Because the network selects the RAND challenges and the triplets, an attacker that knows n (2 or 3) GSM triplets for the subscriber is able to impersonate a valid network to the peer. (Some peers MAY employ an implementation-specific counter-measure against impersonating a valid network by re-using a previously used RAND; see below.) In other words, the security of EAP-SIM is based on the secrecy of Kc keys, which are considered secret intermediate results in the EAP-SIM cryptographic calculations.

Given physical access to the SIM card, it is easy to obtain any number of GSM triplets.

Another way to obtain triplets is to mount an attack on the peer platform via a virus or other malicious piece of software. The peer SHOULD be protected against triplet querying attacks by malicious software. Care should be taken not to expose Kc keys to attackers when they are stored or handled by the peer, or transmitted between the subsystems of the peer. Steps should be taken to limit the transport, storage and handling of these values outside a protected environment within the peer. However, the virus protection of the peer and the security capabilities of the peer's operating system are outside the scope of this document.

The EAP-SIM server typically obtains the triplets from the Home Location Register (HLR). An attacker might try to obtain triplets by attacking against the network used between the EAP-SIM server and the HLR. Care should be taken not to expose Kc keys to attackers when they are stored or handled by the EAP-SIM server, or transmitted between the EAP server and the HLR. Steps should be taken to limit the transport, storage and handling of these values outside a protected environment. However, the protection of the communications between the EAP-SIM server and the HLR is outside the scope of this



document.

If the same SIM credentials are also used for GSM traffic, the triplets could be revealed in the GSM network; see [Section 11.8](#).

In GSM, the network is allowed to reuse the RAND challenge in consecutive authentication exchanges. This is not allowed in EAP-SIM. The EAP-SIM server is mandated to use fresh triplets (RAND challenges) in consecutive authentication exchanges, as specified in [Section 3](#). EAP-SIM does not mandate any means for the peer to check if the RANDs are fresh, so the security of the scheme leans on the secrecy of the triplets. However, the peer MAY employ implementation-specific mechanisms to remember some of the previously used RANDs, and the peer MAY check the freshness of the server's RANDs. The operation in cases when the peer detects that the RANDs are not fresh is specified in [Section 6.3.1](#).

Preventing the re-use of authentication vectors has been taken into account in the design of the UMTS Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA), which is used in EAP-AKA [[EAP-AKA](#)]. In cases when the triplet re-use properties of EAP-SIM are not considered sufficient, it is advised to use EAP-AKA.

Note that EAP-SIM mutual authentication is with the EAP server. In general, EAP methods do not authenticate the identity or services provided by the EAP authenticator (if distinct from the EAP server) unless they provide the so-called channel bindings property. The vulnerabilities related to this have been discussed in [[RFC3748](#)], [EAP Keying] , [Service Identity].

EAP-SIM does not provide the channel bindings property, so it only authenticates the EAP server. However, ongoing work such as [Service Identity] may provide such support as an extension to popular EAP methods such as EAP-TLS, EAP-SIM, or EAP-AKA.

#### **[11.4](#) Flooding the Authentication Centre**

The EAP-SIM server typically obtains authentication vectors from the Authentication Centre (AuC). EAP-SIM introduces a new usage for the AuC. The protocols between the EAP-SIM server and the AuC are out of the scope of this document. However, it should be noted that a malicious EAP-SIM peer may generate a lot of protocol requests to mount a denial of service attack. The EAP-SIM server implementation SHOULD take this into account and SHOULD take steps to limit the traffic that it generates towards the AuC, preventing the attacker from flooding the AuC and from extending the denial of service attack from EAP-SIM to other users of the AuC.





### **11.5 Key Derivation**

EAP-SIM supports key derivation. The key hierarchy is specified in [Section 6.4](#). EAP-SIM combines several GSM triplets in order to generate stronger keying material and stronger AT\_MAC values. The actual strength of the resulting keys depends, among other things, on some operator specific parameters including authentication algorithms, the strength of the Ki key, and the quality of the RAND challenges. For example, some SIM cards generate Kc keys with 10 bits set to zero. Such restrictions may prevent the concatenation technique from yielding strong session keys. Because the strength of the Ki key is 128 bits, the ultimate strength of any derived secret key material is never more than 128 bits.

It should also be noted that a security policy that allows  $n=2$  to be used may compromise the security of a future policy that requires three triplets, because adversaries may be able to exploit the messages exchanged when the weaker policy was applied.

