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OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession (PoP) Security Architecture  
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## Abstract

The OAuth 2.0 bearer token specification, as defined in [RFC 6750](#), allows any party in possession of a bearer token (a "bearer") to get access to the associated resources (without demonstrating possession of a cryptographic key). To prevent misuse, bearer tokens must to be protected from disclosure in transit and at rest.

Some scenarios demand additional security protection whereby a client needs to demonstrate possession of cryptographic keying material when accessing a protected resource. This document motivates the development of the OAuth 2.0 proof-of-possession security mechanism.

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[1.](#) Introduction

At the time of writing the OAuth 2.0 protocol family ([[RFC6749](#)],

[[RFC6750](#)], and [[RFC6819](#)]) offer a single standardized security mechanism to access protected resources, namely the bearer token. [RFC 6750](#) [[RFC6750](#)] specifies the bearer token mechanism and defines it as follows:

"A security token with the property that any party in possession of the token (a "bearer") can use the token in any way that any other party in possession of it can. Using a bearer token does not require a bearer to prove possession of cryptographic key material."

The bearer token meets the security needs of a number of use cases the OAuth 2.0 protocol had originally been designed for. There are, however, other scenarios that require stronger security properties and ask for active participation of the OAuth client in form of cryptographic computations when presenting an access token to a resource server.

This document outlines additional use cases requiring stronger security protection in [Section 3](#), identifies threats in [Section 4](#), proposes different ways to mitigate those threats in [Section 5](#), outlines an architecture for a solution that builds on top of the existing OAuth 2.0 framework in [Section 6](#), and concludes with a requirements list in [Section 7](#).

## [2.](#) Terminology

The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this specification are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)], with the important qualification that, unless otherwise stated, these terms apply to the design of the protocol, not its implementation or application.

## [3.](#) Use Cases

The main use case that motivates better-than-bearer token security is the desire of resource servers to obtain additional assurance that the client is indeed authorized to present this access token. The expectation is that the use of additional credentials (symmetric or asymmetric keying material) will encourage developers to take

additional precautions when transferring or storing the access token in combination with these credentials.

Additional use cases listed below provide further requirements for the solution development.

### [3.1.](#) Access to an 'Unprotected' Resource

This use case is for a web client that needs to access a resource that makes data available (such as videos) without offering integrity and confidentiality protection using TLS. Still, the initial resource request using OAuth, which includes the access token, must

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be protected against various threats (e.g., token replay, token modification).

While it is possible to utilize bearer tokens in this scenario with TLS protection when the request to the protected resource is made, as described in [[RFC6750](#)], there may be the desire to avoid using TLS between the client and the resource server at all. In such a case the bearer token approach is not possible since it relies on TLS for ensuring integrity and confidentiality protection of the access token exchange since otherwise replay attacks are possible: First, an eavesdropper may steal an access token and represent it at a different resource server. Second, an eavesdropper may steal an access token and replay it against the same resource server at a later point in time. In both cases, if the attack is successful, the adversary gets access to the resource owners data or may perform an operation selected by the adversary (e.g., sending a message). Note that the adversary may obtain the access token (if the recommendations in [[RFC6749](#)] and [[RFC6750](#)] are not followed) using a number of ways, including eavesdropping the communication on the wireless link.

Consequently, the important assumption in this use case is that a resource server does not have TLS support and the security solution should work in such a scenario. Furthermore, it may not be necessary to provide authentication of the resource server towards the client.

### [3.2.](#) Offering Application Layer End-to-End Security

In Web deployments resource servers are often placed behind load

balancers, which are deployed by the same organization that operates the resource servers. These load balancers may terminate the TLS connection setup and HTTP traffic is transmitted in the clear from the load balancer to the resource server. With application layer security independent of the underlying TLS security it is possible to allow application servers to perform cryptographic verification on an end-to-end basis.

The key aspect in this use case is therefore to offer end-to-end security in the presence of load balancers via application layer security.

### [3.3.](#) Preventing Access Token Re-Use by the Resource Server

Imagine a scenario where a resource server that receives a valid access token re-uses it with other resource server. The reason for re-use may be malicious or may well be legitimate. In a legitimate use case consider chaining of computations whereby a resource server needs to consult other third party resource servers to complete the

requested operation. In both cases it may be assumed that the scope of the access token is sufficiently large that it allows such a re-use. For example, imagine a case where a company operates email services as well as picture sharing services and that company had decided to issue access tokens with a scope that allows access to both services.