There is no known way to obtain complete GSM triplets by mounting an attack against EAP-SIM. A passive eavesdropper can learn  $n \cdot \text{RAND}$  and AT\_MAC and may be able to link this information to the subscriber identity. An active attacker that impersonates a GSM subscriber can easily obtain  $n \cdot \text{RAND}$  and AT\_MAC values from the EAP server for any given subscriber identity. However, calculating the Kc and SRES values from AT\_MAC would require the attacker to reverse the keyed message authentication code function HMAC-SHA1-128.

As EAP-SIM does not expose any values calculated from an individual GSM Kc keys, it is not possible to mount a brute force attack on just one of the Kc keys in EAP-SIM. Therefore, when considering brute force attacks on the values exposed in EAP-SIM, the effective length of EAP-SIM session keys is not compromised by the fact that they are combined from several shorter keys, i.e the effective length of 128 bits may be achieved. For additional considerations see [Section 11.8](#).

### **11.6 Cryptographic Separation of Keys and Session Independence**

The EAP Transient Keys used to protect EAP-SIM packets ( $K_{\text{encr}}$ ,  $K_{\text{aut}}$ ), the Master Session Key, and the Extended Master Session Key are cryptographically separate in EAP-SIM. An attacker cannot derive any non-trivial information about any of these keys based on the other keys. An attacker also cannot calculate the pre-shared secret (Ki) from the GSM Kc keys, from EAP-SIM  $K_{\text{encr}}$ , from EAP-SIM  $K_{\text{aut}}$ , from the Master Session Key, or from the Extended Master Session Key.

Each EAP-SIM exchange generates fresh keying material, and the keying



material exported from the method upon separate EAP-SIM exchanges is cryptographically separate. The EAP-SIM peer contributes to the keying material with the NONCE\_MT parameter, which must be chosen freshly for each full authentication exchange. The EAP server is mandated to choose the RAND challenges freshly for each full authentication exchange. If either the server or the peer chooses its random value (NONCE\_MT or RAND challenges) freshly, even if the other entity reused its value from a previous exchange, then the EAP Transient Keys, the Master Session Key, and the Extended Master Session Key will be different and cryptographically separate from the corresponding values derived upon the previous full authentication exchange.

On fast re-authentication, freshness of the Master Session Key and the Extended Master Session Key is provided with a counter (AT\_COUNTER). The same EAP Transient Keys (K\_encr, K\_aut) as in the full authentication exchange are used to protect the EAP negotiation. However, replay and integrity protection across all the fast re-authentication exchanges that use the same EAP Transient Keys is provided with AT\_COUNTER.

[RFC3748] defines session independence as the "demonstration that passive attacks (such as capture of the EAP conversation) or active attacks (including compromise of the MSK or EMSK) do not enable compromise of subsequent or prior MSKs or EMSKs". As the MSKs and EMSKs are separate between EAP exchanges, EAP-SIM supports this security claim.

It should be noted that [Patel 2003], which predates [[RFC3748](#)], uses a slightly different meaning for session independence. The EAP-SIM protocol does not allow the peer to ensure that different Kc key values would be used in different exchanges, but only the server is able to ensure that fresh RANDs and thereby fresh Kc keys are used. Hence, the peer cannot guarantee EAP-SIM sessions to be independent with regard to the internal Kc values. However, in EAP-SIM the Kc keys are considered to be secret intermediate results, which are not exported outside the method. Please see [Section 11.3](#) for more information about RAND reuse.

### [11.7](#) Dictionary Attacks

Because EAP-SIM is not a password protocol, it is not vulnerable to dictionary attacks. (The pre-shared symmetric secret stored on the SIM card is not a passphrase, or derived from a passphrase.)

### [11.8](#) Credentials Reuse

EAP-SIM cannot prevent attacks over the GSM or GPRS radio networks.



If the same SIM credentials are also used in GSM or GPRS, it is possible to mount attacks over the cellular interface.

A passive attacker can eavesdrop GSM or GPRS traffic and obtain RAND, SRES pairs. He can then use a brute force attack or other cryptanalysis techniques to obtain the 64-bit Kc keys used to encrypt the GSM or GPRS data. This makes it possible to attack each 64-bit key separately.

An active attacker can mount a "rogue GSM/GPRS base station attack", replaying previously seen RAND challenges to obtain SRES values. He can then use a brute force attack to obtain the Kc keys. If successful, the attacker can impersonate a valid network or decrypt previously seen traffic, because EAP-SIM does not provide perfect forward secrecy (PFS).

Due to several weaknesses in the GSM encryption algorithms, the effective key strength of the Kc keys is much less than the expected 64 bits (no more than 40 bits if the A5/1 GSM encryption algorithm is used; as documented in [Barkan et al. 2003], an active attacker can force the peer to use the weaker A5/2 algorithm that can be broken in less than a second).

Because the A5 encryption algorithm is not used in EAP-SIM, and because EAP-SIM does not expose any values calculated from individual Kc keys, it should be noted that these attacks are not possible if the SIM credentials used in EAP-SIM are not shared in GSM/GPRS.

At the time of writing this document, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has started to work on fixes to these A5 vulnerabilities. One of the solution proposals discussed in 3GPP is integrity protected A5 version negotiation, which would require the base station to prove knowledge of the Kc key before the terminal sends any values calculated from the Kc to the network. Another proposal is so-called special RANDs, where some bits of the RAND challenge would be used for cryptographic separation by indicating the allowed use of the triplet, such as the allowed A5 algorithm in GSM or the fact that the triplet is intended for EAP-SIM. This is currently work in progress, and the mechanisms have not been selected yet.

### **11.9 Integrity and Replay Protection, and Confidentiality**

AT\_MAC, AT\_IV, AT\_ENCR\_DATA and AT\_COUNTER attributes are used to provide integrity, replay and confidentiality protection for EAP-SIM requests and responses. Integrity protection with AT\_MAC includes the EAP header. These attributes cannot be used during the EAP/SIM/Start roundtrip. However, the protocol values (user identity



string, NONCE\_MT and version negotiation parameters) are (implicitly) protected by later EAP-SIM messages by including them in key derivation.

Integrity protection (AT\_MAC) is based on a keyed message authentication code. Confidentiality (AT\_ENCR\_DATA and AT\_IV) is based on a block cipher.

Confidentiality protection is applied only to a part of the protocol fields. The table of attributes in [Section 9.1](#) summarizes which fields are confidentiality protected. It should be noted that the error and notification code attributes AT\_CLIENT\_ERROR\_CODE and AT\_NOTIFICATION are not confidential but they are transmitted in the clear. Identity protection is discussed in [Section 11.2](#).

On full authentication, replay protection of the EAP exchange is provided by the RAND values from the underlying GSM authentication scheme and the use of the NONCE\_MT value. Protection against replays of EAP-SIM messages is also based on the fact that messages that can include AT\_MAC can only be sent once with a certain EAP-SIM Subtype, and on the fact that a different K\_aut key will be used for calculating AT\_MAC in each full authentication exchange.

On fast re-authentication, a counter included in AT\_COUNTER and a server random nonce is used to provide replay protection. The AT\_COUNTER attribute is also included in EAP-SIM notifications, if they are used after successful authentication in order to provide replay protection between re-authentication exchanges.

Because EAP-SIM is not a tunneling method, EAP-Request/Notification, EAP-Response/Notification, EAP-Success or EAP-Failure packets are not confidential, integrity protected or replay protected in EAP-SIM. On physically insecure networks, this may enable an attacker to send false notifications to the peer and to mount denial of service attacks by spoofing these packets. As discussed in [Section 6.3](#), the peer will only accept EAP-Success after the peer successfully authenticates the server. Hence, the attacker cannot force the peer to believe successful mutual authentication has occurred before the peer successfully authenticates the server or after the peer failed to authenticate the server.

The security considerations of EAP-SIM result indications are covered in [Section 11.11](#)

An eavesdropper will see the EAP-Request/Notification, EAP-Response/Notification, EAP-Success and EAP-Failure packets sent in the clear. With EAP-SIM, confidential information MUST NOT be transmitted in EAP Notification packets.





### **11.10 Negotiation Attacks**

EAP-SIM does not protect the EAP-Response/Nak packet. Because EAP-SIM does not protect the EAP method negotiation, EAP method downgrading attacks may be possible, especially if the user uses the same identity with EAP-SIM and other EAP methods.