With this use case the desire is to prevent such access token re-use. This also implies that the legitimate use cases require additional enhancements for request chaining.

### [3.4.](#) TLS Channel Binding Support

In this use case we consider the scenario where an OAuth 2.0 request to a protected resource is secured using TLS but the client and the resource server demand that the underlying TLS exchange is bound to additional application layer security to prevent cases where the TLS connection is terminated at a TLS intermediary, which splits the TLS connection into two separate connections.

In this use case additional information is conveyed to the resource server to ensure that no entity entity has tampered with the TLS

connection.

#### 4. Security and Privacy Threats

The following list presents several common threats against protocols utilizing some form of tokens. This list of threats is based on NIST Special Publication 800-63 [[NIST800-63](#)]. We exclude a discussion of threats related to any form of identity proofing and authentication of the resource owner to the authorization server since these procedures are not part of the OAuth 2.0 protocol specification itself.

Token manufacture/modification:

An attacker may generate a bogus tokens or modify the token content (such as authentication or attribute statements) of an existing token, causing resource server to grant inappropriate access to the client. For example, an attacker may modify the token to extend the validity period. A client may modify the token to have access to information that they should not be able to view.

Token disclosure: Tokens may contain personal data, such as real name, age or birthday, payment information, etc.

Token redirect:

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An attacker uses the token generated for consumption by the resource server to obtain access to another resource server.

Token reuse:

An attacker attempts to use a token that has already been used once with a resource server. The attacker may be an eavesdropper who observes the communication exchange or, worse, one of the communication end points. A client may, for example, leak access tokens because it cannot keep secrets confidential. A client may also re-use access tokens for some other resource servers. Finally, a resource server may use a token it had obtained from a client and use it with another resource server that the client interacts with. A resource server, offering relatively unimportant application services, may attempt to use an access

token obtained from a client to access a high-value service, such as a payment service, on behalf of the client using the same access token.

We excluded one threat from the list, namely 'token repudiation'. Token repudiation refers to a property whereby a resource server is given an assurance that the authorization server cannot deny to have created a token for the Client. We believe that such a property is interesting but most deployments prefer to deal with the violation of this security property through business actions rather than by using cryptography.

## [5.](#) Threat Mitigation

A large range of threats can be mitigated by protecting the content of the token, for example using a digital signature or a keyed message digest. Alternatively, the content of the token could be passed by reference rather than by value (requiring a separate message exchange to resolve the reference to the token content). To simplify the subsequent description we assume that the token itself is digitally signed by the authorization server and therefore cannot be modified.

To deal with token redirect it is important for the authorization server to include the identifier of the intended recipient - the resource server. A resource server must not be allowed to accept access tokens that are not meant for its consumption.

To provide protection against token disclosure two approaches are possible, namely (a) not to include sensitive information inside the token or (b) to ensure confidentiality protection. The latter approach requires at least the communication interaction between the client and the authorization server as well as the interaction

between the client and the resource server to experience confidentiality protection. As an example, TLS with a ciphersuite that offers confidentiality protection has to be applied (which is currently true for all ciphersuites, except for one). Encrypting the token content itself is another alternative. In our scenario the authorization server would, for example, encrypt the token content with a symmetric key shared with the resource server.

To deal with token reuse more choices are available.

### [5.1.](#) Confidentiality Protection

In this approach confidentiality protection of the exchange is provided on the communication interfaces between the client and the resource server, and between the client and the authorization server. No eavesdropper on the wire is able to observe the token exchange. Consequently, a replay by a third party is not possible. An authorization server wants to ensure that it only hands out tokens to clients it has authenticated first and who are authorized. For this purpose, authentication of the client to the authorization server will be a requirement to ensure adequate protection against a range of attacks. This is, however, true for the description in [Section 5.2](#) and [Section 5.3](#) as well. Furthermore, the client has to make sure it does not distribute (or leak) the access token to entities other than the intended the resource server. For that purpose the client will have to authenticate the resource server before transmitting the access token.