EAP-SIM includes a version negotiation procedure. In EAP-SIM the keying material derivation includes the version list and selected version to ensure that the protocol cannot be downgraded and that the peer and server use the same version of EAP-SIM.

EAP-SIM does not support ciphersuite negotiation.

### **11.11 Protected Result Indications**

EAP-SIM supports optional protected success indications, and acknowledged failure indications. If a failure occurs after successful authentication, then the EAP-SIM failure indication is integrity and replay protected.

Even if an EAP-Failure packet is lost when using EAP-SIM over an unreliable medium, then the EAP-SIM failure indications will help ensure that the peer and EAP server will know the other parties authentication decision. If protected success indications are used, then the loss of Success packet will also be addressed by the acknowledged, integrity and replay protected EAP-SIM success indication. If the optional success indications are not used, then the peer may end up believing the server succeeded authentication when it actually failed. Since access will not be granted in this case protected result indications are not needed unless the client is not able to realize it does not have access for an extended period of time.

### **11.12 Man-in-the-middle Attacks**

In order to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks and session hijacking, user data SHOULD be integrity protected on physically insecure networks. The EAP-SIM Master Session Key or keys derived from it MAY be used as the integrity protection keys, or, if an external security mechanism such as PEAP is used, then the link integrity protection keys MAY be derived by the external security mechanism.

There are man-in-the-middle attacks associated with the use of any EAP method within a tunneled protocol. For instance, an early version of PEAP [[PEAP-02](#)] was vulnerable to this attack. This specification does not address these attacks. If EAP-SIM is used with a tunneling protocol, there should be cryptographic binding



provided between the protocol and EAP-SIM to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks through rogue authenticators being able to setup one-way authenticated tunnels. For example, newer versions of PEAP include such cryptographic binding. The EAP-SIM Master Session Key MAY be used to provide the cryptographic binding. However the mechanism how the binding is provided depends on the tunneling protocol and is beyond the scope of this document.

### **11.13 Generating Random Numbers**

An EAP-SIM implementation SHOULD use a good source of randomness to generate the random numbers required in the protocol. Please see [[RFC1750](#)] for more information on generating random numbers for security applications.

## **12. Security Claims**

This section provides the security claims required by [[RFC3748](#)].

Auth. mechanism: EAP-SIM is based on the GSM SIM mechanism, which is a challenge/response authentication and key agreement mechanism based on a symmetric 128-bit pre-shared secret. EAP-SIM also makes use of a peer challenge to provide mutual authentication.

Ciphersuite negotiation: No

Mutual authentication: Yes ([Section 11.3](#))

Integrity protection: Yes ([Section 11.9](#))

Replay protection: Yes ([Section 11.9](#))

Confidentiality: Yes, except method specific success and failure indications ([Section 11.2](#), [Section 11.9](#))

Key derivation: Yes

Key strength: EAP-SIM supports key derivation with 128-bit effective key strength ([Section 11.5](#)). However, as discussed in [Section 11](#), if the same credentials are used in GSM/GPRS and in EAP-SIM, then the key strength may be reduced considerably, basically to the same level as in GSM, by mounting attacks over GSM/GPRS. For example an active attack using a false GSM/GPRS base station reduces the effective key strength to almost zero.

Description of key hierarchy: Please see [Section 6.4](#).

Dictionary attack protection: N/A ([Section 11.7](#))



Fast reconnect: Yes

Cryptographic binding: N/A

Session independence: Yes ([Section 11.6](#))

Fragmentation: No

Channel binding: No

Indication of vulnerabilities: Vulnerabilities are discussed in [Section 11](#).

## **[13.](#) Acknowledgements and Contributions**

### **[13.1](#) Contributors**

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Pasi Eronen and Jukka-Pekka Honkanen contributed [Appendix A](#).

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The identity privacy support is based on the identity privacy support of [[EAP-SRP](#)]. The attribute format is based on the extension format of Mobile IPv4 [[RFC3344](#)].

This protocol has been partly developed in parallel with EAP-AKA [[EAP-AKA](#)], and hence this specification incorporates many ideas from Jari Arkko.

### **[13.2.1](#) Contributors' Addresses**

Nora Dabbous  
Gemplus  
34 rue Guynemer  
92447 Issy les Moulineaux  
France  
EMail: [nora.dabbous@gemplus.com](mailto:nora.dabbous@gemplus.com)  
Phone: +33 1 4648 2000

Jose Puthenkulam  
Intel Corporation  
2111 NE 25th Avenue, JF2-58  
Hillsboro, OR 97124  
USA  
EMail: [jose.p.puthenkulam@intel.com](mailto:jose.p.puthenkulam@intel.com)  
Phone: +1 503 264 6121

Prasanna Satarasinghe  
Transat Technologies  
180 State Street, Suite 240  
Southlake, TX 76092  
USA  
EMail: [prasannas@transat-tech.com](mailto:prasannas@transat-tech.com)  
Phone: + 1 817 4814412





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#### Authors' Addresses

Henry Haverinen (editor)  
Nokia Enterprise Solutions  
P.O. Box 12  
FIN-40101 Jyvaskyla  
Finland

E-Mail: [henry.haverinen@nokia.com](mailto:henry.haverinen@nokia.com)

Joseph Salowey (editor)  
Cisco Systems  
2901 Third Avenue  
Seattle, WA 98121  
USA

Phone: +1 206 256 3380  
E-Mail: [jsalowey@cisco.com](mailto:jsalowey@cisco.com)

#### **[Appendix A.](#) Test Vectors**

Test vectors for the NIST FIPS 186-2 pseudo-random number generator [PRF] are available at the following URL:  
<http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/dss/Examples-1024bit.pdf>

The following examples show the contents of EAP-SIM packets on full authentication and fast re-authentication.

##### **[A.1](#) EAP-Request/Identity**

The first packet is a plain Identity Request:

01	; Code: Request
00	; Identifier: 0
00 05	; Length: 5 octets
01	; Type: Identity





## [A.2](#) EAP-Response/Identity

The client's identity is "1244070100000001@eapsim.foo", so it responds with the following packet:

```
02          ; Code: Response
00          ; Identifier: 0
00 20       ; Length: 32 octets
01          ; Type: Identity
  31 32 34 34 ; "1244070100000001@eapsim.foo"
  30 37 30 31
  30 30 30 30
  30 30 30 31
  40 65 61 70
  73 69 6d 2e
  66 6f 6f
```

## [A.3](#) EAP-Request/SIM/Start

The server's first packet looks like this:

```
01          ; Code: Request
01          ; Identifier: 1
00 10       ; Length: 16 octets
12          ; Type: EAP-SIM
  0a        ; EAP-SIM subtype: Start
  00 00     ; (reserved)
  0f        ; Attribute type: AT_VERSION_LIST
    02      ; Attribute length: 8 octets (2*4)
    00 02   ; Actual version list length: 2 octets
    00 01   ; Version: 1
    00 00   ; (attribute padding)
```

## [A.4](#) EAP-Response/SIM/Start

The client selects a nonce and responds with the following packet:



```

02          ; Code: Response
01          ; Identifier: 1
00 20      ; Length: 32 octets
12         ; Type: EAP-SIM
  0a       ; EAP-SIM subtype: Start
  00 00    ; (reserved)
  07       ; Attribute type: AT_NONCE_MT
    05     ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
    00 00  ; (reserved)
    01 23 45 67 ; NONCE_MT value
    89 ab cd ef
    fe dc ba 98
    76 54 32 10
  10       ; Attribute type: AT_SELECTED_VERSION
    01     ; Attribute length: 4 octets (1*4)
    00 01  ; Version: 1

```

#### A.5 EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge

Next, the server selects three authentication triplets

```

(RAND1,SRES1,Kc1) = (10111213 14151617 18191a1b 1c1d1e1f,
                    d1d2d3d4,
                    a0a1a2a3 a4a5a6a7)
(RAND2,SRES2,Kc2) = (20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f,
                    e1e2e3e4,
                    b0b1b2b3 b4b5b6b7)
(RAND3,SRES3,Kc3) = (30313233 34353637 38393a3b 3c3d3e3f,
                    f1f2f3f4,
                    c0c1c2c3 c4c5c6c7)

```

Next, the MK is calculated as specified in [Section 6.4](#).