### [5.2.](#) Sender Constraint

Instead of providing confidentiality protection the authorization server could also put the identifier of the client into the protected token with the following semantic: 'This token is only valid when presented by a client with the following identifier.' When the access token is then presented to the resource server how does it know that it was provided by the client? It has to authenticate the client! There are many choices for authenticating the client to the resource server, for example by using client certificates in TLS [[RFC5246](#)], or pre-shared secrets within TLS [[RFC4279](#)]. The choice of the preferred authentication mechanism and credential type may depend on a number of factors, including

- o security properties
- o available infrastructure
- o library support

- o credential cost (financial)



- o performance
- o integration into the existing IT infrastructure
- o operational overhead for configuration and distribution of credentials

This long list hints to the challenge of selecting at least one mandatory-to-implement client authentication mechanism.

### [5.3.](#) Key Confirmation

A variation of the mechanism of sender authentication, described in [Section 5.2](#), is to replace authentication with the proof-of-possession of a specific (session) key, i.e., key confirmation. In this model the resource server would not authenticate the client itself but would rather verify whether the client knows the session key associated with a specific access token. Examples of this approach can be found with the OAuth 1.0 MAC token [[RFC5849](#)], and Kerberos [[RFC4120](#)] when utilizing the AP\_REQ/AP\_REP exchange (see also [[I-D.hardjono-oauth-kerberos](#)] for a comparison between Kerberos and OAuth).

To illustrate key confirmation the first examples borrow from Kerberos and use symmetric key cryptography. Assume that the authorization server shares a long-term secret with the resource server, called  $K(\text{Authorization Server-Resource Server})$ . This secret would be established between them out-of-band. When the client requests an access token the authorization server creates a fresh and unique session key  $K_s$  and places it into the token encrypted with the long term key  $K(\text{Authorization Server-Resource Server})$ . Additionally, the authorization server attaches  $K_s$  to the response message to the client (in addition to the access token itself) over a confidentiality protected channel. When the client sends a request to the resource server it has to use  $K_s$  to compute a keyed message digest for the request (in whatever form or whatever layer). The resource server, when receiving the message, retrieves the access token, verifies it and extracts  $K(\text{Authorization Server-Resource Server})$  to obtain  $K_s$ . This key  $K_s$  is then used to verify the keyed message digest of the request message.

Note that in this example one could imagine that the mechanism to protect the token itself is based on a symmetric key based mechanism to avoid any form of public key infrastructure but this aspect is not further elaborated in the scenario.

A similar mechanism can also be designed using asymmetric cryptography. When the client requests an access token the authorization server creates an ephemeral public / privacy key pair (PK/SK) and places the public key PK into the protected token. When the authorization server returns the access token to the client it also provides the PK/SK key pair over a confidentiality protected channel. When the client sends a request to the resource server it has to use the privacy key SK to sign the request. The Resource Server, when receiving the message, retrieves the access token, verifies it and extracts the public key PK. It uses this ephemeral public key to verify the attached signature.

#### [5.4.](#) Summary

As a high level message, there are various ways how the threats can be mitigated and while the details of each solution is somewhat different they all ultimately accomplish the goal.

The three approaches are:

Confidentiality Protection:

The weak point with this approach, which is briefly described in [Section 5.1](#), is that the Client has to be careful to whom it discloses the access token. What can be done with the token entirely depends on what rights the token entitles the presenter and what constraints it contains. A token could encode the identifier of the Client but there are scenarios where the Client is not authenticated to the Resource Server or where the identifier of the Client rather represents an application class rather than a single application instance. As such, it is possible that certain deployments choose a rather liberal approach to security and that everyone who is in possession of the access token is granted access to the data.

Sender Constraint:

The weak point with this approach, which is briefly described in [Section 5.2](#), is to setup the authentication infrastructure such that Clients can be authenticated towards Resource Servers. Additionally, Authorization Server must encode the identifier of the Client in the token for later verification by the Resource Server. Depending on the chosen layer for providing Client-side authentication there may be additional challenges due Web server load balancing, lack of API access to identity information, etc.

The weak point with this approach, see [Section 5.3](#), is the increased complexity: a complete key distribution protocol has to be defined.

In all cases above it has to be ensured that the Client is able to keep the credentials secret.

## [6.](#) Architecture

The proof-of-possession security concept assumes that the authorization server acts as a trusted third party that bind a keys to access tokens. These keys are then used by the client to demonstrate the possession of the secret to the resource server when accessing the resource. The resource server, when receiving an access token, needs to verify that the key used by the client matches the one included in the access token.

There are slight differences between the use of symmetric keys and asymmetric keys when they are bound to the access token and the subsequent interaction between the client and the authorization server when demonstrating possession of these keys. Figure 1 shows the symmetric key procedure and Figure 2 illustrates how asymmetric keys are used.