MK = e576d5ca 332e9930 018bf1ba ee2763c7 95b3c712

And the other keys are derived using the PRNG:

```

K_encr = 536e5ebc 4465582a a6a8ec99 86ebb620
K_aut  = 25af1942 efcbf4bc 72b39434 21f2a974
MSK    = 39d45aea f4e30601 983e972b 6cfd46d1
        c3637733 65690d09 cd44976b 525f47d3
        a60a985e 955c53b0 90b2e4b7 3719196a
        40254296 8fd14a88 8f46b9a7 886e4488
EMSK   = 5949eab0 fff69d52 315c6c63 4fd14a7f
        0d52023d 56f79698 fa6596ab eed4f93f
        bb48eb53 4d985414 ceed0d9a 8ed33c38
        7c9dfdab 92ffbfd2 40fcec6f 5a2c93b9

```



Next, the server selects a pseudonym and a fast re-authentication identity (in this case, "w8w49PexCazWJ&xCIARmxuMKht5S1sxR DqXSEFBEG3DcZP9cIxTe5J40yIwNGVzxeJ0U1G" and "Y24fNSrz8BP274j0JaF17WfxI8Y07QX0 0pMXk9XMMV0w7broaNhTczuFq53aEp0kk3L0dm@eapsim.foo", respectively).

The following plaintext will be encrypted and stored in the AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute:

```

84          ; Attribute type: AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM
13          ; Attribute length: 76 octets (19*4)
00 46      ; Actual pseudonym length: 70 octets
77 38 77 34 39 50 65 78 43 61 7a 57 4a 26 78 43
49 41 52 6d 78 75 4d 4b 68 74 35 53 31 73 78 52
44 71 58 53 45 46 42 45 67 33 44 63 5a 50 39 63
49 78 54 65 35 4a 34 4f 79 49 77 4e 47 56 7a 78
65 4a 4f 55 31 47
00 00      ; (attribute padding)
85          ; Attribute type: AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID
16          ; Attribute length: 88 octets (22*4)
00 51      ; Actual re-auth identity length: 81 octets
59 32 34 66 4e 53 72 7a 38 42 50 32 37 34 6a 4f
4a 61 46 31 37 57 66 78 49 38 59 4f 37 51 58 30
30 70 4d 58 6b 39 58 4d 4d 56 4f 77 37 62 72 6f
61 4e 68 54 63 7a 75 46 71 35 33 61 45 70 4f 6b
6b 33 4c 30 64 6d 40 65 61 70 73 69 6d 2e 66 6f
6f
00 00 00   ; (attribute padding)
06          ; Attribute type: AT_PADDING
03          ; Attribute length: 12 octets (3*4)
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00

```

The EAP packet looks like this:

```

01          ; Code: Request
02          ; Identifier: 2
01 18      ; Length: 280 octets
12         ; Type: EAP-SIM
0b         ; EAP-SIM subtype: Challenge
00 00      ; (reserved)
01         ; Attribute type: AT RAND
0d         ; Attribute length: 52 octets (13*4)
00 00      ; (reserved)
10 11 12 13 ; first RAND
14 15 16 17
18 19 1a 1b

```



```

1c 1d 1e 1f
20 21 22 23      ; second RAND
24 25 26 27
28 29 2a 2b
2c 2d 2e 2f
30 31 32 33      ; third RAND
34 35 36 37
38 39 3a 3b
3c 3d 3e 3f
81                ; Attribute type: AT_IV
05                ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
00 00            ; (reserved)
9e 18 b0 c2      ; IV value
9a 65 22 63
c0 6e fb 54
dd 00 a8 95
82                ; Attribute type: AT_ENCR_DATA
2d                ; Attribute length: 180 octets (45*4)
00 00            ; (reserved)
55 f2 93 9b bd b1 b1 9e a1 b4 7f c0 b3 e0 be 4c
ab 2c f7 37 2d 98 e3 02 3c 6b b9 24 15 72 3d 58
ba d6 6c e0 84 e1 01 b6 0f 53 58 35 4b d4 21 82
78 ae a7 bf 2c ba ce 33 10 6a ed dc 62 5b 0c 1d
5a a6 7a 41 73 9a e5 b5 79 50 97 3f c7 ff 83 01
07 3c 6f 95 31 50 fc 30 3e a1 52 d1 e1 0a 2d 1f
4f 52 26 da a1 ee 90 05 47 22 52 bd b3 b7 1d 6f
0c 3a 34 90 31 6c 46 92 98 71 bd 45 cd fd bc a6
11 2f 07 f8 be 71 79 90 d2 5f 6d d7 f2 b7 b3 20
bf 4d 5a 99 2e 88 03 31 d7 29 94 5a ec 75 ae 5d
43 c8 ed a5 fe 62 33 fc ac 49 4e e6 7a 0d 50 4d
0b                ; Attribute type: AT_MAC
05                ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
00 00            ; (reserved)
fe f3 24 ac      ; MAC value
39 62 b5 9f
3b d7 82 53
ae 4d cb 6a

```

The MAC is calculated over the EAP packet above (with MAC value set to zero), followed by the NONCE\_MT value (a total of 296 bytes).

#### [A.6 EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge](#)

The client's response looks like this:





```
02          ; Code: Response
02          ; Identifier: 2
00 1c       ; Length: 28 octets
12          ; Type: EAP-SIM
  0b        ; EAP-SIM subtype: Challenge
  00 00      ; (reserved)
  0b        ; Attribute type: AT_MAC
    05       ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
    00 00    ; (reserved)
    f5 6d 64 33 ; MAC value
    e6 8e d2 97
    6a c1 19 37
    fc 3d 11 54
```

The MAC is calculated over the EAP packet above (with MAC value set to zero), followed by the SRES values (a total of 40 bytes).

#### [A.7](#) EAP-Success

The last packet is an EAP-Success:

```
03          ; Code: Success
02          ; Identifier: 2
00 04       ; Length: 4 octets
```

#### [A.8](#) Fast Re-authentication

When performing fast re-authentication, the EAP-Request/Identity packet is the same as usual. The EAP-Response/Identity contains the fast re-authentication identity (from AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute above):

```
02          ; Code: Response
00          ; Identifier: 0
00 56       ; Length: 86 octets
01          ; Type: Identity
  59 32 34 66 4e 53 72 7a 38 42 50 32 37 34 6a 4f
  4a 61 46 31 37 57 66 78 49 38 59 4f 37 51 58 30
  30 70 4d 58 6b 39 58 4d 4d 56 4f 77 37 62 72 6f
  61 4e 68 54 63 7a 75 46 71 35 33 61 45 70 4f 6b
  6b 33 4c 30 64 6d 40 65 61 70 73 69 6d 2e 66 6f
  6f
```

#### [A.9](#) EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication

The server recognizes the reauthentication identity, so it will respond with EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication. It retrieves the



associated counter value, generates a nonce, and picks a new reauthentication identity (in this case, "uta0M0iyIsMwWp5TTdSdn0Lvg2XDvf210Yt1vnfiMcs5dnIDH0IFVavIRzMRyzW6vFzdHW@eapsim.foo").

The following plaintext will be encrypted and stored in the AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute. Note that AT\_PADDING is not used because the length of the plaintext is a multiple of 16 bytes.

```

13          ; Attribute type: AT_COUNTER
  01          ; Attribute length: 4 octets (1*4)
  00 01       ; Counter value
15          ; Attribute type: AT_NONCE_S
  05          ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
  00 00       ; (reserved)
  01 23 45 67 ; NONCE_S value
  89 ab cd ef
  fe dc ba 98
  76 54 32 10
85          ; Attribute type: AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID
  16          ; Attribute length: 88 octets (22*4)
  00 51       ; Actual re-auth identity length: 81 octets
  75 74 61 30 4d 30 69 79 49 73 4d 77 57 70 35 54
  54 64 53 64 6e 4f 4c 76 67 32 58 44 56 66 32 31
  4f 59 74 31 76 6e 66 69 4d 63 73 35 64 6e 49 44
  48 4f 49 46 56 61 76 49 52 7a 4d 52 79 7a 57 36
  76 46 7a 64 48 57 40 65 61 70 73 69 6d 2e 66 6f
  6f
  00 00 00    ; (attribute padding)