With the JSON Web Token (JWT) a standardized format for access tokens is available. The necessary elements to bind symmetric or asymmetric keys to the JWT is described in [\[I-D.jones-oauth-proof-of-possession\]](#).




Figure 1: Interaction between the Client and the Authorization Server (Symmetric Keys).

In order to request an access token the client interacts with the authorization server as part of the a normal grant exchange, as shown in Figure 1. However, it needs to include additional information elements for use with the PoP security mechanism, as depicted in message (I). In message (II) the authorization server then returns the requested access token. In addition to the access token itself, the symmetric key is communicated to the client. This symmetric key

is a unique and fresh session key with sufficient entropy for the given lifetime. Furthermore, information within the access token ties it to this specific symmetric key.

Note: For this security mechanism to work the client as well as the resource server need to gain possession to the session key. While the key transport mechanism from the authorization server to the client has been explained in the previous paragraph there are three ways for communicating this session key from the authorization server to the resource server, namely

Embedding the symmetric key inside the access token itself. This requires that the symmetric key is confidentiality protected.

The resource server queries the authorization server for the symmetric key. This is an approach envisioned by the token introspection endpoint [[I-D.richer-oauth-introspection](#)].

The authorization server and the resource server both have access to the same backend database. This is case in smaller, tightly coupled systems.






Figure 2: Interaction between the Client and the Authorization Server (Asymmetric Keys).

The use of asymmetric keys is slightly different since the client or the server could be involved in the generation of the ephemeral key pair. This exchange is shown in Figure 1. If the client generates the key pair it includes a fingerprint of the public key (of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure, more precisely). The authorization server would include this fingerprint in the access token and thereby bind the asymmetric key pair to the token. If the client did not provide a fingerprint in the request then the authorization server is asked to create an ephemeral asymmetric key pair, binds the fingerprint of the public key to the access token, and returns the asymmetric key pair to the client.

Once the client has obtained the necessary access token and keying material it can start to interact with the resource server. To

demonstrate possession of the key bound to the access token it creates the "Authenticator", which is a data structure that binds the request to the access token with the help of the available keying material. When the server receives the request it evaluates it and decides whether access to the protected resource can be granted. This exchange is shown in Figure 3.






Figure 3: Client demonstrates PoP.

The specification describing the Authenticator can be found in TBD.

## 7. Requirements

[RFC 4962](#) [[RFC4962](#)] gives useful guidelines for designers of authentication and key management protocols. While [RFC 4962](#) was written with the AAA framework used for network access authentication

in mind the offered suggestions are useful for the design of other key management systems as well. The following requirements list applies OAuth 2.0 terminology to the requirements outlined in [RFC 4962](#).

These requirements include

Cryptographic Algorithm Independent:

The key management protocol MUST be cryptographic algorithm independent.

## Strong, fresh session keys:

Session keys MUST be strong and fresh. Each session deserves an independent session key, i.e., one that is generated specifically for the intended use. In context of OAuth this means that keying material is created in such a way that can only be used by the combination of a Client instance, protected resource, and authorization scope.

## Limit Key Scope:

Following the principle of least privilege, parties MUST NOT have access to keying material that is not needed to perform their role. Any protocol that is used to establish session keys MUST specify the scope for session keys, clearly identifying the parties to whom the session key is available.

## Replay Detection Mechanism:

The key management protocol exchanges MUST be replay protected. Replay protection allows a protocol message recipient to discard any message that was recorded during a previous legitimate dialogue and presented as though it belonged to the current dialogue.

## Authenticate All Parties:

Each party in the key management protocol MUST be authenticated to the other parties with whom they communicate. Authentication mechanisms MUST maintain the confidentiality of any secret values used in the authentication process. Secrets MUST NOT be sent to another party without confidentiality protection.

## Authorization:

Client and Resource Server authorization MUST be performed. These entities MUST demonstrate possession of the appropriate keying material, without disclosing it. Authorization is REQUIRED whenever a Client interacts with an Authorization Server. The



authorization checking prevents an elevation of privilege attack, and it ensures that an unauthorized authorized is detected.

#### Keying Material Confidentiality and Integrity:

While preserving algorithm independence, confidentiality and integrity of all keying material MUST be maintained.

#### Confirm Cryptographic Algorithm Selection:

The selection of the "best" cryptographic algorithms SHOULD be securely confirmed. The mechanism SHOULD detect attempted roll-back attacks.