```

The EAP packet looks like this:



```

01          ; Code: Request
01          ; Identifier: 1
00 a4       ; Length: 164 octets
12          ; Type: EAP-SIM
  0d        ; EAP-SIM subtype: Re-authentication
  00 00      ; (reserved)
  81        ; Attribute type: AT_IV
    05       ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
    00 00    ; (reserved)
    d5 85 ac 77 ; IV value
    86 b9 03 36
    65 7c 77 b4
    65 75 b9 c4
  82        ; Attribute type: AT_ENCR_DATA
    1d       ; Attribute length: 116 octets (29*4)
    00 00    ; (reserved)
    68 62 91 a9 d2 ab c5 8c aa 32 94 b6 e8 5b 44 84
    6c 44 e5 dc b2 de 8b 9e 80 d6 9d 49 85 8a 5d b8
    4c dc 1c 9b c9 5c 01 b9 6b 6e ca 31 34 74 ae a6
    d3 14 16 e1 9d aa 9d f7 0f 05 00 88 41 ca 80 14
    96 4d 3b 30 a4 9b cf 43 e4 d3 f1 8e 86 29 5a 4a
    2b 38 d9 6c 97 05 c2 bb b0 5c 4a ac e9 7d 5e af
    f5 64 04 6c 8b d3 0b c3 9b e5 e1 7a ce 2b 10 a6
  0b        ; Attribute type: AT_MAC
    05       ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
    00 00    ; (reserved)
    48 3a 17 99 ; MAC value
    b8 3d 7c d3
    d0 a1 e4 01
    d9 ee 47 70

```

The MAC is calculated over the EAP packet above (with MAC value set to zero; a total of 164 bytes).

Finally, the server derives new keys. The XKEY' is calculated as described in [Section 6.4](#):

XKEY' = 863dc120 32e08343 c1a2308d b48377f6 801f58d4

The new MSK and EMSK are derived using the PRNG (note that K\_encr and K\_aut stay the same).

```

MSK   = 6263f614 973895e1 335f7e30 cff028ee
        2176f519 002c9abe 732fe0ef 00cf167c
        756d9e4c ed6d5ed6 40eb3fe3 8565ca07
        6e7fb8a8 17cfe8d9 adbce441 d47c4f5e
EMSK  = 3d8ff786 3a630b2b 06e2cf20 9684c13f

```



```

6b82f992 f2b06f1b 54bf51ef 237f2a40
1ef5e0d7 e098a34c 533eaebf 34578854
b7721526 20a777f0 e0340884 a294fb73

```

#### [A.10](#) EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication

The client's response includes the counter as well. The following plaintext will be encrypted and stored in the AT\_ENCR\_DATA attribute:

```

13          ; Attribute type: AT_COUNTER
  01          ; Attribute length: 4 octets (1*4)
  00 01      ; Counter value
06          ; Attribute type: AT_PADDING
  03          ; Attribute length: 12 octets (3*4)
  00 00 00 00
  00 00 00 00
  00 00

```

The EAP packet looks like this:

```

02          ; Code: Response
01          ; Identifier: 1
00 44      ; Length: 68 octets
12          ; Type: EAP-SIM
  0d          ; EAP-SIM subtype: Re-authentication
  00 00      ; (reserved)
  81          ; Attribute type: AT_IV
    05          ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
    00 00      ; (reserved)
    cd f7 ff a6 ; IV value
    5d e0 4c 02
    6b 56 c8 6b
    76 b1 02 ea
  82          ; Attribute type: AT_ENCR_DATA
    05          ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
    00 00      ; (reserved)
    b6 ed d3 82
    79 e2 a1 42
    3c 1a fc 5c
    45 5c 7d 56
  0b          ; Attribute type: AT_MAC
    05          ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
    00 00      ; (reserved)
    fa f7 6b 71 ; MAC value
    fb e2 d2 55
    b9 6a 35 66
    c9 15 c6 17

```





The MAC is calculated over the EAP packet above (with MAC value set to zero), followed by the NONCE\_S value (a total of 84 bytes).

The next packet will be EAP-Success:

```
03          ; Code: Success
01          ; Identifier: 1
00 04      ; Length: 4 octets
```

## **Appendix B. Pseudo-Random Number Generator**

The "|" character denotes concatenation, and "^" denotes exponentiation.

Step 1: Choose a new, secret value for the seed-key, XKEY

Step 2: In hexadecimal notation let

t = 67452301 EFCDAB89 98BADCFE 10325476 C3D2E1F0

This is the initial value for H0|H1|H2|H3|H4  
in the FIPS SHS [[SHA-1](#)]

Step 3: For j = 0 to m - 1 do

3.1 XSEED\_j = 0 /\* no optional user input \*/

3.2 For i = 0 to 1 do

a. XVAL = (XKEY + XSEED\_j) mod  $2^b$

b. w\_i = G(t, XVAL)

c. XKEY = (1 + XKEY + w\_i) mod  $2^b$

3.3 x\_j = w\_0|w\_1



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