#### Uniquely Named Keys:

Key management proposals require a robust key naming scheme, particularly where key caching is supported. The key name provides a way to refer to a key in a protocol so that it is clear to all parties which key is being referenced. Objects that cannot be named cannot be managed. All keys MUST be uniquely named, and the key name MUST NOT directly or indirectly disclose the keying material.

#### Prevent the Domino Effect:

Compromise of a single Client MUST NOT compromise keying material held by any other Client within the system, including session keys and long-term keys. Likewise, compromise of a single Resource Server MUST NOT compromise keying material held by any other Resource Server within the system. In the context of a key hierarchy, this means that the compromise of one node in the key hierarchy must not disclose the information necessary to compromise other branches in the key hierarchy. Obviously, the compromise of the root of the key hierarchy will compromise all of the keys; however, a compromise in one branch MUST NOT result in the compromise of other branches. There are many implications of this requirement; however, two implications deserve highlighting. First, the scope of the keying material must be defined and understood by all parties that communicate with a party that holds that keying material. Second, a party that holds keying material in a key hierarchy must not share that keying material with parties that are associated with other branches in the key hierarchy.

### Bind Key to its Context:

Keying material **MUST** be bound to the appropriate context. The context includes the following.

- \* The manner in which the keying material is expected to be used.
- \* The other parties that are expected to have access to the keying material.
- \* The expected lifetime of the keying material. Lifetime of a child key **SHOULD NOT** be greater than the lifetime of its parent in the key hierarchy.

Any party with legitimate access to keying material can determine its context. In addition, the protocol **MUST** ensure that all parties with legitimate access to keying material have the same context for the keying material. This requires that the parties are properly identified and authenticated, so that all of the parties that have access to the keying material can be determined. The context will include the Client and the Resource Server identities in more than one form.

### Authorization Restriction:

If Client authorization is restricted, then the Client **SHOULD** be made aware of the restriction.

### Client Identity Confidentiality:

A Client has identity confidentiality when any party other than the Resource Server and the Authorization Server cannot sufficiently identify the Client within the anonymity set. In comparison to anonymity and pseudonymity, identity confidentiality is concerned with eavesdroppers and intermediaries. A key management protocol **SHOULD** provide this property.

### Resource Owner Identity Confidentiality:

Resource servers **SHOULD** be prevented from knowing the real or pseudonymous identity of the Resource Owner, since the Authorization Server is the only entity involved in verifying the Resource Owner's identity.

### Collusion:

Resource Servers that collude can be prevented from using

information related to the Resource Owner to track the individual.

That is, two different Resource Servers can be prevented from determining that the same Resource Owner has authenticated to both of them. This requires that each Authorization Server obtains different keying material as well as different access tokens with content that does not allow identification of the Resource Owner.

#### AS-to-RS Relationship Anonymity:

This MAC Token security does not provide AAS-to-RS Relationship Anonymity since the Client has to inform the resource server about the Resource Server it wants to talk to. The Authorization Server needs to know how to encrypt the session key the Client and the Resource Server will be using.

As an additional requirement a solution MUST enable support for channel bindings. The concept of channel binding, as defined in [\[RFC5056\]](#), allows applications to establish that the two end-points of a secure channel at one network layer are the same as at a higher layer by binding authentication at the higher layer to the channel at the lower layer.

There are performance concerns with the use of asymmetric cryptography. Although symmetric key cryptography offers better performance asymmetric cryptography offers additional security properties. A solution MUST therefore offer the capability to support both symmetric as well as asymmetric keys.

There are threats that relate to the experience of the software developer as well as operational practices. Verifying the servers identity in TLS is discussed at length in [\[RFC6125\]](#).

A number of the threats listed in [Section 4](#) demand protection of the access token content and a standardized solution, in form of a JSON-based format, is available with the JSON Web Token (JWT) [\[I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token\]](#). Hence, threat related to the protection of the access token itself are deferred to the [\[I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token\]](#).

## [8](#). Security Considerations

The purpose of this document is to provide use cases, requirements, and motivation for developing an OAuth security solution extending Bearer Tokens. As such, this document is only about security.

## [9.](#) IANA Considerations

This document does not require actions by IANA.

## [10.](#) Acknowledgments

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In the appendix of this document we re-use content from [[RFC4962](#)] and the authors would like thank Russ Housely and Bernard Aboba for their work on [RFC 4962](#).

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